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ABSTRACT 
  
The law governing the admission, against a criminal accused, of what is referred 
to – sometimes inaccurately - as “similar fact evidence” has been allowed to acquire a 
complexity which is not wholly justified.  This complexity has arisen as the result of 
two errors which have operated in tandem for the best part of two centuries.  The first is 
to regard all instances in which a criminal accused’s additional (usually prior) misdeeds 
are disclosed to a court as “similar fact evidence”, when in fact many such disclosures 
involve facts which are far from similar.  The second has been the attempt to rationalise 
and regulate the law on such disclosure along the lines of the purpose for which it is 
admitted, when in fact it is best approached from the standpoint of its natural relevance 
to the case as a whole. 
 
This thesis corrects the first misconception, and identifies what is herein 
described as “similar fact evidence properly so called”.  It then proceeds to a critical 
examination of the historical treatment, by common law courts around the world, of 
additional misdeeds of a criminal accused, and argues that the current state of confusion 
surrounding the subject is due primarily to the failure to acknowledge that relevance is 
the key to admissibility. 
 
This has finally been recognised in both New Zealand and Canada. The Supreme 
Court of Canada, in its ruling in Handy, also gave detailed guidance to all future trial 
judges in that jurisdiction regarding those factors which made similar fact evidence so 
“relevant” to an issue in a case that it should be admitted, once the potential “prejudicial 
effect” had been similarly identified.  Handy also finally gave due recognition to the 
“doctrine of chances” reasoning identified by the American jurist Wigmore a century 
earlier.  These outcomes in both New Zealand and Canada are finally fused into a 
proposed statutory formula for the admission of “similar fact evidence properly so 
called”. 
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Chapter 1: 
Thesis mission statement  
 
Chapter synopsis 
 Writing in 1956,1 Cowan and Carter observed that: 
 
The constant conflict between the desirability of admitting all evidence having 
probative value on the one hand, and the desirability of excluding all evidence of a 
prejudicial nature on the other runs through a large part of the law of evidence.  The 
problem of the admissibility of similar fact evidence reveals this conflict in its most 
intense form. 
 
 This statement of the law both identifies the academic and legal mindset which 
has prevented “similar fact evidence” in its purest form from being admissible on its 
own terms, and reveals the primary reason for that. 
 
 ‘Similar fact evidence properly so called’ , as I have chosen to call it,2 has 
become conflated with all forms of evidence which suggest the propensity of an 
accused person to commit the crime of which they stand accused by reference to their 
behaviour on other occasions.  There is justification for being apprehensive that a jury 
may make “too much” of the mere fact that an accused person has transgressed in some 
way in the past.  At the same time, these concerns cannot justify the exclusion of 
                                                            
 
 
1 Essays on the Law of Evidence (1956), Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 108. 
2 I have selected this phrase to describe the form of similar fact evidence which compares facts from 
other events involving an accused with those that are similar to the one(s) alleged at trial.  It is, of course, 
an adaptation of Austin’s famous phrase “Laws properly so called” (See Austin, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined (Hart ed. 1954), p. 122). 
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evidence of such transgressions when they so closely replicate what the accused is 
alleged to have done on the instant occasion that it would be “an affront to common 
sense” to ignore them. 
 
 There is thus a strong need to distinguish similar fact evidence properly so called 
from all other forms of propensity evidence, identify the conditions precedent to its 
‘safe’ admission, and establish a formula for such admission which all common law 
jurisdictions can adopt.  
 
Similar fact evidence defined 
 
 One of the best definitions of similar fact evidence is that supplied by Arenson, 3 
namely that it is: 
 
. . . . any evidence of specific conduct, usually criminal or otherwise discreditable in 
nature, that is of the same general characteristic or shares some common feature with 
the conduct which is the subject of the proceeding which is tendered as circumstantial  
evidence of one or more of the constituent elements of that conduct. [original 
emphasis] 
 
Similar fact evidence properly so called is in a class of its own 
 
                                                            
 
 
3 “Propensity evidence in Victoria: A triumph for justice or an affront to civil liberties?”, (1999) 26 
Melbourne University Law Review, 263, at 265.  See also Cowan and Carter (note 1), p. 110, who define 
it as “. . . . evidence tending to show that the accused behaved on another occasion or on other occasions 
in a way to a greater or lesser extent similar to the way in which the prosecution alleges as part of its case 
that he behaved on the instant occasion”. 
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The search for a workable formula to govern the admission of similar fact 
evidence is not assisted by the looseness of language which is often employed to 
describe all circumstances in which previous misconduct by an accused might be 
considered admissible.  The generic term for all such evidence is “propensity evidence”, 
which at its broadest was defined, in 2001, 4 as “. . . . evidence of misconduct of the 
defendant on an occasion other than that leading to the charge.” 
 
 Such a simplistic generalisation masks the reality that similar fact evidence 
properly so called belongs in a class of its own, as a subset of “propensity” evidence as 
a whole.  Unfortunately, a broader view has prevailed for many years, and evidence 
which truly reveals factual similarities between one event and another has become 
simply one manifestation of this broader concept of “propensity” evidence generally.   
 
 However, the tendency to conflate similar fact evidence properly so called with 
other forms of “propensity” evidence is still rife throughout the academic literature.  For 
example, writing as recently as 2006,5 perpetuated the confusion as follows: 
 
The expressions “propensity evidence” and “similar fact evidence” are treated as 
equivalents, and are used to refer to all evidence which shows that on some other 
occasion the accused acted in a way more or less similar to the way in which the 
prosecution alleges the accused acted on the occasion the subject of the present charge.  
The expression “similar fact evidence” is used in the older cases and texts, while 
“propensity evidence” is favoured in more recent judgments. 
                                                            
 
 
4 This is the definition supplied by the English Law Commission in Summary Paper No 273 (9 October 
2001), (Cm 5257), Para. 1.3. 
5 Waight and Williams, Evidence: Commentary and Materials, 7th ed (Law Book Company, Sydney, 
2006), at p. 371.  Compare this passage with its equivalent in the fourth edition of the same work (1995), 
in which this definition was applied, at p.387, to similar fact evidence only.  See also the 8th Australian 
edition of Cross on Evidence (2010, edited by Heydon J of the High Court), Chapter 11 of which, 
dealing with all forms of propensity evidence, is headed “Similar Fact Evidence”.  The equivalent work 
in England (Cross and Tapper, Evidence, 11th ed. 2007, OUP), at 404, fn.6, confirms that the traditional 
use of the generic term “similar fact evidence” to cover all forms of propensity evidence “. . . always was 
inappropriate, since it was used to describe the rule excluding evidence of the accused’s bad character by 
reference to the principal exception to that rule”. 
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 It is fundamentally important to distinguish similar fact evidence from other, 
broader, forms of propensity evidence, because different criteria, based on different 
lines of logic, underpin the admissibility of each such form.  It is the mission statement 
of this thesis to underline and maintain that distinction, and to formulate a statutory 
provision to govern the admission of similar fact evidence properly so called. 
 
 “Relationship” evidence, for example, is deemed admissible because of the light 
which it may be said to throw on the background to the event into which the instant 
court is enquiring.  Whether it is the relationship between two accused persons, 6 or 
between the accused and their victim, 7 such evidence is said to possess probative value 
as part of “the full story” behind the alleged offence(s) on trial.  A similar rationale 
underpins the probative value of so called “res gestae” evidence, which is either part of 
the offence itself, or is so intimately associated in some way with that offence as to be 
inseparable from it. 8  McHugh J, in Harriman v R ,9 said of such evidence that it: 
 
. . . . is so fundamental to the proceedings that its admissibility as a matter of law cannot 
depend upon a condition that its probative force transcends its prejudicial effect. 
 
                                                            
 
 
6 As, for example, in R v Ball and Ball [1911] AC 47 (the previous incestuous relationship between a 
brother and sister) and Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 (the prior relationship between two alleged 
drug dealers). 
7 The most common admission of this type of evidence is in proof of prior misconduct between an 
accused and their child sex victim, which is said to provide a “context” for the offending alleged on the 
indictment. 
8 See, for example, O’Leary v The King (1946) 73 CLR 566, where the murder of a man in a remote 
logging camp, and the drunken debauch which immediately preceded it, were described as “facts and 
matters which form constituent parts or ingredients of the transaction itself” (per Latham CJ at 575), as 
“one transaction”(per Dixon J at 577) and as “a series of connected occurrences” (per Williams J at 582).   
9 Note 6, at 633.  He was referring to the test applied to similar fact evidence following Boardman v DPP 
[1975] AC 421 and DPP v P [1991] 2 AC 447.  He was, of course, at the same time underlining the fact 
that relationship evidence and similar fact evidence properly so called are not the same thing. 
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 Similar fact evidence properly so called proceeds along a different logical track 
to admissibility.  The fact that the accused has, in the past, committed some act which is 
so closely linked factually to what they are now accused of, is admissible because of: 
 
. . . . its possessing a particularly probative value or cogency by reason that it reveals a 
pattern of activity such that, if accepted, it bears no reasonable explanation other than 
the inculpation of the accused person in the offence charged. 10 
 
 The distinction between this justification for admission, and that relating to other 
forms of propensity evidence, has been said to be: 11 
 
. . . . a distinction between the purpose for which evidence of prior criminal acts is 
being tendered, as opposed to what it discloses. 
 
 “What it discloses” is, in simple terms, something that cannot be ignored in the 
interests of justice, if one is to allow common sense and the everyday intuitions of the 
triers of fact to be brought to bear on the evidence as a whole.  In the words of the High 
Court in Hoch v The Queen :12 
 
. . . . the strength of its probative force . . . . [is] such that it raises, as a matter of 
common sense and experience, the objective improbability of some event having 
occurred other than as alleged by the prosecution. 
 
                                                            
 
 
10 Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461, per Toohey J at 506. 
11 Bagaric and Amarasekara, “The Prejudice Against Similar Fact Evidence”, (2001) 5 International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof 71, at 73. 
12 (1988) 165 CLR 292, at 294-5, per Mason CJ and Wilson and Gaudron JJ. 
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 Similar fact evidence properly so called occupies a distinctive place in the law of 
evidence.  It renders more likely the fact that the accused was the offender on the 
occasion under investigation because it identifies some behaviour by the accused on 
another occasion which tends to confirm their involvement this time because they have 
displayed the same behaviour. 
 
 This in itself does not justify its admission without further consideration of the 
commonality of the two behaviours.  The mere fact that the accused has, in the past, 
committed a crime of a broadly similar type is not, of itself, enough.  It is the 
particularity of detail which renders the past behaviour admissible, when compared 
with the behaviour alleged on the instant occasion.   
 
 This particularity of detail has been given many descriptions, most notably in R 
v Boardman.13  Lord Morris, for example, referred, in that case, 14 to “a close or striking 
similarity” and “an underlying unity”.  Lord Wilberforce, in the same case, 15 also opted 
for “striking similarity”, while for Lord Hailsham,16 the operative phrase was either 
“striking resemblances” or “unusual features”.  Lord Cross, 17 identified “very striking 
peculiarities”, leaving Lord Salmon, 18 to opt for “uniquely or strikingly similar”. 
 
                                                            
 
 
13 Note 9. 
14 Ibid, at 441. 
15 At 445.  The term “striking similarity” had already been coined, by Lord Goddard CJ in R v Sims 
[1946] KB 531, at 539. However, the House of Lords went on to warn in the later case of DPP v P (note 
9, per Lord Mackay at 460) that one should not fixate on phrases such as “striking similarity”, because 
this “ . . . is to restrict the operation of the principle in a way which gives too much effect to a particular 
manner of stating it.” N.B. however, the observation by Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ in Pfennig 
(note 10), at 484, that without such factors as “striking similarity, underlying unity and other like 
descriptions of similar facts . . . . usually the evidence will lack the requisite force”.  It is clearly the 
uniqueness of the factors for comparison which governs admissibility, not what name is applied to the 
phenomenon. 
16 At 454. 
17 At 460. 
18 At 462. 
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 What each of these phrases describes is a commonality of compared events 
which cannot be ignored if one is to avoid “an affront to common sense”. 19  This 
commonality will “. . . . point so strongly to . . . . guilt that only an ultra-cautious jury, if 
they accepted it as true, would acquit in the face of it”.20 
 
  The mere fact, for example, that an accused has raped before means nothing in 
itself.  However, if, on that former occasion, he was dressed in a Harry Potter costume 
and persisted in calling his victim “Hermione”, and his latest alleged victim reports 
exactly the same bizarre and highly individualist behaviour, the commonality between 
the two scenarios cannot be ignored. 21 
 
 In such cases, the “probative force” of the additional evidence: 
 
. . . . is derived . . . . from the circumstance that the facts testified to by the several 
witnesses bear to each other such a striking similarity that they must, when judged by 
experience and common sense, either all be true, or have arisen from a cause common 
to the witnesses or from pure coincidence. 22 
 
 Despite the need to avoid generalities in an area of law in which so much 
depends upon the facts of each case, it deserves emphasis that the logical attraction of 
                                                            
 
 
19 Per Lord Simon in Reg. v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729, at 759.  In the Scottish case of Moorov v HMA 
1930 JC 68, at 73, a similar reference by Lord Justice General Clyde was to “the connection between . . . 
. separate acts (indicated by their external relation in time, character or circumstances) . . . such as to 
exhibit them as subordinates in some particular and ascertained unity of intent, project, campaign or 
adventure, which lies beyond or behind – but is related to – the separate acts.” 
20 Per Lord Cross in Boardman, note 9, at 457.   
21 For two additional, and characteristically graphic, hypothetical illustrations of the same principle in 
action, involving a burglar leaving an esoteric symbol written in lipstick at the crime scene, and a 
sodomite wearing a ceremonial Red Indian head-dress for the occasion, see Lord Hailsham in Boardman 
(note 9), at 454. 
22 Per Lord Wilberforce in Boardman (note 9), at 444.  Once coincidence and collusion have been 
eliminated, the only possible conclusion is the guilt of the accused. 
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similar fact evidence varies according to whether or not it is already established that the 
previous behaviour was that of the accused.  If so, then the comparison is between what 
they may be proved to have done in the past, and what they are alleged to have done on 
the occasion under enquiry.  The stronger the factual symmetry between the previous 
and the instant behaviours, the more likely is the accused to have been the actor on the 
instant occasion. 23  
 
 In the example given above of the ‘Harry Potter Rapist’, the factual symmetry 
between the two events leaves little doubt (absent the existence of a “copy-cat” rapist) 
that the now accused, who can be proved to have committed the first rape in a highly 
idiosyncratic way, was the rapist on the occasion now under enquiry.  The mere fact that 
it was a rape does not distinguish the now accused from every other rapist; likewise, the 
mere fact that the previous rapist had a Harry Potter fixation means nothing unless that 
rapist may be shown to have been the accused. 
 
 When the accused does not admit their guilt of the behaviour which is being 
cited as probative of their guilt this time, or if it has only come to light for the first time 
in the context of the instant trial, then a different line of logic is employed, namely the 
elimination of coincidence.  When such evidence takes the form of several victims of 
the same type of crime giving near-identical descriptions of the same behaviour, with no 
suggestion that they have colluded, then: 
 
The probative value of the evidence lies in the improbability of witnesses giving 
accounts of happenings having the degree of similarity unless the events occurred. 24 
 
                                                            
 
 
23 As Professor Rupert Cross put it, “ . . . . there comes a time when, assuming that the evidence is true, 
the hypothesis of the accused’s innocence of the offence charged places a very great strain on the 
credulity of the tribunal of fact” ( [1973] Crim L R 400, at 401). 
24 Per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ in Pfennig (note 10) at 482. 
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 As Hoffman put it, 25 by reference to the facts of Makin,26 the significance of the 
discovery of so many dead infants in the gardens of properties formerly occupied by the 
accused was:   
 
. . . . . the statistical improbability that a number of children which the Makins have at 
various time had in their care would all have died of natural causes.  From this it 
followed that they were likely to have been murdered. 
 
Logic at the mercy of apprehended prejudice 
 
 Unfortunately, the logical appeal of similar fact evidence is obscured by what 
may well be an unjustified fear that the tribunal of fact (usually a jury) will use it for the 
wrong purpose.  This wrong purpose, it is argued, 27 is to conclude from the mere fact 
that the accused has, on another occasion, committed an offence (particularly an offence 
of a like nature to the instant one) that they are therefore more likely to have committed 
the one on the indictment.  Statistically they may be, but this does not distinguish them 
from no doubt thousands of others who have committed the same type of offence in the 
past.  Even worse is to conclude that, since they are a “criminal”, they should be 
convicted on this occasion, regardless of the strength of the direct evidence against them. 
 
 It is the ultimate submission of this thesis that if the admission of similar fact 
evidence is for the correct reason, by reference to the synchronicity of facts which has 
                                                            
 
 
25 “Similar Facts After Boardman”, (1975) 91 Law Quarterly Rev. 193, at 199. 
26 Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57.  See also Smith v The Queen (1915) 11 
Cr App R 229, in which the inherent unlikelihood of three ‘wives’ of the accused succumbing to the 
same bizarrely unlikely bath-time mishap led to the inevitable conclusion that Smith had murdered them 
all. 
27 It was labelled “forbidden reasoning” by Lord Hailsham in Boardman (note 9) at 453.  Studies have 
revealed that the temptation to fall into this error is greater if the prior behaviour is of the same generic 
type (e.g. burglary, rape or robbery) as that alleged on the indictment; see Sealy and Cornish, Wissler 
and Saks, and Lloyd-Bostock (all more fully cited in note 38). 
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already been described, then there is a reduced risk of the triers of fact using it for an 
incorrect one. 28   However, the risk of “forbidden reasoning” is more real when the 
type of propensity evidence which is being tendered takes some form other than similar 
fact evidence. 29   The long-standing failure to distinguish between the forms of 
propensity evidence identified above has led to similar fact evidence being drawn onto 
what was described, in Boardman, 30  as the “pitted battlefield” created by various 
attempts to rationalise, generalise, codify and generally make sense of the permitted 
grounds of admissibility of “propensity” evidence in all its forms. 
 
 For example, John is accused of the “stranger” rape of Janet, an adult female.  
Police search his house and discover material downloaded from the internet which 
depicts simulated acts of rape against both male and female victims, some apparently as 
young as ten.  None of these fictional scenarios even remotely resemble the actions 
alleged against John, and the gender and age of the victims differ considerably from 
Janet.  There is no logical reason for concluding from these facts that John was the one 
who raped Janet, but there is an obvious risk that if the jury is advised of the discovery 
of the internet material in John’s possession, it is more likely that he will be convicted.  
John may possess a ‘propensity’ or ‘disposition’ to be attracted to violent videos of a 
sexual nature, but the specific facts of the case do not justify the admission of that 
propensity into the evidential mix at the jury’s disposal.  
 
                                                            
 
 
28 As McHugh J expressed it in Pfennig (note 10), at 530, “In similar fact cases . . . . evidence is often 
admitted for the reason that the association of the accused with so many similar deaths, injuries or losses 
. . . makes it highly improbable that there is any innocent explanation for the accused’s involvement in 
the matter. . . . In these cases . . . [t]he risk of prejudice is much less . . . . ”.     
29 The greatest risk of this arises when it is what Cowan and Carter (note 1, at p.110) describe as 
“evidence relevant via disposition”.   By contrast, similar fact evidence discloses far more than mere 
disposition.  Many people may have a disposition to be dishonest; what will distinguish one from another 
is the nature of their dishonesty (e.g. a fraudster will not normally commit armed robbery). 
30 Note 9, per Lord Hailsham, at 445. 
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 The dilemma faced by courts when considering ‘evidence’ such as this was 
perhaps most succinctly described, by Stow, 31 in the following terms: 
 
One of the distinctive features of the English law of evidence is the jealousy with which 
it protects an accused person from being harassed and prejudiced by questions 
regarding other offences committed by him 32. . . . . The common law rejects such 
evidence not because it is irrelevant (for logically it is relevant), but because an undue 
weight is allowed to it and it is misleading.  Give a dog a bad name and hang him. . . . 
In some cases, however, to confine the evidence to the act charged would be to present 
a false picture to the jury. 
 
 When the additional evidence which the prosecution seeks to adduce takes the 
form of similar fact evidence properly so called, and appropriate safeguards are in place 
to ensure that it is being admitted for logically compelling reasons, then there is no need 
to lead it out onto the “pitted battlefield” at all.   The fact that it has been in the past 
renders it even more imperative that similar fact evidence now be acknowledged for 
what it is – a logical adjunct to a strong prosecution case, with a reduced risk of it being 
used for inappropriate purposes, and therefore less reason for its exclusion.   
 
 Once it is acknowledged that the admissibility of similar fact evidence depends 
upon its relevance, then the test of its admissibility becomes purely and simply a test of 
its relevance, without any corresponding need to weigh it in the balance against its 
alleged prejudiciality.  If the relevance is strong enough, there is a greatly reduced 
likelihood that the jury will employ that evidence for any reason other than its relevance, 
provided that they are appropriately directed by the trial judge. 
 
                                                            
 
 
31 “Evidence of Similar Facts”, (1922) 38 Law Quarterly Rev. 63. 
32 This was described by Viscount Sankey LC in Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309, at 317, as “. . . . one of 
the most deeply rooted and jealously guarded principles of our criminal law”. 
12 
 
Fundamental assumptions regarding juries 
 
 The root cause of the complexity of the law governing the admissibility of 
propensity evidence generally is the assumption that juries are incapable of either logic 
or sophistication.   This is despite the fact that they are assumed to be capable of 
listening to and assimilating (often lengthy) conflicting testimonies from witnesses, 
absorbing directions in law from trial judges, then making decisions which will almost 
certainly affect at least one fellow citizen for the rest of their life.  The irony of this has 
not gone unnoticed,33 but nevertheless: 
 
. . . . it is widely believed among prosecution and defence counsel alike that the 
revelation of the bad record of the accused has an effect on the jury disproportionate to 
its logical cogency. 34 
 
 For this reason, evidence which is logically relevant is kept from juries out of 
fear that they will subject it to emotion and irrationality. 35  In accordance with this 
wider policy, propensity evidence generally has been required to pass through various 
sieves, the most recent, and most recondite, of which is that somehow “probity” should, 
and can, be measured against “prejudice”. 
 
                                                            
 
 
33 As Leubsdorf put it (“Presuppositions of Evidence Law” (2006), 91 Iowa L. Rev. 1209, at 1244), “ . . . 
fact finding, which the law claims should be dispassionate and objective, is assigned to jurors whom the 
same law usually sees as emotional and unreliable”.  As early as 1827, Jeremy Bentham was moved to 
enquire “Where is the consistency between this utter distrust of juries, and the implicit faith bestowed . . . 
on the decisions they are permitted to give on such evidence as they are permitted to receive?” [5, 
Rationale of Judicial Evidence, 15-16]. 
34  Colin Tapper, (1973) 36 Modern Law Rev. 56.  See also Pettys, “The Immoral Application of 
Exclusionary Rules” (2008) Wisconsin L. Rev. 463, at 492.  
35 “Trials search for truth by excluding certain truths” (Damaska, Evidence Law Adrift, (1997), p. 149. 
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 While policy makers continue to debate the fallibility of jurors, 36 generations of 
psychologists and legal commentators have set out to test the hypothesis that they are 
unduly prejudiced by learning of an accused’s criminal past, beginning with the famous 
Chicago Jury Project of 1953. 37 It is not germane to this thesis to report in detail on 
their findings, but on balance it would seem that there is good reason to believe that 
exposure to information that an accused person has discreditable items lurking in the 
closet of their life history enhances their chance of conviction by the triers of fact.38  
 
 Much of the negative response to these findings was based upon the fact that the 
“jurors” who were surveyed were inevitably mock jurors.  However, in a recent meta-
analysis of some three hundred actual trials across four large counties in the USA, legal 
scholars, statisticians and researchers, Eisenberg and Hans, 39 concluded that: 
 
Juries appear to rely on criminal records to convict when other evidence in the case 
normally would not support conviction.  Use of prior-record evidence may therefore 
lead to erroneous convictions. 
 
 It is also part of the received wisdom in this area of law that judges – themselves 
usually experienced former trial lawyers – are immune from the seductive influence of 
                                                            
 
 
36 Even the English Criminal Law Revision Committee, in its Eleventh Report, “Evidence (General)” 
(1972, Cmnd. 4991), at para.76, was obliged to report that “We differ greatly among ourselves as to the 
extent of the danger that juries may be unduly affected by knowledge of other misconduct on the part of 
the accused . . . . ”. 
37 Devine et.al, “Jury decision making: 45 years of empirical research on deliberating groups”, (2001), 
Psychology, Public Policy and Law, 7. 
38 See, for example, Sealy and Cornish, Juries and the Rules of Evidence (a report on the findings of the 
so-called “LSE Jury Project” in England), 1973 Crim L Rev 208; Doob and Kirshenbaum, “Some 
Empirical Evidence on the Effect of s.12 of the Canada Evidence Act upon an Accused”, (1972) 15 
Crim. L. Q. 88; Greene and Dodge, “The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision 
Making”, (1995) 19 Law and Hum. Behav. 67; Hans and Doob, “Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act 
and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries”, (1976) 18 Crim. L. Q. 235; Sally Lloyd-Bostock, “The 
Effects on Juries of Hearing About the Defendant’s Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study”, 
2000 Crim L R 734; Wissler and Saks, “On the Inefficiency of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use 
Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt”, (1985) 9 Law and Hum. Behav. 37. 
39 “Taking A Stand On Taking The Stand: The Effect Of A Prior Criminal Record On The Decision To 
Testify And On Trial Outcomes”, (2009) 94 Cornell L. Rev, 1353. 
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learning of an accused’s discreditable past. 40   While this has yet to be proved or 
disproved, 41  it has been the somewhat disturbing conclusion of those who have 
conducted comparable research among lay magistrates that they are no better than juries 
at putting aside any prior knowledge they may have of an accused’s past when assessing 
their guilt.   
 
For example, when Sally Lloyd-Bostock replicated part of her jury study, 42 this 
time with English lay magistrates, 43 she discovered the same tendency that she had 
noted with jurors to rate the likelihood of guilt as higher when the accused had a prior 
criminal history.  Coupled with this is the inevitability that a lay magistrate sitting 
regularly in a busy court will be very familiar with the criminal records of some of their 
‘regulars’.44   
 
There would therefore seem to be some justification for the observation by Lord 
Widgery CJ, in Wetherall v Harrison, 45 that: 
 
                                                            
 
 
40 See Leubsdorf (note 33, at 1254), who asserts that “. . . .the procedural system in which judges rule on 
what the jury will hear implies a judicial posture of superior cognitive ability and greater freedom from 
bias”. 
41 N.B. however the alarming conclusions of a study by Blanck et.al. (“The Appearance of Justice: 
Judge’s Verbal and Nonverbal Behaviour in Criminal Jury Trials”, (1994) 38 Stan. L. Rev. 89), to the 
effect that trial judges who were aware that the accused had a prior criminal history displayed 
“distinctive nonverbal behaviour” when directing the trial jury.  Wistrich et. al. also conducted research 
among judges awarding damages in civil actions to see if they could be influenced in their awards by 
knowledge of the criminal history of the plaintiff; they concluded (in “Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information?” (2005), 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, at1308), that “ . . . judges were affected by the evidence 
that they themselves had ruled inadmissible”. 
42 Note 38. 
43 “The Effects on Lay Magistrates of Hearing That the Defendant Is of “Good Character”, Being Left to 
Speculate, or Hearing That He Has a Previous Conviction”, 2006 Crim L Rev 189. 
44 See Darbyshire, “Previous Misconduct and Magistrates’ Courts – Some Tales from the Real World”, 
(1997) Crim L R 104, at 107. 
45 [1976] 1 All E.R. 241, at 244. The case actually concerned whether or not a lay magistrate who was 
also a doctor should have advised his fellow magistrates of the nature of “needle phobia” in a case 
involving a suspected drunken motorist who had refused to supply a blood sample. 
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“Laymen . . . . sitting as justices . . . . lack the ability to put out of their minds certain 
features of the case . . . . In a sense the bench of justices is like a jury . . .  
 
 This was taken as a universal truth by the Law Commission in its Discussion 
Paper on “Prior Misconduct”,46 which in its deliberations referred throughout to “juries 
and magistrates”, without distinguishing between them regarding their susceptibility to 
the influence of learning of the criminal history of an accused.  Certainly, it would seem 
that perhaps even in the case of legally trained and trial-experienced judges we should 
not: 
 
. . . . quickly assume that judges can transcend those perceived cognitive and decisional 
failings of jurors that inspired the law of evidence in the first place. 47 
 
Similar fact evidence avoids these issues 
 
 When one examines more carefully these “cognitive and decisional failings”, it 
may be seen that they can be largely discounted in respect of similar fact evidence 
admitted for the correct reason, with direction from the trial judge against using it for 
any other  reason. This is because these failings arise from the effect of being told 
simply that the accused has a criminal past, and not how similar in points of detail their 
past activities are to what is now being alleged against them. 
 
 The first cognitive error on the part of those laymen open to the seductive effect 
of being told of an accused’s discreditable past is the assumption that “leopards never 
change their spots”.  This is put in more academic terms by psychologists, who refer to 
                                                            
 
 
46 (1996), paras. 7.2 – 7.20. 
47 Schauer, “On the supposed jury-dependence of evidence law”, (2007) 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 165. 
16 
 
“trait” theory. 48   This, in turn, may be described as an underlying belief in the 
consistency and stability of a person’s behaviour and personality, such that it may 
confidently be predicted that a person who has behaved in a certain way in the past may 
be expected to behave in the same way in the future.49 
 
 Over the years, this has been challenged by other psychologists who subscribe to 
the theory that criminal behaviour is “situational”, that is, dependent entirely on 
circumstances.50 As pointed out by Stanford University Law Professor Miguel Mendez, 
51: 
 
These findings threaten the common law’s basic assumptions about the probative value 
of character evidence.  If even seemingly trivial situational differences can render 
behavioural predictions totally invalid, then character evidence may possess little or no 
probative value. (original emphasis). 
 
                                                            
 
 
48 It has also been labelled “fundamental attribution error”; see Ross, “The intuitive psychologist and his 
shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process”, in Berkowitz (Ed), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol.10, New York: Academic Press)(1977), pp. 174-221. 
49  See, for example, Kassin (1995) Psychology (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company); Morris and 
Maesto, Psychology: An introduction (12th ed. 2005) (New Jersey, Pearson Prentice Hall); Myers, 
Psychology (1998, 5th ed) (New York, Worth Publishers).  For legal commentary on the same 
phenomenon, see Cowan and Carter (note 1), pp. 144-5; Imwinkelreid, “The Use Of Evidence Of An 
Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct To Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines Which Threaten To Engulf The 
Character Evidence Prohibition”, (1990) 51 Ohio State Law Journal 575, at 581-2; Palmer, “The Scope 
of the Similar Fact Rule”, (1994) 16 Adelaide Law Review 161, at 169. 
50 Exemplars of this school of psychology include Hartshorne and May, (1928), Studies in the nature of 
character: Vol.1. Studies in deceit (New York, MacMillan), who argued, at p. 243, after conducting a 
series of subject studies, that the so-called “trait” of “dishonesty” was in fact “ . . . .a group of highly 
situational habits that consisted of a series of specific responses to specific situations” (for example, that 
a person who is likely to steal is no more likely to tell a lie, and vice-versa).  See also Mischel (1968), 
Personality and assessment (New York, Wiley), at p. 146, that “ . . . highly generalized behavioural 
consistencies [have been proven to be] undemonstrated”, and at p.37, that “ . . . . behaviours which are 
often construed as stable personality indicators are actually highly specific and depend on the evoking 
situation.”  Even a leading criminal profiler has been obliged to concede that “. . . . . situational factors 
need to be considered to get a full understanding of the person . . . . behaviour must be viewed in 
context” (Turvey, Criminal profiling. An introduction to behavioural evidence analysis, (1999) 
California, Academic Press). 
51 “California’s New Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent 
Psychological Studies”, (1984) 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1003. 
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 However, jurors who have not made a detailed study of recent psychological 
literature are still likely to make too much of the mere fact that an accused person has a 
discreditable past.  This is the result of yet more “cognitive” failings or “intuitive” 
thought processes, all of which are side-stepped if similar fact evidence is admitted for 
the right reasons. 
 
 These inappropriate thought processes were summarised by McHugh J in 
Pfennig .52  Apart from the assumption of consistent behavioural traits referred to above, 
his Honour referred to the tendency to draw too strong an adverse conclusion from the 
“improbability of sequences”, 53  and the “moral prejudice”, 54  which a jury may 
experience against an accused who is shown to have engaged in the past in behaviour 
(such as child molestation) which excites strong antipathy.  To these, the psychologists 
have added what they refer to as the “reverse halo effect”,55 under which one or more 
known adverse facts about a person tempt the fact-finder to make a disproportionate 
judgment about the rest of their character, including their guilt of the crime on trial.56  
Then there is what has been termed “the regret matrix”, under which jurors have less 
reluctance to convict someone who already has a criminal history, and even less if 
another crime has been revealed for which they have not yet been punished.  
 
 All of these powerful reasons for taking exceptional care before admitting 
evidence of an accused’s criminal history, and balancing its “probative value” against 
its “prejudicial effect”, are redundant when the reason for admitting that criminal 
history is that it is probative for the correct purpose, a purpose which at the same time 
severely reduces the risk of subconscious prejudice, provided that the jurors are 
                                                            
 
 
52 Note 10, at 512-13. 
53 This is what occurred in Perry (1982) 150 CLR 594, when the mere occurrence of a series of apparent 
deaths from arsenic poisoning were assumed to be non-coincidental because the accused had provided all 
the meals in the house. 
54 His Honour did not employ this term, which has been adopted from the English Law Commission’s 
Consultation Paper of 1996 (“Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Previous Misconduct of a Defendant”; 
Consultation Paper no.141). 
55 Mendez (note 51), at 1047, called this the “devil’s horns effect”. 
56 See Hans and Doob, note 38, at 237-238. 
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carefully directed by the trial judge on the precise purpose for which the evidence is 
being admitted, and the unacceptability of using it for any other purpose. 
 
 The “correct purpose” referred to above is the factual commonality between the 
cited and alleged behaviours; in short, the relevance of the past behaviour to what is 
being newly alleged.  As Redmayne put it:57 
 
The intuition behind the similar fact rule is that the probative value of the previous 
convictions depends on their degree of similarity to the present charge. 
 
The thesis which follows 
 
 In the chapters which follow, it will be demonstrated precisely why similar fact 
evidence properly so called is in a category of its own, and why it should never have 
been conflated with other forms of propensity evidence with which it has nothing in 
common.  The subjection of similar fact evidence properly so called to the “probity 
versus prejudice” mantra has served to obscure its unique logical claim to admission.  
The baby has not so much been thrown out with the bath-water as drowned in it. 
 
 It will be argued that the lack of success of all previous attempts to either 
rationalise or codify the common law approach to propensity evidence can be ascribed 
to this failure to distinguish between one form of it and another.  To continue the 
analogy, the bathwater has become so murky that it is impossible to distinguish 
anything in it.  If similar fact evidence properly so called is to be restored to its deserved 
role in the criminal justice process, the grounds upon which it is admitted must be 
clearly identified, and insulated from the confusion which has been allowed to obscure 
                                                            
 
 
57 “The Relevance of Bad Character”, (2002) Cambridge Law Journal, 61(3), 684 at 691. 
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all other forms of the broad genus of “propensity” evidence, of which similar fact 
evidence properly so called is only one species, albeit the purest.  
  
20 
 
 
Chapter 2: 
The English years before Makin 
 
Chapter synopsis 
 By 1894, when Lord Herschell read the seminal judgment of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in Makin v Attorney-General of New South Wales,58 it 
had become so commonplace for the prosecution to be allowed to adduce evidence of 
the previous ‘bad acts’ of an accused person that, in one sense, nothing new was being 
handed down.59  The significance of Makin was that it constituted the first attempt to 
induct a general principle from what had hitherto been a collection of individual 
decisions handed down to meet specific factual situations. 
 
 As these pre-Makin cases demonstrate, the relevance of an accused person’s 
proven prior bad acts to the allegations against them on the instant occasion became 
recognised in respect of several different types of crime throughout the Nineteenth 
Century.  However, there was, as yet, little acknowledgment of the corresponding 
potential prejudice which this could have on an accused’s chances of acquittal.  Nor was 
there any suggestion that admitting such evidence might result in an “unfair” trial. 
 
                                                            
 
 
58 [1894] AC 57. 
59 There is a body of academic opinion to the effect that prior to Cole (note 118), there was in fact no 
general ban on the use of bad act evidence against a criminal accused; see, for example, Wigmore, 
Evidence in Trials at Common Law, (3d ed.1940 – hereafter ‘Wigmore 3’), § 923, at 450 (“Historically, 
the use of bad general character appears as generally allowable”); Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on 
Evidence at the Common Law (1898), at 525 (“This rule is modern.  In earlier times such evidence was 
freely used in our courts . . . ”); Julius Stone, “The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: 
England”, (1933) 46 Harv. L.Rev. 954, at 957 (“An examination of the early text-writers fails to reveal 
any recognized rule excluding evidence of similar facts”).  It was in fact Stone (at 960) who cited Cole as 
the case which first established that the demonstrated propensity of an accused, in the past, to perform 
the criminal acts of which they were freshly accused was inadmissible. 
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 Although occasionally,60 a trial judge admitting such evidence might do so with 
an expression of regret, such regret was in respect of the accused being taken by 
surprise by the need to defend against more charges than they had come to court 
prepared to defend.61  There was no suggestion, in these early cases, that “unfairness” to 
an accused, or the risk of the evidence being considered by the jury for the “wrong” 
reason, ought to be balanced against the probative strength of the bad act evidence in the 
context of the case as a whole.  It all, initially, depended upon relevance. 
 
 The development of the law along new lines during the Nineteenth Century, 
recognising the need for the Crown to justify the admission of bad act evidence, 
reflected the role played by precedent during those formative years.  The common law 
of England had grown – and continued to grow – by reference to what had gone before. 
62  Our contemporary legal environment of regular and reliable reporting was still in its 
infancy, as was the fully developed principle of stare decisis which depended upon it, 
but trial judges were already fully aware of the need to follow what had been laid down 
in previous cases.  The first generation of trial judges to be confronted by prosecution 
requests to admit bad act evidence against an accused, following the apparent change of 
a policy which had hitherto admitted it without question, sought guidance from the 
isolated previous decisions of their brethren, and granted leave only when it was 
regarded as established by precedent.   
  
By this means, “similar fact evidence”, as it became known, developed 
“inductively”. 63   For example, once it had become generally accepted that “guilty 
                                                            
 
 
60 One example was Flannagan and Higgins; see note 111. 
61 As late as 1904, in the first edition of his influential treatise cited in note 59 (hereafter ‘Wigmore 1’), § 
216, at 265, Wigmore regarded taking the accused by surprise as the “chief reason” for excluding bad act 
evidence.  
62 See, for example, Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, (Butterworths, London, 1969), 
p. 260. 
63 As Lord Asquith put it, in Chapman v Chapman [1954] AC 429 at 470; [1954] 1 All E R 798 at 819; “. 
. . . English jurisprudence starts with a clean slate, scored over, in course of time, with ad hoc decisions.  
General rules are arrived at inductively, from the collation and comparison of these decisions”.  The 
development of the law on “similar fact evidence” was no different. 
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knowledge” might be proved against a person accused of forgery and uttering by means 
of evidence of their similar actions in the past, analogy reasoning was employed in 
order to justify the admission of the same sort of evidence in trials for receiving stolen 
property. 
  
The development of the law by means of the “case method” tends to be tentative 
and piecemeal, and as the Nineteenth Century moved on, the confidence with which 
counsel on both sides argued for and against the admissibility of a particular item of 
‘other act’ evidence varied according to the clarity of the established precedents, rather 
than either the logic or the justice of admitting the evidence in the instant case.  Since 
these precedents were seen as having been established by reference to the type of case 
involved, there was no simultaneous recognition that in most cases, it was the factual 
synchronicity between the cited behaviour and that alleged in the new case which 
demanded the admission of the challenged evidence. 
  
Nevertheless, a study of these early cases reveals a subtly developing rationale 
for the admission of such evidence.  This depended, not so much on inferences from the 
established propensity of an accused to commit a particular type of crime, as upon the 
similarity of the two compared behaviours, which made the prior behaviour relevant to 
that alleged on the instant occasion.   By the date of Makin, it was simply a matter of 
‘joining up the dots’, and formulating an over-arching principle based on relevance to 
an issue before the jury.64 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
64 The modern American commentator David P Leonard (in The New Wigmore. A Treatise on Evidence: 
Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events (2011), Aspen Publishers, USA – hereafter 
‘Leonard’), at §1.1, describes the rule thereby developed as one “. . . . not restricting admissibility of the 
evidence if the evidence might be relevant based on reasoning that does not require an inference as to 
character”. 
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Factual ‘cluster groups’` 
  
The pre-occupation, pre-Makin, with the need to justify the admission of what 
may be generically described as ‘bad act’ evidence against an accused by reference to 
clear precedent resulted in the development of what might be termed ‘factual cluster 
groups’ of cases, in which the allegations against the accused were essentially the same 
as in previous cases, and might therefore be admitted without risk of error.  This process 
began with the offence of forgery, spread into other forms of dishonesty, then travelled, 
via abortion and sexual offences, to allegations of homicide.  Thus, by the date of Makin, 
a factual precedent was available, upon which the Judicial Committee would construct a 
broader principle. 
 
 Forgery and uttering 
 
 The earliest reported Nineteenth Century case on the use of bad act evidence 
against an accused,65 was in relation to an allegation of forgery and uttering. Two 
women had attempted to pass a forged banknote to a shopkeeper, and claimed at trial 
that they had done so innocently.  This defence was rebutted by evidence of prior 
occasions upon which they had been apprehended for similar attempts, and had given 
false names and addresses.  When their counsel objected to the admission of this 
evidence on the basis that it was not directly relevant to the charges on the indictment, 
Chief Justice Ellenborough referred, in his judgment,66 to a decision, a few years earlier, 
                                                            
 
 
65 The King v Sarah Whiley and Ann Haines (1804) 2 Leach 983. 
66 At 985-6.  Heath J, at 986, observed that “ . . . as [the guilty] knowledge cannot be collected from the 
circumstances of the transaction, it must necessarily be collected from other facts and circumstances”. 
Leonard (note 64), at §7.4, cites this as a ruling based on “necessity”.  Baron Thompson, ibid, was 
satisfied simply that “The case of Rex v Tattershall is exactly in point”. 
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67 by “the Twelve Judges”, and previous cases over which he had presided, as his 
authority for concluding that: 
 
. . . it is competent for the Court to receive evidence of other transactions, though they 
amount to distinct offences . . . from which it may be fairly inferred that [the accused 
were] conscious of [their]  guilt while . . . doing the act charged upon [them] in the 
indictment . . . . 
 
 “The Twelve Judges” were consulted again three years later by Heath J in R v 
Edward Ball,68 a case almost identical on its facts to Whiley and Haines.  Their response 
was that the evidence of B’s prior uttering of similar forged banknotes in the six months 
prior to the date of the offence charged on the indictment had been rightly admitted, and 
Heath J added that “. . . . there can be little doubt of the propriety of receiving it”.69  
 
 In a series of cases which followed, it was obvious that the precise logical basis 
for the admission of bad act evidence in such circumstances remained obscure.  
Compare, for example, Rex v Taverner ,70 and Rex v Thomas Smith,71 in both of which 
the emphasis was on the need for factual similarity between the similar fact evidence 
which it was sought to lead, and the new allegations against the accused, with Regina v 
Salt,72 in which the significance of the similar fact evidence was said to be its relevance 
to “an issue” in the case in hand.  
  
                                                            
 
 
67 The case was referred to as Tattershall’s Case, and it was said to have been heard in 1801.  However, 
there is no citation for the case in Whiley and Haines, and it is has been concluded by the author that 
Tattershall’s Case was never officially reported. 
68 (1807) 1 Campbell 324. 
69 At 326. 
70 (1809) Carr.Supp. 195, reported second-hand in a footnote to Smith (see note 71). 
71 (1827) 2 Car. & P. 633. 
72 (1862) 3 F. & F. 834. 
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Just over a decade before Makin, it finally emerged that what was being proved 
when the Crown was allowed to adduce evidence of prior forgeries and utterings was 
the existence of a “system” employed by the accused, which had also been employed on 
the occasion specified on the indictment.  Regina v Colclough, an Irish case,73 was 
factually complex, and essentially involved an allegation that C had forged and uttered a 
stamped court document.  His defence was that either an employee of his had 
deliberately carried out the deception, or that he (C) had committed the act innocently.   
 
 In rebuttal, the Crown had been allowed to adduce evidence of the discovery, in 
C’s office, of a “vast number” of identically forged forms.   On appeal, that decision 
was upheld, 74 on the ground that the evidence was admissible “. . . as evidence of guilty 
knowledge”.  While the term “system” was not employed anywhere in the judgment, the 
reasoning was clearly to the effect that when one considered the facts as a whole, it was 
proved that C was engaged in a continuous process of generating forged documents 
which were then uttered as genuine, and that the individual form which was the basis of 
the charge had been generated as part of that same system.  In those circumstances, C 
could hardly claim that it had happened by innocent accident, or via the hand of another 
person. 
  
 There were two ways of explaining the relevance of the evidence which had 
been admitted.  The first was that C was engaged in a systematic scheme of fraudulent 
behaviour involving documents of that kind.  The second was that his possession of 
blank forgeries was so factually relevant to his alleged uttering of the forgery on the 
indictment that the only conclusion which could be drawn from all the facts, taken 
together, was that the offence alleged on the indictment was one instance of a wider 
pattern of criminality involving the forgery and uttering of such documents. 
 
                                                            
 
 
73 (1882) 15 Cox C.C. 92.  At that date, Irish courts were still subject to English law. 
74 At 97-8, per Harrison J. 
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 The failure to make this distinction allowed the case to serve as a precedent for 
admitting such evidence for the purpose of proving “system” or “guilty knowledge”.  
While this might have been justified on the facts of that case, the general principle 
thereby established might not be valid in respect of other cases in which the factual 
synchronicity was not so compelling.  
  
As the result of the failure to make that distinction, and on the eve of Makin, the 
Chief Justice of the day was able to refer,75 in the context of yet another forging and 
uttering case, to: 
 
. . . . the rule – now well established – that acts done by a prisoner of the same 
character as the acts charged in the indictment are, within reasonable limits, admissible 
in evidence in order to prove his guilty knowledge. 
  
It appears that what had once been an exclusionary rule had now become an 
inclusionary one if “guilty knowledge” could be proved by the admission of such 
evidence. A similar new “rule” had also become established, in other factual contexts, in 
order to prove “system” on the part of an accused. 
 
 Other offences of dishonesty 
 
 Once it had become judicially accepted that it was appropriate to admit evidence 
of an accused person’s previous apparent dishonesty in relation to fresh allegations of 
forging and uttering – in rebuttal of any suggestion of innocent mistake on their part – 
legal argument turned to whether or not, by analogy, the same process might be 
                                                            
 
 
75 Coleridge CJ, in The Queen v Gibson (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 541. 
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acceptable in respect of other offences in which the bona fides of an accused might be 
an issue for consideration by a trial jury. 
 
 One of the first of these extensions to the established precedent arose in The 
King v Ellis,76 in which E, a shop assistant, was found guilty of stealing six shillings in 
marked coins from his employer’s till.  The marked coins had been planted there when 
E fell under suspicion, and E had been covertly watched by the employer’s son, who 
checked the till from time to time.  On the first occasion, two shillings was found to be 
missing, but when the son went on to testify regarding the subsequent thefts, it was over 
a defence objection that one offence had already been described, and that the witness 
ought not to be allowed to testify regarding any more.  On appeal, the resulting 
conviction was allowed to stand because: 77 
 
. . . . where several felonies are connected together, and form part of one entire 
transaction, then the one is evidence to show the character of the other. 
 
 This constituted a subtle change in the rationale for admission.  Whereas in the 
early forgery and uttering cases, admissibility had been said to be on the basis of “guilty 
knowledge” when two or more incidents were factually linked, these incidents were 
now being considered as an “entire transaction”, 78  which would soon come to be 
expressed as “a single course of criminal conduct”, or a “dishonest system”, engaged in 
by the accused.   
 
                                                            
 
 
76 (1826) 6 B. & C. 145.  
77 Per Bayley J, at 147-8. 
78 In Rex v Birdseye (1830) 4 C. & P. 386, the term “one continuing transaction” was employed by 
Littledale J, while Erle  J referred to “one entire transaction” in Regina v Bleasdale (1848) 2 Car. & P. 
765 at 766.  This was held to be the test in Rex v Davis and Another, 6 C. & P, even though the entirety 
of the goods stolen (from the same victim) were charged, item by item, on separate indictments, but the 
Crown insisted on leading the evidence of the victim, in each case, in proof of the theft of the total.   
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 This change of rationale opened the door to admissibility based on factual links 
which were broader-based than had originally been thought acceptable as evidence of 
dishonesty, and focused more on the purpose for which the evidence was admissible.  
Thus, in R v Dunn,79 it was held that on the trial of a person for receiving stolen 
property, evidence might be given of the receipt by the accused of other stolen items 
given to her by the same thief on a date or dates prior to that on the indictment.80  In R v 
Mansfield ,81 it was held that on an indictment charging the theft of a quantity of tin, a 
constable might testify that he came across the tin in the possession of the accused when 
he called at his premises to search for stolen iron.82 
 
 Dunn, Davis and Another and Mansfield were all cited by Crown Counsel in 
Reg v Oddy,83 in which O was tried on an indictment which contained three counts 
arising from a break-in at a wool warehouse on a given date.  These were (a) breaking 
and entering and stealing a quantity of cloth; (b) stealing the cloth; and (c) receiving the 
cloth knowing it to have been stolen.  There is no indication from the case report that 
these charges were in the alternative, but in respect of each of them the Crown 
succeeded in adducing evidence that on two subsequent occasions O had been found in 
possession of a total of four pieces of cloth which had been stolen three months 
previous to the date of the break-in specified in the indictment, and from another 
woollen mill entirely.   
  
                                                            
 
 
79 Moo. C.C. 146.  The case report does not reveal the precise year, but by inference it was prior to 1851. 
80 This was presumably justified as showing a “course of conduct” on the part of the accused.  In fact, it 
did not depend upon any narrow factual similarity between the misbehaviours, but merely revealed the 
accused to be of a dishonest propensity generally.  Once again, focus was on the purpose for admitting 
the evidence, and not its logical factual relevance.  Insofar as it established the accused’s alleged guilty 
association with a known thief, it was perhaps best characterised, in modern terms, as “relationship” 
evidence.  
81 Car. & M. 140.  Again, a process of elimination dates this case as being between 1840 and 1842. 
82 It is not clear whether or not any stolen iron was actually found.  Once again, a case of “Once a thief, 
always a thief”, admitted to prove dishonest character by means of questionably relevant evidence. 
83 (1851) 5 Cox C.C. 210.  
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O was acquitted of the first two charges, and his appeal against his conviction on 
the third – receiving – charge related to the admissibility of the evidence relating to his 
possession of the cloth linked to the previous break-in.    The conviction was quashed 
on appeal because:84 
 
It would be evidence to prove that the prisoner is a very bad man, and likely to commit 
such an offence; but . . . . How can the possession of other stolen goods show any 
knowledge that the particular goods mentioned in the indictment were stolen? 
  
The implication was that the similar fact evidence was insufficiently linked to the 
fresh allegation in any factual way which made it possible to conclude that both events 
were part of the same “course of conduct” or “continuing transaction”.  Baron 
Alderson,85 was even more pedantic in his observation that whereas in ‘uttering’ cases, 
the same sort of behaviour is being alleged on each occasion, in this case the previous 
action by the accused might have constituted stealing, which is not the same thing as 
receiving stolen property.   
  
This splitting of hairs completely overlooked the arguable conclusion that O had 
been engaged in an unlawful scheme involving cloth stolen from local warehouses.86  
But the “dishonest scheme” rationale was re-affirmed in Regina v Richardson,87 in 
which R was accused of embezzling his employer’s money in his capacity as a clerk by 
fraudulently misrepresenting the amount he had expended on the employer’s behalf.   
  
                                                            
 
 
84 Per Lord Campbell, at 215.  The point was clearly being reaffirmed that without some factual link 
supplying the necessary relevance, the challenged evidence simply went to show the accused as 
dishonest generally. 
85 Ibid. 
86 The same refusal to look at the broader picture was also evident in Reg v Holt (1860) 8 Cox C.C. 411. 
87 (1860) 2 F. & F. 343. 
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These ‘offences’ might have been explained away as simple arithmetical errors, 
and the Crown accordingly sought leave to admit evidence of a series of similar 
misrepresentations, both before and after the dates of those on the indictment, in 
anticipation of a defence of “accident”, over a defence objection,88 that “ . . . the 
evidence must be confined to the point in issue . . . . the only exceptions being . . . on 
indictment for conspiracy, for uttering, or for receiving stolen goods”. 
  
The trial judge, Williams J, admitted the evidence on the ground that:89  
 
. . . this evidence is admissible . . . in accordance with the principle laid down in 
numerous cases . . . to  explain motives or intention . . . . although it does not 
otherwise bear upon the issue to be tried.90 
  
Such was the confidence with which the legal world adhered to the principle 
expounded by his Lordship in this case that only a decade later it was incorporated into 
the Prevention of Crimes Act 1871, (E. & W.), s 19, 91  which provided that in 
connection with any trial for receiving or possessing stolen property, the Crown might 
lead evidence of prior occasions within the previous twelve months upon which the 
accused had been found in possession of other stolen property, in order to prove guilty 
knowledge. 
  
The validity of employing evidence of similar events in an accused’s past in 
order to prove a “course of criminal conduct”, or “system” which encompassed the 
offence on trial was re-affirmed in a seminal pre-Makin decision in relation to an 
                                                            
 
 
88 At 345.  Note the attempt to restrict admission to certain types of case in which there were clear 
precedents. 
89 At 346.  Clewes (note 96) was cited in support.  His Lordship claimed also to have acquired the 
agreement of the Chief Baron, whom he had consulted before making his ruling. 
90 This is another clear example of the swing away from the need to show factual similarity, towards the 
admission of evidence for a ‘purpose’ for which a precedent has already been established. 
91 It was subsequently repealed by the Larceny Act 1916 (E. & W.). 
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offence of dishonesty.  In Reg v Francis,92 F was charged with two counts of attempted 
false pretences in respect of his attempted pawning of a worthless ring which he had 
sought to pass off as a diamond ring.  F’s defence was essentially innocent mistake, or 
absence of guilty knowledge, in rebuttal of which the Crown had been allowed to 
adduce the evidence of three other pawnbrokers to whom F had made false 
representations regarding the value of different items he was attempting to pawn.   
  
On his appeal against conviction, F’s counsel argued,93 not only that the evidence 
had been prejudicial against F, and had been led without sufficient notice to allow F to 
fairly defend himself against it, but that “Evidence of this kind has heretofore been 
usually confined to cases of passing counterfeit coin and forged bank notes”.   
 
 The Crown appears to have been sufficiently confident of its case that it did not 
instruct counsel to appear on the appeal, and the judgment of the Court was delivered by 
Lord Coleridge, C.J,94 who ruled that: 
 
It seems clear upon principle that. . . . evidence of the class received must be admissible. 
It tends to show that [F] had been pursuing a course of similar acts, and thereby it raises  
a presumption that he was not acting under a mistake. It is not conclusive; for a man 
may be many times under a similar mistake or may be many times the dupe of another.  
But it is less likely he should be so oftener than once, 95 and every circumstance which 
shows that he was not under a mistake on any one of these occasions strengthens the 
                                                            
 
 
92 (1874) 12 Cox C.C. 612.  See also The Queen v Cooper (1875) 1 Q.B.D. 19, for a similar ruling, in 
which almost 300 letters of reply to a fraudulent newspaper advertisement inserted by C were admitted in 
evidence , in order to prove C’s ‘system’ for obtaining small sums by way of misrepresentation. 
93 At 614-5, citing Russell on Crimes (3rd ed.), at 127 for the second assertion.  It is also indicative of the 
growing generality of the practice of admitting bad act evidence against an accused that counsel was also 
able, somewhat inconsistently, to cite Reg v Gray (note 116), an arson case, and Geering (note 99), a 
murder case, in both of which such evidence had been admitted. 
94 At 615-6. 
95 This was perhaps the first faint stirrings of what later became known as “coincidence reasoning” – see 
Smith, note 26.  It is also a clear early example of repeated events being employed to eliminate 
coincidence, which is one of the justifications for the admission of ‘similar fact evidence properly so 
called’ which is advocated in this thesis. 
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presumption that he was not on the last. . . . The cases in which this had been acted on 
are most commonly cases of uttering forged documents or base coin, but they are not 
confined to those cases. 
  
Homicide 
 Previous ‘bad act’ evidence was also being tested out in homicide cases.  One of 
its earliest applications was in R v Clewes,96 when the Crown, in proof of C’s guilt of 
the murder of H, was allowed to introduce evidence of C and H’s joint complicity in the 
earlier murder of P in order to demonstrate C’s motive for wanting H dead.97 This 
evidence owed its relevancy as much to the evidence being part of the res gestae of the 
murder of H as it did to any prior indication of C’s capacity for murder. 
 
 Whatever the precise rationale for the admission of evidence of C’s prior 
involvement in a murder which was not directly related to the one on the new 
indictment, it was clearly demonstrated that courts would not shrink from admitting 
evidence which was relevant to the matter in hand even though it might cast the accused 
in an unfavourable light. 98   This adherence to relevance over prejudice was 
demonstrated once more in Geering,99 in which G was tried for the murder of her 
husband by arsenic poisoning administered in food she had cooked.  Evidence was 
admitted, by the trial judge,100 of the subsequent poisoning of two sons of the accused in 
what appeared to be identical circumstances. 
                                                            
 
 
96 (1830) 4 Car. & P. 221. 
97 H had in fact been detected as the murderer of P, and C was apprehensive that H would implicate him.  
Were this case to be replicated in a modern context, one might justify the admission of this aspect of the 
evidence on the ground that it demonstrates the “relationship” between the accused and his victim. 
98 It was this aspect of the case which led to its being cited by the Crown in Oddy (note 83) and 
Richardson (note 87), which were both cases of dishonesty, and Dossett (note 115), an arson case.  The 
underlying principle of ‘relevance’ was rapidly crossing the narrow boundaries of offence type. 
99  18 L.J. (N.S.) (M.C.) 215. At the time of writing, the author has not been able to access the original 
report, but this summary of the case has been compiled from references to it located in other, later, 
reports. 
100 Pollock, C.B., in order to rebut any suggestion of accident in the murder of the husband.  He regarded 
it as “wholly immaterial” whether the sons died before or after the husband.  Again, it has to be noted 
that the failure to cite the factual synchronicity of the incidents as the basis for their relevance served to 
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 However, in a subsequent case with comparable facts,101 the Crown’s attempt to 
employ evidence of similar prior deaths in order to eliminate both “accident” and “alibi” 
defences was rejected by the trial judge following a submission by defence counsel that: 
 
. . . whatever effect the proposed evidence  might have in a moral view,102 I submit that 
legally it is inadmissible, and if admitted must tend to prejudice and endanger the 
prisoner on this trial. 
  
Counsel reporting this case added a footnote in which he described the outcome 
as “exactly the opposite of that in Geering”.  There was clearly an urgent need for an 
authoritative ruling which would resolve the conflict between these two case authorities, 
and this was supplied, three years later, in Regina v Garner and Wife.103   
 
G and W were accused of murdering G’s mother in December 1861, by 
administering arsenic to her.  It was beyond dispute that the deceased died from arsenic 
poisoning, and that G had legitimate access to arsenic.  The essential issue at trial 
became one of whether the arsenic had been deliberately administered, or whether it had 
occurred as the result of an accident, and the Crown proposed to counter this latter 
suggestion by adducing evidence of the death of G’s former wife in March 1861, at a 
time when G’s current wife had lived with them as a servant.  The former wife’s death 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
divert the attention of later lawyers away from an important issue.  Three people had died after 
consuming G’s cooking.  She was either the victim of an inconceivably tragic series of accidents, or she 
had poisoned them.  The third alternative – that she was simply a rotten cook – went more to her mens 
rea than to the causes of the deaths, which were arguably not accidental.  
101 Reg v Thomas Winslow (1860) 8 Cox C.C. 397. 
102 It is assumed that this is a reference to the “probity” of the evidence.  Defence counsel seem by this 
point to have begun to protest against the inherently prejudicial nature of such evidence in the minds of 
the jury, in addition to the more traditional “ambush” argument. 
103 (1863) 3 F. &  F. 681 and 4 F. & F. 346.  N.B., however, that this was only at the level of the trial 
court (Lincoln Assizes).  The reason why this case was reported twice, in successive volumes of the 
report series, is given by the reporter as being “on account of its very great importance”.  The second 
report is more detailed in dealing with the facts of the case. 
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had also been occasioned by arsenic, and the clear implication was that G and W had 
been conducting a clandestine relationship, and had disposed of the former wife in order 
that they might be married.  From that, the jury might infer that they had been 
encouraged by their previous success to murder G’s mother, which was the only charge 
for which they were on trial. 
 
The two were convicted, and in a footnote to the Report the reporters cited 
Geering ,104 as being a case “of a similar nature”.  They added that: 
 
. . . . our law . . .  unlike that of France, does not allow the whole history of the prisoner 
to be gone into, by way of showing the probability of his commission of the crime in 
question; on the contrary, seeks to shut out as much as possible evidence extraneous to 
the case, by way of avoiding prejudice . . . In the case cited, 105 the great argument 
against the admissibility of the evidence was, that its necessary tendency would be to 
create a prejudice against the prisoner; but then, of course, the evidence being legally 
admissible could not per se exclude it . . . . The principle is always the same, is the 
evidence sufficiently connected with the matter in question? 
 
 The importance of relevance as the benchmark of admissibility was obviously 
generally recognised by this time, but there was also clearly a growing awareness of the 
need for that relevance to be so strong that it overrode any prejudice which its 
admission might generate. 
 
 Geering and Garner were cited by the Crown ten years later in R v Cotton,106  in 
which C was convicted of the murder of her child by arsenic poisoning, in 
                                                            
 
 
104 Note 99.  
105 The subsequent reference to “the prisoner” suggests that they were referring to the Geering case.  
106 (1873) 12 Cox C.C. 400. Cotton was in turn cited, only a year later, in Reg v Roden (1874) 12 Cox C.C. 
630,  in what must be one of the few cases on record in which ‘bad act’ evidence was admitted in a case 
which ended in a directed acquittal. 
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circumstances in which the ingestion of the arsenic in question by the deceased could 
have been accidental.  The Crown was granted leave to adduce evidence of the deaths 
by arsenic poisoning of two other children of the deceased, plus a lodger in the house to 
whom she had been engaged to be married. All three of these deaths appear to have 
occurred prior to the one on the indictment. 
 
 Cotton, Roden, Garner, and, most significantly, Geering were successfully cited 
by the Crown in Reg v Heesom,107  in which H was charged with the murder of her 
infant child (S) by arsenic, a substance to which she had access through her employment.  
There was evidence of arsenic in the corpse of the child, and further evidence that H 
stood to benefit financially, by reason of an insurance policy taken out on the child’s 
life by H.  The Crown sought leave to adduce evidence of the death of another of H’s 
children (this one, J, by her first marriage) in similar circumstances two years 
previously. H had also insured the life of that child.  Neither the trial judge nor defence 
counsel seemed to have raised any objection until the Crown also sought leave to 
adduce evidence of the similar death, exactly a month after the death of S, of H’s 
mother (L) during a visit to H’s home.108   
 
In admitting the evidence, the trial judge observed: 109  
 
I cannot help thinking it is within the principle of Reg v Gearing (sic), namely, that 
evidence of the domestic history of the family during a period of four deaths in that 
family by poison can be received to enable the jury to decide under what circumstances 
the poison had been taken.  If there had been no case on the point I would have paused 
to consider whether the evidence could be received, but after the decision quoted, and 
with which I am quite satisfied, I have no doubt that it is competent to show that the 
                                                            
 
 
107 (1878) 14 Cox C.C. 40. 
108 It appears from the case report that H had also insured L’s life. 
109 Lush J, at 44. 
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death of the child . . . .  was not due to the accidental taking of arsenic.  To prove the 
intention, you may show the motive, and this is the link in the chain of evidence.110 
 
By this point in the developing case-law, it had clearly become established that 
guilt of a murder which was simply one in a series of suspicious deaths could be proved 
by reference to the remaining deaths in the series in order to prove “system”, “motive” 
and/or “criminal intent”.  Although the term “coincidence reasoning” had not yet been 
employed, it clearly underlay the logic of the emerging principle.   
 
The application of this logic to a number of deaths in a series in order to 
demonstrate a “system” employed by the alleged perpetrator of those deaths, and at the 
same time eliminate any credible hypothesis of coincidence or lack of intent, was 
exemplified by Reg v Flannagan and Higgins,111 the closest in time of this group of 
cases to the watershed judgment in Makin. 
 
In this case, the scenario was once again an allegation of serial poisoning by 
arsenic, by two sisters, F and H.  The indictment charged them jointly with the murder 
of T, who had been H’s husband and F’s brother in law, and who had demonstrably died 
from arsenic poisoning whilst in their joint care.  The issue at trial was the usual one of 
whether this had occurred accidentally, or as the result of the deliberate actions of F and 
H, and in support of the latter theory, the Crown sought leave to adduce evidence of the 
deaths of three other persons within the previous three years, all of whom had died from 
the same cause whilst the accused had access to them. 
 
                                                            
 
 
110 Again, with respect, an important issue of logical relevance is being overlooked in the enthusiasm to 
‘pin the tail on the donkey’ by finding a purpose for which the evidence is being admitted.  The number 
of deaths, and the factual context in which they all occurred, simply defied coincidence. 
111 (1884) 15 Cox C.C. 403. 
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The trial judge admitted this evidence over the strong protests of defence counsel, 
because: 112  
.  . . . I cannot conceive that on a charge of this nature it is consistent with common 
sense to exclude such evidence.  It has been decided in some cases – in one case at least, 
on very high authority - 113 in the case of poisoning by arsenic, that evidence of the 
deaths of people other than the deceased, whose death was the subject matter of the 
particular inquiry, might be given, with a view to showing, not that the prisoner had 
feloniously poisoned the deceased, but that the deceased had, in fact, died by poison 
administered by someone. That is the extent to which that authority went, and that is the 
extent to which I have no hesitation in saying I shall admit evidence as to the other 
deaths in this case.  There is one matter against which I wish to guard myself.  I don’t 
think there is any authority, neither do I think it clear that it would be altogether 
consistent with reason and good sense, to admit such evidence as evidence of 
motives: . . . .  
 
In dismissing a submission that the evidence in question was unduly prejudicial 
to the accused, his Lordship used terms very similar to those later adopted by Lord 
Herschell in Makin, when he said that:114  
 
. . . he was of opinion that the evidence was admissible.  The question of its prejudicing 
the prisoners was not what he had to consider.  The question was, Was it material to the 
issue they were there to try? And if it was, sorry as he might be if any prejudice should 
thereby accrue to the prisoners, it was, nevertheless, his duty to admit it. And he held it 
to be material for the reasons given by the judges in Reg v Geering , with which he 
most entirely agreed, and apart from that case, he should have had no doubt whatever in 
admitting the evidence.   
 
 
                                                            
 
 
112 Butt, J, at 408. 
113 Citing Geering (note 99). 
114 At 410. N.B. that the Report reproduces the judge’s words in the third person. 
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Miscellaneous cases 
 
The same gradual appreciation of the ‘lack of coincidence’ value of several 
factually similar events in an accused’s life is also to be found in isolated pre-Makin 
cases involving other crimes.   In Regina v Rowland Dossett, 115 for example, D was 
charged with the arson of a hayrick by means of firing a gun close to it, and in order to 
rebut the suggestion that the fire was caused accidentally, evidence was admitted that on 
the previous day, the same hayrick was also found on fire, with D standing close it with 
a gun in his hand.   
 
This was for the purpose of disproving the defence of “accident”, and proving 
wilful behaviour on the part of the accused, in terms which foreshadowed those to be 
employed six decades later by Lord Herschell in Makin, namely that:116  
 
Although the evidence offered may be proof of another felony, that circumstance does 
not render it inadmissible, if the evidence be otherwise receivable. 
 
The experienced and learned reporters of this case added, as a footnote,117 that it 
was “the constant practice”, in cases of uttering forged bank notes knowing them to be 
forged, and cases of receiving stolen property knowing it to be stolen, to admit 
“evidence of other utterings and of other receivings by the prisoner, with a view of 
shewing a guilty knowledge”.   
                                                            
 
 
115 (1846) 2 Car. & K. 306.  See also Rex v Charlotte Long (1833) 6 Car. & P. 179. 
116 At 307. Despite the admission of this evidence, D maintained his accident defence, and was ultimately 
acquitted by the jury.  See also Regina v David Gray (1866) 4 F. & F. 1102, in which both Geering (note 
99) and Garner (note 103)  were cited as a justification for further extending the principle relied on in 
those cases to a case of arson. 
117  Ibid. However, the only cases cited in the footnote were Voke R & R., C.C. 531, a charge of 
“malicious shooting”, and Clewes (note 96), and the unreported case of Donnall (1817), both murder 
cases. 
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A further extension to the slowly-widening principle which had apparently 
emerged in Geering was also evident in a series of cases involving sexual offences, in 
which previously the Crown had not been allowed any latitude.118  The break-through 
case was Regina v Reardon,119 in which R was charged with the rape of the nine year 
old child of the woman in whose house he was lodging at the time.  The Crown 
proposed to lead evidence that R had committed the offence alleged on the indictment 
on a Thursday, had threatened the girl with violence if she complained to anyone, and 
by means of the same continuing threat had committed two more rapes against her, on 
the following Saturday and Monday, following which the child had complained to her 
mother, and R had been arrested.120  
 
Willes J,121 ruled that: 
 
The evidence is admissible.  Virtually it is all part of one and the same transaction.  In a 
case before me on the Western Circuit,122 a case of larceny of grain from a barn, in 
which the owner had watched and detected several stealings by the same person, I 
admitted evidence of all of them. 
 
                                                            
 
 
118 A very early case in this area had been The King v John Carey Cole (1810, Judge’s Note Books on 
Crown Cases, volume 3), which remained officially unreported for over a century until it was reproduced 
as a footnote to the judgment in Sims (note 203).  In that case, Cole had been charged on three separate 
indictments with three acts of sodomy, involving three separate “victims”, and had been convicted of two 
of them after the Crown had been allowed to adduce the evidence of the father of the third victim, who 
had confronted Cole with what he had been accused of doing with his son, and testified that Cole had 
replied to the effect that sodomy “was his natural inclination”.  The convictions had been overturned on 
appeal as the result of the admission of this evidence, because (ibid) “. . . . it would not be allowable to 
shew . . . that the prisoner has a general disposition to commit the same kind of offense as that charged 
against him”.  In the cases which followed, there were other justifications for the admission of bad act 
evidence, based on their factual relevance to the instant case. 
119 (1864) 4 F. & F. 76. 
120  Undoubtedly, in a modern context, this evidence would also be admissible as “uncharged act” 
evidence of “relationship”, in addition to arguably being admissible under the heading of “res gestae”. 
121 At 77 
122 This case was not identified. 
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Defence counsel submitted, in argument,123  that such a rule could not apply 
“where, as in this instance, there are separate felonies on different days”, but the fallacy 
in that argument was immediately exposed by his Lordship, who countered that:124  
 
It is quite a mistake to suppose that you cannot prove a matter because it would be the 
subject of a different count or indictment.  There is a decision to that effect,125 which 
lays that down, and illustrates it by reference to the case of larceny . . . to show that it 
was not a mistake, and so in the case of embezzlement, and I have acted on that 
repeatedly, even in the case of murder.126 
 
In applying the rule he had just expounded to the facts of the instant case, his 
Lordship added:127 
 
. . . . the man, by a threat of violence, deters the child from complaining, and thus 
acquires a species of influence over her by terror, which enables him to repeat the 
offence on subsequent occasions . . . .this seems to me to give a continuity to the 
transaction, which makes such evidence properly admissible. 
 
The full evidence of the victim was admitted, and R was convicted. 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
123 Ibid. 
124 At 77-80. 
125 This was believed by the Reporter to have been R v Bleasdale; see note 78. 
126 Citing his own previous ruling in Garner; see note 103.  His Lordship had, of course, admitted similar 
fact evidence in that murder trial the previous year, and in so doing appears to have relied upon the 
authority of Geering, at least according to the reporters in that case.  The same reporters also cite 
Geering in support of the ruling in the instant case; see note (c) at p.79 of the Report. 
127 At 80. 
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Summary 
 
Prior to Makin, judicial decisions on the admissibility of bad act evidence against 
a criminal accused were initially made on an ad hoc basis, and only when a decision to 
admit the evidence could be justified on the basis of factually parallel previous case 
authority. The case law thereby developed in a series of ‘cluster groups’ with specific 
offences at their nucleus. 
 
Over time, and with increasing confidence, the trial judges began to apply 
analogy reasoning from one cluster to another.  In ground-breaking cases such as 
Geering and Francis, the rationale for admission became, not the type of offence of 
which the accused stood charged, but the issue in the case to which it was seen to be 
relevant. 
 
This then set the scene for Makin, in which the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council contributed to the jurisprudence of the subject by crafting an over-arching 
principle to cover all future cases.  However, because of the continual failure of the 
earlier courts to acknowledge the factual similarity of one incident to another as one of 
several logical routes to relevance, and therefore admissibility, a new era of ‘case 
categories’ was destined to succeed the old. 
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Chapter 3:  
English law from Makin to Boardman – the era of 
categorisation 
 
Chapter synopsis 
 
 The judgment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Makin v 
Attorney-General for New South Wales was to dominate the common law world for 
some eighty years, before it was overtaken by the new admissibility formula handed 
down by the House of Lords in Boardman v DPP.  In an attempt to fuse previous 
isolated decisions into a workable formula for the future, the Committee, whose joint 
judgments were delivered by Lord Chancellor Herschell, handed down two related 
statements of law.  The first was that the mere fact that an accused had been guilty of 
bad behaviour in the past, or possessed a bad character, was not to be admissible in 
evidence in any subsequent trial involving that accused if this was all that the evidence 
disclosed.  The second was that if the discreditable antecedents of an accused went 
beyond that, and were relevant to an issue before the jury in any subsequent trial, the 
trial judge should not shrink from admitting them in evidence merely because they cast 
that accused in a bad light. 
 
 The next eighty years witnessed a confusion of case precedents regarding the 
practical application of the second of these two statements.  Put simply, when precisely 
could evidence of an accused’s additional bad behaviour be said to be admissible 
because it revealed more than the mere existence of a history of poor past behaviour?   
 
There emerged from this process a regime of ‘categorisation’ of circumstances 
in which similar fact evidence might be admitted, which did nothing to clarify the law, 
but instead obscured the true reason for the admission of such evidence.  Principled and 
rational analysis was replaced by rote categorisation. This was brought to an end by the 
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decision in Boardman, which in terms of clarifying the law had all the qualities of a 
Trojan Horse.  By this stage, however, those who had fought to rationalise what had 
been handed down in Makin were grateful for any change. 
 
 During that perplexing period, the law, and those who sought to implement it, 
drifted further away from an appreciation of the true justification for the admission of 
similar fact evidence properly so called, namely its factual relevance to a live issue in 
the case.  This is far more compelling than whether or not the evidence ‘ticks the box’ 
in respect of a predetermined ‘category’ of issue.  
  
The question raised in Makin 
 
John and Sarah Makin were convicted of the murder of an infant (Horace 
Murray), who had been handed to them by his mother for adoption, as part of what 
appears to have been a regular practice by the Makins.  They fell under suspicion of 
having done away with him, and police began to make enquiries in and around various 
Sydney properties which the Makins had occupied at various times during the material 
period.  They eventually located a total of twelve infant corpses associated with these 
properties. The evidence of these discoveries was admitted during their trial, the Makins 
were convicted, and they appealed against the admission of this evidence.    
 
The only direct evidence was the finding of the bodies other than that of Horace 
Murray; the significance of the precedent which was set in this case was the use which 
was made of this evidence, which contributed overwhelmingly towards the resulting 
convictions when it was properly analysed for what it signified, in light of how the 
Makins came to be in charge of the deceased.   
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The first appeal against conviction was to the New South Wales Supreme Court 
128, where it was argued, on the Makins’ behalf, that the finding of the other infant 
bodies could not be admitted in the absence of some direct evidence linking the accused 
to the death of Horace Murray.  Windeyer J rejected that argument, ruling,129 that the 
involvement of the Makins in the death of the child could be inferred beyond reasonable 
doubt by a combination of facts, 130 which led to only one overpowering conclusion.  
Not only had the Makins been in the business of baby farming, but that business was of 
such a nature that it could not be continued profitably unless the infants were killed 
almost immediately after their handing over. Accordingly, it was highly probable that 
the death of the particular infant was a death in the ordinary and inevitable course of 
such a business.   
 
As his Honour put it:131 
 
 A family might be unfortunate enough to take a house in the back yard of which babies 
had been buried by a former tenant; but no one could believe that it was by mere coincidence 
that a person took three houses in the back yards of which former tenants had secretly buried 
babies. 
 
This line of reasoning employed what Wigmore was,132 only a few years later, to 
identify as: 
 
                                                            
 
 
128 (1883) 14 L.R. (N.S.W.) 1, in which the case is cited as R v Makin and Wife. 
129 At 13. 
130 He identified these facts as (1) the discovery of the other infant corpses in several properties occupied 
at one time by M, (2) the number of other infants “adopted” by M, (3) the inadequacy of the money 
received by M to keep those infants for more than a short time, (4) the good health of the infants when 
handed over, and (5) the fact that none of the infants had been heard of since.   
131 At 22. 
132 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourne Rev. 1979), Vol. II, at §302.  Wigmore’s first edition in his own 
right was published in 1904, and contained this same passage. 
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. . . . the doctrine of chances – that logical process which eliminates the element of 
innocent intent by multiplying instances of the same result until it is perceived that this 
element cannot explain them all. 
  
Put another way, the possibility of coincidence has been reduced to the point at 
which it is no longer a rational option.133  By eliminating coincidence, one is obliged to 
accept the only rational alternative.   
 
 Windeyer J. also rejected, without difficulty,134 the submission that similar fact 
evidence could only be adduced in rebuttal of a specific defence (in this case, 
presumably one of “accident”, although this was never formally pleaded on the Makins’ 
behalf). His Honour clearly preferred a broad approach which appealed to the logic of 
everyday human experience, without reference to specific defences which might 
conceivably be raised by an accused.  As he put it:135  
 
 . . . . if the nexus between . . . two events is such as to irresistibly lead the mind to the 
 conclusion that the guilty agent in one case must be the guilty agent in the other, the 
 admission of such evidence as leads to this conclusion must be right, irrespective of the 
 existence of any abstract question of accident or design (emphasis added). 
 
It is the fundamental tenet of this thesis that had this remained the final 
judgment in the Makin case, a century or more of confusion, uncertainty and 
contradiction regarding the admission of similar fact evidence might have been avoided.   
 
                                                            
 
 
133 See also Julius Stone (note 59), who refers to “a point in the ascending scale of probability when it is . 
. .  near to certainty . . . . ”  Wigmore himself added, ibid, that “. . . . it is the improbability of a like result 
being repeated by mere chance that carries probative weight. . . . ” 
134 At 24. 
135 Ibid. 
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However, and, with hindsight, regrettably, the Makins were entitled to one more 
appeal.  By virtue of the jurisdictional arrangements then in place between New South 
Wales and its colonial masters in England, the matter ultimately came before the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“JCPC”) in London.136 
 
 Before the JCPC, it was argued, on the Makins’ behalf, 137 that the common law 
restricted the evidence led by the Crown “strictly to direct evidence of the commission 
of the particular act charged”, and excluded evidence of “similar acts committed, or 
supposed to have been committed, by the same prisoner on other occasions”.  It did so, 
it was submitted, because such evidence was “wholly irrelevant” and “inconvenient and 
dangerous”, and “tended both to confuse and unduly to prejudice the jury”.138  It was 
also argued that there had been no direct evidence led relating to the killing of Horace 
Murray.  In support of their submissions, defence counsel cited Reg v Oddy.139 
 
The Crown, for its part, sought to justify the admission of all the evidence on the 
ground that it was, for various reasons given during legal argument, relevant to the issue 
which the jury had to determine, which was whether or not the Makins had killed 
Horace Murray. Crown counsel cited, inter alia, R v Geering,140 for the proposition that 
“It was the general and not the exceptional rule of law to admit such evidence to rebut 
defence of accident, and to shew existence of motive and a systematic course of 
conduct”.   
 
It will be noted that the legal arguments on both sides were based upon 
established precedent, without reference to any general principle such as had been 
                                                            
 
 
136 Makin v Attorney-General for New South Wales [1894] AC 57. 
137 At 60 -61. 
138 This appears to have been the first suggestion before a court at appeal level that the rationale behind 
the exclusion of similar fact evidence might be the potential prejudice to the accused posed by the 
admission of evidence which was of insufficient direct relevance to the facts of the case. 
139 Note 83. 
140 Note 99. 
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identified in the earlier appeal.  This was to prove decisive of the judgment which 
followed. 
 
The emergence of the Rule 
 
In dismissing the appeal, Lord Chancellor Herschell, in delivering the 
unanimous opinion of the JCPC, 141 began by ruling that there was “ample” direct 
evidence of the murder, before going on to observe that the real question which their 
Lordships had to determine was the admissibility of the evidence relating to the finding 
of other bodies of children who might have been entrusted to the appellants. 
 
In dealing with the two leading cases cited in submissions by counsel, their 
Lordships experienced little difficulty in following Geering rather than Oddy.142  The 
different rationes of these two authorities were neatly combined into two contrasting 
statements of law,143 which were intended by their Lordships to indicate the appropriate 
principles to apply when considering questions of this nature. They were as follows: 144 
 
[1] It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to 
show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the 
indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person 
likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which 
he is being tried.  [2] On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends 
to shew the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant 
to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question 
whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed 
or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused. 
                                                            
 
 
141 At 64. 
142 See notes 99 and 83 respectively. 
143 At 65.  These two statements subsequently became known collectively as “The Rule in Makin”. 
144 Italicised numbers added. 
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The first of these statements firmly outlawed what would later be referred to as 
“forbidden reasoning”,145 along the lines of “Once a thief, always a thief”, which would, 
to adopt the argument of defence counsel in Makin, place prejudice above strict 
relevance.  It also asserted that general character is irrelevant, and that something more 
factually specific will be required before an accused person’s previous behaviour will 
have sufficient relevance to justify its admission.  In light of this, the second statement 
of law describes the exception rather than the rule. 
 
The uncertainties, contradictions and confusion which crept into this area of law 
in the years following Makin arose out of Lord Herschell’s second statement of law, and 
the question it left open regarding what factor(s) may make similar fact evidence so 
“relevant to an issue before the jury” as to override any objection to its admission.  As 
Lord Herschell himself conceded:146 
 
The statement of these general principles is easy, but it is obvious that it may often be very 
difficult to draw the line and to decide whether a particular piece of evidence is on the one side 
or the other. 
 
Their Lordships clearly had in mind that when such evidence is “relevant to an 
issue before the jury”, then it should not be excluded simply because it reveals past 
misdeeds by an accused. This much had been foreshadowed in landmark judgments in 
certain key cases prior to Makin such as Richardson 147, Flannagan and Higgins 148, and 
Dossett. 149  But these had all been specific decisions based on the unique facts of each 
case. What was now being attempted was the construction of a general principle which 
                                                            
 
 
145 Per Lord Hailsham in DPP v Boardman; see note 252.  
146 Ibid. 
147 Note 87. 
148 Note 111. 
149 Note 115. 
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would cover all circumstances in which such evidence might be relevant.  Certainly, 
even at this early stage, relevance was seen as the key to admissibility, but not on so 
broad a base as that proposed by Wigmore and Windeyer J.  The JCPC clearly did not 
feel any need to comment on Windeyer J’s rejection of the ‘categories of admissibility’ 
approach in favour of the broader test based on “doctrine of chances” reasoning.   
 
Even then, had subsequent courts focused more on the fact that similar fact 
evidence should be excluded when it reveals nothing of relevance to the facts of the 
instant case,150 all might have been well.  However, what followed was an eighty-year 
period during which the English courts allowed themselves to misinterpret what Lord 
Herschell had handed down.  In the process, they focused too intently on Lord 
Herschell’s second statement.  Instead of regarding the admission of similar fact 
evidence as an exception to a broad general rule banning its use unless justified by 
factual relevance, they began to amass a collection of ‘categories’ of situations in which 
it might be admissible, following the old ‘case’ methodology. 
 
His Lordship’s reference to rebutting the “accident” defence was clearly 
intended to apply the broad principle he was expounding to the specific facts of the case 
before him.151  But legal posterity was not well served by whoever drafted the Headnote 
to the Appeal Cases report of Makin, which states that the ratio emerging from the case 
was that: 152  
 
                                                            
 
 
150 This was the essence of Lord Herschell’s first statement of law.  Specifically, he had ruled that the 
mere fact that an accused has transgressed on a prior occasion is inadmissible; it was to be many years 
before the reason for this was fully appreciated, it being that the mere fact of previous offending is 
insufficiently relevant. 
151 The brevity of both case reports when dealing with the actual facts of the case is such that one cannot 
be certain that the “accident” defence was even raised by the Makins, which would make this case 
arguably the first in which similar fact evidence was used to prove the commission of the actus reus by 
the accused.  At the very least, it would serve as the authority for the admission of similar fact evidence 
to rebut “a defence open to the accused”, whether formally raised by the defence or not.  This point is 
taken up again below. 
152 At 57. 
50 
 
 Evidence tending to shew that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than 
those covered by the indictment is not admissible unless upon the issue whether the acts charged 
against the accused were designed or accidental, or unless to rebut a defence otherwise open to 
him. 
 
This is a gross under-valuation of the breadth of the second of his Lordship’s 
governing principles, and effectively shrinks the potential “issues before the jury” in 
respect of which similar fact evidence is admissible to those which may be said to 
involve some defence which the accused has either already claimed, or has available to 
them on the facts.153  It was also symptomatic of the tendency (identified in Chapter 2) 
to develop the law according to narrow precedent, rather than by reference to a broadly-
stated principle. 
 
It was also possible to take a much broader view of what had actually been 
stated by Lord Herschell, by interpreting “relevant to an issue before the jury” as 
including “anything which might be relevant to those matters which a jury has to 
decide”.  This could have been justified by reference to case authorities other than 
Geering; for example, in Francis, 154  a former Lord Chief Justice had obliquely 
identified, as a relevant issue, the elimination of coincidence as the logical basis for 
concluding that while “. . . . a man may be many times under a similar mistake . . . it is 
less likely he should be so oftener than once . . . ”. 
 
A decade or so after Makin, the approach taken by Windeyer J. in the New 
South Wales court was still being suggested as an alternative, only to be dismissed out 
of hand by a higher English court.  Thus, in Ball and Ball, 155 the trial judge, when 
considering whether or not Makin might be authority for admitting evidence of the prior 
                                                            
 
 
153 In such cases, the trial judge is therefore obliged to leave the defence to the jury, after directing them 
on it; see, for example, R v Payne [1970] Qd R 260. 
154 Note 92, at 615-6. 
155 Note 6, at 52, per Scrutton J.  See also Smith (note 26). 
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incestuous behaviour of the accused brother and sister, opined that the similar fact 
evidence against the Makins: 
 
 . . . . must have been given to enable the jury to draw the proper inference as to the sort 
of business or transaction that the prisoners were carrying on, of which the disappearance of this 
particular child was an incident.  From proving the sort of business carried on to proving the 
relation of the parties seems to me a very small step. 
  
However, on appeal, the House of Lords employed the authority of Makin for 
the narrow ruling that the evidence of the prior behaviour of the Balls was “clearly 
admissible” to prove the actus reus, thereby confirming the creation of yet another 
‘category’ of admissibility to add to the growing collection. 
 
 One of those still campaigning for a much broader rule of admissibility, three 
decades after Makin, was the revered academic Julius Stone.  In one of the most 
frequently quoted journal articles in this area of the law,156 Stone sought in vain to 
restore the pre-eminence of the ‘admissibility via factual relevance’ approach advocated 
by Wigmore, by observing of what had been laid down in Makin, that: 
 
Here is no broad rule of exclusion with exceptions, but a broad rule of admissibility 
where there is relevance, except where the only relevance is via disposition. 
The examples of relevance given . . . . are clearly no more than examples.157  Yet in the 
next three decades they were to become the starting point for further attempts to 
enumerate all the  possible exceptions to the rule of exclusion, and judges frequently 
overlooked the question of relevance and merely asked, “Does this case fall within 
either of the two classes mentioned in Makin’s case? (original emphasis). 
                                                            
 
 
156 Note 59, at 975. 
157 He was referring to those handed down by Lord Herschell in his second statement of law in Makin. 
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What Stone had observed was a continuation of the ‘case’ methodology which 
had existed prior to Makin, which soon metamorphasised into a ‘categorisation’ 
approach, by means of which:158 
 
. . . . the courts have no hesitation, if there is no ready-made exception, in creating a 
new one into which the fact may then be fitted 159. . . . Their more recent difficulties 
have arisen because judges and writers have attempted to make categories of admissible 
relevance, and have tested  evidence of similar facts by seeking to determine whether 
they fitted into some one of the categories.  
  
The legacy of Makin 
 
The post–Makin cases may be seen to have fallen into three broad chronological 
groups.  The earliest group ignored Makin altogether, and drew precedents from the 
cases which had preceded it.  The second group involved a widening search for 
defences “otherwise open to the accused”. But the most radical departures from what 
had gone before arose a few years later, when courts began to take the broader 
“relevance” principle where it had never been applied before, in the process of 
recognising new ‘categories’ of admissibility.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
158 Note 59, at 975-6. 
159  These combined processes of analogy reasoning and ‘action on the criminal case’ received the 
ultimate accolade in Harris v DPP [1952] A.C. 694 at 715, when it was declared that the categories of 
admissibility were not closed.   
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a) Pretend it never happened 
 
Some of those courts which could, in its immediate aftermath, have utilised the 
newly-stated “Rule in Makin”, seem not to have even been aware of its existence.  In 
these courts at least, it seems to have been ‘business as usual’, as if Makin had never 
happened.160  As late as twenty years after Makin, even the intermediate appeal courts in 
England were still making decisions on the extent to which similar fact evidence could 
be employed by the Crown in a criminal case without reference to Makin.  For example, 
in Reginald Mason, 161  the Court of Criminal Appeal reverted yet again to the old 
“action on the case” process as if neither the JCPC, nor the House of Lords, 162 had ever 
considered the broader application of the recently emerged principle. 
 
b)  Treat it as another narrow precedent based on its own facts 
 
Those who actually read, and sought to apply, Makin, had a choice between two 
rationes which they might take from it. The first was the broader of the two, explained 
in the actual words of Lord Herschell, to the effect that similar fact evidence was 
admissible whenever it was “relevant to an issue before the jury”.  The second was the 
narrower ratio to be found in the Headnote to the case report, which appeared to limit 
the admissibility of similar fact evidence to the rebuttal of “a defence otherwise open” 
to the accused. 
 
                                                            
 
 
160 In what appears to have been the first post-Makin case to come before the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved, The Queen v Rhodes [1899]1 QB 77; 12 Cox C.C. 612,  Makin was not even cited.  Makin was 
similarly snubbed in The King v Fisher [1910] 1 KB 149. 
161 (1914) 10 Cr. App. R. 169.  See also Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746, in which the Court of Criminal Appeal 
unanimously applied the spirit of Makin without once referring to it.  Instead, it preferred to rely directly 
on the factual analogy with Fisher.  See also Baird [1915] AC 186, in which the rationes of both Fisher 
and Ellis were followed without reference to Makin. 
162 The House had handed down its ground-breaking decision in Ball and Ball three years previously.  
However, because of other implications arising from this judgment, it is best considered below, at note 
173. 
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The second group of post – Makin cases followed the narrower of these two 
routes.  The need to find an arguable “defence otherwise open to” an accused, in order 
to justify the admission of evidence of previous similar misdeeds by them, seems in fact 
to have dominated the minds of Crown counsel in many of the leading English cases 
between Makin and Boardman.163 This sustained, but narrow, approach obscured the 
potential breadth of the second rule which Lord Herschell had propounded, and further 
obscured the central significance of the first rule.   
  
 Typical of what was going on during this period was the decision reached by the 
majority Court for Crown Cases Reserved in The King v John Bond, 164  which, in 
dismissing B’s appeal, employed analogy reasoning firmly rooted in the narrower ratio 
of Makin, in concluding that:165  
 
This surely was “a defence open to the accused” which the prosecution might rebut – a 
defence, at all events, clearly ejusdem generis with the particular defences mentioned 
by Lord Herschell. 166 (footnote omitted). 
 
A.T.Lawrence J at least, in this case, was prepared to concede that:167  
 
                                                            
 
 
163 Examples of this process were Thompson v The King [1918] AC 221 (alibi), Smith v The King (1915) 
11 Cr. App. R. 229 (accident) and Noor Mohamed v The King [1949] AC 182 (lack of guilty intent).  
164 [1906] 2 KB 389, an abortion trial in which the defence was “accident”.  See also R v Starkie [1922] 2 
KB 275, in which a similar judgment was handed down on the narrow authority of Bond. 
165 Per Jelf J, at 413. 
166 This still, however, appears to be a process of “analogy”, rather than “deductive”, reasoning.  Again it 
also illustrates the ongoing concentration on the “narrow” ratio of Makin, rather than its broader 
principle. 
167 At 421.  His Lordship appears to have been one of the first judges, post-Makin, to appreciate that the 
second statement of law in Lord Herschell’s judgment was merely citing examples of what was intended 
to be a general principle, of broader application, based on relevance.  He also referred, at 424, to the need 
for “ . . . . a nexus between the two sets of facts. . . . ”.   
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There is no special rule of the law of evidence applicable to accident or to system.  
These are merely convenient phrases indicative of cases in which evidence of this 
character is admissible. 
 
The outer limits of this early ‘narrow’ application of Makin were reached in The 
King v Boyle and Merchant,168  in which the unanimous Court of Criminal Appeal 
confirmed that the Crown might adduce similar fact evidence, not only in respect of 
defences actually raised by the accused, but defences which might be open to them on 
the facts of the case.  This simply invited Crown Counsel to be more inventive in 
seeking to justify the admission of similar fact evidence. 169 
 
c) Broadening the “issues” covered by Makin 
 
All these early post-Makin decisions had dealt with what were essentially 
defences which denied mens rea, once the Crown had proved the actus reus by direct 
evidence.  The next extension to the “issues” which might be proved under the Makin 
Rule involved proof of the actus reus itself.170   
 
The first of these decisions was The King v Chitson,171 in which C had been 
convicted of carnal knowledge of B, a girl under 16. Part of B’s evidence in chief at the 
trial was that the day after the offence, C had told her that he had done the same thing to 
                                                            
 
 
168 [1914] 3 KB 339.  The facts of this case were complex, and are not germane to the author’s reason for 
citing it. 
169 As one commentator (Williams, “Evidence of Other Offences”, (1923) Law Quarterly Rev. 212, at 220) 
observed when reviewing this case, “. . . .what check is to be put upon the ingenuity of the prosecution in 
tabulating possible defences which would open up the evidence of other offences?”   
170 Arguably, there was already some case precedent for such an apparently bold step forward.  As already 
indicated, it is not clear from the JCPC report of Makin whether or not the accused in that case had 
claimed that the death for which they were on trial was accidental.  If not, then the finding of the other 
infant bodies had been admitted in direct proof of the Makins’ involvement in the death cited in the 
indictment.  Similar reasoning seems to have underpinned the decision in Geering  (See note 99).   
171 [1909] 2 KB 945 
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another under-age girl, H.  The unanimous decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal,172 
dismissing C’s appeal, was delivered by A.T. Lawrence J, and it contained the 
following: 
 
We are . . . of opinion that the learned judge rightly admitted the [evidence], not in 
order to  prove a habit or system, as was the case in [Makin] and [Bond], but because 
the evidence was . . . . material to the issue as to whether the prisoner did commit the 
offence for which he was then being tried. (author’s emphasis, footnotes 
omitted). 
 
Three years later, the House of Lords handed down the first decision which it 
was called upon to make regarding the true extent of the general principle which had 
been laid down in Makin.  The same ruling also laid the foundations for the creation of 
yet another subset of similar fact evidence, this time dealing with “relationship”.  The 
case in question was The King v Ball and Ball.173 
 
In that case, a brother and sister were charged with incest.  The circumstantial 
fact that they occupied a house together in which there was only one bedroom, 
furnished with only a double bed which both of them appeared to have been occupying, 
was supplemented by evidence that they had lived together as man and wife on a 
previous occasion before incest became a statutory crime, during which time the female 
accused had given birth to a child which had been registered with the male accused as 
its father.  The admission of this prior relationship evidence was justified by the House 
of Lords on the ground that it shed light on the true nature of their relationship at the 
time covered by the charge,174 even though the previous behaviour was precisely the 
                                                            
 
 
172 Lord Alverstone C.J., Darling and A.T.Lawrence JJ, at 947-8. 
173 [1911] A.C. 47. Any lingering doubt there may have been regarding the authority of Makin was also 
dispelled in this case, when the principle it had established was endorsed by the House of Lords. 
174 Presumably it employed the circumstantial common law “presumption of continuance”; see, e.g. 
Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572. 
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same as that alleged in the instant case,175 and even though, on that prior occasion, the 
couple had been committing no crime. 
 
It was also said to justify the admission of this evidence of “prior relationship” 
that the entire nature of the relationship between the two accused at the material time 
specified in the indictment assumed a different significance when the “propensity” 
evidence was added to the new circumstantial evidence, and the facts as a whole were 
then considered.   
 
As indicated above,176 the trial judge, Scrutton J,  had given,177 as his reason for 
admitting the evidence, that it was admissible under the broader rationale of 
‘eliminating coincidence’ by means of ‘the doctrine of chances’, although he did not 
employ either term.   This appears to have been damned by silence during the ultimate 
appeal to the House of Lords, in which it was held that the evidence was plainly 
admissible to prove “the nature of the relationship between the parties”, or, as it was 
characterised in Ball and Ball, the nature of the “system” of criminal behaviour engaged 
in by the accused.   
 
However, since the relationship alleged on the indictment was being proved by 
means of evidence of the same relationship in the past, it follows that the very actus 
reus with which the accused were charged was being proved by means of propensity 
evidence.  Significantly, this was justified by the creation of the notional defence of 
“innocent association” implicit in any denial of a sexual offence.  Yet another ‘category’ 
                                                            
 
 
175 It is therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the jury were thereby being encouraged to draw a 
“conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed 
the offence for which he is being tried” (Lord Herschell in Makin, note 144).  The primary rationale of 
Lord Herschell’s first statement of law appeared to have been overridden by the compelling relevance of 
the similar fact evidence.  Thereafter, it was impossible to argue against the proposition that even pure 
‘propensity’ can be sufficiently relevant to justify its admission in proof of guilt. 
176 See note 155. 
177 His words were cited at pp. 50-53 of the House of Lords report. 
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had been created, which was to cause endless problems in future sexual offence cases in 
which the prior behaviour of the accused towards the victim was narrated by the victim 
in their testimony.178   
 
 Following this endorsement, at the highest judicial level, of the use of similar 
fact evidence to prove even the commission of an offence, the floodgates opened for a 
whole new range of applications of propensity evidence to prove the guilt of the accused 
directly, rather than the absence of any defence once their apparent guilt has been 
established by direct evidence.179  
 
Another missed opportunity 
 
 It was ironic that during the very period in which English law was heading down 
the blind alley of ‘categories’ methodology, there arose a paradigm case for the 
application of the ‘doctrine of chances’ approach advocated by Wigmore and others.  
The seemingly inevitable outcome was the addition of yet one more category of 
admissibility, unwittingly labelled “coincidence reasoning”.  This overlooked the key to 
the much broader logic underlying the admission of much similar fact evidence properly 
so called, namely admissibility through absence of coincidence. 
 
                                                            
 
 
178 The so-called ‘uncharged acts’ cases.  The same process was successfully employed by the Crown in 
The King v Shellaker [1914] 1 KB 414, in which S was charged with the carnal knowledge of a girl under 
16, and the Crown was granted leave to adduce evidence of the girl’s previous pregnancy, and certain 
conduct by S which tended to show that he had been the father of her child.  This use of the fictional 
defence of “innocent association” would subsequently be described in the House of Lords as “ . . a 
specious manner of outflanking the exclusionary rule”; see Lord Wilberforce in R v Boardman, note 253, 
at 443. 
179 In Perkins v Jeffrey  [1912] 2 KB 702, for example, it was employed in order to prove “identity”, in an 
indecent exposure case in which the High Court condoned the admission of evidence tending to show, not 
only that J had committed the act alleged against one victim, but had committed several more, on the 
ground (at 707) that it tended to prove that the victim “was not mistaken in her identification” of the 
accused.  There could be no fictional use of a defence notionally claimed by the accused in this case, 
given that he was flatly denying guilt by way of an open “Not Guilty” plea. 
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 In George Joseph Smith,180  S was charged with the murder of M, whom he had 
“married” bigamously some time previously. He had then taken her to a solicitor, who 
had advised him that he could only gain access to M’s property upon her death.   S then 
took M to a doctor with a suggestion (denied by the doctor) that M had recently suffered 
an epileptic fit.  S had also previously purchased a new bath in which, a few days after 
the visit to the doctor, M was found drowned after allegedly suffering an epileptic fit.   
 
The Crown was allowed to lead evidence of the deaths of two other “wives” of S 
(B and L) in almost identical circumstances after the death of M. In each case, the lady 
in question had recently taken out a life insurance policy of which S was the beneficiary.  
S was convicted of the murder of M, and this conviction appears to have proceeded 
from a realisation that the coincidence of three wives dying in this fashion without some 
criminal behaviour by S was too remote to contemplate.181 
 
One of the grounds of complaint raised on appeal was that:  
 
The judge admitted [the evidence of the deaths of B and L] as evidence of a system of 
murdering women, with whom the appellant had gone through a form of marriage, for 
the sake of their money. 182  . . . . It should not be assumed that there was any prima 
facie case here; there was strong evidence of motive, and some of opportunity, but none 
of any physical fact.   
 
                                                            
 
 
180 (1915) 11 Crim App R. 229 
181 To adapt the famous epigram of Oscar Wilde (per Lady Bracknell in The Importance of Being 
Ernest), “To lose one wife may be regarded as a misfortune.  To lose three looks like carelessness”. 
182 Note, once more, the slick transition from “system” to “actus reus” which had been evident in Ball 
and Ball. 
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Defence counsel further complained,183 that in charging the jury, the trial judge 
had observed that: 
 
. . . . the occurrence of so many accidents benefiting him is such a coincidence that it 
cannot have happened unless it was design. 
 
This was met with the telling response of the Lord Chief Justice that:184  
 
. . . . that. . . . states exactly the reason why the evidence is admissible. (emphasis 
added) 
 
The Court was only one step away from acknowledging the universal 
justification for the admission of all similar fact evidence properly so called, regardless 
of what category it might be seen to fall within, namely its relevance to the direct case 
against the accused.  But so ingrained had the categories approach become in English 
judicial thinking that future courts took the strict ratio of Smith to be confirmation that, 
as in Makin, similar fact evidence might be admitted to prove “system” or “design” on 
the part of the accused.   
 
What they were in truth recognising was that the evidence was admissible 
because of its startling factual relevance to the issue which the court had to decide.  
However, such was the prevailing philosophy that Smith became merely another 
‘category’ of case in which similar fact evidence might be admitted, rather than a useful 
precedent for the employment of ‘lack of coincidence’ reasoning.  The evidence was 
specifically relevant because it negated any possibility of coincidence; the ultimate key 
                                                            
 
 
183 At 233. 
184 Ibid. 
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to admissibility was therefore not “system”, “design” or “elimination of coincidence”, 
but specific relevance to the facts of the case.  The narrow symptom was being mistaken 
for the underlying condition. 
 
The subsequent use of this narrower precedent was no doubt based on the 
careful words of Lord Chief Justice Reading,185 who read the unanimous decision of the 
Court in rejecting S’s appeal.  His Lordship sidestepped the essential question raised in 
the legal arguments, in the following terms: 
 
We think that that evidence was properly admitted, and the judge was very careful to 
point out to the jury the use they could properly make of the evidence.  He directed 
them more than once that they must not allow their minds to be confused and think that 
they were deciding whether the murders of [B] and [L] had been committed; they were 
trying the appellant for the murder of [M].   
 
With respect, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the jury were indeed 
being told to consider the possibility that B and L had been murdered, but not by means 
of “propensity reasoning”.  The jury had not been instructed that S’s guilt of the murder 
of M might be reasoned from the assumption that he had murdered B and L.  Rather, 
they were advised that the circumstances surrounding all three deaths eliminated the 
possibility that the one on the indictment was a tragic accident.186   The evidence was 
admissible as showing a “design” on the part of S to feloniously dispose of unwanted 
wives in bathtubs, so as to benefit financially from their deaths.  Implicit in this 
argument is the suggestion that M’s death was “designed” by the accused, as part of his 
“system”.  However, there is clearly a fine line to be drawn between evidence of 
                                                            
 
 
185 At 237.  
186 This much was suggested to the jury by the trial judge when he is reported (at 233) as having observed 
that “. . . . the occurrence of so many accidents benefiting him is such a coincidence that it cannot have 
happened unless it was design”.  Expressed in another way, it amounts to a direction that “It would be 
strange indeed if all of these women died the same way by accident – therefore the accused must have 
killed them all”.  
62 
 
“design”, and the “circular reasoning” which the Court of Appeal was clearly anxious to 
avoid. 
 
Even though the “system” or “design” which ensured Smith’s conviction was 
proved by the elimination of all other reasonable hypotheses, it had not occurred to 
anyone that all applications of similar fact evidence had this potential, and not just those 
which bore the hallmarks of what became the newly-created category of “lack of 
coincidence leading to proof of design”.   Had the justification for the admission of such 
evidence been expressed in the negative (the elimination of coincidence), rather than the 
positive (the presence of factors suggesting “design”), then the penny might have 
dropped for future courts.  As it was, the signal was both confused and confusing, even 
to academic observers.  
 
 Commenting, in 1923,187 Ernest Williams concluded, of the cases heard up to 
and including Armstrong,188 that: 
 
Looking back over this list of cases it will surely be agreed that they display on the 
whole a  continuation of the tendency to widen the area of admissibility of evidence of 
other offences, and so take away from the accused person the protection which in many 
cases would ensure his acquittal. 
 
However, in response to this assertion, Julius Stone, writing at approximately 
the same time,189 countered that: 
 
                                                            
 
 
187 Note 169, at p. 223. 
188 [1922] 2 KB 555, in which A’s guilt of the arsenic poisoning of his wife was established partly by 
reference to his attempt to dispose of a business rival by the same ‘system’. 
189 Note 59, at 976.  Stone at least seems to have understood that relevance is the common factor in all 
situations in which similar fact evidence is admissible 
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. . . the area of admissibility is no wider today at common law than it was in 1692, in 
1762, in  1791, or in 1851.  All that has happened is that new situations have arisen in 
which the evidence offered was relevant. [emphasis added]. 
 
This exchange serves to confirm that even the academics had become confused 
as to what precisely was happening.  Both authors were accurately summarising the law 
as it was at that stage in its development, but from different perspectives.  It was still the 
law that similar fact evidence had to be relevant to the instant case in order to be 
admissible; however, lawyers were encountering new examples of that relevance almost 
on an annual basis. The door had now been opened for future Crown counsel to bolster 
what was at best only a “prima facie” case of actus reus against the accused with 
prejudicial similar fact evidence, in circumstances in which the relevance of that 
prejudicial evidence to the facts of the instant case was far less obvious than it had been 
in the Smith case itself.190   
 
From “previous actions” to “pre-existing propensities” 
 
The admissibility of similar fact evidence to prove the identity of the offender 
which had been confirmed in Perkins v Jeffrey,191 was extended only three years later to 
encompass, not only previous actions by an accused, but also evidence of their 
propensities.  This time, the argument was along the lines of “There is no dispute that 
this offence occurred, and the issue for determination by the jury is who committed it.  
The Crown may employ similar fact evidence in order to prove to the jury that it bore 
all the hallmarks of a person with the propensities of the accused, in support of the 
allegation that the accused was in fact the offender on this occasion”.   
 
                                                            
 
 
190 See, e.g. Kennaway [1917] 1 K.B. 25 and Lovegrove [1920] 3 K.B. 643.  See also Armstrong, note 
188. 
191 Note 179. 
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 The case in question was Thompson v The King,192 in which T was charged with 
several sodomies involving a group of boys, and to each allegation his defence was that 
of alibi. The person responsible for the offences (on 16th) had made an appointment with 
the victims for the 19th, and on 19th T had met with the boys, told them that he had 
another appointment, and given them money. They then identified T, to a waiting police 
officer, as the person who had sodomised them on 16th. The “issue before the jury” was 
therefore clearly whether or not T was the man who had met with the boys and 
committed the offences on 16th.  In support of its allegation that he had been, the Crown 
was allowed to adduce evidence that when apprehended on the 19th, T was in possession 
of powder puffs, and had indecent photographs of boys at his residence.  T was 
convicted, and appealed to the House of Lords, where it was argued, on behalf of the 
Crown,193 that the photographs of the boys were material to the issue of identification.  
 
The “lead” judgment, of Lord Chancellor Finlay,194 upheld the admission of the 
evidence, on the ground that: 
 
What was done on the 16th shows that the person who did it was a person with abnormal 
propensities of this kind. . . . The criminal of the 16th and the prisoner had this feature in 
common, and it appears to me that the evidence which is objected to afforded some 
evidence tending to show the probability of the truth of the boys’ story as to identity. 
 
  It was hardly surprising that this ruling caused confusion for those observers 
who could not appreciate that the key to the admissibility of that evidence was not 
solely the fact of T’s propensities, but the inherent unlikelihood that in identifying 
                                                            
 
 
192 [1918] AC 221.  In this case, Perkins v Jeffrey was cited, along with, inter alia, Ball and Ball (note 
173) in support of Crown Counsel’s submission that the evidence at the trial had been correctly admitted. 
193 At 223. 
194  At 223-5, Lord Dunedin concurring.  The suggestion that homosexual proclivities alone were 
sufficient to place the accused and the perpetrator in the same narrow sub-group of the population would 
later be corrected by a changed social climate; see DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729.  However, the 
principle lived on. 
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someone allegedly at random as their molester, the boys should have picked someone 
with such relevant tendencies.   
 
This was barely alluded to directly in the case report itself, and the criticism 
which the case attracted was based on the belief that S had somehow been convicted on 
his propensity alone.195  Once again, the highest court in the land had perpetuated 
confusion and misconception by failing to identify precisely the nature of the relevance 
to the facts of the case which made the evidence admissible.196 
 
 The increasing willingness of senior judges of this period to recognise new 
categories of admissibility of propensity evidence may been a judicial reaction to a 
belief that the criminal trial process had, during the years since Makin, swung more in 
favour of an accused.   
 
In its 1914 decision in R v Christie,197 the House of Lords had ruled that some 
items of evidence, while technically and logically relevant to the case in hand, might 
lead to “unfairness” to an accused were they to be admitted into evidence.  This appears 
to have been the first appreciation that somehow the two concepts of “probity” and 
“prejudice” must be balanced against each other, culminating in the re-formulation of 
the similar fact evidence rule in Boardman.  The same considerations also inform 
decisions by trial judges as to whether or not to allow the “joinder” of indictment counts 
so as to reveal a multiplicity of alleged offences by an accused, and allow the evidence 
of one alleged victim of this course of behaviour to appear to corroborate the evidence 
of other(s).  This formed the next chapter in the history of similar fact evidence under 
English law. 
                                                            
 
 
195  This misconception was no doubt materially encouraged by Lord Sumner’s now infamous 
homophobic diatribe at p. 235 of the case report. 
196 The Court of Criminal Appeal was afforded the opportunity to correct this misconception only a few 
months later, in The King v Twiss [1918] 2 KB 853.  It failed to do so.  
197 [1914 A.C. 545; (1914) 24 Cox C.C. 249. 
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Similar fact evidence from the joinder of indictment counts 
 
 The Indictments Act 1915 (E & W), s 4, provided that two or more offences, 
even involving different complainants, could be joined on the one indictment if they 
were “offences of the same or similar character”.198  However, under s 5(3), it was also 
provided that a trial judge could order separate trials if they were of the opinion that 
such a process could lead to the accused being “prejudiced or embarrassed” in their 
defence.   
 
At least until Bailey,199 in 1924, it seems that such “prejudice or embarrassment” 
was thought of only in terms of the complexity of the trial process thereby created, and 
little or no consideration was given to the potential prejudice to the accused of facing 
the same allegations from a whole series of different accusers before the same jury.  The 
joinder of different counts in an indictment was not even perceived to be a form of 
similar fact evidence until a series of appeals revealed its potential in this regard.  The 
later cases in this series in turn led the way to the re-formulation of the law in 
Boardman. 
 
 The first of these cases was Bailey itself, in which Lord Hewart C.J. observed 
that: 200  
 
It is so easy to derive from a series of unsatisfactory accusations, if there are enough of 
them, an accusation which at least appears satisfactory.   
                                                            
 
 
198 This rule of law found practice expression under Rule 9 of the Indictment Rules, 1971. 
199 [1924] 2 KB 300.  This case bore some similarity, on its facts, to the later watershed case of 
Boardman (note 9).  However, the facts are less important than the observation of Lord Hewart C.J. in 
granting the appeal against conviction which resulted from the joinder of two indictment counts. 
200 At 306.  The appeal against conviction was upheld in this case. 
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The alternative view was expressed by Talbot J in Southern,201 as follows: 
 
. . . . as a matter of common sense, it is more likely, in fact, that a man should be guilty 
of filthy conduct on one occasion if he has been guilty of it on another.  
 
The judicial climate on this issue eventually came to favour the Crown,202 as the 
residual outcome of two of the leading similar fact evidence cases of the middle years of 
the century, Rex v Sims,203 and Noor Mohamed v The King.204  These two cases also 
revealed a fundamental split in judicial thinking which had developed since 1894 
regarding how Lord Herschell’s second, “inclusive”, principle was to be interpreted.  
This created the need for clarification at the highest level which resulted in Boardman. 
 
In Sims, S had been convicted of a total of three offences of a homosexual nature, 
following a trial in which four of his alleged victims had been allowed to testify to 
alleged events which disclosed S’s homosexual propensities.  His appeal was eventually 
heard by the Court of Criminal Appeal, before whom it was argued, on his behalf,205 
that “The effect of trying all the cases together was to make the jury say “This is a dirty 
old man because four different persons have given similar evidence about him””. 
                                                            
 
 
201 (1930) 22 Cr. App. R. 6, at 9.  His Lordship nevertheless felt constrained to overturn the conviction 
which had resulted.  This was fortunate, given that his observation was one of pure “propensity 
reasoning”.  For a more detailed analysis of the difficulties which can arise when two different 
allegations, although “similar” enough to be joined on the same indictment, do not enjoy a sufficient 
“nexus of similarity” to render one allegation admissible “similar fact evidence” in proof of the other, see 
Yale, “How many counts to an indictment?” 1975 Crim L R 428.  See also Ailes 13 Cr. App. R. 173, in 
which during the trial, in 1919, of a cinema attendant for an alleged indecent assault upon a young girl 
attending the cinema, similar fact evidence had been admitted from another young girl alleging a similar 
assault. 
202 Even thirty years later, however, trial judges were still refusing joinder in cases of alleged sexual 
offences against young victims when it was felt that the combined emotive effect of such conjoined 
allegations could not be justified by reference to the apparent similarities between those separate 
allegations; see, e.g. Fitzpatrick (1963) 47 Cr. App. R. 16 and Doughty [1965] 1 WLR 331. 
203 [1946] 1 KB 531.   
204 [1949] AC 182. 
205 At 533. 
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Lord Goddard C.J. read the unanimous judgment of the Court rejecting S’s 
appeal,206 during the course of which he made the following general statement of law: 
 
If one starts with the assumption that all evidence tending to show a disposition towards 
a particular crime must be excluded unless justified, then the justification of evidence of 
this kind is that it tends to rebut a defence otherwise open to the accused.207 ; but if one 
starts with the general proposition that all evidence which is logically probative is 
admissible unless excluded, then evidence of this kind does not have to seek a 
justification but is admissible irrespective of the issues raised by the defence, and this 
we think is the correct view.  It is plainly the sensible view (emphasis added). 
 
The emphasised part of this judgment obviously had the effect of turning the 
originally perceived Makin principle on its head.  Instead of requiring the Crown to 
justify the admission of similar fact evidence which was otherwise inadmissible by 
demonstrating that it was relevant to “an issue before the jury”, 208  it was being 
suggested that once it could be demonstrated that the evidence which the Crown was 
seeking to adduce was “logically probative”, then it was admissible regardless of the 
line of defence offered by the accused.  The key to admissibility was, as with all other 
items of evidence, one of relevance, and the only perceivable heresy in this judgment 
was the failure to add the caveat that ‘relevance through propensity alone’ is insufficient. 
 
                                                            
 
 
206 At 539. 
207 This was, of course, the classic rationale of admissibility arising from the “narrow” interpretation of 
Lord Herschell’s second statement in Makin.  The italicised portion of his Lordship’s ruling goes to the 
fundamental core of this thesis, and the rationale for the admission of all similar fact evidence – it is 
admissible once its relevance is established, regardless of what ‘category’ of case is involved, and 
regardless of the label which may be attached to it.  It is, in short, an inclusive rule based on relevance, 
not an exclusive one with categories of exception. 
208 This was the “broader” interpretation of Lord Herschell’s “inclusive” rule in Makin, and the one in 
judicial favour at the time. 
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Applying the ‘inclusive’ principle thus identified to the facts of the case, his 
Lordship justified the admission of the evidence of each of the complainants on the 
basis of the “striking similarity” between each of the acts described and the others, 
adding that:209  
 
The probative force of all the acts together is much greater than one alone; for, whereas 
the jury might think one man might be telling an untruth, three or four are unlikely to 
tell the same untruth unless they were conspiring together.  If there is nothing to suggest 
a conspiracy their evidence would seem to be overwhelming.210 
 
In short, the overwhelming “probative force” (= relevance) of the evidence was 
the key to its admissibility.   
 
The next case in the series gave equal emphasis to the potential prejudice which 
the admission of such evidence might also impose on an accused, thus laying the 
groundwork for what was to follow in Boardman.  The Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (“JCPC”) in Noor Mohamed was sitting in an appeal from British Guinea by a 
man (N) who had been convicted of the murder of his de facto by potassium cyanide 
poisoning, after the jury had been allowed to learn of the death of his former wife from 
an identical cause two years previously.  N had never been charged with this first death, 
and the JCPC ultimately quashed his conviction on the ground that this evidence should 
not have been admitted,211 because it “offended against the principle” laid down in the 
first statement of Lord Herschell’s judgment in Makin, namely that a person should not 
be convicted solely on evidence which reveals the mere fact that they have offended 
before. 
                                                            
 
 
209 At 540. 
210 This simultaneously highlights the need to be extra vigilant, in such cases, to eliminate “collusion”, as 
it is now more commonly called.  It is also, of course, yet further endorsement of the ‘elimination of 
coincidence’ approach. 
211 According to the Headnote, ibid. 
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The judgment of the Committee was delivered by Lord Du Parcq, who first re-
affirmed the pre-eminence of that first statement,212 then went on to impose another 
caveat,213 namely that:  
  
. . . the judge ought to consider whether the evidence which it is proposed to adduce is 
sufficiently substantial, having regard to the purpose to which it is professedly directed, 
to make it desirable in the interest of justice that it should be admitted.  If, so far as that 
purpose  is concerned, it can in the circumstances of the case have only trifling weight, 
the judge will be right to exclude it . . . cases must occur in which it would be unjust to 
admit evidence of a character gravely prejudicial to the accused even though there may 
be some tenuous ground for holding it technically admissible.  The decision must then 
be left to the discretion and the sense of fairness of the judge. 214 
 
With reference to the dictum of Goddard C.J. in Sims quoted in note 206, his 
Lordship observed that:215  
  
The expression “logically probative” may be understood to include much evidence 
which English law deems to be irrelevant.  Logicians are not bound by the rules of 
evidence which guide English courts. . . .   
 
                                                            
 
 
212  At 190. His Lordship noted, in passing, that this first statement had been described by Lord 
Chancellor Sankey in Maxwell v DPP [1935] A.C. 309 at 317 as “one of the most deeply rooted and 
jealously guarded principles of our criminal law”, and one which was “fundamental in the law of 
evidence as conceived in this country”.  Having given examples of when evidence of the mere charging 
of a man (as opposed to his conviction) might be admissible in later proceedings, his Lordship had 
added, at 321, that “ . . . these instances all involve the crucial test of relevance”. 
213  This appears to have been the first ruling by an English appeal court to seek to weigh “probity” 
against “prejudice”. 
214 At 192. 
215 At 194-6. See also Rex v Hall [1952] 1 KB 302, in which the Court of Appeal confirmed that a mere 
plea of Not Guilty, and nothing more, entitled the Crown to lead similar fact evidence in relation to facts 
alleged in the instant trial for which the accused claims to have an innocent explanation. 
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In short, while relevance is ultimately the key to the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence, something more may be required than what might be termed ‘bare relevance’. 
 
Sims and Noor Mohamed were considered again that same year, this time by the 
House of Lords in Harris v DPP,216 in which the ‘categories of exception’ approach was 
once more rejected in favour of a more ‘general principle’ approach.   
 
The facts of the case were complex, and are of no illustrative value, but on 
appeal, it was argued on H’s behalf that the evidence in question was not admissible 
under any of the “five recognised heads” justifying its admission.217  It was further 
urged that these categories could not be added to (as here, to negative a defence of 
“coincidence”), and that the House should resist any further attempts to erode the basic 
principle laid down in Makin.  Finally, it was argued, on the authority of Bailey,218 that 
the trial judge should have instructed the jury to consider the evidence on each count 
separately. 
 
Viscount Simon delivered the majority view of the House, quashing the 
conviction.  In so doing, he said that:219  
 
In my opinion, the principle laid down  . . . in Makin’s case remains the proper principle 
to apply, and I see no reason for modifying it . . . It is, I think, an error to attempt to 
draw up a closed list of the sorts of cases in which the principle operates: such a list 
only provides instances of its general application, whereas what really matters is the 
                                                            
 
 
216 [1952] A.C. 694. 
217 At 697-8.These were identified as (a) to prove system; (b) to rebut a defence of accident or mistake 
which was “raised, raisable or open”, as established by the modification of the decision in Sims by the 
subsequent decisions in Noor Mohamed and Hall; (c) to rebut a defence of innocent intent; (d) to show 
“vicious or unnatural propensity”, and (e) to negative a defence of mistaken identification.  Clearly, the 
‘categories’ approach had proved to be very productive by this stage, even if it was the wrong approach. 
218 Note 199. 
219 At 705. 
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principle itself and its proper application to the particular circumstances of the charge 
that is being tried. It is the application that may sometimes be difficult, and the 
particular case before the House illustrates that difficulty. [emphasis added; 
footnote omitted]. 
 
Finally, someone in high judicial office had acknowledged that Lord Herschell’s 
second statement of law in Makin had been intended as illustrative, rather than 
prescriptive.  His Lordship then added that:220  
 
. . . the prosecution may adduce all proper evidence which tends to prove the charge.  I 
do not understand Lord Herschell’s words to mean that the prosecution must withhold 
such evidence until after the accused has set up a specific defence which calls for 
rebuttal.  
There is a second proposition which ought to be added . . . [which] flows from the duty 
of the judge when trying a charge of crime to set the essentials of justice above the 
technical rule if the strict application of the latter would operate unfairly against the 
accused.  If such a case arose, the judge may intimate to the prosecution that evidence 
of “similar facts” affecting the accused, though admissible, should not be pressed 
because its probable effect “would be out of proportion to its true evidential value” 
221 . . . Such an intimation rests entirely within the discretion of the judge.  
 
The confusion which had previously surrounded the question of how “relevant” 
similar fact evidence required to be before it became admissible was deftly lifted by the 
following distinction:222 
 
. . . .evidence of “similar facts” should be excluded unless such evidence has a really 
material bearing on the issues to be decided. (emphasis added). 
                                                            
 
 
220 At 706-9 
221 Citing Lord Moulton in Christie at Cox, p. 257; see note 197. 
222 At 710. 
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Writing in the years between Harris and the next leading case of Kilbourne, 
English law’s leading scholar in this area, at that time,223 emphasised the significance of 
“striking similarity” between the facts alleged on the indictment and the facts sought to 
be admitted when he made the following observation regarding the decision in Sims. 
 
The similar fact evidence was admissible because there were specific features which 
made each accusation bear a striking resemblance to the others . . . not only was the 
accused given to committing the crime charged, but he was also given to doing it 
according to a particular pattern. 224 
 
“Striking similarity” appeared to have become the touchstone of ‘admissibility 
through relevance’, and the impossibility of overlooking the striking similarity which 
had justified the admission of the evidence in Smith,225 and was emphasised by Cross 
some fifty years later, had also ruled the day in Straffen,226 in the same year as Harris.  
In Straffen, the similar fact evidence consisted of homicidal acts, by the accused,227 
which were so uniquely distinctive that, as in Smith, it is difficult to believe that any 
injustice could have arisen from their admission, even though there was no specific 
defence raised to the charge, and the evidence in question had been admitted purely in 
rebuttal of S’s simple “Not Guilty” plea.  
                                                            
 
 
223 Cross, Evidence, 3rd ed. (1967) at p. 319. 
224 Writing almost a decade later (in [1975] Crim L R 62, at 68-9), the same author cited lack of “striking 
similarity” as the reason for the Court of Criminal Appeal decisions in Chandor (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 74 
and Flack (1969) 53 Cr. App. R. 166.  
225 Note 180. 
226 [1952] 2 QB 911. In that case, a little girl was found strangled, with no sign of sexual assault, and no 
attempt to hide the body, which could easily have been done in the circumstances.  S had earlier that day 
escaped from a nearby criminal lunatic asylum, where he had been sent for two killings committed in 
circumstances identical to those relating to the latest victim.  He had been in the vicinity at the time of the 
girl’s death.  These facts were made known to the jury, and in particular the trial judge held that evidence 
of S’s previous offences was admissible “to establish the identity of the murderer”. S was convicted of the 
fresh murder, and his subsequent appeal was dismissed. 
227 N.B. that these previous killings had never been proved against D beyond reasonable doubt, since 
ahead of his first trial he had been found unfit to plead due to insanity. 
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 In the years immediately prior to Boardman, therefore, “striking similarity” 
became the new mantra of admissibility.  But, like the “defence otherwise open to the 
accused” which had dominated legal thinking after Makin, it was only a symptomatic 
example of something more fundamental, namely the strong suggestion of guilt as the 
result of the application of “the doctrine of chances”.  By exchanging one mantra for 
another, the courts were no nearer to acknowledging what Wigmore had identified 
almost a century earlier.   
 
Similar fact evidence as corroboration – the final step towards Boardman 
 
Three cases at appellate level, prior to 1975,228 involved the issue of what might 
constitute “corroboration” of the trial testimony of an alleged child victim of sexual 
abuse, when this is required either as a matter of law or as a rule of practice.  In 
Campbell it was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that the sworn evidence of one 
such victim could corroborate the sworn evidence of another,229 and in the course of 
rejecting C’s appeal, Goddard C.J. observed that:230  
 
. . . a jury may be told that a succession of these cases may help them to determine the 
truth of  the matter provided they are satisfied that there is no collaboration between the 
children to put up a false story.   
 
There was no reference to any need for a “striking similarity” between such 
testimonies before they might be admitted; nor does the case report suggest that any 
                                                            
 
 
228 R v Campbell [1956] 2 QB 432, DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296 and DPP v Kilbourne (Note 194). 
229 This was required as a matter of practice, since each of the victims was a child under 16 whom C was 
accused of indecently assaulting in his capacity as their schoolteacher. 
230 At 439. 
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existed.  What was being impliedly accepted was the lack of coincidence inherent in a 
“succession” of allegations against the same accused, even though the gory details were 
not identical.  The same underlying logic was implicit in the House of Lords ruling in 
Hester, that:  
 
The essence of corroborative evidence is that one creditworthy witness confirms what 
another  creditworthy witness has said. . . . . Corroborative evidence in the sense of 
some other material evidence in support implicating the accused furnishes a safeguard 
which makes a conclusion  more sure than it would be without such evidence.  
 
The further implications which arise when mutual corroboration occurs between 
two witnesses who are themselves both victims of alleged crimes by the accused which 
are joined on the same indictment were addressed by the House in the third case in the 
series, Kilbourne.231 
 
In that case, the essential question was whether or not evidence of “system” on 
the part of an alleged sexual predator against young boys could constitute corroboration 
of the sworn evidence of each of these victims.  It was the unanimous opinion of the 
House that it could, and this was most succinctly expressed by Lord Reid,232 in the 
following terms: 
 
 Once there are enough children to show a “system” I can see no ground for refusing to 
 recognise that they can corroborate each other. 
                                                            
 
 
231 Note 194. 
232 At 751.  All their Lordships drew heavily on the logic behind leading Scottish authorities such as 
Moorov v H.M. Advocate and Ogg v H.M. Advocate which are considered in Chapter 7.  Lord Reid also 
expressed the view that the evidence of only two such children would be insufficient to establish 
“system” on the part of an accused.  Even at this late stage, it would seem that the ‘categories’ approach 
was still being followed, hence the admission of the evidence to prove “system”, rather than a 
recognition of its relevance through lack of coincidence. 
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The Court was at pains to emphasise that in such cases, great care should be 
taken to exclude the possibility of collusion between the witnesses.233  In the course of 
his judgment, Lord Simon expressed the true test for the admissibility or otherwise of 
similar fact evidence in terms which were to be echoed by the House only two years 
later in Boardman.  Having quoted Lord Herschell’s seminal words in Makin, he 
continued:234 
 
All relevant evidence is prima facie admissible.  The reason why the type of evidence 
referred  to by Lord Herschell in the first sentence of the passage is inadmissible is, not 
because it is irrelevant, but because its logically probative significance is considered to 
be grossly outweighed by its prejudice to the accused, so that a fair trial is endangered 
if it is admitted: the law therefore exceptionally excludes this relevant evidence: 
whereas in the circumstances referred to in the second sentence the logically probative 
significance of the evidence is markedly greater. [emphasis added]. 
 
 The significant conceptual breakthrough which occurred here is partly masked 
by the terminology employed.  His Lordship’s words echo the ‘old’ statement, per 
Makin, that similar fact evidence is not admissible solely to demonstrate propensity.  
However, unlike Makin, it explains why.  It is insufficiently relevant.  In an important 
sense, the reference to prejudiciality is a red herring.  “Propensity” reasoning is not 
inadmissible because it is unduly prejudicial; it is unduly prejudicial because it lacks 
logical relevance. 
 
 However, this failure, at a later stage in the development of similar fact evidence 
law, to drill down deeply enough into the raison d’etre of the exclusion of propensity 
reasoning, was to colour what followed in Boardman. 
                                                            
 
 
233 See, e.g. Lord Hailsham at 748 and Lord Reid at 750. 
234 At 757. 
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Boardman – “intellectual breakthrough” or “fumbled pass”? 
 
 Although the next House of Lords ruling, in Boardman,235 was to have such a 
profound influence on the admission test for similar fact evidence, factually it appeared 
to be a logical successor to Campbell and Hester.236  B was the headmaster of a 
boarding school who had been convicted of sodomy offences involving two of his 
pupils, S and H.  His counsel had not sought separate trials, and the trial judge had 
directed the jury that the sworn evidence of S was admissible in relation to the charge 
involving H, and vice-versa.  It was this ruling which was the subject of an eventual 
appeal to the House of Lords.  It was never suggested that the boys had got together to 
concoct their stories, and there were certain similarities in their allegations which B’s 
evidence failed to explain away.237 
 
While denying the suggestion that homosexual preferences were in themselves 
sufficient to provide a “strong nexus of similarity”, the House of Lords dismissed B’s 
appeal because of the similarities between the unusual facts narrated by each boy, 
together with the implausible reasons given by B for having woken them up in the first 
place.   
 
In the event, the long-term importance of the decision in Boardman for the 
development of this area of the law lay not in the decision arrived at on the facts,238 but 
                                                            
 
 
235 [1975] AC 421. 
236 See note 228 for both case references. 
237 In each case, for example, B had woken the boy in the dormitory in the early hours of the morning, and 
had taken him to his own room, where he had attempted to persuade each of them to take the ‘active’ role 
in the intended sodomy. 
238 This decision would appear to have been unexceptional in itself, given the noticeable trend towards 
admitting this type of evidence in this type of case, but it was not without its critics even on its facts.  
See, e.g. Tapper, “Similar Facts: Peculiarity and Credibility”, (1975) 38 Modern Law Rev. 206, who 
claimed (at 208) that none of the admitted evidence from the two complainants who were allowed to 
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in the re-statement of the governing principles underlying the reception of propensity 
evidence.  Under the Makin formulation of the rule, it had previously been a pre-
requisite for the admission of such evidence that the party seeking its admission point to 
some “issue before the jury” to which it was relevant.  The new formulation was in 
terms of what has been called a “total issue” test .239  Unfortunately, and with respect, it 
proved to be the wrong test. 
 
Lord Cross, reflecting the majority view of the House, 240  said of the 
circumstances in which “similar fact evidence” might be admitted that: 
 
Circumstances . . . may arise in which such evidence is so very relevant that to exclude 
it would be an affront to common sense.241 . . . . The question must always be whether 
the similar fact evidence taken together with the other evidence would do no more than 
raise or  strengthen a suspicion that the accused committed the offence with which he is 
charged or would point so strongly to his guilt that only an ultra-cautious jury, if they 
accepted it as true, would acquit in face of it.  In the end – although the admissibility of 
such evidence is a question of law, not of discretion – the question as I see it must be 
one of degree.242 
 
The reference to “a question of law” appears to have been an attempt to make 
judicial decisions on admissibility directly appealable.  This is of crucial importance, 
because the erroneous admission of propensity evidence of any sort against an accused 
can be fatal to a fair trial, and productive of a miscarriage of justice.  Such a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
corroborate each other displayed any “striking similarity” with that of the other.  Even Lord Wilberforce, 
in the House of Lords (at 445) admitted to “. . . . some fear that the case, if regarded as an example, may 
be setting the standard of “striking similarity” too low”.  Nonetheless, it has always been assumed that in 
this case, “striking similarity” existed between the allegations of the two victims. 
239 By Roberts, “Evidence, Proof and Practice”, Lawbook Co (Sydney), p. 309. 
240 At 456-457. 
241 He cited Straffen  (note 226) as a good example of such a circumstance. 
242 His Lordship further asserted that this had been stated by the Criminal Law Revision Committee, in 
its 11th Report, to be “the existing law”.  This Report is considered in Chapter 4. 
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fundamental error is less easy to appeal if it is seen simply as an unwise exercise of a 
discretion. 
 
At the same time, there was no question of dispensing with the discretion given 
to every trial judge to exclude evidence when it would be “unfair” to admit it. This 
discretion had been granted to trial judges by the House many years earlier in Christie. 
243  Its survival, despite the creation of a new rule of law based on admissibility through 
relevance, was confirmed by Lord Salmon, in the following terms:244 
 
If a trial judge rightly rules that the evidence is relevant and admissible, he still, of 
course, has a discretion to exclude it on the ground that its probative value is minimal 
and altogether outweighed by its likely prejudicial effect.  
 
However, before this discretionary power could be factored into a re-statement 
of the law, it was first necessary to establish the logical basis for admissibility.  The pre-
requisite for the admissibility of all evidence being its relevance,245 it is perhaps not 
surprising that Lord Goddard’s suggested approach to the issue, in Sims,246 was adopted 
by their Lordships in Boardman, 247  who took the opportunity to re-cast it in the 
following terms:248 
 
The basic principle must be that the admission of similar fact evidence (of the kind now 
in question) is exceptional and requires a strong degree of probative force.  This 
probative force is derived, if at all, from the circumstance that the facts testified to by 
                                                            
 
 
243 Note 197.  This same principle was described by Lord Hailsham, at 451, as “ . . . a rule of English law 
which has its roots in policy, and by which . . . . logicians would not be bound”. 
244 At 463. 
245 See, e.g. Cross on Evidence (8th Australian Edition, 2010) at [1485].             .   
246 See note 203. 
247 As it already had been in Kilbourne; see note 194.  N.B. also Lord Hailsham in the instant case, who 
observed, at 450, that “Sims was never in need of support, for . . . it was only a particular example of a 
general principle which stems from Makin . . . . “ 
248 Per Lord Wilberforce, at 444.  “Logical probity” appears to have become “probative force”. 
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the several witnesses bear to each other such a striking similarity that they must, when 
judged by experience and common sense, either all be true, or have arisen from a cause 
common to the witnesses 249 or from pure coincidence.  The jury may, therefore, 
properly be asked to judge whether the right  conclusion is that all are true, so that each 
story is supported by the other(s). (emphasis added). 
 
Here, once again, was clear acknowledgment of the fact that what gives similar 
fact evidence properly so called its logical appeal in some cases is its ability to eliminate 
coincidence. Once coincidence is eliminated, then “when [the circumstances are] judged 
by experience and common sense”, the true relevance of those similar facts becomes so 
obvious that it would be “an affront to common sense” not to employ them in reasoning 
towards guilt.   In the context of the instant case, different (and proven independent) 
witnesses would not give such an identically detailed account of events unless those 
events had really happened.  In these circumstances, it had been appropriate for the trial 
judge not only to allow the various allegations to be tried together, but also to allow 
each of the complainants/witnesses to corroborate each other.   
 
The same conclusion had already been arrived at in a series of Scottish cases 250, 
in which the “underlying unity” of the detailed complaints made by each victim of a 
series of criminal acts was said to supply the necessary corroboration required under 
Scots criminal law before a guilty verdict might be entered.  However, the principle 
being laid down in Boardman went much deeper than that, and was capable of much 
broader application.  As one learned commentator said, 251  of the portion of Lord 
Wilberforce’s judgment emphasised by the author above, “That, in a nutshell, is the 
ratio decidendi of Boardman.”   
                                                            
 
 
249 His Lordship is taken to have been referring here to what we today call “collusion”.  This is certainly 
how his words were subsequently interpreted; see, e.g. Lord Mackay in DPP v H, note 294. 
250 See Moorov v H.M. Advocate, H.M. Advocate v A.E and Ogg v H.M. Advocate, all of which are 
considered in Chapter 7.  Lord Hailsham ruled, at 456, that “ . . . there is no relevant difference in this 
context between the English doctrine of corroboration and the Scottish doctrine as defined in Moorov . . 
.”.   
251 Hoffman, (note 25), at 194-5. 
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At the same time, future courts were warned to avoid either (a) finding that 
“strong degree of probative force” simply in “forbidden reasoning”,252 along the lines of 
‘Once a thief, always a thief’, or (b) admitting such evidence when to do so would be to 
invite a finding of guilt which in the circumstances would be “unsafe or unsatisfactory”.  
Henceforth, the test was to be whether or not the similar fact evidence offered by the 
Crown possessed “a strong degree of probative force”,253 and not whether or not it could 
be made to fit into one of the categories already approved for the admission of such 
evidence, as had previously been the perceived requirement under the Makin test.   
 
As Lord Salmon put it, most succinctly:254 
 
The test must be: is the evidence capable of tending to persuade a reasonable jury of the 
accused’s guilt on some ground other than his bad character and disposition to commit 
the sort of crime with which he is charged? [emphasis added]. 
 
It was unfortunate that the opportunity was not taken, at this point, to underline 
precisely why “propensity reasoning” was not to be encouraged.  It is because 
propensity alone is insufficiently relevant to justify reasoning towards guilt.  Even in 
those circumstances in which it appears to have been allowed,255 it is not the fact that 
the accused has done it before which is relevant, but the specific circumstances in which 
they have done it. 
 
                                                            
 
 
252 Per Lord Hailsham at 453. 
253 This test was clearly being offered as a replacement for the bare “logical probity” test suggested in 
Sims, which had provoked such semantic outrage in some quarters. 
254 At 462. 
255 For example, in Straffen; see note 226. 
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Subsequent confusion was also created by the failure to spell out that the lack of 
sufficient relevance possessed by pure propensity evidence is also the key to its 
prejudicial effect.  “Probative value” and “prejudicial effect” are not two discrete 
concepts which occasionally collide; the one flows from the other.  Allowing a jury to 
be advised of an accused’s propensity when it has no real relevance to the facts of the 
case leaves open only one use which they can make of it – namely “forbidden 
reasoning”.  Lack of relevance is the cause of prejudicial effect; if the evidence is 
sufficiently relevant to be admitted for the right reason, then there can be no prejudice. 
 
The failure to emphasise this point resulted in yet another suggested test which 
relied on categorisation, although henceforth there would be only two categories; 
“propensity reasoning” and “non-propensity reasoning”.  Propensity reasoning was 
labelled as “forbidden” by Lord Hailsham, who handed down the new test in the 
following passage of his judgment:256 
 
If there is some other relevant, probative purpose [for admission] than for the forbidden 
type of reasoning, the evidence is admitted, but should be made subject to a warning 257 
from the judge that the jury must eschew the forbidden reasoning.  The judge also has a 
discretion, not as a matter of law but as a matter of good practice,258 to exclude 
evidence whose prejudicial effect, though the evidence be technically admissible on the 
decided cases,259 may be so great in the particular circumstances as to outweigh its 
probative value to the extent that a verdict of guilty might be considered unsafe or 
unsatisfactory . . .  
 
                                                            
 
 
256 At 453. 
257 This would eventually become known as a “propensity warning”. 
258 This would eventually harden into “a matter of law”.  It may, of course, be argued that if the trial 
judge applies the correct admission test as a matter of law, then there will be no need to exclude the same 
evidence as a matter of practice, because there will be no prejudice. 
259 This appears to have been a curious affirmation of the old ‘case method’ approach which had caused 
such difficulty after Makin, and had led to the need for a comprehensive restatement of the underlying 
principles involved in these cases. 
83 
 
This was the formal birth of the “probity versus prejudice” concept which was to 
dominate the approach of the courts towards similar fact evidence for the remainder of 
the century, and it was unfortunate that his Lordship did not see fit to define either 
“probity” or “prejudice” in this context.   
 
A moment’s reflection reveals that, in a broadly general sense, the more 
“probative” an item of evidence is in support of a Crown case, the more “prejudicial” it 
is to the accused’s prospects of an acquittal.  This conundrum was to baffle lawyers for 
many years, until it was finally agreed that “prejudice” in the context of propensity 
evidence meant “used for the wrong purpose” (= unfair), and was in reality nothing 
more than an additional exhortation not to employ the “forbidden reasoning” identified 
by Lord Hailsham,260 which equated guilt on a former occasion with guilt on the present 
occasion without some additional factor(s) which linked the two events in a way which 
gave the previous events enhanced relevance to the new allegations. 
 
But it would have made the subsequent history of the law in this area less 
complex had the simple point been conceded that all evidence adduced against an 
accused is meant to be prejudicial; the task of a trial judge is to ensure that it is not 
“unfairly” prejudicial.  The true “prejudice” which the House was seeking to avoid was 
“unfair” prejudice, and this arises from the use of propensity evidence for the wrong 
reason.  That wrong reason is its admission for a purpose which is insufficiently relevant 
to the issues raised in the case. 
 
The more fundamental omission was of any definition of “probity”.  Although it 
may be, as Lord Cross opined,261 “a question of degree”, it was, with respect, not 
enough simply to imply that the facts of each case would themselves reveal how much 
                                                            
 
 
260 See note 252. 
261 Note 242. 
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“degree” was involved.  The factors which have to be considered when arriving at an 
estimate of “probative value” had not even been identified, let alone enumerated.  The 
result was that Boardman left in its wake a perception that somehow it was possible to 
assess the admissibility of similar fact evidence by means of a set of theoretical scales, 
into one side of which was loaded the “probity” of the proffered evidence, to be 
weighed in the balance on the other side by its “prejudiciality”.   
 
The failure, at the same time, to appreciate the precise nature of that 
prejudiciality – namely the use of similar fact evidence for the wrong (“unfair”) 
purpose, the “ambushing” of an accused with evidence they have not come to court 
prepared to defend, and the confusion, through complexity, of the issues which the jury 
has to consider - doomed the suggested formula to failure. As long as “probity” is 
thought of as being a measure of the degree of likelihood of the accused’s guilt, while 
“prejudice” is focused on the likelihood of conviction, one will always be measuring the 
same commodity twice. Put another way, whatever is loaded into the scales, they will 
remain in balance, and one side cannot be seen to carry any more weight than the other.  
“Probity versus prejudice”, without adequate judicial clarification, was likely to 
generate nothing more startling than the discovery that 2 kgs. of carrots weigh the same 
as 2 kgs. of onions. 
 
The long-term problems generated by the failure to define either “probity” or 
“prejudice” accurately were still being experienced twenty years after Boardman, and at 
the highest levels.262  However, in the final analysis, Boardman cannot be dismissed 
simply as merely the substitution of one unworkable test for another.  Its most lasting 
legacy was to remove the uncertainty which had developed regarding the true nature of 
the Makin test, to cancel out the conflict which had arisen within the case-law which 
                                                            
 
 
262 For example, the majority judgment of the Australian High Court ruling in Pfennig v The Queen (note 
10), per Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ, at 477, which was in turn to generate its own problems within 
its own jurisdiction, took the ratio of Boardman to be “whether the prejudice to the accused is 
outweighed by the probative force of the evidence.”  This case is further considered, in more detail, at 
note 564. 
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had attempted to follow the ‘general rule subject to exceptions’ approach and above all, 
to take one more step towards the identification of the appropriate test.263   
 
Academic reaction to Boardman 
 
The academic euphoria which greeted the publication of the judgments in 
Boardman probably owed much to the fact that the era of categorisation was apparently 
at an end.  Academic lawyers had long been complaining of the growing complexity of 
the law which had developed post-Makin,264 and were no doubt deceiving themselves 
that it had been simplified.  Sir Leonard Hoffman 265 described Boardman as both 
“. . . .an intellectual breakthrough”,266 and “. . . . by far the most important decision on 
similar fact evidence since Makin. . . . ”.  He applauded the demise of what he described, 
267 as “the categories of relevance” approach, observing that “The test is simply whether 
the evidence has, on the facts of the case, a sufficiently high degree of probative force”.   
 
He expressed no concern that their Lordships had offered no guidance on how 
precisely it might be determined that the probative force did possess the appropriate 
“high degree”.  However, that point was not lost on others, and it was not long before 
observers began to realise that they had been short-changed.  Only ten years after 
Boardman, one academic,268 was enquiring “If . . . . evidence can be given of the 
                                                            
 
 
263 As Lord Morris observed in Boardman (at 441), all the case-law which had preceded it had simply 
been “guides to principle”, and that principle had now been re-formulated. 
264 See, e.g. Wigmore, Evidence (3rd. ed, 1940), vol.ii, §302, who had complained of a “vast morass of 
authority”, which rendered it “. . . . hopeless to attempt to reconcile the precedents”.  Cross [1973] Crim 
L R 400, at 401, observed that “. . . . even the most wholehearted admirer of the status quo might be 
disposed to question the good sense of some of the decisions”. 
265 Note 25, at 193. 
266 In fact, the Boardman test was not even original.  A whole legal generation earlier, Cowan and Carter 
(note 1, at 160) had suggested that “Admissibility in an individual case ought to be determined by 
balancing these two highly complicated and varying factors, probative value and undue prejudice”. 
267 Ibid, at 200. 
268 Allan, “Similar Fact Evidence and Disposition: Law, Discretion and Admissibility”, (1985) Modern 
Law Rev. 253, at 261.   
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defendant’s disposition in order to prove his guilt of the crime charged,269 what standard 
of cogency must such evidence satisfy?” 
 
The same author also gave voice, 270 to the ongoing confusion between “probity” 
and “prejudice” which Boardman had created by suggesting that they were somehow to 
be measured in the balance without regard to the purpose for which the evidence was 
being admitted.  Thus: 
 
. . . . the danger is that the jury will. . . . mistakenly think that they can draw conclusions 
from their view of the defendant’s character.  This is a danger which will vary from 
case to case.  The more remote the danger becomes, the lower will be the degree of 
relevance which can be accepted as satisfying the test for admissibility.  The standard of 
“positive probative value” to be met will depend upon the seriousness of the risk of 
prejudice. 
 
With respect, the “standard of positive probative value” does not depend upon 
“the risk of prejudice”.   The “risk of prejudice” is eliminated by the “positive probative 
value” of the reason for which the evidence is admitted.271 
 
If the academics were confused, it was unlikely that the practitioners would fare 
any better.  As it transpired, they did not. 
                                                            
 
 
269 Clearly, Boardman had failed to clarify the most fundamental point of all, namely that “disposition” 
per se is insufficiently relevant.  Even that most respected academic Cross (“Fourth Time Lucky – 
Similar Fact Evidence in the House of Lords”, [1975] Crim L R 62, at 63) was still, even after 
Boardman, citing Straffen and Ball and Ball for the assertion that propensity alone had sufficed in some 
past cases. 
270 Note 268, at 262. 
271 If, for example, a masked armed robber accidentally leaves, at the crime scene, an appointment card 
from his probation officer which contains his name and address, is the jury more likely to be influenced 
by the identification of the robber thereby provided, or the fact that he was on probation for some 
unspecified offence at the time?  The probative value of the information on the card, for the purpose for 
which it is admitted, clearly overpowers any marginal prejudice which the disclosure of the accused’s 
probationary status might generate. See also Zuckerman, “Similar Fact Evidence – the Unobservable 
Rule”, (1987) 103 Law Quarterly Rev. 182, at 194. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The essential importance of Boardman in the history of similar fact evidence is 
that it administered the formal death sentence to the suggestion that its admissibility was 
dependent upon its fitting within a pre-ordained and judicially approved category of 
case.272  Boardman forced trial advocates to focus instead on how such evidence might 
be seen to be so relevant that its “probative value” overrode any “prejudicial effect” it 
might possess.  The failure to insist on this in previous cases had almost entirely 
obscured the fact that the key to the admissibility of similar fact evidence is its 
relevance. 
 
Following Boardman, the admissibility of similar fact evidence was more 
appropriately to be assessed from a starting point of “relevance”, subject to judicial 
caveat regarding its likely prejudicial effect.  The challenge for future lawyers was to 
accurately identify what was legitimate, and what was not; this, in turn, required them 
to accurately identify the “relevant, probative purpose” for which they were seeking to 
have similar fact evidence admitted.  
 
The court was then to determine whether the degree of relevance was enough to 
override its prejudicial effect.  It was inevitably to do so as a question of law, rather 
than by exercising a residual discretion to exclude anything which might be too 
prejudicial, because ‘admission via relevance’ would eliminate any “unfairness”. Any 
alleged failure to apply the correct test would therefore be readily appealable.  
 
                                                            
 
 
272 As one observer (Carter, “Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence A Decade after 
Boardman”, (1985) 48 Modern Law Rev. 29 at 36) put it ten years after Boardman, “It is no longer 
necessary for a judge to seek out a specific escape route from a supposedly inflexible rule of exclusion”. 
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But even this apparently simplified process was to generate problems of its 
own.  The sun had not yet set on the ‘categories’ approach; it had simply been 
temporarily eclipsed by what seemed to be a better way forward. 
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Chapter 4: 
English law from Boardman to statutory categories of 
admissibility  
 
Chapter synopsis 
 
 “Probity versus prejudice” turned out to be easier to state than to implement.  
The appellate courts subsequent to Boardman, having failed to accurately define 
“probative value”, did not even attempt to further elaborate on “prejudicial effect”.   By 
the turn of the millennium, there was, in any case, a growing political perception that 
the existing law facilitated too many acquittals, and that this trend might only be 
reversed by allowing criminal juries to learn more about the unfavourable antecedents 
of those on trial. 
 
 Policy finally prevailed over principle, in the form of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 (E &W).  Its provisions returned the nation to a ‘categories’ regime which had its 
roots in a policy designed to facilitate, and legislatively justify, the admission of ‘bad 
character’ evidence for a greater number of purposes than the common law had ever 
sanctioned.   
 
This concentration on ‘relevance for a specified purpose’ was at the expense of 
any consideration of ‘prejudicial effect’, and the prospect of any balanced score-card in 
such matters disappeared.  In particular, there was still no overt recognition of the fact 
that the more overwhelming the probative value of an item of evidence used for the 
correct reason (as opposed to admitted for a statutorily prescribed purpose), the less is 
the risk that a properly directed jury may use it for the wrong reason. 
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The attempt to define “probity” 
 
The emphasis placed by their Lordships in Boardman on the need to balance 
“prejudice” against “probity” resulted in a search for measurable levels of the latter, 
without any corresponding attempt to define “prejudice”.  The only question being 
asked was “How probative must the evidence be before it will be admitted?” 
 
 For at least the next decade, the appeal courts resorted to what Zuckerman, in 
1987,273 labelled “catch phrases” in relation to the “probity” half of the new equation.  
Initially it was seen as a choice between “striking similarity” and “probative force”, 
both of which phrases had been employed in Boardman.  It appears not to have 
occurred to anyone during the early stages of this process that “striking similarity” was 
a source of “probative force”, rather than an alternative to it.  Neither did any court at a 
persuasive level appear to perceive the need to identify the factors involved in assessing 
probity. 
 
 At first, the emphasis at Court of Appeal level was on “striking similarity”,274 
until differently constituted benches of the same Court began to require that the “similar 
fact evidence” be “positively probative in regard to the crime now charged”.275  To 
further confuse matters, Scarman LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in 
                                                            
 
 
273 Note 271, at 194. 
274 For example, in Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr. App. R. 26, the Court of Appeal said that Boardman had 
established that “. . . . for similar fact evidence to be admissible there must be a striking similarity 
between the evidence sought to be adduced and the offences alleged.”.  This was re-affirmed at the same 
level in both Novac and Ors (1976) 65 Cr. App. R. 107 and Johannsen (1977) 65 Cr. App. R. 101. 
275 Rance and Herron (1976) 62 Cr. App. R. 118, at 121.  This test was reaffirmed in Mansfield  (1977) 
65 Cr. App. R. 276, Neale (1977) 65 Cr. App. R. 304 and R v Clarke (1978) 67 Cr. App. R. 398. 
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Scarrott,276 categorised “striking similarity” as only one route towards a broader test, 
when he observed that:277  
 
Hallowed though by now the phrase “strikingly similar” is . . . it is no more than a 
label. . . . it is not to be confused with the substance of the law which it labels . . . 
evidence is admissible as similar fact evidence if, but only if, it goes beyond showing a 
tendency to commit crimes of this kind and is positively probative in regard to the crime 
now charged . . . . (author’s emphasis). 
 
 The suggestion that “striking similarity” is, in fact, only one species of the 
broader genus “positive probity” was picked up by a leading English academic of the 
time, Professor Elliott.278 Noting, first,279 that the phrase “striking similarity” had been 
originated by Lord Goddard in Sims, 280  had met with House of Lords approval in 
Kilbourne,281 and had then been “approved in nearly all the speeches in Boardman”,282 
Elliott made the telling, point, which was not, however, original,283 that “. . . . “striking 
similarity”, valuable as the phrase is, cannot deal with absolutely everything in the field”  
 
 A decade had passed after Boardman before it began to dawn upon 
commentators that any assessment of probity was bound to be contextual in nature, in 
the sense that the evidence which the Crown was seeking to admit required to be 
considered in the context of the Crown case as a whole.  It is not the contested evidence 
                                                            
 
 
276 (1977) 65 Cr. App. R. 125.  It was typical of the misconception which now surrounded the topic that 
observers assumed that his Lordship was substituting one test for another 
277 At 129-130. 
278 “The Young Person’s Guide to Similar Fact Evidence – 1”, [1983] Crim L R 284. 
279 Ibid, at 286. 
280 Note 203, at 539. 
281 Note 194, at 738. 
282 Note 235.  In fact,  in that case, Lord Morris (at 441) had cited “striking similarity” as merely one way 
of demonstrating “underlying unity”, while Lord Wilberforce (at 444) referred to it as supplying what he 
called “probative force”.  The perception that “striking similarity” was merely one road towards 
something more general may, therefore, be found even in the judgments in Boardman. 
283 Note 278, at 287. 
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itself which supplies its own probity, but its relevance in the light of all the other 
evidence.  In the words of Allan:284 
 
. . . evidence which does merely show criminal disposition may nevertheless have 
specific probative value in relation to the crime charged in the light of the other 
evidence in the case.   
 
The same point was highlighted by the Court of Appeal in Brooks:285  
 
. . . . it is better for the court simply to enquire what the evidence sets out to prove and 
whether there are any features of the evidence which makes it probative of that fact in a 
permissible way.  It is not enough for the facts to be similar, they must be similar in a 
way which tells the jury something useful.  Whether they will do so depends entirely on 
the circumstances, but the more commonplace the facts the less likely that the 
similarities will lead anywhere at all.  [emphasis added]. 
 
What had seemed like a new ‘clean slate’ in Boardman was rapidly written all 
over in subsequent cases, of which, ten years later,286 Carter observed: 
 
. . . . the flow of reported cases concerning the admissibility of similar fact evidence can 
scarcely be said to have abated . . . Any attempt to distil a statement of the law from the 
morass of authority remains a formidable undertaking.287   
                                                            
 
 
284 Note 268, at 255.  It was this appreciation of the potential relevance of this type of evidence to the 
Crown’s case as a whole which led to the “no hypothesis consistent with innocence” approach of the 
Australian High Court in Pfennig that same year – see note 564.  Allan added (ibid) that it was necessary 
to look at “. . . . the context of the whole case, including the nature of the defence”, which was of course 
a reflection of the rule originally formulated in Makin. 
285 (1991) 92 Cr. App. R. 36, in which the Court reviewed all the case-law since Boardman, and repeated 
its warning against the slavish use of phrases such as “positive probity”. 
286 Note 272, at 42. 
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At the same time, he reminded those with an interest in the topic that the 
Boardman test involved the balancing of “probity” against another ingredient which 
seemed to have escaped everyone else’s attention:288  
 
The judge must be satisfied that the real probative worth of the evidence completely 
underwrites any likely prejudice.  The matter is one of degree, but the test must be a 
stern one. (emphasis added). 
  
 When given its first opportunity to restore the balance, and show the way 
forward, the House of Lords, in DPP v P,289 did no more than repeat the mantra of the 
Court of Appeal for the previous sixteen years, namely that a “striking similarity” 
between the facts of a case and the similar fact evidence which it was being sought to 
adduce was only one way in which such evidence might be sufficiently relevant to 
justify its admission. Lord Mackay L.C. opined that:290  
 
Whether the evidence has sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect 
must in each case be a question of degree.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
287 Wigmore (note 264) had been complaining of a “vast morass of authority” three decades before 
Boardman, so it would seem that little had changed.  The courts were clearly no nearer to producing a 
working formula than they had been in the post-Makin days. 
288 Note 272, at 43.  In Lewis (1983) 76 Cr. App. R. 33, for example, the Court of Appeal had completely 
ignored this aspect of the Boardman test, in upholding the admission, during the trial of a man accused of 
acts of indecency with his stepdaughters, of evidence that the accused possessed literature belonging to 
the Paedophilic Society, and had admitted to police that he was a paedophile, while denying that he was 
a child molester.  On appeal, it was held to have been sufficient for the trial judge to warn the jury that 
they were not to regard L’s predilections as evidence of his guilt, although one is tempted to ask what 
precisely their Lordships thought it was admissible as evidence of.  Clearly, the prejudicial nature of such 
evidence far outweighed any probative value it might have possessed, but that aspect of Boardman had 
clearly not travelled well. 
289 [1991] 2 AC 447. 
290 At 460-461. 
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All that this added to what their Lordships had already laid down in Boardman 
was the superfluous rider that some forms of similar fact evidence will be more 
obviously admissible than others. 
 
The policy swing towards increased admissibility 
 
 While these efforts to define “probity” were occuring, a subtle policy swing 
towards a greater admission of prior misconduct evidence was under way.  It was led by 
the Court of Appeal, but disguised as another question entirely, namely whether the 
“probity versus prejudice” test was to be applied by trial judges as a prerequisite of 
admission, or left for determination by juries, as the “tribunals of fact”. 
 
 This ball was first sent rolling by Scarman LCJ only a year after Boardman.  In 
Rance and Herron,291 he observed that: 
 
If the judge is satisfied that the evidence, if accepted by the jury, goes beyond mere 
evidence of disposition, he should let the evidence in and then leave it to the jury to 
make what they think of it . . . the judge should . . . . tell them that if they think it 
merely contains evidence of disposition they should not take any notice of it.  
 
 Two difficulties are immediately apparent if this approach is adopted.  The first 
is that the correctness of the exercise of a judicial discretion is a difficult matter to 
                                                            
 
 
291 Note 275, at 122.  See also Scarrott, note 276, at 131.  This would make the test for the admission, and 
use made, of similar fact evidence analogous to that employed in relation to a challenged confession.  The 
trial judge must first determine whether or not, as a matter of law, it is admissible, but it is ultimately a 
matter for the jury how much “weight” they attach to it, having regard to precisely the same factors which 
went into an assessment of its admissibility. 
95 
 
assess on appeal.  This had been alluded to twice by the Court of Appeal in the space of 
one month, barely a year after Boardman.292   
 
The second difficulty is that before safely leaving in the hands of a jury a task 
which requires them to “ignore the elephant in the room”, the trial judge will be 
required to direct that jury in the most detailed and authoritative terms regarding the 
need to avoid “forbidden reasoning”. Once the evidence is admitted, there is always the 
risk that the jury will employ it for the wrong reason, and no amount of judicial 
direction can guarantee that this does not occur.   
 
This in turn underlines the need for strong judicial direction to the jury regarding 
(a) why the Crown asserts that the similar fact evidence is relevant to the case against 
the accused; (b) the fact that it is for the jury to decide for themselves whether or not 
they agree with the Crown on that point, and (c) that they may not use that evidence for 
any other purpose.  This need for additional judicial attention to these matters had been 
latent in some of their Lordships’ pronouncements in Boardman,293 but like so much 
else in that case, it was about to be overlooked.  
 
 The issue was thrown into sharp focus on the second occasion after Boardman 
when the House of Lords was called upon to reap what it had sown.  DPP v H 294  
involved the all-too familiar scenario of separate victims of alleged sexual offences by 
the accused (in this case his adopted daughter and his step-daughter) being allowed to 
cross-corroborate each other on the trial of a “joined” indictment, in circumstances in 
                                                            
 
 
292 In Mustafa (note 274, at 30), it had pointed out that “It is for the judge in the exercise of his discretion 
to balance probative value and prejudicial effect.  Unless one can show in an appellate court that that 
discretion has been wrongly exercised or has been exercised upon a mistaken view of the law, this Court 
will not interfere with the discretion of the trial judge.”  See also Novac and Ors (note 274), at 115.  
293 Note 235, per Lord Hailsham at 453 and Lord Cross at 459. 
294 [1995] 2 AC 596; [1995] 2 WLR 737. 
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which it was being alleged that the girls had either deliberately colluded with, or been 
unconsciously influenced by, each other. 
 
The trial judge had allowed the jury to decide for themselves whether or not the 
evidence of the two girls had been contaminated in this way, and on appeal it was 
argued for the defence, in essence, that proof of the truth of the similar fact allegations 
was a pre-requisite to their admissibility. In rejecting this approach, and dismissing the 
appeal, Lord Mackay, L.C. ruled that:295  
 
Where there is an application to exclude evidence on the ground that it does not qualify 
as similar fact evidence and the submission raises a question of collusion . . . . the judge 
should approach the question of admissibility on the basis that the similar facts alleged 
are true. 
 
Lord Griffiths expressed the same view in language more directly reflecting the 
traditional roles of judge and jury, thus:296  
  
Deciding the facts requires the jury in all cases to decide whose evidence they find 
credible and what inferences they are prepared to draw from the facts as they find them.  
I would therefore resist any attempt to remove this essential role from the jury for to do 
so seems to me to strike root and branch at the very reason we have jury trial . . .  
 
Lord Mustill, while conceding the risk which such an arrangement might entail, 
nevertheless went along with the remainder of the House,297 on the pragmatic ground 
that “. . . . I would not be willing to impose a practice which would in many cases make 
the just prosecution of these offences impossible.” 
                                                            
 
 
295 At 612.  
296 At 613. Lords Lloyd and Nicholls issued judgments containing similar sentiments. 
297 At 617.   
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His Lordship seems to have been primarily concerned that the need for a trial 
judge to hold a voir dire in order to test the possibility of collusion would require the 
victim to undergo further cross-examination, which would be “. . . . more than I am 
willing to accept”.298  But, with respect, if one of the essential tests of the “probity” of 
an item of evidence is its “cogency”,299  then any trial judge, required in terms of 
Boardman to balance “probity” against “prejudice”, must make due inquiry into the 
possibility of falsehood through contamination. 
 
Put another way, 
 
. . . . since probative value is an essential part of the admissibility test and since 
credibility of the evidence in question might be thought an element thereof, the test 
does naturally entail a preparedness to take the possibility of contamination into 
account.300 
 
Even Lord Lloyd, while concurring with the rulings of his brethren in the instant 
case, seemed to advocate the need for more vigilance by the trial judge in certain cases, 
because:301 
 
. . . . where a risk of collusion or contamination is apparent on the face of the 
documents, it will always be an element, and exceptionally a decisive element, in 
deciding whether the probative force of the similar fact evidence is sufficiently strong 
to justify admitting the evidence, notwithstanding its prejudicial effect. 
 
                                                            
 
 
298 Ibid.  
299 Cross on Evidence (7th ed, 1990), at p.352. 
300 Mirfield, ‘Proof and Prejudice in the House of Lords’, (1996) 112 Law Quarterly Rev. 1, at 4. 
301 At 626. 
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Again with respect, the need for a high degree of probity is surely at its greatest 
when the risk of “moral prejudice”, as it is usually called,302 against the accused is at its 
highest, as it is in cases such as DPP v H, and it is in such cases that the accused is in 
the greatest need of judicial protection. It is bad enough that the evidence is prejudicial; 
if it is also untrue, then clearly the trial will be unfair. It was for this reason, among 
others, that the approach adopted by the House of Lords in this case was soundly 
rejected by both the High Court of Australia,303 and the Supreme Court of Canada.304   
 
Roberts,305 in summarising the combined consequences of DPP v P and DPP v 
H, said of them that: 
 
In DPP v P, and then in H, the senior judiciary has reversed the tide of a century’s 
jurisprudence on the admissibility of . . . . similar fact evidence and turned its back on 
those concerns about the unreliability of evidence that may have been contaminated by 
collusion or confabulation which so exercised Lords Cross and Wilberforce in DPP v 
Boardman only twenty years before. (footnotes omitted). 
 
The clear implication that, whenever possible, bad character evidence ought to 
be admitted, and then left to the jury to assess for its relevance (regardless of their lack 
of legal training to avoid any “forbidden” reasoning) was further underlined in the next 
case to come before the House of Lords.  In R v Z,306 the Crown appealed a decision by 
a trial judge not to admit certain evidence against a man accused of rape who was 
pleading “consent”. The evidence in question concerned four previous occasions on 
                                                            
 
 
302 That is, prejudice based solely on the jury’s feelings of revulsion following the exposure of the 
accused’s tendencies; see note 337. 
303 In Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292.   
304 In Handy [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908.  In this latter case, it was observed, at para. 110, that “. . . . the    
existence of collusion rebuts the premise on which admissibility depends”.  However, in Christou, [1997] 
AC 117, the House of Lords again declined an opportunity to adopt this more logical approach in cases of 
alleged contamination of testimony. 
305 ‘All the Usual Suspects; A Critical Appraisal of Law Commission Consultation Paper 141’, [1997] 
Crim L R 75, at 78.   
306 [2000] 2 AC 483. 
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which he had been tried for rape, on three of which he had been acquitted.  In every case, 
Z had pleaded consent, and the Crown had sought to call, as witnesses against Z in the 
instant case, the complainants from the previous cases.  It was not disputed that their 
testimony would reveal “a considerable number of similarities in the conduct of the 
defendant alleged by [the new victim] and the other four complainants”.307 
 
The defence argument was to the effect that, since Z had been acquitted of three 
of the previous charges, to allow these previous complainants to testify against him 
again would be a breach of the “double jeopardy” rule, in that it would tend to show Z 
to be guilty of offences to which a formal plea in bar of trial of “autrefois acquit” should 
apply.308 
 
The House drew an important distinction between “res judicata” estoppel, which 
relates to the entire cause of action between an accused and the Crown, and “issue 
estoppel”, which relates to only one issue of fact between them.  Only the former, they 
ruled, was caught by the “double jeopardy” rule, whereas in relation to specific issue of 
fact between the Crown and an accused 
 
. . . . the defendant is not placed in double jeopardy because the facts giving rise to the 
present prosecution are different to the facts which gave rise to the earlier prosecution.  
The evidence of the earlier complainants is . . . . not inadmissible because it shows that 
the defendant was, in fact, guilty of the offences of rape of which he had earlier been 
acquitted . . . . subject . . . to the discretion of the judge to exclude the evidence after 
                                                            
 
 
307 Per Lord Hutton, at 488. 
308  The defence team, and the trial judge, based their arguments on the Privy Council ruling in 
Sambasivam v Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya [1950] AC 458 at 479, that “ . . . the verdict is 
binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication”. 
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weighing its prejudicial effect against its probative force or under section 78 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.309 
 
His Lordship further explained the logical basis for his ruling as being that:310 
 
It would be a denial of the principle upon which similar fact evidence is admitted that 
such evidence should be treated as inadmissible. 
 
The Court justified its position by reference to the alternative which, it was 
held,311 might involve: 
 
. . . . the unedifying spectacle . . . . of a succession of acquittals based on individual 
allegations which, viewed in isolation, left room for doubt, but which, when viewed as 
part of a pattern, each drawing support from the others, might lead irresistibly to a 
conclusion of guilt. 
 
                                                            
 
 
309 Per Lord Hutton, at 506, with whom the remaining Lords concurred.  Section 78 was the statutory 
embodiment of the Christie principle, while the ‘probity versus prejudice’ test was the common law one 
which had emerged in Boardman. 
310 At 508-9.  One is, however, prompted to speculate on what precisely his Lordship believed the 
evidence of the prior incidents was “relevant” to.  It is difficult to appreciate how the state of mind (re. 
consent) of four independent women on four separate occasions in the past might be relevant to the state 
of mind of the accused on a fifth occasion; see Phillips (note 653).  However, the same distinction had 
been drawn between “cause of action” and “issue” estoppel by the Australian High Court in Rogers v The 
Queen (1994) 181 CLR 251. R v Z also found judicial support in New Zealand, where it was adopted by 
that country’s Court of Appeal in R v Degnan [2001] NZLR 280 (C.A.). The United States Supreme 
Court also adopted a comparable stance in Dowling v United States (1990) 110 S. Ct. 668. 
311 At [33].  There was also some authoritative academic opinion in support of this approach. The 
Canadian scholar Stuesser (“Admitting Acquittals as Similar Fact Evidence”, (2002) 45 Criminal Law 
Quarterly, 488, at 498), commenting not only on the ruling in R v Z, but also a line of decisions by the 
Canadian courts, made the telling observation that if Smith (note 180) had been tried separately for each 
of his wives’ deaths, without reference to either of the other two, then he might well have been acquitted 
of all three, because none of the juries would have been allowed to be advised of what might be termed 
“the full picture”.  With respect, the court in that case was concerned with the state of mind of the 
accused, not the victims. 
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  Stuesser, in addition,312 argued that if this application of issue estoppel were to 
be allowed to prevail in such cases, then : 
  
We are back to playing games with similar fact evidence.  We are back to admitting 
such evidence given its purpose but not its probative value.  We are back to pigeon-
holing the similar fact evidence. 
 
This was essentially an argument in favour of approaching similar fact evidence 
from the standpoint of its relevance rather than the category into which it might be fitted. 
In this regard, Stuesser found support from a leading English academic, Roberts,313  
who confirmed that “. . . . the probative value of extraneous misconduct evidence is not 
affected by a prior acquittal.” 
 
But there were also academic opinions to the contrary. Tapper, 314  after 
reminding his readers of the House’s prior ruling in DPP v H,315 to the effect that 
evidence admitted under the similar fact rule should be presumed to be true, observed 
that: 
 
There might be thought to be some incompatibility between presuming persons guilty 
after, and despite, their acquittal according to law, and presuming them to be innocent 
until they have been proved guilty according to law. . . .  
 
                                                            
 
 
312 Ibid. 
313 ‘Acquitted Misconduct Evidence and Double Jeopardy’, [2000] Crim L R 952, at 958.  See also 
Munday, ‘Admitting Acquittals as Similar Fact Evidence of Guilt’, [2000] Cambridge Law Journal, 468, 
at 470, who opined that “ . . . . to admit acquittals as similar fact evidence provided that they possess 
sufficient probative value accords with instinctive common sense”.  See also Birch, [2001] Crim L R 
222, at 224. 
314 ‘Clouded Acquittal’, (2001) 117 Law Quarterly Rev. 1, at 3. 
315 Note 294. 
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Similarly,316 Mahoney insisted that: 
 
. . . a guilty verdict by the current jury that relies even in part on the similar fact 
evidence of the earlier offence necessarily means that the current jury had no ultimate 
doubt about the accused’s guilt of that earlier offence.   
 
Tapper observed,317 of R v Z, that “It remains to be seen what inspired so radical 
a change.”  In fact, the decision in Z proved to be the first warning of an impending 
policy change in English law, born of a growing belief that laws such as those which 
restricted the admission of similar fact evidence were operating too favourably towards 
an accused.   There was also a growing insistence by qualified commentators that 
“Truth is our ultimate goal in a criminal trial”,318 which was to be cynically employed 
by those with a policy agenda to “get tough on criminals”. 
 
 This policy was soon to be expressed in statutory form.  In the meantime, from a 
common law standpoint, what had been described only twenty years earlier, as “an 
intellectual breakthrough” had not lived up to its promise.  
 
An avalanche of paper 
 
 The growing belief that the legal pendulum in England was swinging 
against the criminal accused was confirmed in a series of Government-sponsored 
papers in which calls for the “simplification”, “clarification” and “reassessment” of the 
law on similar fact evidence proved to be camouflage for a new policy initiative to “get 
                                                            
 
 
316  “Acquittals as Similar Fact Evidence: Another View”, (2003) 47 Criminal Law Quarterly 265, at 
270-1.  See also Mirfield, P, “Res Judicata Rejected”, (2001) 117 Law Quarterly Rev. 194. 
317 Note 314, at 4. 
318 Per Stuesser, note 311, at 490. 
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tough on criminals”.  It was also cunningly disguised as a campaign to ensure that a 
court received as much “evidence” as was available to it.  This series of papers 
culminated in the Criminal Evidence Act 2003 (E&W), which re-established a 
‘categories of admissibility’ regime which generated far more confusion and 
uncertainty than either Makin or Boardman.  
 
 These papers, in chronological order, were:  
 
1. The Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972).319 
2. Law Commission Consultation Paper (1996).320 
3/4 “Criminal Justice – The Way Ahead” (2001), 321  and “Justice for All” 
(2002).322 
5. The Auld Review (2001).323 
6/7. Law Commission Final Report (2001),324 and Criminal Justice Act 2003 (E 
 & W) 
 
 The 11th Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee 
 
In its Eleventh Report to the UK Parliament, issued three years before 
Boardman, the Criminal Law Revision Committee (“CLRC”) had taken, 325  as its 
starting point: 
                                                            
 
 
319 CLRC 11th Report – “Evidence (General)” (1972) (Cmnd. 4991). 
320  “Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Previous Misconduct of a Defendant” (Law Commission 
Consultation Paper no. 141, 1996). 
321 CM 5074. 
322 CM 5563. 
323 “Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales” (HMSO, October, 2001). 
324 “Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings” (Cm. 5257).  
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. . . . the ideal that all available and relevant evidence should be before the court.  We 
have throughout aimed at reducing the exceptions to admissibility under the present 
law. . . . There has . . . . been a good deal of feeling in the committee and elsewhere that 
the law of evidence should now be less tender to criminals generally.   
 
 Ominously, it added that:326  
 
. . . . there seems to be an idea that the defence have a sacred right to the benefit of 
anything in the law which may give them a chance of acquittal, even on a technicality, 
however strong the case is against them.  We disagree entirely with this idea. 
 
Given these caveats, it was probably too optimistic to expect any workable 
proposals for reform, and indeed there were none.  The Committee’s principal proposal 
to “codify the main part of the rule”,327 on the admission of similar fact evidence, found 
its way into Clause 3 of its Draft Bill, which reproduced the first ‘arm’ of the original 
Makin Rule, to the effect that evidence of “other conduct” by an accused should not be 
admissible solely to prove their “disposition”, then stipulated three purposes for which 
such evidence might be admissible.  They were, essentially, to prove (a) modus 
operandi, (b) similarity of chosen victim, and (c) identification by a Crown witness.  
This clearly would have taken the common law back to where it was before Boardman, 
and arguably even before Makin. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
325 Note 319, paras. 20 & 21. 
326 Ibid, at para.27.  However, in para. 22, it conceded that “We differ greatly among ourselves as to the 
extent of the danger that juries may be unduly affected by knowledge of other misconduct of the accused 
and . . . . as to how far it is right to go in allowing this conduct to be disclosed.” 
327 Para. 78.   
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The most controversial proposal contained within the Report was the suggestion 
that the rule thereby enacted should be relaxed in cases in which the accused admits the 
act which is the basis of the charge for which they are on trial, but still maintains a “Not 
Guilty” plea to that charge (e.g. the alleged rapist who admits intercourse but claims 
that the alleged victim consented).  In such cases, it was proposed that the accused’s 
“disposition” to commit offences should be admissible in those circumstances in which 
case-law had held it to be admissible under the second limb of Makin (e.g. to prove 
‘state of mind’ or ‘absence of accident’), with the important difference that it would no 
longer be necessary for the Crown to demonstrate any factual similarity between the 
previous offence and the offence charged.328  This revealed a total ignorance of the fact 
that relevance is the key to admissibility, and factual similarity is one form of 
relevance.   
 
It also ran contrary to what the House in Boardman would shortly decide should 
be the law.  It was also open to serious criticism, in that it appeared to proceed from a 
questionable policy which sought to ‘jail more criminals’,329  rather than any legal 
principle based on logic and relevance.  From its outset, the legal justification for the 
admission of similar fact evidence had always been its “logical probity” to the facts of 
the instant case, and the principal reason for its exclusion had been the risk that the 
offender would be convicted for the wrong reason.  This safeguard was now being 
depicted as a “technicality” which stood in the way of a higher conviction rate.  Clause 
3 was also open to the objection that it perpetuated the ‘categories of admissibility’ 
approach to “disposition” evidence generally which had generated so much confusing 
and inconsistent case-law since Makin. 
 
                                                            
 
 
328 By way of example, it was suggested (in para. 92) that “. . . if the accused is charged with obtaining 
property by deception and admits that he made the statement and that it was false, evidence of any 
previous offence of obtaining property by deception will be admissible, on the issue of dishonesty, even 
if the circumstances were quite different”. 
329 In para. 93, the Committee added that “ . . . . all agree that, if the defence agree that the conduct took 
place, then the probative value of the other offences justifies making them admissible in evidence 
notwithstanding their possibly prejudicial effect.” 
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The implied assertion that the probative value of similar fact evidence is in 
some way enhanced, and its prejudicial effect somehow reduced, by the fact that the 
accused admits the actus reus, flies in the face of both logic and the rationale for 
admitting such evidence.  If one factor had emerged clearly from the case-law to that 
point, it was surely that what gives some similar fact evidence its probity is the 
“striking similarity” between the facts and circumstances of the previous misbehaviour 
and the alleged actions of the accused in the instant case.  It is therefore counter-
intuitive to deny a jury access to those previous facts in any context.330   
 
Professor Cross, himself a member of the CLRC, observed, shortly after the 
publication of its Report,331  that “I have a sneaking feeling that cl.3 of the Draft 
Criminal Evidence Bill is the least likely of all the clauses ever to become law”.  In 
fact, it never did become law, and the task of replacing a besieged legal principle with a 
new statutory policy was handed to the Law Commission. 
 
Law Commission Consultation Paper, 1996 
The Law Commission’s Consultation Paper of 1996 began with a reference to 
the CLRC Report,332 and, first,333 endorsed the CLRC’s earlier observation,334 regarding 
the law relating to the admission of similar fact evidence, namely that it was: 
 
. . . . difficult to summarise because it is exceptionally complicated and because 
opinions differ greatly as to the effect of some of the decisions and as to whether the 
law is entirely consistent in itself. 
                                                            
 
 
330 This much was actually conceded by the Committee, when they observed (in para. 96) that “. . . . . a 
bare conviction does not reveal the facts of the offence sufficiently to indicate whether the disposition 
which caused the accused to commit it is of particular relevance for the proof of the offence charged”. 
331 “Clause 3 of the Draft Criminal Evidence Bill, Research and Codification”, [1973] Crim L R 400.  
332 Note 319. 
333 In para.1.2. 
334 Note 319, para.78.  The Commission clearly did not consider that this state of affairs had improved 
following Boardman. 
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The Commission, first of all,335 distinguished between what it termed “reasoning 
prejudice”,336 and “moral prejudice”,337 and concluded that:338  
 
It is only where there is a risk of prejudice that the evidence needs to be subject to an 
exclusionary rule; 339 
 
The Commission took,340 as its guiding principle, that: 
 
. . . . the admissibility of bad character evidence in chief should depend upon the 
probative value of the evidence, and not on the purpose for which it is proposed to 
adduce it; and that the evidence should not, therefore, be inadmissible merely because it 
is relevant only to propensity, provided that it is sufficiently probative. 
 
The final test recommended by the Commission for the admissibility of similar 
fact evidence in chief appeared in para.10.74 of the Paper, and was that such evidence 
should be admissible if: 
 
(1) it is relevant to a specific fact in issue; and 
                                                            
 
 
335 In paras.7.7 – 7.15. 
336 This it defined as the danger that “ . . . the jury or magistrates may assess the evidence wrongly, 
giving too much weight to the disposition evidence”; see para. 7.7. 
337 This is the risk that “the jury or magistrates may reach a verdict based on the accused’s character, 
rather than on the evidence”; see para.7.10. 
338 In para.9.86.  
339 With respect, surely it is the other way around, in that an exclusionary rule is required in order to 
prevent possible prejudice. 
340 The Commission was obviously satisfied that the similar fact evidence had been rightly admitted in 
Ball and Ball (note 173), Thompson (note 192) and Straffen (note 226), even though, in each case, it was 
evidence relating to the accused’s  “propensity”  to behave in a certain way.  See paras.10.9 and 10.10.  It 
also clearly favoured the Boardman approach over what it perceived to have been the original ratio of 
Makin 
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(2)  
(3) on the assumption that the evidence is true, the degree to which it is relevant to that 
fact (in other words, its probative value) outweighs the risk that, if admitted, it 
might 
(a) result in prejudice; 
(b) mislead, confuse or distract the fact-finders; or 
(c) cause undue waste of time. 
 
There were several obvious difficulties with such a suggested statutory formula, 
offered at that time.  The first was that, although in form it appeared to replicate the 
‘probity versus prejudice’ test of Boardman, in substance it took the test no further than 
it had been stated more succinctly in Boardman, and therefore did nothing to resolve the 
unworkability of the test in practice which had become apparent in the case-law 
subsequent to Boardman.341  Also, like that subsequent case-law, it failed to define 
either “probative value” or “prejudice” in any practical sense. 
 
Another difficulty was the requirement that one assume the truth of the similar 
fact evidence which was being considered for admissibility.  There is, in admitting 
several unproved allegations of a “strikingly similar” nature against an accused who is 
on trial in respect of only one of them, the risk that, by sheer weight of numbers, or by 
mere repetition, each acquires a seemingly enhanced credibility, whether or not all or 
any of them are false.  As the Canadian Supreme Court was to observe in Handy,342 the 
whole logic of admitting similar fact evidence depends upon that evidence being true. 
 
                                                            
 
 
341 As one commentator  (McEwan, “Law Commission Dodges the Nettles in Consultation Paper No. 
141”, [1997] Crim L R 93, at 94) subsequently observed, “It is not clear why it is thought that placing 
what amounts to the common law into a statute is going to make any difference to judicial decisions.  The 
application of such a clause would depend upon the subjectivity of the court’s perception of probative 
value, and that is the root cause of the present levels of unpredictability in the similar facts case law”.  
342 Note 304. 
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Despite these dangers, the House of Lords in DPP v H,343 had held that, in 
admitting such evidence, the trial judge must assume its truth, and leave it to the jury to 
assess its veracity as part of the normal jury function.  The Commission was prepared to 
rely on the authority of H for its generalised conclusion that it:344  
 
. . . . . would be very unhappy about adopting a procedure by which the role of the fact-
finders  moved from jury to judge. 
 
This approach would also seem to be inconsistent with the very rationale for 
excluding some similar fact evidence, namely the risk that the “fact-finders” night be 
unduly prejudiced by it. Once they have heard it, it would take a very strong direction 
indeed from the trial judge to persuade them to put it from their minds once it has been 
shown to be unreliable.345 
 
The academic response to the Paper was mixed.  For example, Roberts, the 
following year,346 complained of what appeared to him to be: 
 
. . . . a populist programme of criminal justice reform predicated on the notion that the 
criminal process now too greatly favours defendants at the expense of law-abiding folk. 
 
On the other hand, Professor Tapper, a few years later,347 said of it that: 
 
                                                            
 
 
343 Note 294.  
344 Para.10.97 
345 “A bell once rung cannot be unrung” (Leonard, The New Wigmore.  A Treatise on Evidence: Evidence 
of Other Misconduct and Similar Events, (2011 Aspen Publishers, USA). 
346 Note 305, at 79. 
347 In [2004] Crim L R 533, at 537. 
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A singular strength of this paper was the robust clarity of the principles it recommended 
to govern this area of the law: that it should be simplified so far as possible; that all 
relevant evidence should be admissible unless there is a good reason for its exclusion; 
and that no evidence should be admitted if no effective warning as to weight, or 
coherent instruction as to its use, can be given. 
  
However, in the event the Paper had no immediate practical outcome, and:348  
 
We were condemned to a future of endless tinkering with the rules of evidence rather 
than a comprehensive overhaul.  But overhaul is what is needed.   
 
That “overhaul” lay another six years in the future, and yet again failed to 
deliver the simple formula for admissibility which was so clearly required.   
 
“Criminal Justice: The Way Ahead”/ “Justice for All” (2001-2) 
 
The suspicion that a widely-swung legislative axe was about to be taken to some 
fundamental and time-honoured principles which were getting in the way of convictions 
was deepened by some of the phrases employed in two Government-sponsored papers 
delivered in 2001 and 2002. The Introduction to the 2001 Paper, which appeared to be 
largely politically inspired,349 contained the following: 
 
Nothing does more damage to people’s confidence in the [criminal justice system] than 
a perception that criminals are getting away with their crimes . . . . . . we aim to . . . 
close the ‘justice gap’ and bring more criminals to justice. . . . One option for 
                                                            
 
 
348 Darbyshire, note 44, at 105. 
349 Note 321. This was published in February 2001, and the quotations are taken from paras. 2, 14,17, 
and 28 of the Introduction to it. 
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simplification would be to allow evidence of previous convictions where relevant, 
providing their prejudicial effect does not outweigh their probative value. 
 
 One could be forgiven for believing that this is what had already been laid down 
in Boardman.  However, this time what was being promised were:350  
 
. . . . simpler, fairer rules of evidence, so that magistrates and juries may have access to 
all the relevant and reliable material they need to acquit the innocent and convict the 
guilty. 
 
 This generalised bundle of pious promises was followed, in July 2002, by 
another Government White Paper, “Justice for All”,351 which was even blunter in its 
message that:352  
 
Too few criminals are caught or convicted . . . This White Paper is designed to send the 
strongest possible message to those who commit crimes that the system will be 
effective in . . . . convicting them. 
 
Once again, the Government pledged to:353  
 
. . . . overhaul the rules of evidence to ensure the widest possible range of relevant 
material is available for a judgment. This includes making information available to 
judges and juries on previous convictions and misconduct where it is relevant and put in 
context. 
 
                                                            
 
 
350 On p.11. 
351 Note 322. 
352 The quotation comes from the third paragraph of the “Foreword” section of the Paper. 
353 On p.68 of the Paper. 
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In relation to similar fact evidence it foreshadowed that: 354  
 
. . . . where a defendant’s previous convictions, or other misconduct, are relevant to an 
issue in the case, then unless the court considers that the information will have a 
disproportional effect, they should be allowed to know about it.  It will be for the judge 
to decide whether the probative value of introducing this information is outweighed by 
its prejudicial effect. 355 These safeguards will be set out in legislation.  This will 
reform the current haphazard collection of exclusionary rules. 
 
In the event, this “haphazard collection of exclusionary rules” was to be replaced 
by a haphazard collection of inclusionary rules. 
 
The Law Commission’s Final Report/ The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (E & W) 
 
Following the feedback it had received on its 1996 Consultation Paper,356 the 
Law Commission presented its final Report in October 2001, together with a draft Bill 
intended to reflect its recommendations in statutory form.  The legislation which 
eventually emerged from the Report, following vigorous, and at times heated, 
Parliamentary debate,357 was the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (E & W), most of which 
                                                            
 
 
354 In para. 4.57. 
355 It will be noted that the Government of the day was impliedly taking the credit for the decision in 
Boardman, which itself was by now a quarter of a century in the past, and had proved unworkable in the 
hands of judges who could not effectively identify what constituted either “probative value” or 
“prejudicial effect”.  Lord Justice Auld, in his “Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales”, 
published the previous year (see note 323) had already (one assumes unwittingly) drawn attention (in para. 
116) to what had followed the Boardman “test of balancing proof against prejudice”, namely the 
eventuation of the risk that “the imprecision of the exercise applied on a case by case basis might in the 
early days substitute uncertainty for complexity, only to succumb again to complexity as it became 
overlain with case law.”  
356 Note 320. 
357 One example of this will suffice.  On 12 December 2004, during the House of Lords debate on the 
associated Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Categories of Offences) Order 2004 (reported in Hansard HL, 
vol.667, cols 1260-1), Lord Thomas of Gresford QC likened what was being introduced to the draconian 
legislation forced through by Robespierre during the Reign of Terror in post-Revolutionary France.  
Interestingly, during the same speech, he illustrated the extent of what he regarded as the Government’s 
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came into force on 15 December, 2004.  Part 11, Chap.1 (sections 98-113) of that Act 
deals with “bad character” evidence generally.  
 
Re-defining “bad character” evidence 
Fundamental to the entire philosophy and structure of both the Report and the 
Act was a new definition of what precisely constituted “bad character” evidence. Para.3 
of the Summary of the Report advocated : 
 
. . . .the idea that, in any given trial, there is a central set of facts about which any party 
should be free to adduce relevant evidence without constraint – even evidence of bad 
character.  Evidence falls within this central set of facts if it has to do with the offence 
charged, or is evidence of misconduct connected with the investigation or prosecution 
of that offence.358  We recommend that evidence of bad character which falls outside 
this category should only be admissible if the court gives leave for it to be adduced, or 
all parties agree to its admission, or it is evidence of a defendant’s bad character and it 
is that defendant who wishes to adduce it. 
 
This purported new concept appeared, at long last, to acknowledge the 
fundamental and crucial test for the admissibility of all similar fact evidence, namely its 
relevance to the facts of the instant case.  Unfortunately, not only did it fail to equally 
acknowledge that some bad character evidence can be more prejudicial than probative, 
but it also proposed that however prejudicial it might be, it was to be automatically 
admissible, without any judicial restraint, if it fell within either of the categories of (a) 
being “to do with the offence” on trial, or (b) “misconduct to do with the investigation 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
exaggeration of the urgent need for reform of the criminal trial process by quoting the Home Office’s own 
2003\4 statistics, which revealed that of over 5 million reported crimes, acquittal by jury did not exceed 
9,000 outcomes. 
358 This was included so as to allow a defendant to make allegations against the police (e.g. of an 
“involuntary” confession) or a prosecution witness (e.g. an allegation of false testimony by an alleged 
victim proceeding from improper bias) without the loss of any “shield” provided by the law against the 
“tit for tat” adduction of the defendant’s own bad character, which had hitherto been possible under s 1 
(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (E & W).    
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or prosecution of that offence”.  Furthermore, if it did, it was not even to be regarded as 
“bad character evidence”.   
  
 This new principle was embodied in s 98 of the Act, which unfortunately failed 
to indicate what behaviour by an accused might be said to “have to do with” the facts of 
the instant case. Clearly within the definition would be other criminal acts performed as 
part of the actus reus of the main offence on trial,359 or reprehensible behaviour which is 
part of the events leading up to the main offence,360 or without which the final criminal 
act cannot be fully understood in its context.361 
 
 As it transpired – and might perhaps have been predicted - there was 
considerable potential for overlap between bad character evidence which might be said 
to “have to do with” the facts of the instant case, and therefore be admissible without 
judicial leave under s 98, but which might also be said to fall within one of the 
“gateway” categories under which bad character evidence might be admitted only with 
leave.362 It was not long before the Court of Appeal began hedging its bets,363 by ruling 
that even if it was wrong in holding that the evidence fell within the provisions of s 98, 
then at least it was clearly admissible through one of the ‘gateways’ set out in section 
101.  The difference between the two, which such an approach clearly overlooks, is that 
in the latter case, the Crown would need to have justified the admission of the evidence 
to the trial judge. 
 
                                                            
 
 
359 An example of such a scenario might be what under Queensland law would be called a “deprivation 
of liberty” as part of a subsequent rape.  
360 As in Brummitt [2006] EWCA Crim 1629, in which a thief racing from a crime scene caused a fatal 
road accident. In Saleem [2007] EWCA Crim 1923, the Court of Appeal suggested, as an example, a 
“revenge” assault on a person who had earlier reported the accused for wife-beating. 
361 As in the Australian case of O’Leary (1947) 73 CLR 566, in which the previous behaviour was 
regarded as res gestae of the incident on trial.   
362 These appear in s 101 – see below. 
363  Professor Spencer (Evidence of Bad Character, 2nd ed. Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009) at p.39 
described this process as “. . . . a series of ‘belt and braces’ decisions”, 
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One such “belt and braces” case was Malone,364 in which M’s defence to a 
charge of murdering his wife was that she had simply run away somewhere, which was 
her habit. Evidence was admitted of a purported report from a private investigator 
apparently confirming this habit, which M had forged prior to her disappearance.  This 
was held to have satisfied the tests either under s 98,365 or under s 101(c).366 
 
The opportunity was also taken to expand the potential scope of “bad character”. 
Section 98 defines it as “misconduct, or a disposition towards misconduct”, by an 
accused. The extended definition of “misconduct” supplied under s 112 of the Act 
includes not only “the commission of an offence”,367 but also “other reprehensible 
behaviour”.  There is not even a requirement that the previous misconduct in question 
be sufficiently probative to secure a conviction if it were to go to trial.   
 
Hardly surprisingly, several commentators expressed uncertainty regarding what, 
in future, might be taken to constitute “reprehensible behaviour”, and the even more 
vaguely expressed “evidence of a disposition towards” such behaviour. 368 
 
The judicial debate which these widely drafted concepts generated is well 
illustrated by the issues raised before the Court of Appeal in Manister.369  During the 
                                                            
 
 
364 [2006] EWCA Crim 1860.  For a case in which the evidence failed the s 98 test, but was admitted 
under the “important matter” gateway of s 101(1)(d), see Timaveanu [2007] 1 W.L.R. 3049.  Other “belt 
and braces” cases were Lewis [2008] EWCA Crim 424 and McKintosh [2006] EWCA Crim 193. 
365 It clearly “had to do with the case”, in that it suggested premeditation. The Court categorised this act 
as “reprehensible behavior”, thus confirming its admissibility without leave under s 98. 
366 It had “substantial value” in “understanding the case as a whole”; see below.    
367 Even, presumably, one of which the defendant has previously been acquitted (as in Z – see note 306), 
or in respect of which they have not yet stood trial (as in Boardman and Smith). 
368 See, e.g. Munday, ‘What Constitutes “Other Reprehensible Behaviour” under the Bad Character 
Provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003?’, [2005] Crim L R 24, who complained that “. . . . the word 
“reprehensible” is . . . . more evocative of Victorian social moralising than representative of the more 
neutral traits of a statute designed to set the creaking rules of criminal evidence on a modern footing.”.  
See also Spencer, note 363, at pp. 34-36, who cited twelve Court of Appeal cases in the first three years 
of the Act’s operation in which these concepts were considered.   
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trial of M, aged 39, for sexual offences involving a 13 year old girl, evidence was led by 
the Crown of non-criminal behaviour by M in the past involving girls of 15 and 16, 
when M had been 34. Having ruled that the prior behaviour of M could not be properly 
categorised as “reprehensible”,370 and therefore did not fall within the “bad character” 
definition of s 98 , the Court added that it was nevertheless:371  
 
. . . . admissible at common law, in the particular circumstances of this case, because it 
was relevant to the issue of whether the appellant had a sexual interest in . . . .  early or 
mid-teen girls, much younger than the appellant, and therefore bore on the truth of his 
case of a purely supportive, asexual interest in [the victim].  It was not in our judgment 
unfair to admit the evidence. 372 
 
Commenting on this curious decision, Waterman and Dempster made the telling 
observation that:373 
 
If [the evidence] was sufficiently relevant to that issue [i.e. of whether or not M had a 
sexual interest in the victim named in the indictment] to be probative, it is submitted 
that it is difficult to see how it could fail to have qualified as reprehensible behavior. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
369 Manister was one of the appellants in Weir and Ors [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 19, in which the Court of 
Appeal also made the general observation (at 333) that “ . . . . once it is decided that [the evidence does] 
not amount to ‘evidence of bad character’, the abolition of the common law rules governing the 
admissibility of ‘evidence of bad character’ by section 99(1) [does] not apply.”  
370 This was clearly a subjective opinion with which many people might disagree, further demonstrating 
the uncertainty which had been created in this area of the law.  The Court in fact categorised M’s 
behaviour as “unattractive”.  In Renda and Ors.[2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 24, at 390, the Court of Appeal 
observed that “. . . . as a matter of ordinary language, the word ‘reprehensible’ carries with it some 
element of culpability and blameworthiness.” 
371 Ibid .  
372 Despite the abolition of the common law rules relating to the admission of bad character, under s 99 of 
the Act, there had been no abolition of the “unfairness” discretion given to trial judges under s 78 of the 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (E & W) (“PACE”).  This was further confirmed in Smith, part of 
Edwards and Rowlands and Ors. [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 4, 84.   
373 ‘Bad Character: Feeling Our Way One Year On’, [2006] Crim L R 614, at 617. 
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To this one may add the obvious question of why, given its prejudicial nature, it 
was not caught by the common law rule under Boardman, if, as the Court observed, the 
abolition of the common law rules did not affect evidence which fell outside the “bad 
character” definition of s 98.  It was clearly not regarded as prejudicial to M, but it was 
regarded as sufficiently relevant to allow the jury to consider it when assessing whether 
or not he was guilty of inappropriate behavior with an under-age girl.  It is submitted 
that had the Boardman test been applied, the evidence would have been excluded. 
 
Opening up the flood gate(way)s 
 
 In its 2001 Report,374 the Law Commission had recommended that bad character 
evidence relating to an accused which did not form part of “the central facts of the case” 
ought to be admissible only in certain defined circumstances in which it could be 
justified, and even then only with judicial leave.  These certain defined circumstances 
ultimately became the “gateways” to admissibility listed in s 101 of the Act. However, s 
101 differed materially from the 2001 Report proposals in that (a) there was one more, 
somewhat controversial, gateway, and (b) there was no requirement for judicial leave to 
be sought, over and above the need for Crown Counsel to demonstrate that the evidence 
in question qualified to pass through one or more of the “gateways” created.375   
 
 The gateways specified in s 101 may be summarised as encompassing 
circumstances in which: 
(a) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being admissible; 
                                                            
 
 
374 Note 321, Parts IX to XIV. 
375 This could, of course, be described as “judicial leave” by another name. The Court of Appeal in D 
[2009] 2 Crim. App. R. 17 added insult to injury when it confirmed that these gateways are not even 
mutually exclusive. 
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(b) the evidence is adduced by the defendant, or is given in answer to a 
question asked by them in cross-examination and intended to elicit it; 
(c) it is important explanatory evidence; 
(d) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant 
and the prosecution; 
(e) it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in 
issue between the defendant and a co-defendant; 
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant, or 
the defendant has made an attack on another person’s character. 
  
  As if the existence of so many gateways, with so many alternative 
justifications for the admission of similar fact evidence, were not confusing enough, the 
Court of Appeal, in Highton and Ors,376 subsequently ruled that: 
 
. . . . a distinction must be drawn between the admissibility of evidence of bad character, 
which depends upon it getting through one of the gateways, and the use to which it may 
be put once it is admitted.  The use to which it may be put depends upon the matters to 
which it is relevant rather than upon the gateway through which it was admitted.  
 
One might have expected that the use to which such evidence might be put 
would be restricted to the reason for which (i.e. the gateway through which) it was 
admitted.377 
 
                                                            
 
 
376 [2006] 1 Crim. App. R. 7, 131. 
377 But see also Enright and Gray, part of Edwards and Rowlands and Ors.(note 372), in which the Court 
observed, at 88, that “Bad character in section 98 is broadly defined. Its relevance will vary from case to 
case.  Once admitted (no matter through which gateway) it can be used for any purpose for which it is 
relevant.” 
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Some of these gateways were also broadly defined, creating many new 
opportunities for Crown Counsel to justify the admission of similar fact evidence in 
circumstances in which it might never have been admissible at common law.  There 
have already been several opportunities for the Court of Appeal to apply any judicial 
brake which was felt appropriate, 378  but none has been taken.  For example, in 
Chohan,379 a gateway (c) case, a key eyewitness in a robbery trial was allowed to 
bolster the credibility of her identification of the accused as the robber with evidence 
that she knew him as a drug dealer from whom she regularly bought heroin, although a 
less prejudicial alternative might have been to restrict the witness to testifying that she 
knew him socially.380   
 
Nowhere in the Act was it more obvious that Parliament had “significantly ‘bent’ 
[the Law Commission’s proposals] to make evidence of the defendant’s bad character 
more readily admissible”,381 than under the provisions of s 101(1)(d), which makes such 
evidence admissible when it is “relevant to an important matter in issue between the 
defendant and the prosecution”.382  
 
                                                            
 
 
378 The Law Commission had required that before such evidence might be admitted under any of its 
newly-proposed gateways, it should first be demonstrated that either “in all the circumstances of the case” 
the evidence would not be prejudicial to the defendant, or in “the interests of justice” the value of the 
evidence in understanding the case as a whole required its admission notwithstanding its prejudicial 
effect.  This safeguard, in a diluted form, was attached to only two gateways in the Act, namely gateways 
(d) and (g). 
379 This case was one of the conjoined appeal cases reported under Edwards and Rowlands and Ors (note 
372).  See also Frain and Unsworth [2007] EWCA Crim 397, Chapman [2006] EWCA Crim 2545 and 
Glenn [2006] EWCA 3236 for examples of cases in which highly prejudicial evidence regarding an 
accused’s criminal past was admitted in order to strengthen the Crown’s theory that he was likely to be 
involved in a criminal organisation. 
380 See Phillips v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 45. 
381 Spencer, note 363, at p. 7.  
382 The phrase “an important matter in issue” between the Crown and the defence is curiously reminiscent 
of Lord Herschell’s second statement of law in Makin (note 144).  The relevance of similar fact evidence 
to “a matter in issue” had led to the admission of such evidence in the pre-Makin cases from which Lord 
Herschell’s second statement of law in that case had been constructed; see, e.g. Francis, note 92. It 
remained to be seen how “importance” would be interpreted. 
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Section 112(1) of the Act defines an ‘important matter’ as “a matter of 
substantial importance in the context of the case as a whole”, while s 103(1) includes,383 
within the definition of the “matters in issue” between the parties (a) the defendant’s 
“propensity to commit offences of the kind with which he is charged”, and (b) their 
“propensity to be untruthful”.384  
 
By this legislative sleight-of-hand, an accused’s “propensity”, in either 
category, has been made an “important matter” in issue between the Crown and the 
defence.  This has made possible the re-opening of doors long since believed to be 
closed at common law.385  At the same time, s 103(2) provides that one of the ways of 
proving “propensity” may be by reference to the defendant’s previous conviction of an 
offence of “the same description”, or in “the same category” as that with which they are 
currently charged.   
 
                                                            
 
 
383 The legislative origins of s 103 are further testimony to the determination of the government of the day 
to ensure that as much as possible of an accused person’s murky past be revealed to the jury.  What is 
now contained within the section was originally part of another ‘gateway’ proposed by the Government, 
but not part of the Law Commission’s recommendations.  Trenchant opposition to this additional gateway 
during Parliamentary debate led to its removal, followed by its somewhat arrogant re-insertion as a form 
of evidence admissible under the ‘important matter’ gateway.  
384 In each case, the subsection contains the curious proviso that such factors may not be considered if 
they bear no relevance to the defendant’s likely guilt, or truthfulness, on the instant occasion.  Not only 
did this appear to underline the obvious, but it betrayed the true agenda lying behind the provision, 
namely to legitimise the admission of as much “bad character” evidence as possible in pursuit of a 
conviction. It was in fact a compromise at the Debate stage of the Bill’s passage through the Lords, 
designed to restrict the application of such evidence to matters which were still truly “live” between the 
parties: see Hansard, HL vol 654, col. 2080 (20 November, 2003). For post-2003 Act Court of Appeal 
decisions on what may be regarded as “live” issues in a trial, see McKenzie [2008] EWCA Crim 758, 
Bullen [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 25,  and L [2006] EWCA Crim 2988. 
385 For example, in DPP v Kilbourne (note 194), it was held that an accused’s homosexual proclivities did 
not single them out as part of a sufficiently small population to have probative value in proving their guilt 
of homosexual offences.  But, were the facts of Lewis (note 288) to be reproduced post-2003, a man’s 
paedophilic leanings might be sufficient to secure a conviction for child sexual abuse. The argument 
would be that “A paedophile has the propensity to commit sexual offences against children, therefore this 
propensity is admissible under s 103(1).”  Little wonder that Professor Spencer was of the opinion, 
shortly after the Act came into force (note 363, at p. 51), that “. . . . the bad character of the defendant has 
become admissible in a far wider range of situations than it was at common law.”   
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The allocation of cases into “categories” was to be done by subsequent 
subordinate legislation, which at the time of writing has resulted in only one Order.386  
The philosophy behind the creation of these categories appears to be that a “propensity” 
to commit one offence within that category may be demonstrated by evidence of 
conviction(s) for another offence in the same broad category.  Not only are these 
categories far from comprehensive of all types of criminal offence - one obvious 
missing category group being that relating to personal violence – but they fail to 
acknowledge that even within each such category, there are wide variations in criminal 
“propensity”.  For example, in the “Theft” Category prescribed under the 2004 Order, 
there is unlikely to be any natural connection between an opportunistic sneak “theft”, 
and a highly organised “armed robbery in company”.  Equally, in the “Sexual Offences 
(Persons Under 16)” Category, “rape” and “incest” with one’s own under-aged 
daughter are likely to require wholly different perverted tastes. 
 
 As a further “belt and braces” exercise, the wording of s 103(2) leaves it open 
for “propensity” to be proved in other ways.  As the Court of Appeal explained in 
Hanson and Ors:387 
 
. . . . section 103(2) is not exhaustive of the types of conviction which might be 
relied upon to show evidence of propensity to commit offences of the kind 
charged.  Nor, however, is it necessarily sufficient, in order to show propensity, 
that a conviction should be of the same description or category as that charged. 
 
Another difficulty with the use of an accused’s “propensity” as “an important 
matter in issue” between Crown and defence under gateway (d) arises in respect of an 
                                                            
 
 
386 The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (Categories of Offences) Order 2004; SI 2004/3346. This Order 
creates “prescribed categories of offences” for both “Theft” and “Sexual Offences (Persons Under the 
Age of 16)”. 
387  [2005] 1 WLR 3169, at 3172.  See also Weir and Ors, note 369, at 313, in which the Court 
reconfirmed that the “categories” approach was only one way of proving an accused’s “propensity” to 
commit a particular crime. 
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alleged “propensity” which has yet to be tested in a criminal trial, as in cases such as 
Smith,388 and Boardman.389  Decisions such as this had been permissible in an age in 
which “a strong nexus of similarity’ justified admissibility.  It remained to be seen 
whether or not evidence which tended to demonstrate “propensity” on the part of an 
accused would still be admissible under gateway (d) in cases in which there was no 
such strong nexus.  The answer to this question was “yes”, according to the Court of 
Appeal in Wallace.390  
 
The case involved an indictment containing four armed robbery counts.  
Evidence showing W to be linked circumstantially to each of them, without displaying 
any strong nexus of similarity between them, was held to be admissible in order to 
prove his involvement in them all. This was despite the fact that, from the perspective 
of each individual count, he was simply being shown to possess a “bad character”.  
Based on the decision in Wallace, Professor Spencer concluded that:391  
 
. . . . the result will be that where counts for different offences are properly joined, it 
will happen more frequently than in the past that the evidence on one count is 
admissible on the other. 
 
Almost all the academics who commented on the Act itself, and its early 
interpretation by the Court of Appeal, were highly critical of gateway (d),392 and its 
failure to deliver the practical clarity to the law which the Law Commission had 
                                                            
 
 
388 See note 180. 
389 See note 235. 
390 [2007] 2 Cr. App. R. 30.  
391 Note 363, at p. 88. See also Omerod and Fortson, ‘Bad Character and Cross-admissibility’, [2009] 
Crim L R 313. 
392 See, e.g. Tapper, note 347, at 542, and Waterman and Dempster, note 373, at 621-5. 
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advocated.  Typical of such criticism, and summative of all the complaints which 
gateway (d) attracted, is this passage from Waterman and Dempster.393 
 
The use of the word “substantial” was intended by the Law Commission to represent a 
type of “enhanced relevance” for the evidence to be admissible at the instigation of the 
prosecution.  The word “substantial” does not, however, appear in gateway (d) . . . . . 
The words “relevant to an important matter in issue” cannot therefore be read as 
requiring any “enhanced relevance”.  Similarly, there is no reference to setting the 
probative value of the evidence against the potential prejudicial effect.  These features 
are contrary to the recommendations of the Law Commission . . . .  
 
 
The call to balance probity against prejudice had been regarded by many as a 
judicial Pentecost,394 but in Weir and Ors,395 it was dismissed as “obsolete” under the 
new legislation.  This was hardly surprising, given that the touchstone to admissibility 
under gateway (d) appears to be solely that of “propensity”, without any reference to 
“prejudice”. It was presumably judicially convenient to overlook the fact that the House 
of Lords, three decades earlier,396 had condemned reasoning from propensity alone 
because it leads to “forbidden reasoning”.397   
 
                                                            
 
 
393 Ibid, at 621-2.  See also Tapper, note 347, at 542.  Andrew Ashworth (in [2004] Crim L R 516, at 
517) went so far as to allege that “Vote-winning and populism appear to hold greater sway with the 
Government than respect for rights”. 
394 Hoffman had spoken for most when he described it as “an intellectual breakthrough” – see note 266. 
395 Note 369, at 320. The factual scenarios of the Weir group of cases showed only too clearly how far 
the Court of Appeal was prepared to retreat from the high ideals of Boardman. In Weir itself, the Court 
upheld the admission, on a charge of indecently assaulting a 10 year old girl, of evidence of W’s caution, 
five years previously, for taking an indecent photograph of a young girl, while in Somanathan, in which 
S was charged with the rape of a “vulnerable” member of his religious congregation, it approved the 
admission of evidence of the manner in which S had “ingratiated” himself with other vulnerable female 
members of the same congregation.   
396 In Boardman; see note 252. 
397 This argument is supported by Waterman and Dempster, note 373, at 624. 
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As Waterman and Dempster concluded,398 on the basis of these and other cases, 
 
. . . the criticism levelled at similar fact evidence by the Law Commission is even more 
applicable to the present state of the law, despite one of their main aims in 
recommending a change in the law being to clarify the practical application of it. 
 
Section 101(d) was not the only “gateway” which had the potential to become a 
floodgate.  Section 101(f) allows for the admission of similar fact evidence in order to 
“correct a false impression given by the defendant”.  It was arguable that the “false 
impression” referred to was intended to relate to one regarding the accused’s character, 
and not the facts of the case.  It has, indeed, been used for the former purpose.399  But in 
another series of cases,400 the Court approved the admission of evidence regarding an 
accused’s bad character in response to the line of defence which they were running 
regarding their involvement in the matter on trial.  For example, in Bernasconi, that he 
was trying to maintain the peace rather than act as the aggressor in an offence of 
violence.   
 
Other possible invalid applications of gateway (f) can be predicted, most 
obviously whether or not a previous charge or acquittal (as opposed to a conviction) 
can be called in aid by the Crown to breach the facade of good character which an 
                                                            
 
 
398 Ibid, at 625. 
399 For example, in Amponsah  [2005] EWCA Crim 2993, a conviction for theft was admitted against an 
accused who had set herself up as “a hard working, truthful, church-going individual”, while in 
Somanathan (note 395), a Hindu priest charged with raping a vulnerable member of his congregation 
who claimed to have a good reputation in another temple in which he had previously been employed was 
proved to have been dismissed from that position because of his untruthfulness and his indiscretions 
involving similarly vulnerable women.  These were clearly all cases in which the accused, had, in the 
words of Professor Spencer (note 363, at p. 108), made “ . . . an ostentatious parade of [their] non-
existent good character in [their] evidence in chief”.  
400 For example, L (note 384), Bernasconi  [2006] EWCA Crim 1052, and S [2007] EWCA Crim 1387.  
Spencer (note 363, at p. 106) expressed the hope that “ . . . the Court of Appeal will find the occasion to 
condemn this error for what it is”.  So far, it has not. 
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accused has created for themself.401 The old law has already been surpassed in its 
previous application by s 105(2)(b), which includes, within the various circumstances 
in which an accused can set themself up under gateway (f), the possibility of their 
creating a “false impression” during their preliminary and post-charge conversations 
with police. However, the Court of Appeal, in B,402 drew the line against the use, 
against an accused who had denied a police question as to whether or not he had any 
sexual interest in children, of evidence to the effect that at some time in the past he had 
shown a child a pornographic book. 
 
While it may eventually prove to be the case that gateway (f) will only be 
employed when it was traditionally employed at common law, it may equally well be 
cynically employed to generate other dubious grounds upon which an accused’s “bad 
character” may be revealed to a jury.  Likewise with another gateway, s 101(g), which 
applies whenever it may be said that the accused has “made an attack on another 
person’s character.” 
 
Under the previous regime of s 1(3)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (E & 
W),403 a defendant who ran a defence which cast “imputations on the character of” 
virtually anyone involved in the case against them (but most notably the victim) ran the 
risk of having their own criminal history revealed to the jury.  This was done, notionally, 
in order to cast a new light on that defendant’s credibility as a witness, but, given the 
risk that the jury might employ it in order to engage in either “reasoning” prejudice,404 
                                                            
 
 
401 There was said to be “no blanket answer” to this type of question in U [2008] EWCA Crim 1457, in 
relation to a matter which had yet to come to trial. 
402 [2008] EWCA Crim 1850. It would be all too easy for the police, in circumstances such as this, to 
frame their questioning so as to expose a suspect, later an accused, to the revelation of their spotted past, 
just as it is one of tricks of the trade of Crown Counsel to cross-examine an accused in such a way as to 
goad them into blurting out some protestation of good character which will not withstand the cold wind 
of scrutiny.  Thankfully, in Good [2008] EWCA Crim 2923, the Court of Appeal declined to impliedly 
approve such a tactic when an accused was harassed into blurting out “I’m not that type of person”, 
ruling that the evidence that he indeed was, which Crown Counsel had been attempting to have admitted, 
should have been excluded. 
403 This was formerly s1(f)(ii) of the same Act. 
404 This might happen if the previous offences were similar in nature to the instant ones. 
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or “moral” prejudice, 405  it was made subject to judicial discretion regarding the 
admission of the evidence in the first place, and in practice required a “propensity 
warning” from the trial judge.406  A disadvantage with this arrangement, from a Crown 
perspective, was that a defendant could attack the character of the victim with impunity 
for as long as they (the defendant) remained out of the witness box.407 
 
There was also the dilemma caused by the genuine need of a defendant to cast 
aspersions on the character of either the victim (e.g. by alleging that his so-called rape 
victim was in fact a consenting promiscuous person) or one of the other Crown 
witnesses (e.g. a drugs officer alleged to have “planted” the drugs on the suspect).  This 
led in due course to some complex, and occasionally inconsistent, case-law regarding 
whether or not the aspersions being cast were an “essential part of” an accused’s 
defence (in which case the heavy hand of the subsection would be stayed) or not (in 
which case the sanction would be applied).  
 
The Law Commission had sought to resolve all these difficulties in one tortuous 
provision,408 which balanced out the concerns at both ends of the bar table, but the U.K. 
Government of the day had other ideas. Lying behind the innocuous-seeming gateway 
(g) lies s 106, under which there is no relief granted to a defendant who finds that they 
cannot adequately run a valid defence without casting character aspersions on the 
                                                            
 
 
405 This risk might arise if, for example, the previous behaviour was morally repulsive, as in the case of 
child molestation. 
406 This was to the effect that the evidence could only be used for the purpose for which it had been 
adduced, and could not necessarily be used to infer guilt directly. 
407 This was because the subsection permitted a Prosecution counter-attack only by way of questions 
asked of an accused in cross-examination; see Butterwasser [1948] 1 K.B. 4.  Another technical side-
effect was the original requirement that the person whose character was attacked be either “the 
prosecutor” (which in practice meant the victim) or one of their witnesses.  Until a 1994 amendment to 
the previous provision, this meant that a defendant could defame the character of a non-witness victim 
(e.g. the deceased in a murder trial) without mercy, and with no fear of any “tit-for-tat” repercussions 
allowing their own bad character to be revealed. 
408 Clause 9 of its draft Bill. 
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victim, a Crown witness, or one of the investigating police.409  Not only that, but the 
“bad character” evidence adduced against the accused in response may be led in chief, 
and therefore does not depend upon whether or not that accused elects to give evidence 
on oath.   
 
The situations in which an accused may be said to have brought this particular 
roof down on their head may also have subtly expanded with the definition of 
“character” found within s 106(2)(b) of the Act, which henceforth includes an 
allegation that the person being maligned by the accused has behaved “in a 
reprehensible way”.  This exposes an accused to the vagaries of changing social mores 
when assessing whether or not their defence alleges “reprehensible” conduct on 
someone’s part.410  
 
The Law Commission had also recommended that judicial leave be obtained 
before what is now gateway (g) was invoked.  This recommendation was excluded 
from the Act, although such evidence may still be caught under the “fairness” 
provisions of either s 101(3) or s 78 of PACE. 
 
Further complications arise from the fact that gateway (g) may be opened when 
an accused attacks the character of any “person”,411 which involves potentially many 
                                                            
 
 
409 The Law Commission had proposed an exception when the imputation cast by the accused “had to do 
with” the facts of the case, or related to alleged misconduct by the investigating or prosecuting 
authorities. This did not find its way into the Act. 
410 Emerging social evils which have received adverse public comment in recent years include wife-
beating, cyber-bullying and child pornography.  If, for example, a High School student in future claims 
the defence of “provocation” to an allegation of assault, based on the fact that they were being bullied on 
“Facebook” by the victim, will this be classed as an allegation of “reprehensible” behaviour on the part 
of the victim, entitling the Crown to cite the accused’s previous assaults on fellow students? 
411 As explained above, the pre-1994 law only applied in respect of character assassinations of “the 
prosecutor” or one of their witnesses.  There is also doubt as to whether or not the use of the phrase “any 
person” blocks the former loophole (referred to above) when the person being maligned is now deceased.  
Professor Spencer (note 363, at pp. 113-4) is of the opinion that the phrase is apposite to cover a 
deceased person, in conformity with the post-1994 law immediately prior to the passing of the Act.  He 
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more categories of people than the former law, and the full extent of this change has yet 
to be tested.   
 
In fact, gateway (g) has kept the Court fairly busy already.  In Ball,412 the Court 
of Appeal confirmed that a defendant may open gateway (g) long before the start of 
their trial, by attacking the character of a complainant during conversations with 
investigating police, while in Edwards,413 the Court confirmed that it is not necessarily 
“unfair” for the trial judge, having declined to admit bad character evidence against the 
accused through gateway (d), to allow it in later under gateway (g), when the accused 
goes on to launch an attack on the character of some of the Crown witnesses.   
 
The Law Commission had recommended that the bad character of an accused 
admitted under gateway (g) should continue, as under the old law, to be admissible 
only as to their credibility as a witness, and not the likelihood of their guilt.  However, 
in Highton and Ors,414 the Court held that: 
 
In the case of gateway (g) . . . .admissibility depends upon the defendant having made 
an attack on another person’s character, but once the evidence is admitted, it may, 
depending on the particular facts, be relevant not only to credibility but also to 
propensity to commit offences of the kind with which the defendant is charged. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
also cites Rose LJ in Hanson and Ors. (note 387, at 3171), who opined that gateway (g) encompassed 
character attacks on victims “whether alive or dead”. But at least one textbook writer (Munday, Law of 
Evidence¸(4th ed, Oxford, OUP, 2007), at 7.87)  has expressed a contrary view, and this is clearly a 
matter for a more authoritative statement from a future House of Lords. 
412 Part of Renda and Ors. (note 370).  In this case, a rape accused, while being questioned by police, 
referred to his alleged victim in terms which depicted her as sexually promiscuous, and his previous 
criminal history was allowed through gateway (g).  The Court did, however, further confirm that trial 
judges should be on the alert for the tactical use of such interviews by the Crown, so as to enable 
gateway (g) to be opened.  The same concern might apply under gateway (f), where during interview the 
suspect claims to possess a better character than they actually enjoy; see B, note 402. 
413 [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 3.  
414 Note 376, at 131, confirmed in Campbell [2007] 1 W.L.R. See also George [2006] EWCA Crim 
1652, Lamaletie [2008] EWCA Crim 314 and Singh [2007] EWCA Crim 2140. 
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This decision has, justifiably, attracted a great deal of learned criticism,415 not 
least because it provides a “back door” gateway to admission for a Crown Counsel who 
has failed to justify the admission of “bad character” evidence under gateway (d), on 
the basis of its “relevance” to an “important matter in issue” between the parties in the 
trial.  If it is not sufficiently “relevant” from that perspective, goes the argument, then 
why should the same prejudicial evidence be admitted, for the same purpose, in a 
context in which it is arguably less relevant? 
 
Professor Spencer, in his work,416 defends the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the 
basis that “bad character” is not divisible into two groups labelled “credibility” and 
“propensity”, and that it is “counter-intuitive” to advise a jury trying a person for 
shoplifting who claims absent-mindedness, against whom evidence is led of prior 
convictions following the same failed defence, that they may use that person’s 
“previous” only in relation to their likely truthfulness, and not their propensity to steal 
from shops while claiming absent-mindedness.   
 
With respect, it is precisely because juries are not capable of such sophistry that 
judges are required to give them clear guidance via “propensity warnings”.  Given our 
knowledge that juries cannot easily avoid arguing from “credibility” to “guilt”, we 
should in fact be avoiding situations in which bad character evidence is admitted solely 
on the issue of credibility. We should not increase the number of opportunities for 
“forbidden reasoning” to covert credibility into guilt. It is wrong to use the inability of 
the average jury to make the distinction in practice as an excuse for not even attempting 
                                                            
 
 
415 See, e.g. Munday, ‘The Purposes of Gateway(g): Yet Another Problematic of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003’, [2006] Crim L R 300, and the commentary in [2005] Crim L R 869. 
416 Note 363, at p. 119.  His example is, of course, based on a rare situation in which “credibility” and 
“guilt” cannot be separated.  This will rarely be the case; would he be able to defend the same argument 
if the accused is this time accused solely of having assaulted a store security officer in an attempt to 
escape prosecution? 
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to make the same distinction in law. Professor Spencer, however,417 nails his colours 
high on the mast with the assertion that: 
 
. . . . it is a good thing that [propensity] directions no longer have to be given on these 
confusing lines. 
 
It will perhaps remain to be seen whether or not it is “a good thing” for a jury to 
be advised, unnecessarily, of an accused’s discreditable past, when deciding upon their 
guilt of a new charge.  
 
More routes to conviction 
 
 The English Parliament clearly succeeded in its declared objective of bringing 
the murky history of an accused more frequently to the attention of a jury trying them 
for a new offence, and thereby “jailing more criminals”, under the thin veneer of 
“making more evidence available” to a court.  Apart from the lengthy list of prescribed 
‘categories’ of admissibility (labeled “gateways”, so that it was not accused of 
reinstating the post-Makin regime), some of the background definitional provisions it 
inserted into the 2003 Act (considered above) have considerably widened the field from 
which an accused’s prior misdeeds may be harvested. 
 
 By contrast, the amount of legislative space devoted to the “prejudice” half of 
what had once been regarded as the formula for the future is intentionally minimal.  
Only in s 101(4) is there a reference to the fact that evidence should not be admitted 
                                                            
 
 
417 Ibid, at p. 120. 
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under one of the ‘gateways’ of s 101(d) or (g),418 if it would have “an adverse effect on 
the fairness of the proceedings”.  “Fairness” is not defined anywhere in the Act (in 
marked contrast to the definitional attention paid to expanding “relevance”), and the 
word ‘prejudice’ is absent altogether, even though the Law Commission’s original 
recommendation had required the balancing of probity and prejudice as a pre-condition 
of admissibility under any category.419 
 
 A further five sections of the Act (ss 102-6) are devoted to explaining how each 
of the admission categories are to be interpreted, while s 109 requires trial judges 
assessing the “probative value” of a proposed item of evidence (but not, it will be 
noted, any possible “prejudicial effect”) to assume that it is true; only if it later turns 
out to be “contaminated” is the trial judge required to either abort the trial or direct the 
jury to acquit, and even then only if the alternative would be an “unsafe” conviction. 
  
The net effect of the Act was not so much a stacking of the cards against an 
accused as the supply of a ‘rigged’ deck with which to play.  This legislative approach 
mirrored that of the United States a generation earlier,420  and it had the same political 
agenda.  The governments of both nations clearly believed that playing with a straight 
deck decreased the number of convictions; whether or not they are convictions of 
which a nation could be proud is a debate worthy of a whole thesis of its own. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it can be observed that the English statutory 
regime has obscured what could have been the clarity of the law governing the 
admissibility of ‘bad character evidence’ to the point of virtual impenetrability.  The 
                                                            
 
 
418 This proviso does not apply to the other gateways of s 101, despite the Law Commission’s original 
recommendation that it should – see note 378. 
419 Note 378. 
420 See Chapter 5. 
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2003 Act has in effect divided evidence of previous misconduct by an accused into three 
different categories, with three different tests of admissibility.   
 
1.  Outside the Act completely. 
 
The first category is evidence of previous misconduct which is neither “to do 
with” the facts of the Prosecution case against the accused, nor connected in some way 
with the “investigation or prosecution” of that case, and does not fit within one of the 
“gateways” of s 101.421  Such evidence is not covered by the Act at all, and to such 
evidence, the old common law rules still apply.  In respect of such evidence, and in 
accordance with Boardman, “probity” must outweigh “prejudice”, and it would seem 
that the “fairness” test of s 78 of PACE will also apply.422 
 
2. Admissible without leave under s 98 
  
The second category of case is that in which the evidence does either have “to 
do with” the facts of the Prosecution case against the accused, or connect in some way 
with the “investigation or prosecution” of that case.  Such evidence is now admissible 
without leave under s 98 of the Act. It will no longer even be classed as “bad character 
evidence”, and the old common law rules which had previously required “probity” to 
outweigh “prejudice” will no longer apply to this category of similar fact evidence.423 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
421 Given the potential breadth and scope of these provisions, however, it is unlikely that much evidence 
will escape in this way. 
422 The evidence in Manister came within this category – see note 369. 
423 Arguably, however, this type of evidence will still attract the provisions of s 78 of PACE, and could 
be excluded if, in the opinion of the trial judge, it would be “unfair” to admit it. 
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3. Admissible only with leave through a “gateway” 
 
Finally, there are those cases in which the evidence is not automatically 
admissible without leave because of its connection with either the Crown’s factual case 
or the investigation or prosecution of it.  Such evidence will henceforth be admissible if 
it can be argued through one of the “gateways” identified under s 101 of the Act.  These 
gateways have been liberally interpreted in the Crown’s favour.  They are also capable 
of manipulation by conviction-hungry prosecutors, and the case-law to date has 
widened them even further by means of questionable applications of the concept of 
“relevance”.  By contrast, “prejudice” is now an obsolete concept, replaced by a half-
hearted concession to “fairness”, a term less easy to define. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In all of this, English law has forfeited any prospect of testing the advisability of 
admitting bad character evidence by comparing and contrasting measurable factors of 
“probity” and “prejudice” in an exercise intended to identify the logical relevance of 
such evidence to the case in hand.  What Wigmore might have termed “the calculus of 
admissibility”, as a natural extension to his “doctrine of chances” philosophy, has 
finally been abandoned under English law. 
  
 This has been a policy process in which the appeal courts have been complicit.  
The lesson which might be learned from the English experience is that any future 
statutory intervention should not only establish tight guidelines designed to admit only 
similar fact evidence which is truly relevant to the case for the right reason, but should 
also oblige the trial judge to have regard, on the record, to those factors taken into 
account when assessing admissibility. 
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Chapter 5: 
United States law 
Chapter synopsis 
 In its early years, United States law on ‘bad act’ evidence was not only no 
different from the law in England, it was effectively identical to it.  English case 
precedents were adopted in American cases, and American legal texts were little more 
than English treatises under different covers. 
 
 The American equivalent of Makin was the New York Courts of Appeal’s 1901 
decision in People v Molineux, which confirmed that bad act evidence was not 
admissible solely to prove guilt from propensity, but that it might be admitted for other 
purposes, some of which it identified.  This led American law down the same 
‘categories’ road that bedevilled English law until Boardman.  Unfortunately there was 
no similar ruling in America which would indicate that a broader, more principled, 
approach might be better.   
 
The result was a growing list of confusing, overlapping and occasionally 
contradictory case precedents which cried out for clarifying legislation.  The legislation 
which followed merely perpetuated the ‘categories’ approach, and America’s legacy to 
the overall debate on the admissibility of bad act evidence emerges as a powerful 
argument against any attempt to categorise in this way. 
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The early influence of English precedent 
 
Many of the more influential pre-Makin English cases considered in Chapter 2 
were regularly relied upon by the American courts.424  The same ‘categories’ of cases in 
which ‘bad act’ evidence had been admitted in England became the same categories 
across the Atlantic, to the point at which US law was a mere mirror image of its English 
counterpart. Only the case names were different.425 
 
 Gradually, the courts began to focus less on the type of case in which such 
evidence might be admitted, and more on the precise purpose for admitting it.  Opinions 
varied, from the orthodox view, in Rando,426 that it demonstrated the necessary “guilty 
knowledge”, to the more pragmatic opinion, expressed in Jacob,427 that there was no 
way of proving such knowledge other than by reference to other actions by the accused.  
These ‘other actions’ were said, in Morgan,428 to be evidence of “a systematic plan” by 
the accused, while in Shriedley,429 it was said that such evidence “. . . . when taken in 
connection with other circumstances . . . might strongly tend to fasten guilty knowledge 
upon the defendant”.430  
                                                            
 
 
424 The most important of these were Ball (note 68), Cole (note 118), Whiley and Haines (note 65), and 
Dunn (note 79). 
425 Typical of this process were cases such as State v Van Houten (1810) 3 N.J.L. 672, a New Jersey 
Supreme Court decision, and Wood v United States (1842) 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, a federal case, both of 
which followed Whiley and Haines in allowing in evidence of previous acts by an accused in order to 
demonstrate dishonest intent.  As in England, this reasoning then transferred by analogy from cases of 
forgery and uttering into cases relating to the receipt of stolen goods; see, for example, People v Rando 
(1857) 3 Park Cr 335 (N.Y.), Devoto v Commonwealth (1861) 60 Ky. (3 Metc.) 417, Commonwealth v 
Charles (1871) 14 Phila. Rep. 663, Shriedley v State (1872) 23 Ohio St. 130, State v Jacob (1889) 8 S. E. 
698 (S.C.), and Morgan v State (1892) 18 S. W. 647 (Tex. Crim. App.).  There were then a number of 
cases (such as Bottomley v United States (1842) 1 Story’s Rep. 135, Commonwealth v Stone (1842) 45 
Mass. (4 Metc.) 43, Commonwealth v Shepard (1861) 83 Mass. (1 Allen) 575, and Trogden v 
Commonwealth (1878) 72 Va. (31 Gratt.) 862), in which bad act evidence was admitted in order to prove 
the necessary intent in cases alleging dishonesty generally.   
426 Note 425.  
427 Note 425. 
428 Note 425, at 648. 
429 Note 425, at 142. 
430 The expression “guilty knowledge” can be made to incorporate the concepts of “intent”, or “lack of 
accident”, as it had by the date of People v Seaman (1895) 65 N.W. 452 (Mass.). Close adherence to 
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 This was the same ‘categories’ approach which, as in England, prevented the 
identification and development of any broader underlying logical basis for admissibility.  
As Leonard puts it:431 
   
Rather than asking exactly how the evidence was relevant on a non-character 
basis, the courts’ opinions tended to focus on the kind of case and on the broad 
purpose for which the evidence was offered. 
 
 It was also realised by US courts at an early date that the admission of 
such evidence brought with it a risk of prejudice against an accused.  But whereas in 
Trogden,432 the Virginia Supreme Court had specified the principal prejudice to the 
accused to be “. . . . to require him to answer for two offences”, the equivalent 
Massachusetts court, in Shepard,433 ruled that “. . . . a party is not to be convicted of one 
crime by proof that he is guilty of another”.   
 
The same recognition of the risk of “reasoning prejudice” was to occur under 
English law, but in the USA the probative value of the bad act evidence was being 
compared directly with its prejudicial potential a century earlier than Boardman. In 
Gassenheimer v State,434 for example, a conviction for receiving stolen cotton was 
overturned (“reversed”, to use the American expression) because of the admission of 
evidence of persons seen entering G’s storehouse with full sacks and leaving with 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
English precedent was also to be found in early American homicide cases.  For example, the influential 
English authority of Geering  (note 99) was relied upon in argument by the prosecution (although not 
cited by the court) in Commonwealth v Robinson (1888) 16 N.E. 452 (Mass.).   
431 The New Wigmore.  A Treatise on Evidence: Evidence of Other Misconduct and Similar Events, 
(2011) Aspen Publishers, USA (hereafter ‘Leonard’), at § 3.4. 
432 Note 425, at 870. 
433 Note 425, at 581-2. 
434 (1875) 52 Ala. 313. 
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empty ones.435   It was observed, on appeal,436  that while there appeared to be no 
“legitimate tendency” for this evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, it “. . . . 
doubtless alarmed the suspicions of the jury, and inclined them the more readily to 
believe in the guilt of the [accused]”, because of “. . . . the vague inferences which 
unreasoning suspicion would draw from them”. 
 
US law falls into the ‘categories’ pit 
 
 By adopting the English approach, the American courts were led down the same 
road of ‘categories’ of admissibility,437 where they encountered the same potholes and 
landmines.  They also adopted the same attitude towards established case precedent as 
their English counterparts.  The result was that, as the case-law began to build up:438 
   
If the facts of the pending case permitted the prosecutor to rely on a previously 
approved theory on the list, the theory sometimes served as a passport to admissibility 
with an almost “open sesame” effect. 
 
 Imwinkelried 439 attributes the ongoing adherence to a “list approach” in large 
part to the New York Courts of Appeal’s decision in People v Molineux,440 in which the 
                                                            
 
 
435 There was no evidence that these sacks even contained cotton, let alone stolen cotton. 
436 At 319. 
437 Imwinkelried, “The Evolution of The Use Of The Doctrine of Chances As Theory Of Admissibility 
For Similar Fact Evidence”, (1993) 22 Anglo-Am. Law Rev. 73 (hereafter “Imwinkelried 1993”), at 79, 
describes it as “[a] “list” approach”.  Julius Stone also observed (Stone, “The Rule of Exclusion of 
Similar Fact Evidence: America”, (1938) 51 Harvard L. Rev. 988 (hereafter “Stone, America”), at 991, 
that “. . . . the rule under discussion . . . was adopted bodily from the English books into the American 
law”. 
438 Imwinkelried 1993, note 437, at 80.  See also Stone (note 437), at 1007, who described the list 
approach as “spurious and fallacious”, and Slough, (1978) “Other Vices, Other Crimes: Kansas Statutes 
Annotated Section 60-455 Revised”, 26 Kan. L. Rev. 161, at 167. 
439 Note 437, at 86. 
440 (1901) 61 N. E. 286, at 293-4 (N.Y.).  This principle had a much older pedigree in the USA; see 
Commonwealth v Hardy (1807) 2 Mass. Rep. 303 and Walker v Commonwealth (1829) 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 
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contrasting principles which had been handed down by Lord Herschell in Makin were 
confirmed, albeit in  somewhat different language, for America.  So far as concerned the 
first (exclusionary) principle, it held that:  
 
. . . . the state cannot prove against a defendant any crime not alleged in the 
indictment. . . . as aiding the proofs that he is guilty of the crime charged. . . . This rule 
[is] universally recognised and . . . . firmly established in all English-speaking lands . . .  
 
 It then went on to list, as exceptions to that general principle, evidence adduced 
to prove “motive”, “intent”, the absence of “mistake” or “accident”, a “common scheme 
or plan”, and “identity”. Leonard also observes ,441 of “This . . . . categorical approach to 
uncharged misconduct evidence”, that it “. . . . would prove extremely influential in the 
development of the law”. 
 
 The lasting legacy of Molineux was that the American courts either missed – or 
chose to overlook – the warning of Lord Cross, in Boardman,442 that it is a fruitless task 
seeking “. . . . to compile an exhaustive list of the sort of cases in which similar fact 
evidence is admissible”, and that a broader basis for admissibility should be sought.  As 
a result, in the USA it continued to be ‘business as usual’ in the US courts, in respect of 
an increasing number of categories of case. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
574.  Molineux is still being cited in New York, for example in People v Rojas (2001) 735 N. Y. S. 2d 
470 (N. Y.). 
441 Note 431, § 3.3.1.  Imwinkelried (note 437), at 86, adds that the lead judgment in that case “. . . . 
repeatedly referred to the theories as “exceptions”.  That terminology implied that there was a general 
rule excluding uncharged misconduct testimony . . . the prosecution had to bring the testimony with an 
“exception” to the rule.  As more and more courts adopted the “exception” terminology from Molineux, a 
“pigeonholing” mentality developed”. 
442  Note 235, at 457.  Lord Hailsham, ibid, at 452, also warned against “categorisation” and the 
application of “labels”. 
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 The last flickering hope of a broader-based approach, arising out of the logic of 
the elimination of chance, was raised by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
United States v Woods,443 which appeared to favour the same logic which Windeyer J 
had adopted at the NSW stage of Makin.444  The case was factually close to Makin, 
involving a mother accused of murdering her foster son by smothering him (a cause of 
death known medically as “cyanosis”).  To rebut W’s defence of accident, the 
prosecution was allowed to lead evidence of 20 other incidents of cynanosis in nine 
young children in her care.  Perhaps surprisingly, the defence were able to argue – 
accurately – that there was no case precedent in that Circuit for such use of bad act 
evidence.  On appeal, however, the Court ruled,445 that such an approach was “too 
mechanistic”, and cited both Makin and Smith for the ruling that the evidence was 
admissible because the large number of similar deaths served to render unlikely the 
explanation of accident on the instant occasion.  
 
 However, the wholesale adoption, in federal cases, of a full-blown “doctrine of 
chances” approach was not to be.  Significantly, Woods was taken, in later cases closely 
analogous to it, to have established only a case precedent for employing bad act 
evidence to prove the actus reus by disproving “accident”.446  A decade or so later, this 
had broadened in order to allow the same argument in proof of mens rea.447  But when it 
came to proof of identity, the accent was back on a modus operandi category approach; 
as Imwinkelried observed as late as 1993:448 
 
. . . . to date, the American courts have not analysed modus operandi cases in terms of 
the doctrine.  They either do not recognize the probabilistic rationale underlying the 
modus theory or are unwilling to explicitly extend the doctrine. 
                                                            
 
 
443 (1973) 484 F. 2d 127 (4th Cir.). 
444 See note 135. 
445 At 134. 
446 See Myers and Carter, “Proof of Physical Child Abuse”, (1988) 53 Mo. L. Rev. 189, at 214-5; Myers, 
“Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Child Abuse Litigation”, [1988] Utah Law Rev. 479, at 521. 
447 United States v York (1991) 933 F. 2d 1343 (7th Cir.). 
448 Note 437, at 90.  He is referring to the doctrine of chances. 
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 To further exacerbate the problem, the courts in practice began to demonstrate a  
pro-prosecution attitude towards the proliferation of ‘categories’, until “. . . .by the time 
the Federal Rules were adopted, the courts were admitting uncharged misconduct 
evidence fairly freely.” 449  At approximately the same time, one of America’s leading 
academics in this area,450 was describing the admission or rejection of bad act evidence 
as “. . . . the single most important issue in contemporary criminal evidence law”. 
 
No warning bells from the academics 
 
 The academic commentators who could have argued against – and perhaps even 
prevented – the formalisation of the ‘categories’ approach into legislation, instead 
expended their energy on debating whether “the rule” which had developed by case-law 
was exclusionary or inclusionary.451    
 
                                                            
 
 
449 Leonard, note 431, at § 4.3.2. 
450 Imwinkelried, (1986) “Uncharged Misconduct”, 1 Crim. Just. 6, at 7 (hereafter “Imwinkelried 1986”). 
451 Leonard (note 431, at § 2.1) commented that the ‘exclusionary’ approach of Nineteenth Century 
English law “proved enormously influential in the development of contemporary . . . .American law”, 
requiring, as it did, that the Prosecution fit the desired evidence “. . . within a number of specifically 
delineated exceptions”.  Wigmore, when revising Greenleaf’s work (see note 453), appears to have 
adopted his predecessor’s ‘categories’ approach to the subject, which is essentially an “exclusive” one.  
The alternative, ‘inclusionary’, approach was evident in the work of American treatise writers such as 
Jones (The Law of Evidence in Civil Cases (1896), at 299-300) and Elliott (A Treatise on the Law of 
Evidence (1904-5), § 261, at 218), and in general it may be said that the more modern the treatise, the 
greater the likelihood that the approach adopted is the ‘inclusionary’ one.  By 1933, Stone (note 437, at 
998) was describing the ‘exclusionary’ approach as “spurious”. Most recently, Leonard (note 431, at § 
4.3.1) observes that “. . . . today, the uncharged misconduct rule is viewed as inclusionary in virtually 
every American jurisdiction”, although he laments (ibid) the fact that neither approach has resulted in “. . 
. . the sort of broad, analytical look at the problem that would lead to the embrace of an overriding 
theory”. 
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The error of following blindly down the English road owed much to the fact that: 
452 
   
. . . . before the mid-point of the nineteenth century, most American treatises on 
criminal  law and evidence were essentially English treatises with citations to American 
cases added in footnotes. . . . in many cases, the text of the American treatises was 
identical to that of the English versions. 
 
 The shining exception to this process seems to have been the writing of 
Wigmore, which in turn succeeded the work of Greenleaf.  Greenleaf’s work was taken 
over by Wigmore in 1899, and it was perhaps out of academic respect for his literary 
predecessor that the latter, in that first volume, continued to categorise bad act evidence 
according to the purposes for which, and the context in which, it had been held to be 
admissible in past cases.   
 
 However, even in this first foray into the area,453 Wigmore made reference to the 
“ordinary doctrine of chances”, which he developed into an alternative theory to both 
justify, and better regulate, the admission of propensity evidence.  Wigmore’s theory is 
considered in more detail towards the end of this chapter, and in Chapter 10.  He was, 
however, to be largely ignored by the legislators who created the statutory regime which 
followed. 
   
                                                            
 
 
452 Leonard, note 431, at § 3.2.  He cites, as examples of this process, the works of Phillips (A Treatise on 
the Law of Evidence (Dunlap ed, 1816) and Starkie (A Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence 
(Metcalf ed., 1826).  Later in that century, the same process may be observed in the American versions 
of Stephen (published in the USA by the American author Reynolds as A Digest of the Law of Evidence 
as Established in the United States, but heavily reliant on the sixth edition of Stephen’s treatise of almost 
exactly the same name), while even the American author Thayer (A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at 
the Common Law, 1898) was required to rely on English precedent when explaining (at 525) how the 
American law at that date “forbids the use of a person’s general reputation or actual character, as a basis 
of inference to his own conduct”. 
453 Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence (16th ed. John Henry Wigmore and Edward 
Avery Harriman rev. 1899), at 71-72. 
142 
 
 It is, in a very important sense, dangerously misleading to think of the law, 
whether as formulated in Makin, or as it was to be laid down in Rule 404(b), as being 
two separate rules, the dominance of one over the other determining whether the 
outcome is either ‘inclusionary’ or ‘exclusionary’.  There is, in effect, only one rule.  It 
states that evidence may not be employed if it invites reasoning to guilt from character 
or propensity, and nothing else.  To that rule there are no exceptions.  In light of that, it 
is duplicitous to think of the existence of a second rule which permits the admission of 
such evidence for different purposes.  Provided that it is relevant, evidence adduced to 
demonstrate, for example, “course of conduct”, is being admitted in accordance with the 
one rule, namely that it does not reason solely from character or propensity to guilt. 
 
 If more attention had been paid to the danger of admitting evidence whose only 
relevance is what was identified in Boardman as “forbidden reasoning”,454 then there 
would have been no need, in the USA or anywhere else, for ‘categories’ of admission, 
and there would have been a correspondingly reduced risk of artful prosecutors 
disguising character reasoning evidence as something else.  The greater the number of 
categories of admissibility, the greater the risk of abuse by prosecutors, and the greater 
the danger of the jury being allowed to employ the evidence for the prohibited reason.  
The question should not be “What purpose is this evidence being admitted for?”, but 
“What line of reasoning is the jury being invited to employ?”. 
 
 The ‘purpose’ approach was, however, too deeply established by case precedent, 
and too deeply embedded in the American legal psyche, not to have been perpetuated by 
the legislators when they finally set about codifying the law in this area. 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
454 Note 252. 
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The Federal Rules 
 
 The ‘categories’ of admissibility which had come to be recognised by the courts 
became incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.  They had been 
anticipated by a “Model Code” provision in 1943,455 and a “Uniform Rule”,456 a decade 
later.  The first of these had merely reaffirmed the inadmissibility of evidence which 
sought solely to encourage reasoning from character to guilt, while the second, after 
repeating the ban on such evidence, permitted the admission of bad act evidence in each 
of the categories which are now to be found in Federal Rule 404(b).457  The last-named, 
therefore, reflects no change in approach since the middle years of the Twentieth 
Century, a full two decades before Boardman, which was not reflected in any 
subsequent amendments.  
 
The relevant Rules, for the purpose of this thesis, are Rules 403 and 404(b).  
They provide as follows: 
  Rule 403  
 Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.458 
Rule 404 (b)  
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
                                                            
 
 
455 Rule 311, heavily influenced by the writings of Stone (note 437). 
456 Rule 55.  These Rules were intended for use by State legislators. 
457 The latest Uniform Rule in the series, produced in 1999, contains a Rule 404(b) which is identical in 
its permissible purposes for admission with its federal counterpart. 
458 This is clearly intended as a broad exclusionary rule, capable of being applied to all evidence which 
has the undesired effects specified.  However, it suffers from the defects that (a) it is discretionary, and 
(b) it is for the accused to justify exclusion. 
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knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by 
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in 
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, 
of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.459 
 
 Despite a technical amendment in 1987, and the insertion of the notice 
requirement in 1991, the Rules are the same today, in their application in criminal 
cases, as when they were first enacted.  Rule 404(b) is described by Professor Cleary, 
the original Reporter to the Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence,460 
as “. . . . one of the most cited Rules in the Rules of Evidence”. This is despite the fact 
that technically, these Rules only apply in prosecutions for breaches of federal law, and 
trials for non-federal offences on military bases and Indian Reservations. 
 
 Leonard,461 defines the overall effect of Rule 404(b) in terms very reminiscent of 
Makin, namely that: 
 
The rule contains two basic principles.  The first is that evidence of uncharged 
misconduct is not admissible when offered to prove conduct by means of a character 
inference.  The second principle is that the court may admit evidence of uncharged 
misconduct when it is offered for other purposes. 
  
                                                            
 
 
459 This Rule has been substantially followed in all the State Evidence Codes, and in the case of some 
states (e.g. Alabama, Colorado, Indiana, West Virginia and Utah) the equivalent Rule is word-identical.  
Even in those States in which there are variations (predominantly regarding the notice requirement), the 
‘categories’ approach has been followed, and the categories are the same.  Interestingly, Hawaii seems to 
be unique among the States in including “modus operandi” within those categories.  The Californian 
Rule also includes, within the permitted inclusion categories, evidence to rebut the claim of “honest and 
reasonable belief in consent” in sexual cases. 
460 Federal Rules of Evidence (2010-2011 Edition), Thomson Reuters, USA, p. 36.  He was writing in 
2010.  Even earlier than that, it had been reported (Imwinkelried 1993, note 437, at 74) that “Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b) has produced more published appellate opinions than any other subsection of 
the Federal Rules”.   
461 Note 431, at § 4.1.   
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The combined effect of Rules 403 and 404(b), read together, is that a pre-trial 
assessment of the admissibility of an item of bad act evidence, and the “reasonable 
notice” requirement which precedes it, are both limited to the question of whether or not 
the evidence in question may be fitted within one of the categories of inclusion.  The 
all-important issue of whether or not the prejudicial potential of the evidence exceeds its 
probative value can, it seems, be addressed only at trial, and only under Rule 403.  By 
this means, admissibility is still determined by ‘category’, rather than by measuring 
probative value against potential prejudice. The danger of unfair prejudice must also, 
under Rule 403, be shown to “substantially” outweigh the probative value of the 
evidence.  Put in reverse, if the probative value of the evidence is perceived to be great, 
then a considerable degree of potential “unfair prejudice” must be demonstrated before 
the evidence will be excluded. 
 
 In what is regarded as the leading case on the application of the two Rules, the 
inference was that both tests would be applied at the same time, which by default would 
be at trial.  Thus, in United States v Beechum,462 the Supreme Court explained that: 
 
[The]Rule relating to admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence calls for essentially [a] 
two-step test; first, it must be determined that similar offense evidence is relevant to an 
issue other than the defendant's character, and second, the evidence must possess 
probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must 
meet other requirements of [the] rule providing for weighing of probative value of 
evidence against danger of undue prejudice. 
 
 This still does not avoid the conceptual defect that “probative value” is not seen 
to be a direct factor in admissibility.  Instead, the admissibility focus is on the purpose 
(that is, the reason) for the admission of the evidence, without any reference to the fact 
that the underlying logic for admissibility (i.e. the ‘key’ to it) is its relevance to the case 
                                                            
 
 
462 (1978) 582 F. 2d 898 (5th Cir.). 
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as a whole.463  The important test is arguably not the purpose of admission at all, but 
rather the probative strength of the evidence in eliminating alternative hypotheses 
consistent with innocence. 
  
Another weakness in the system emerged shortly after the 1975 enactment, and 
has never been addressed by subsequent amendments.  This is that a literal reading of s 
403 limits the duty to exclude evidence on the grounds of undue prejudiciality to jury 
trials; in Gulf State Utils v Ecodyne Corp,464 the Supreme Court ruled that Rule 403 
“. . . . has no logical application in bench trials”.  This seems to place what may be 
unwarranted faith in the ability of a trial judge not to be adversely affected by evidence 
revealing the allegedly ‘true nature’ of the person on trial before them alone. 
  
Rules 403 and 404 are also supplemented by Rule 105, which requires “the 
court”, upon request by either party, to instruct the jury on the limited use to which bad 
act evidence may be put.  If, for example, under Rule 404(b) it is admitted in order to 
prove “plan”, then the trial judge must direct the jury against its use in order to infer 
guilt from general character. There is, of course, no guarantee that the jury will even 
understand that distinction, let alone apply it. 
  
Professor Cleary,465 observes that the “reasonable notice” requirements of Rule 
404(b) do not preclude the possibility of an admissibility ruling being made in advance 
                                                            
 
 
463 McCormick (McCormick on Evidence, 6th ed, 2006, student edition), § 188, at p. 133, confirms that 
“In ascertaining whether [character-type] evidence is admissible, the purpose for which the evidence is 
offered remains of the utmost importance” (emphasis added).  Leonard (note 431, at § 3.4), expresses the 
same view of the approach which had hitherto been taken by the courts, which “[r]ather than asking 
exactly how the evidence was relevant on a non-character basis . . . .  tended to focus on the kind of case 
and on the broad purpose for which the evidence was offered”. 
464 (1981) 635 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.).  This was clearly a civil case, but the principle laid down is equally 
applicable in criminal cases, given the broad application of Rule 403 and the lack of limitation in the 
ruling.  See also Schultz v Butcher (1994) 24 F.3d 626 (4th Cir.) 
465 Note 460, at p. 37. 
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of the trial.466 However, this does not prevent prejudicial evidence being admitted on a 
provisional basis, under yet another Rule. 
 
 Rule 104(b) provides that: 
 
When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfilment of a condition of fact, the 
court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support 
a finding of the fulfilment of the condition. 
 
 It is impossible to interpret this rule otherwise than as permitting the jury to hear 
prejudicial evidence which they may later be told to ignore.467  Additional comment on 
this point would seem to be superfluous.468 
 
 As originally drafted, Rule 404(b) did not come with a notice requirement.  This 
was inserted following a 1991 amendment, while leaving the remainder of the Rule 
unchanged.  Given the fact that unfair surprise has long been regarded as one of the 
undesirable consequences of admitting bad act evidence,469 this was perhaps a little 
overdue, but it does bring with it the possibility that the legal arguments for and against 
admission may be heard in limine, with all the corresponding benefits of not delaying 
the trial itself and allowing the accused to prepare for the complete prosecution case.   
                                                            
 
 
466 “in limine”, which is the American equivalent of a “pre-trial motion” or “interlocutory application” in 
other jurisdictions.   
467 This interpretation was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Huddleston v United States (1988) 485 
U.S. 681, which advised courts beneath it that “Often the trial court may decide to allow the proponent to 
introduce evidence concerning a similar act, and at a later point in the trial assess whether sufficient 
evidence has been offered to permit the jury to make the requisite finding. If the proponent has failed to 
meet this minimal standard of proof [defined elsewhere in the judgment as being on the balance of 
probabilities], the trial court must instruct the jury to disregard the evidence.” 
468 As Leonard so eloquently puts it (note 431, at § 4.5.1), “. . . . a bell once rung cannot be unrung”. 
469  Only some states (such as Alaska and Pennsylvania) have adopted similar, or near-identical, 
provisions.  Others (such as Florida) have imposed a minimum number of days before trial for the issue 
of the notice, while others (such as Wyoming and Connecticut) have left it to their senior courts to 
introduce a notice requirement. 
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The wording of the notice requirement indicates two possible weaknesses in its 
operation.  The first is that it is only activated by a request from the accused.  While an 
accused will obviously know what they have lurking in their closet, they will not 
necessarily be aware of whether or not the prosecutor (a) knows of it, or (b) will seek to 
employ it.  This may come as a nasty surprise at the opening of the trial, and may be 
aggravated by the second flaw in the wording of the Rule, namely that the trial judge 
may “excuse pretrial notice on good cause shown”.  One wonders whether or not a 
“good cause” might be that the prosecution has allegedly only discovered, on the 
morning of trial, that the accused intends to oppose the proposed admission of the bad 
act evidence, of which they (the accused) have only just become aware. 
 
  One of the other advantages of a hearing in limine is the possibility that there 
remains a record of the grounds upon which the decision to admit or exclude the bad 
act evidence  was made, and in particular the reasoning behind the application of the 
probity versus prejudice test required under Rule 403.  This assumes, of course, that 
Rules 403 and 404(b) are considered at the same hearing, which is not clearly required 
by their wording.  Be that as it may, the existence of a clear record makes matters 
easier for any later appeal court, but surprisingly few jurisdictions – not even the 
federal one – impose any statutory requirement on the trial judge to place the reasons 
for their findings on record.  The failure to do so is not even regarded as a “reversible 
error”,470 and it seems to be left to opposing counsel to ensure that a proper record is 
created. 
 
  Even if there is sufficient record available for an adequate review on appeal, the 
position adopted by the American appellate courts is that their role is not to replace the 
opinion of the trial judge, who is in the “. . . . best position to engage in th[e] balancing 
                                                            
 
 
470  United States v Bradshaw (1982) 690 F. 2d 704, 708 (9th Cir.).  The position is different in 
Washington; see State v Smith (1986) 725 P. 2d 951 (Wash.), at 953. 
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process”.471  The stance adopted, by the Seventh Circuit of the Supreme Court,472 
encapsulates the position perfectly: 
 
We will reverse a trial court’s admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) only upon a 
clear showing of abuse of discretion.  Our role on review is not to second guess the 
results reached by the trial court. . . .  
 
  The task of any appeal court is not assisted by the diversity of situations in 
which, and purposes for which, bad act evidence may be offered.  This has made it 
particularly difficult to assess whether or not the trial judge abused their discretion by 
admitting the evidence, most notably when assessing the ‘similarity’ of the challenged 
evidence to the criminal act alleged in the indictment.  In the context of a disputed 
admission of modus operandi evidence, the New York Court of Appeals in People v 
Mateo observed that: 473 
 
Both defendant and the People . . . . ask us to provide a calculus of “similarity” by 
which all future cases might be plotted.  To do so, however, would ignore the relative 
nature and contextual considerations inherent in any analysis and application of the 
“similarity” element. 
 
  Whatever may have been the intentions of the legislators, Rule 404(b) has 
proved itself to be an evidential quagmire.  By following the long-established practice 
of creating a general exclusionary ban, but then allowing ‘heads’, ‘gateways’ or 
‘loopholes’ of admissibility, American legislators have perpetuated the worst aspects 
                                                            
 
 
471 State v Fortin (1999) 724 A. 2d 818 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), at 827. 
472 United States v Connelly (1989) 874 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir.). 
473 (1999) 690 N. Y. S. 2d 527 (N. Y.), at 530.  The same was said to be true for all permissible heads of 
inclusion in People v Golochowicz (1982) 319 N. W. 2d 518 (Mich.).  With respect, this is a 
comprehensive negation of responsibility by those courts to which one looks for judicial guidance.  The 
very fact that each case is different makes it even more imperative that guideline principles be laid down 
which identify the factors which should govern admissibility in every case. 
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of the ‘categories’ regime which developed in England post-Makin, and have 
formalised it in legislative legerdemain which has echoes of the English Criminal 
Justice Act 2003.474   
 
A recipe for prosecutorial abuse 
   
The subsequent case history of Rule 404(b) is a powerful indictment of any ‘categories’ 
approach to the admission of similar fact evidence.  Like all rules which define 
admissibility by reference to ‘purpose’, it has fallen hostage to slick prosecutorial 
analogy reasoning and ‘liberal’ (i.e. pro-prosecution) judicial interpretation.  Also, 
given that ‘admissibility’ has been allocated one Rule, and ‘prejudiciality’ another, 
there is a risk that the two will never be considered together. 
  
If bad act evidence is erroneously admitted through one of the categories of Rule 
404(b), and is then allowed to sway the jury into “forbidden” reasoning, the “unfair 
prejudice” caused by that admission may go unnoticed.  It may be concluded on appeal 
that the evidence was admitted for a ‘proper’ purpose, for reasons no more persuasive 
than the fact that the evidence ‘ticked the box’.   
 
 Under Rule 403, the burden of proof appears to lie on the accused who seeks to 
have the evidence excluded. It is not for the prosecution to seek inclusion of the 
evidence because its probity “substantially outweighs” prejudice.  It is for the defence to 
argue exclusion on the ground that its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
                                                            
 
 
474 See Chapter 4.  Congress was warned of the complexity of what they had enacted by Judge Friendly 
(Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit of the Supreme Court) in his statement to the Congressional 
Hearing into “Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws” in 1973 (93d Cong. 251-2), when he observed of 
Rule 404(b) that “The rule seems to walk both sides of the street.  It will provide a bountiful source of 
appeals and possible reversals”. 
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“the danger of unfair prejudice”. This seems to confirm that the rule is essentially an 
inclusive one which the defence must seek to override with an “unfair prejudice” 
argument. If, on a mere “preponderance”, the bad act evidence is more likely to 
facilitate unfair prejudice than is justified by its relevance, it is still apparently 
admissible. 
 
 The Court, in Huddleston,475 cited Rule 105 as one which provides protection to 
an accused under the Federal Rules.  That Rule requires a trial judge (but only if 
requested to do so by the defence) to issue a “limiting instruction” to a jury,476 confining 
the use of bad act evidence to the purpose for which it was admitted.  Not only does this 
beg the question of whether or not that reason for admissibility was a valid one, but it 
relies upon the jury following the instruction.  After citing an impressive number of 
studies,477 to support his argument, Leonard,478 concludes that “. . . . juries often are not 
able to ignore inadmissible evidence nor are they very good as using evidence only for 
its permissible purposes”.   
  
Despite the confidence in the regime of the Federal Rules which it expressed in 
Huddleston, the Supreme Court has never seen fit to guide trial courts in what might 
constitute either “probity” or “unfair prejudice”, but has contented itself with the 
generalised observation that each case must be judged on its own facts, given that each 
case is “extremely fact-specific”.479  Nor is any such guidance to be found in the Rules 
themselves.480  
                                                            
 
 
475 Note 467. 
476 This is the equivalent of a “propensity warning” in some jurisdictions, including Australia. 
477 Kalven and Zeisel (1966), The American Jury, 127-130, 177-180; Wissler and Saks, (note 38), at 47; 
Stanley Sue et. al., “Effects of Inadmissible Evidence on the Decisions of Simulated Jurors: A Moral 
Dilemma”, 3 J. Applied Soc. Pyschol. 354 (Dec 1973); Diamond and Vidmar, “Jury Room Ruminations 
on Forbidden Topics”, (2001) 87 Va. L. Rev. 1857, at 1864-65. 
478 Note 431, § 4.5.1. 
479 Leonard, note 431, § 7.5.1. 
480 The Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 403 (see Federal Rules of Evidence, note 60, at p.33) refers 
only to (a) consideration being given to a “limiting instruction” if the evidence is admitted, and (b) the 
need to consider the possible availability of other means of proof of the fact it is sought to demonstrate. 
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 This absence of guidelines, and the stated policy of only reversing a decision to 
admit similar fact evidence if “abuse of discretion” can be demonstrated, 481  have 
combined to foster a regime which favours prosecutorial ‘boundary pushing’ and, 
ironically, an inability to rely on previous case-law. It is next to impossible, under U. S. 
law, to predict in advance just how “probative” any given item of evidence will be 
judged to be, or what nature or degree of “unfair prejudice” will serve to have it 
excluded.482  Even then, it need only be “a danger” of unfair prejudice, requiring the 
trial judge to assess the apparent intelligence and gullibility of the jury.  What might 
well, in the context of any given trial, unfairly prejudice one jury may have no adverse 
effect on another. 
 
 Nor can one predict which ‘purpose’ of admission will be the chosen one under 
Rule 404(b). The sheer number of possibilities has further sub-divided the case-law.  
There are also many precedents on record, for example, emphasising that the ‘similarity’ 
required between the act charged and the similar fact to be alleged will vary according 
to which head of admissibility is being employed.483 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
481 See United States v Connelly, note 472.  The ‘contextual’ view of the evidence formed by the trial 
judge is always afforded considerable weight and respect in such appeals. 
482 As Leonard explains (note 431, at § 7.5.2), “. . . . identification of relevant factors, though extremely 
important, can only provide a rough guide.  The courts must decide the admissibility of the evidence in 
each case on its own merits”. 
483 See, for example People v Gallego (1990) 276 Cal. Reptr. 679, 706 (the degree of similarity required 
for proof under the “intent” head is less than that required when establishing identity through “modus 
operandi”).  In United States v Hearst (1977) 563 F. 2d 1331 (9th Cir.), it was held that evidence of a 
robbery which bore little factual resemblance to the robbery on the indictment could be employed against 
H to disprove her defence of duress. 
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The liberality of judicial interpretation of Rule 404(b) 
 
 The net effect of Rule 404(b) has been described, by one observer, 484 as having 
been “to undercut the character rule”.  Prosecutors have quickly learned which heads of 
admissibility are looked upon most favourably by their local judges, and have framed 
their submissions under whichever head seems more likely to offer a ‘softer’ test.  They 
have been assisted by the sheer number, confusion and overlap of the potential heads of 
admissibility, and the growing indulgence of trial judges anxious not to be seen to be 
impeding ‘justice’, or to be accused of ‘being soft on criminals’.485  This has even 
extended to excluding similar fact evidence from the operation of the Rule in the first 
place. 
 
Acts “intrinsic” to the offence on trial 
 
 Under the Criminal Evidence Act 2003 [E & W],486 this type of evidence is 
described as being “to do with the facts of the case”.  The justification for its admission 
is that without it, the prosecution could not give the jury “the full picture” of the events 
they have been called upon to assess.  In some contexts it is more aptly categorised as 
res gestae evidence. 
 
                                                            
 
 
484 Leonard, note 431, at § 7.5.2.   
485 In many states, judges are popularly elected, a process which may encourage pro-prosecution rulings 
when state equivalents to Rule 404(b) are being considered. 
486 See note 358. 
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 It has been long established under US law that “intrinsic” evidence is not 
regarded as falling within the category of ‘guilt by reasoning from character’.  In United 
States v Williams,487 it was held by the Supreme Court that:  
 
“Other act” evidence is “intrinsic” when the evidence of the other act and the evidence 
of the crime charged are “inextricably intertwined” or both acts are part of a “single 
criminal episode” or the other acts were “necessary preliminaries” to the crime charged. 
 
 Only similar fact evidence which is deemed to be extrinsic to the case is required 
to qualify for admission for one of the purposes identified in Rule 404(b). But the 
distinction between “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” has proved hard to draw, and the case 
histories are full of borderline decisions, in most of which the decision went against the 
accused, and prejudicial evidence was admitted without regard to the Rule.488  The 
courts have taken a broad view of what may be categorised as “intrinsic” to the offence 
on trial, although the Supreme Court has reconfirmed that such evidence must still pass 
the ‘probity/prejudice’ test of Rule 403.489   
 
 Leonard,490 lists the bases on which “intrinsic” evidence has been admitted as 
including (1) a series of transactions which are the same as the one on trial;491 (2) 
                                                            
 
 
487 (1992) 900 F. 2d 823 (5th Cir.).  It was able to cite ample case authority, such as United States v 
Torres (1982), 685 F.2d 921 (5th Cir.) and United States v Stovall (1987) 825 F. 2d 817 (5th Cir.). See 
also United States v Williams (1990) 900 F. 2d 823 (5th Cir.).    
488 See, for example, United States v Summers (1998) 137 F. 3d 597 (8th Cir.), in which, at his trial for 
conspiring to supply drugs, the jury was allowed to learn of S’s supply of drugs to a prosecution witness 
ahead of the starting date of the alleged conspiracy, on the ground that it was part of the “factual setting 
of the crime in issue”.  A similar ruling was handed down in United States v Kennedy (1994) 32 F. 3d 
876 (4th Cir.). 
489 In United States v Senffner (2002) 280 F. 3d 755 (7th Cir.)  
490 Note 431, at § 5.2. 
491 See United States v Swinton (1996) 75 F. 3d 374 (8th Cir.). This procedural side-step has become 
increasingly noticeable in more recent cases involving ‘continuing’ offences such as drug trafficking or 
criminal conspiracies; see, for example, United States v Badru (1996) 97 F. 3d 1471 (D.C. Cir.) and 
United States v Montgomery (2004) 384 F. 3d (9th Cir.). 
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supplying the jury with the ‘context’ or ‘full story’ behind the offence on trial;492 (3) 
identifying the offender or the reason why the offence was committed; (4) explaining 
the relationship between co-offenders; 493  and (5) demonstrating the offender’s 
knowledge of the crime’s commission. 
 
 The academic commentators appear to be divided on the advisability of allowing 
prejudicial evidence of this nature to be admitted without at least some sort of pre-trial 
testing of its true relevance for some reason other than its revelation of the accused’s 
true character.494  But the possible political agenda which lies behind the tendency to 
exclude such evidence from the notional protection of Rule 404(b) has not gone 
unnoticed. For example:495 
 
  . . . . since about the year 1980, evidence of uncharged crimes can be rendered 
admissible by the simple expedient of describing it as “inextricably intertwined” with 
evidence of the crime or crimes [alleged] in the indictment.  It is difficult to view this 
                                                            
 
 
492 Cases coming within this category include United States v Vretta (1986) 790 F. 2d 651 (7th Cir.), 
United States v Daly (1992) 974 F. 2d 1215 (9th Cir.), and United States v Murray (1996) 89 F. 3d 459 
(7th Cir.).  Leonard comments (ibid) that “. . . . the “completing the story” rationale is the most common 
situation in which courts hold that evidence is inextricably intertwined with or intrinsic to the charged 
acts”. 
493 United States v Boyd (1995) 53 F. 3d 631 (4th Cir.), People v Leeson (2009) 908 N.E. 2d 885 (N.Y.) 
and Heywood v State (2009) 208 P. 3d 71 (Wyo.).   
494  Compare, for example, Schuster, “Comment, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The 
Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence”, (1988) 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 947, 951, with 
Saltzburg et.al, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual (8th ed., 2002), § 404.02 [11]. 
495  Hirsch, ““This New-Born Babe an Infant Hercules”: The Doctrine of “Inextricably Intertwined” 
Evidence in Florida’s Drug Wars”, (2000) 25 Nova L. Rev. 279-281.  A fruitful area for the “intrinsic” 
evidence argument has been the defence of ‘entrapment’ in which the accused claims that they were 
pressured into committing a criminal act totally alien to their inclinations as the result of manipulation by 
a government agent such as an undercover police officer.  The prior track record of the accused may then 
be said to be “inextricably entwined” with the prosecution allegation that the accused needed no undue 
persuasion to commit the offence, and was merely being monitored while pursuing their habitual course 
of criminal behaviour.  This has been interpreted more than once by a court as carte blanche to inform the 
jury of the accused’s proven disposition in the past; see, e.g. United States v Crump (1991) 934 F. 2d 947 
(8th Cir.), in which the Court (at 954) ruled that “. . . . prior bad act evidence is admissible to show a 
defendant’s predisposition once the defendant has asserted the entrapment defence”.  For other examples 
of this process, see United States v Padilla (1989) 869 F. 2d 372 (8th Cir.) and United States v French 
(1982) 683 F. 2d 1189 (8th Cir.). 
.  
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doctrinal volte face as anything but result-oriented jurisprudence . . . [which] supports 
the admission of highly prejudicial and otherwise inadmissible other-crimes evidence.  
It enables the prosecution to circumvent the procedural obstacles set up by Rule 404(b) 
governing the admissibility of prior similar fact evidence. . . . . It. . . . [deprives] the 
defendant of one of the ancient and honourable premises of the Anglo-American system 
of justice: that the jury sits in judgment on the act a man is alleged to have done, not on 
the life a man is alleged to have led. 
 
“Crimes, wrongs or acts” 
 
 Rule 404(b) applies only to similar fact evidence which may be said to reveal an 
accused’s “crimes, wrongs or acts”.  This raises the question of whether or not the jury 
may be told of other previous events in a person’s life, or aspects of their lifestyle, 
which may cause that jury to be predisposed against them.  For example, being a 
member of a motorcycle club, in itself, is morally “neutral”, 496  but may be 
misunderstood by some jurors, even if the club in question is not proscribed by 
legislation. 
 
  However, the approach of the American courts has consistently been that 
Rule 404(b) may not be invoked by the defence unless the evidence in question is being 
used to impugn their character. 497   The same view has also attracted academic 
support.498 
 
                                                            
 
 
496 This is the description employed by Leonard (note 431), at § 4.6. 
497 See, for example, Huddleston v United States (note 467). See also United States v Rawle (1988) 845 
F. 2d (4th Cir.) 1244 at 1247, United States v Terebecki (1982) 682 F. 2d (11th Cir.) 1345 at 1348 and 
United States v Beechum (note 462), at 914. 
498 See, for example, Kaloyanides, “The Depraved Sexual Instinct Theory: An Example of the Propensity 
for Aberrant Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)”, (1992) 25 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 1297 at 
1313, who opines that the rule is only intended to apply to bad acts.  See also Leonard (note 431, at § 
4.6) that “. . . . the act must be one that reflects negatively on the character of the actor”. 
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 But this stance overlooks the possibility that behaviour which might be seen as 
“neutral” as to the accused’s character in one context may be held against them by a 
jury in another.499  It is also almost impossible to predict in advance if a jury will react 
unfavourably to a particular piece of information regarding an accused, and employ 
irrational prejudice in reasoning that they should be convicted.  It is not sufficient to 
rely, as some commentators have done,500 on the belief that if the prior act is “neutral”, 
there is no risk of prejudice.  Nor is it sufficient to point to Federal Rule 403, and 
assume that the “probity versus prejudice” test will take care of the situation.  This 
relies on the opinion of the trial judge regarding the prejudiciality of the evidence, not 
the jury.  
 
 As the previous example of declaring bankruptcy illustrates, one’s “status” 
might also prove prejudicial to a jury.501 The question of whether or not status falls 
within Rule 404(b) has never been answered judicially, but in Leonard’s opinion:502  
 
. . . . it is reasonable as a matter of policy to interpret the word [“act”] broadly as it 
appears in the uncharged misconduct rule, sweeping both neutral acts and evidence of 
status within the reach of the rule. 
 
 The problem is further exacerbated when what is disclosed to the jury is said to 
be “intrinsic” to the events on trial. Is the homophobic juror less likely to be influenced 
by the disclosure that the accused is homosexual in the context of a trial in which the 
charge is one of the robbery of a man he met in a ‘gay’ club earlier that evening, than if 
                                                            
 
 
499 For example, a person who has in the past declared themself bankrupt would not be likely to be 
prejudiced by that status when facing a charge of assault, but it might count against them in a fraud case.  
However irrational such reasoning might be, it is a possibility which a trial judge should be alert to. 
500  These include Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence (1988) (hereafter “Imwinkelried 
1988”), § 8.24. 
501 Examples of “status” in this context would include not only being an undischarged bankrupt, but also 
being unemployed, divorced, homosexual or drug-addicted.  As Leonard (note 431, at § 4.6) puts it, “. . . 
. status evidence almost always communicates something about an underlying act”. 
502 Ibid. 
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they are advised  that the victim set out that evening to meet up with someone he had 
contacted through the pages of a ‘gay’ magazine?  In the first example, the evidence of 
the accused’s presence in the gay club might well satisfy the “intrinsic” test, while in 
the second, hopefully it would not.  However, in either context a homophobic juror 
might elect to record their prejudice with a conviction based on emotion rather than 
evidence. 
 
The “kitchen sink” process 
 
Not only does Rule 404(b) contain a considerable number of potential ‘heads’ 
under which similar fact evidence might be admitted, but they have the potential to 
overlap, and to be somewhat ‘rubbery’ in definition.  Appeal courts in the USA have 
also frequently justified, with hindsight, the admission of bad act evidence under more 
than one head, in a process described, by Leonard, 503 as a “kitchen sink approach to 
admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence”.  This same approach, at trial level, 
has resulted in prosecutors persuading trial judges to admit similar fact evidence under 
several heads, without analysing carefully its relevance under any of them.  Once again, 
‘ticking the box’ seems to be the name of the game. 
 
For example, in in United States v Gamble,504 G and others were on trial for an 
alleged conspiracy to transport stolen trucks interstate, and evidence of a prior burglary 
by one accused, and a prior car theft by another (neither of which were remotely 
                                                            
 
 
503 Note 431, at § 10.4. 
504 (1976) 541 F.2d 873 (10th Cir.).  See also United States v Hall (1996) 93 F. 3d 1337 (7th Cir.), in which 
H was convicted of the kidnapping, for sexual purposes, of a 15 year old girl, following the admission of 
evidence of his “habit” of stalking teenage girls.  This was said (at 1346) to be evidence of “intent, 
preparation or plan”, even though there was no evidence of his having stalked the girl he was alleged to 
have eventually kidnapped, and it is difficult to see how stalking other girls might have “prepared” him 
for the eventual kidnap.  It is not difficult to imagine what use the jury made of this uncharged evidence; 
it was the clearest possible example of a man being convicted on the basis of his “known character”, and 
little else.  
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connected to the offences on trial) was admitted, and later upheld by the appeal court on 
the ground that:505  
 
. . . . .this evidence was admissible to show “. . . . motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan,  knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident” . . . Such 
evidence is particularly relevant in a conspiracy case. 
 
Although all the heads of admissibility identified under Rule 404(b) are open to 
abuse, and susceptible to overlap,506 the extent of that abuse and overlap in practice is 
best illustrated by reference to three of those heads, namely “intent”, “opportunity” and 
“plan”. 
 
Intent 
  
The head of “intent” is perhaps the one most widely employed by pro-
prosecution judges searching for a justification for admitting evidence of the accused’s 
unflattering history or previous lifestyle. 507   Over the years, it has been deemed 
appropriate to argue towards “intent” from other heads of admissibility specified in 
                                                            
 
 
505 At 877-8. 
506 Consider, for example, the facts in People v Archerd (1970) 477 P. 2d 421 (Cal.). A was on trial for 
murder by poisoning, and her knowledge of the nature of the substance employed was said to be proved 
by evidence of three similar prior deaths linked to her; it was also said to prove identity, intent, malice, 
premeditation, motive and modus operandi.  Were such a case to arise today under Rule 404(b), the 
prosecution would obviously be spoiled for choice.   
507 See, for example, United States v Haukaas, (1999) 172 F. 3d 542 (8th Cir.), in which H’s defence to 
an assault with a weapon charge was that he was too intoxicated to have formed the necessary intent.  
The prosecution was allowed to adduce, in rebuttal, evidence of an attack on his girlfriend two years 
previously, and this decision was upheld on appeal without considering the similarities and 
dissimilarities which might have existed between those two incidents.  It is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the real rationale was that a man who has proved himself capable of intentionally 
committing one violent assault is more likely to have done so on a later occasion.  See also United States 
v Hearst (note 483). 
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Rule 404(b), such as absence of “mistake” or “accident”,508 “knowledge”, “motive”, 
“plan” and “preparation”.  The existence of so many overlapping categories invites this 
confusion, and has led to a situation in which, in the USA: 
 
. . . . there is a wide divergence of opinion among courts and commentators about the 
requirements for  admission of uncharged misconduct evidence to prove intent.509 
 
 Additionally, as Reed points out:510  
 
Intent is an element of almost every crime.  If evidence of other crimes could be 
admitted in any case in which intent was an element of crime, this exception alone 
would have emasculated the general rule. 
 
 Some trial judges have even allowed bad act evidence to be admitted in order to 
prove intent when it was not even a material issue in the case, as for example when the 
accused denied even performing the act.511  Some federal courts have regarded intent as 
a material issue whenever an accused simply pleads not guilty.512  Similar fact evidence 
has even been admitted to prove intent when the accused has offered to admit it.513 
 
                                                            
 
 
508 A good example of proving criminal intent via the “lack of accident” route was United States v 
Perkins (1996) 94 F. 3d 429 (8th Cir.). P’s denial that he knew the substance found in his apartment was 
crack cocaine was rebutted by evidence of his guilty plea to possessing it six months earlier.  The 
knowledge he had acquired by this means was said (at 434-5) to be “. . . . probative of his knowing 
possession . . . . at the time charged in the Indictment.  Additionally, the prior offence was admissible to 
show intent” (emphasis added) 
509 Leonard, note 431, at § 7.1. 
510 “The Development of the Propensity Rule in Federal Criminal Causes 1840-1975”, (1982) 51 U. Cin. 
L. Rev. 299, at 307. 
511 This admission was upheld on appeal in State v Sweeney (2000) 999 P. 2d 296 (Mont.).  
512 See, for example, United States v Misher (1996) 99 F. 3d 664 (5th Cir.) and United States v Shedlock 
(1995) 62 F. 3d 214 (8th Cir.). 
513 United States v Ponce (1993), 8 F. 3d 989 (5th Cir.), relying on a broader principle laid down in Old 
Chief v United States (1997) 519 U. S. 172. 
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 Prosecutors have also succeeded in using the “intent” head in order to 
circumvent the printed word of Rule 404(b). A strict reading of s 404(b) suggests that it 
was intended to encompass only evidence relating to conduct.  The first half of the 
subsection restricts the ‘character ban’ to evidence showing ‘action in conformity with’ 
character, and a possible glib argument by a prosecutor would be to the effect that “The 
government is entitled to prove the accused’s character if such proof is limited to 
questions about their mental intent, and not their actions”.   
 
 Such an argument won the day in United States v Weddell,514 in which it was 
held that “Where intent is an element of the crime charged, evidence of other acts 
tending to establish that element is generally admissible”. Imwrinkelried argues that:515  
 
This doctrine is a dangerous one threatening to emasculate the character evidence 
prohibition . . . .  Intent is an element of every true crime.  Accepting the premise that 
the character evidence prohibition is applicable to evidence offered to establish mens 
rea, the courts could rationalize admitting evidence of any similar uncharged crimes as 
a matter of course. 
 
Opportunity 
 
The same process of abuse and what might be termed ‘category conflation’ has 
occurred under the “opportunity” head.  Even if it is proved that the accused did have 
the opportunity to commit the crime, this does not necessarily distinguish them from 
                                                            
 
 
514 (1989) 890 F. 3d, (8th Cir.)106, at 107-8.  This line of argument seems to have originated in respect of 
California Evidence Code Sec. 1101(b), which is equivalent to, and was the model for, Rule 404(b).  In 
People v Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal. 3d 1046, at 1096, the California Supreme Court determined that Rule 
1101(b) applied only “. . . . when offered to prove [the accused’s] conduct on a specified occasion . . . . 
rather than [their] conduct on any particular occasion” (original emphasis). 
515 “The Use of Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrine 
Which Threatens to Engulf the Character Evidence Prohibition”, (1990) 51 Ohio State L. J. at 575 
(hereafter “Imwrinkelried 1990”), at 579-80. 
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many others with the same opportunity.  But if, in the process of proving opportunity, 
the prosecutor is allowed to advise the jury of previous bad acts by the accused, the 
odds narrow in favour of the accused as the perpetrator, particularly if the 
circumstances of that previous bad act are similar to the act alleged on the indictment. 
 
 In Straffen,516 for example, the fact that S had been committed to a mental 
institution following the previous, almost identical, murder of two small girls, needed 
only to be ‘topped off’ with evidence that he had escaped from that institution a few 
hours before the murder alleged in the indictment, and therefore had the ‘opportunity’ 
to commit it.  Under Rule 404(b), a similar scenario could be approached from the 
reverse direction, allowing the jury to learn of the compelling similarity between the 
two crimes on the notional basis that it was relevant solely to “opportunity”.  In such a 
case, the outcome would probably not give cause for concern, but not all uses of this 
head of Rule 404(b) have been so innocuous.517 
 
 In practice, over the years, “opportunity” seems to have leaked across into 
“capacity”, and evidence has become admissible to prove an accused’s capacity or 
ability to have performed the act alleged, even though it is not one of the specified 
heads of admissibility under Rule 404(b).  This is most frequently allowed in order to 
rebut a defence that the accused did not have such a capacity.518 
 
                                                            
 
 
516 Note 226. 
517 See, for example, United States v Stover (1975) 565 F. 2d 1010 (2nd Cir.), in which the fact that S 
could have stolen a car was established by evidence that he had just escaped from a nearby prison. 
518 In People v Manson (1976) 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 ((Ct. App.), for example, M, a cult leader, was on trial 
for ordering a series of murders by his cult followers.  When he denied his capacity to exert that much 
influence over his “family”, evidence was led of his ability to persuade family members to engage in 
bizarre sexual orgies.  This was upheld on appeal, on the basis that “. . . if Manson could induce bizarre 
sexual activities, he could induce homicidal conduct.  While the evidence is less than flattering, its 
prejudicial character is outweighed by its evidentiary value showing Manson’s involvement in the 
murders”. 
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 Such a ‘capacity’ obviously provides one with ‘opportunity’, and on more than 
one occasion has been extended into ‘plan’.519    
 
Plan 
 
If an alleged criminal “plan” is defined broadly enough by a prosecutor, it can be 
made to connect two or more vastly different types of similar criminal behaviour.520    
The logic of ‘relevance’ is then replaced by the irrationality of character reasoning.521 
The same is true of “preparation”, which once again can be made to overlap with other 
exceptions to the general rule.  The accused’s prior involvement in some action which 
may be linked to the resulting crime may indicate not just the accused’s preparation, but 
also their plan,522 their intent, their opportunity, and their motive.   
 
                                                            
 
 
519 In United States v Provenzano (1980) 620 F. 2d 985 (3rd Cir.), P’s ‘ability’ to control the union 
members under his leadership, and his previous extortionate threats to their employers, were said to 
amount to evidence of his “plan” to extort money from them on the occasions specified on the indictment, 
via his “opportunity” to do so. In United States v Doherty (1987) 675 F. Supp. 714 (D. Mass.), D’s 
“ability” to obtain and sell advance copies of examination papers was established by evidence that he had 
previously done the same with similar papers.  This was said (at 715) to be admissible to prove “intent, 
plans, preparations and manner of doing so”.  See also United States v DeLuna (1985) 763 F. 2d 897 (8th 
Cir.). 
520 The overt argument that the offence on trial and the contested offence(s) are part of the same overall 
“plan” is successful in having the evidence admitted, but the lack of striking similarity between the 
offences is more likely to tempt the jury to reason that since the accused is a confirmed criminal, he is 
therefore more likely to be guilty on the occasion on trial. 
521 For example, in United States v Walls (1978) 577 F.2d 690 (9th Cir.), W was convicted of fraudulently 
acquiring a loan on the security of mineral rights which he did not own, following the admission of 
evidence of his having previously defaulted on other, different, loans in the past.  The justification for the 
admission of this evidence was said to be that his “system or course of conduct” rebutted any suggestion 
that the mineral rights loan agreement was conducted in good faith.  In reality, of course, the jury were 
being asked, in effect, “Would you have loaned money against those mineral rights had you known of 
W’s past record?”  See also State v Wright (1999) 593 N.W. 2d 792 (S.D.) (W’s claim of ‘justification’ 
for physically beating his son in the belief that he had set fire to the family home was rebutted by 
evidence that he had similarly beaten the boy in the past for relatively minor reasons, which was 
admitted to show W’s “plan or design” to inflict excessive violence on his son regardless of the alleged 
justification). 
522 Wigmore (Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 1904, hereafter “Wigmore 1”), at § 238, in fact 
included ‘preparation’ within his definition of “plan”.  Not even the latest edition of McCormick (note 
463) lists “preparation” as a separate head of admissibility; instead, at § 190, it is subsumed within 
“plan”. 
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The relevance – and logical admissibility – of such evidence is obvious when the prior 
behaviour and the alleged crime are linked chronologically in a ‘chain of events’.523  In 
such scenarios, the overlap with “opportunity” is obvious.  But it is not always so 
straightforward.524 
 
 
“Let’s get tough on sex offenders” 
 
 The marked tendency of those in judicial authority to allow considerable latitude 
to prosecutors searching for a ‘way in’ for their prejudicial evidence has been more than 
matched by the legislators.  As had occurred in England, public policy considerations – 
in the form of a public demand for increased convictions – led in the USA to a change 
in judicial approach to the rules of admissibility of bad act evidence in sex offence cases, 
including those involving children.  Its blatant agenda was to bend the protective 
provisions afforded to an accused by Federal Rules 403 and 404(b), and allow juries in 
sexual offence cases to learn of the accused’s previous sexual misdeeds in the almost 
certain knowledge that they would then convict him.525  This was reflected in legislative 
changes at the federal level, to give official sanction to what had been happening in 
practice for years. 
 
                                                            
 
 
523 A clear example of this fact scenario is provided by Lewis v United States (1985) 771 F. 2d 454 (10th 
Cir.), in which L was charged with a burglary which had been committed with the aid of a specific 
cutting tool, and evidence was adduced of his theft, the same evening, of just such a tool.  There would 
be little risk of the jury reasoning, in such a case, “He has been proved to be a thief, therefore he is 
probably a burglar”.  Instead, the persuasive link between the tool required for the task, and the accused’s 
possession of it, will command their attention far more; the argument goes that “the man who has the 
correct tool for the job has the “opportunity” to perform it”.  Likewise, in United States v Hill (1990) 898 
F. 2d 72 (7th Cir.), H’s involvement in a conspiracy to grow marijuana was proved partly by his proven 
possession of the necessary seeds during a prior arrest.  See also Commonwealth v Choate (1870) 105 
Mass. 451 (Mass.).  
524 See, for example, how “plan” was employed as one of eight possible heads of admissibility under 
Rule 404(b) in United States v Gamble (Note 504). 
525 I have reverted to gender specific terminology in light of the fact that the vast majority of accused in 
sexual cases are male. 
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 The notional justification for such a stance is that, given the nature of such 
crimes, there is usually only one witness to them (the victim), they often occur without 
any circumstantial corroboration such as physical evidence, and they are often 
prosecuted long after the event.  It therefore comes down to a credibility contest 
between accused and victim, and the only supporting evidence which may be available 
to the prosecutor is the fact that the accused has done it before. 
 
 When he has done it before to another victim, it may of course be possible to 
make the additional misconduct evidence available to the jury using one of the existing 
inclusionary heads of Rule 404(b), such as “motive”.526  But when the similar fact 
evidence is that the accused has done the same thing before to the same victim, then the 
real reason for its admission would seem to be to boost the credibility of the victim over 
that of the accused.  The logical counter-argument – that a so-called victim who is 
prepared to lie about one incident will have little difficulty in lying about others – seems 
to have been lost in the witch-hunt against sex offenders.  Even when the prior offence 
is a matter of public record (for example, in the form of a previous conviction), the 
accused is too easy a target for a malevolently-disposed victim seeking further revenge. 
  
When stretching the boundaries in order to admit the evidence under these 
existing heads, the courts left observers in little doubt of the true rationale for admission. 
For example, in People v Leonard,527 a stepdaughter alleging aggravated incest was 
allowed to testify to a whole series of incidents of sexual abuse against her going back 
                                                            
 
 
526 See, for example, State v Merida (2008) 960 A. 2d 228 (R.I.), in which evidence of M’s misdeeds 
against his niece was admitted on his trial for similar offences against his granddaughter, in order to 
prove “motive”, “intent” and “plan”.  See also United States v Gano (1977) 560 F. 2d 990 (10th Cir.), in 
which the challenged evidence was admitted to prove “motive”, “preparation”, “plan” and state of mind 
(designated as “knowledge”). 
527 (1993) 872 P. 2d 1325 (Colo. Ct. App.), at 1328.  For a similar decision, see Veloz v State (1984) 666 
S. W. 2d 581 (Tex. App.), at 582.  In Adrian v People (1989) 770 P. 2d 1243 (Colo.), at 1246, the heads 
of admission were said to be “modus operandi and motive” 
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for several years,528 in the face of L’s denial that the incident on trial had occurred.  On 
appeal, it was held that the evidence had been rightly admitted: 
 
. . . . to demonstrate that it was more probable than not that the defendant had a motive 
to commit yet another assault, and thus to demonstrate that the victim’s testimony was 
not fabricated. [emphasis added] 
 
 In People v Barney,529 the bad act evidence was admitted under the modus 
operandi head.  The Court, while acknowledging that such reasoning is normally 
applied to proof of the identity of the perpetrator (which in this case was clearly not in 
doubt), added that it:530  
 
. . . . may also support the credibility of a witness in a sex crime case . . . by 
corroborating the details peculiar to the offences. 
 
 As Leonard points out,531 the admission of evidence in this way proceeded more 
from ‘propensity reasoning’ than the logic underlying any of the notional heads under 
which it was more properly admitted.  It therefore, prior to 1995, contravened Rule 
404(b), in that it was being admitted to show “action in conformity” with the accused’s 
disposition as demonstrated by other acts on his part (“Once a paedophile, always a 
paedophile”).    Some courts were as bold as to say so. 
                                                            
 
 
528 Although these incidents were not identical to that alleged on the indictment, the Court of Appeal 
opined that they possessed “sufficient similarity” because they involved the same parties, occurred in 
private, and involved express or implied intimidation.  It is difficult to conceive of a series of sexual 
offences which would not fit that broad description. 
529 (1983) 192 Cal. Rptr. 172 (Ct. App.).  The victims in this case were a daughter and a granddaughter, 
both when minors, and the similar fact evidence consisted of additional uncharged offences against each 
of them.  Curiously, Leonard (note 431, at § 8.5.3) seems to object to the application of modus operandi 
logic to what is essentially corroboration of the testimony of the victim, but raises no such objection to the 
use of “motive” logic for the same purpose in Leonard. 
530 At 176. 
531 Ibid. 
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 In Butler v State,532 for example, the Arkansas Court of Appeal proclaimed that: 
 
This court has long recognised a “paedophile exception” to Rule 404(b).  The rationale 
for this exception is that such evidence helps to prove the depraved sexual instinct of 
the accused . . . [The court] consistently considered similarities in age and gender of 
victims to be demonstrative of a depraved sexual instinct, such that the paedophile 
exception is applicable. 
 
 In 1994, with effect from 1995, federal legislators gave statutory legitimacy, at 
the federal level, to what the state courts had been allowing in practice, and enacted 
Rules 413 and 414.  They provide as follows: 
 
  Rule 413.  Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases 
(a)  In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, 
evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault 
is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is 
relevant. 
(b)  In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the 
attorney  for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including 
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected 
to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time 
as the court may allow for good cause. 
(c)  This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence 
under any other rule. 
  Rule 414.  Evidence of Similar Crimes in Child Molestation Cases 
                                                            
 
 
532 (2010) WL 2132266 (Ark. May 27).   
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(a)  In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child 
molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of 
child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to 
which it is relevant. 
(b)  In a case in which the Government intends to offer evidence under this rule, the 
attorney  for the Government shall disclose the evidence to the defendant, including 
statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected 
to be offered, at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later time 
as the court may allow for good cause 
(c)  This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of evidence 
under any other rule. 
 
 The overtly political origins of these two Rules are well documented.533  The 
outgoing Bush Administration demonstrated its willingness to ‘get tough’ on sex 
offenders in precisely the same way, and at approximately the same time, as their 
counterparts in Britain were beginning to roll the ball that became the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003 (E & W).  The grandstanding of the Republic majority in Congress is typified 
by this address by Senator Dole:534 
 
[T]oo often, crucial evidentiary information is thrown out at trial because of technical 
evidentiary rulings. . . . [I]f we are really going to get tough, and if we are really going 
to try to make certain that justice is provided for the victim . . . [I] think we ought to 
look seriously at [ Rules 413-5]. 
 
                                                            
 
 
533 Ellis, “The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415” (1998), 38 Santa Clara L. 
Rev. 961.  Public sentiment against sex offenders hardened following the widely reported trials for rape 
of high profile identities William Kennedy Smith (a Kennedy cousin) and the boxer Mike Tyson, at the 
same time that career appointments of females increased in many areas of influence such as commerce, 
the legal profession, the armed forces and politics.   
534 139 Cong. Rec. S15,072-77 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1998).  He had earlier (137 Cong. Rec. S4927 (daily ed. 
Apr. 24, 1991)) raised the prospect that “concealing [the bad acts of the accused] from the jury often 
carries a grave risk that such a criminal will be turned loose to claim other victims”. Representative 
Susan Molinari (140 Cong. Rec. H8991 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) referred to “. . . a triumph. . . . for the 
women who will not be raped and the children who will not be molested because we have strengthened 
the. . . tools. . . for bringing the perpetrators of these atrocious crimes to justice”. 
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 It is not obvious why the drafters of these amendments saw fit to divide the 
legislation into two separate provisions, given that they are word identical except in 
relation to the type of offence covered by each Rule.  This division does have the effect, 
however, that the types of evidence thereby admitted under one Rule will not be 
admissible under the other.  For example, a man facing a charge of child molestation 
will not be confronted by evidence of his previous rape of an adult victim.  To this 
extent, the logical irrelevance of other bad sexual acts in proof of alleged new ones is 
acknowledged; otherwise, the decision to enact these rules can only be regarded as 
based upon public policy rather than any recognition of either logic or justice. 
 
 Rules 413-5 certainly did not meet with approval from practising lawyers, 
judicial officers or academic commentators.  The most obvious reason for this was best 
summed up by Duane:535 
 
It is self-evident that allowing juries to learn of a defendant’s prior criminal history . . . 
will increase the chances of convicting all those accused . . . who have been convicted 
(or at least accused) of sexual offences in the past – regardless of whether those 
defendants are guilty or innocent. 
 
 For this reason, if for no other, Rules 413-5 experienced a turbulent passage into 
law. It is reported by Cleary that:536  
                                                            
 
 
535 “The New Federal Rules of Evidence on Prior Acts of Accused Sex Offenders: A Poorly Drafted 
Version of a Very Bad Idea”, (1994) 157 F. R. D. 95, at 107.  For the counter-argument that juries do not 
fall for that shallow logic, see Melilli, “The Character Evidence Rule Revisited”, (1998) BYU L. Rev. 
1547, at 1606.  Several states already had Rules which permitted evidence to be admitted from a 
defendant’s past which disclosed his “depraved sexual instinct”, or “lustful disposition”, but “. . . . the 
influence of the Federal Rules is so persuasive that [their] adoption is of vital importance” (Orenstein, 
“No Bad Men!: A Feminist Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials” (1997) 49 Hastings L. J. 633, 
n.97.). 
536 Note 460, at p.308.  He further records that the same objections were raised by the Federal Advisory 
Committee, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Judicial Conference of 
the United States.  Clearly, those who knew most about the law warned against the amendments, but the 
politicians won the day. 
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The overwhelming majority of judges, lawyers, law professors and legal organisations 
who responded to the Federal Advisory Committee’s call for public response opposed 
the enactment of Rules 413 through 415 without equivocation. 537   The principle 
objections expressed were twofold.  First, the rules would permit the admission of 
unfairly prejudicial evidence by focusing on convicting a criminal defendant for what 
the defendant is rather than what the defendant has done.538 (original emphasis) 
 
 This robust opposition by those best placed to appreciate the legal ramifications 
of what was being proposed, as opposed to its short-term popularity with the electorate, 
created considerable procedural difficulty for its proponents.  The proposals had been 
either rejected by both the Supreme Courts Advisory Committees and the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, or subjected to proposed amendments which would 
have removed the automatic right of the prosecution to have the similar fact evidence 
admitted.  The Rules themselves were inserted into a “Violent Crime and Law 
Enforcement Bill” which Rep. Susan Molinari and others threatened to block unless and 
until what are now Rules 413-5 were included.  Because of the perceived political need 
for the Bill to be passed, the Rules were enacted.539 
  
The Rules did not even find favour with those who might have been expected to 
most welcome them, namely the feminist scholars.540  The feminists found support from 
                                                            
 
 
537 Rule 415 allows evidence of other bad sexual acts to be admitted in civil actions arising from sexual 
assault or child molestation. 
538 The second ground of objection was in relation to perceived problems in drafting. 
539 For further detail on the procedure summarised above, see Eads et.al, “Getting It Right: The Trial of 
Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases under Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415, (2000) 18 Behav. 
Sci. Law, 169, at 179-80. 
540 Their complaint, typified by Orenstein (note 535), was that the broad-axe approach adopted by the 
legislators tended to perpetuate “rape myths” which suggest that rapists belong to “a small class of 
depraved criminals” (ibid, p. 692) who can be identified by their past misdeeds, and who fall into a 
minority.  Orenstein asserts that the fact that someone has raped before is not necessarily probative of the 
fact that they raped on the occasion under investigation, while the real-life rapist is often a nice, clean-cut 
college type whom one would never suspect.  She also anticipated that when jurors became familiar with 
the exception contained within Rules 413-5, there would be a “halo effect” which might lead to 
acquittals unless the accused conformed to the mythical stereotype, and instead had only one or two 
‘priors’ for sexual offences.  She concedes, however (ibid, p. 695), that “. . . . the argument in favour of 
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the behavioural scientists, one group of whom,541 first of all point out that the combined 
effect of Rules 403, 413-5 is that the burden of proof is placed upon the accused to 
persuade the trial judge that the prejudicial effect on the jury of being told of his 
previous bad acts “substantially outweighs” any probative value it may have in the 
prosecution case.  They then go on to emphasise the need for the trial judge, when 
assessing probative value, to have regard to “objective data gleaned from empirical 
studies on recidivism”. 542  
 
Specifically, they challenge the assumption that one can assess the likelihood of 
a person having offended on the occasion on trial from the fact that he has offended in 
the past.  This is not the same thing as predicting re-offending in the future, which is 
what most recidivism studies undertake.  Finally, given that “sexual crimes are 
idiosyncratic”,543 they argue that similarity of modus operandi is a far better indicator of 
guilt of a new offence based on previous behaviour.   Put another way, the old Rule 
404(b) was a better regime under which to handle allegations of prior bad acts in 
relation to alleged new sex offences, and Rules 413-5 were little more than political 
grandstanding. 
 
 Subsection (c) of each Rule at least requires the trial judge to balance probity 
against prejudice under Rule 403, but given the case-law which preceded these 
amendments it is unlikely that a person accused of, say, child molestation would receive 
any sympathetic consideration from a trial judge to whom defence counsel complains 
that the admission of the contested evidence will all but guarantee the conviction of his 
client.  Nor would such a judge be likely to decline to admit it, or rule “lack of good 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
the probative value of prior similar crimes is stronger in cases of child molestation, where there is 
believed to be a higher recidivism rate for perpetrators”. 
541 Eads, et.al, note 539, at 182. 
542 Ibid, at 183.  At 185, they warn that “. . . . expert prediction of future violence based on clinical 
impression or logical intuition has a poor track record . . . . the actuarial (empirically based) method . . . 
significantly outperforms the clinical method of judgment”.  They also observe (at 187) that generalised 
statistics regarding recidivism among survey groups are no reliable indicator of future offending by 
individuals, given the arguable effect of “situational” variables. 
543 Ibid, at 188. 
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cause”, if the prosecutor does not give the fifteen day notice to which the accused is 
officially entitled.544 
 
 These Rules are of course federal, and do not cover state proceedings in state 
courts, where most sexual offences are likely to be tried.545  It is therefore puzzling 
that, with the exception of California, 546  the states did not respond with mirror 
legislation of their own, as they did with Rule 404(b).  The suspicion that, for political 
reasons, the state legislators did not want to ‘go public’ on what was already 
happening in practice is deepened when one reads of the reaction of those who 
responded to the call by the Federal Advisory Committee for feedback on their draft 
Rules 413 and 414 (see above).   
  
Only when seeking to bolster their case for the enactment of Rules 413-5 did the 
United States Department of Justice fall back on a line of argument which may have 
been born of desperation, but which coincidentally supplied the most logical 
justification for the admission of bad act evidence in any case, not just those involving 
sexual offences.  In what amounted to an endorsement of a ‘doctrine of chances’ 
approach, in its analysis of the proposed new Rules, the Department argued that:547  
 
                                                            
 
 
544 Academics had long complained of the increasing tendency of the courts to interpret Rule 404(b) and 
its state equivalents liberally in favour of the prosecution in sexual offences cases.  See, for example, 
Mendez and Imwinkelried, “People v Ewoldt: The California Supreme Court’s About-Face on the Plan 
Theory for Admitting Evidence of an Accused’s Uncharged Misconduct”, (1995) 28 Loy. L. A. L. Rev. 
473.  To that extent, nothing new was being proposed, but the legislators clearly felt obliged to create the 
impression that it was. 
545 N. B. that the cases cited above were all heard in state courts, under state legislation. 
546 Cal. Ev. Code § 1108, which contains similar provisions to Federal Rules 413 and 414, but does not 
distinguish between the two broad types of offence, and covers “sexual offenses” generally. 
547 Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 43, at § 3212.  The argument of course overlooks the facts (a) 
that the greatest risk of a “false accusation” may well come from police rounding up “the usual 
suspects”, and (b) that the lack of coincidence of “multiple false accusations” only exists if one can 
eliminate collusion between complainants.  It also only deals with one type of sex offence trial; there is 
no ‘coincidence value’ in one complainant testifying to a long list of “uncharged acts” by the same 
accused against her. 
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It is inherently improbable that a person whose prior acts show that he is in fact a rapist 
or child molester would have the bad luck to be later hit with a false accusation of 
committing the very same type of crime, or that a person would fortuitously be subject 
to multiple false accusations by a number of different women. 
 
 Speight 548 picks up on the more cynical justification for Rules 413-5, namely 
that this type of evidence had been admitted in the past by means of the abuse of Rule 
404(b), and comments that: 
 
The fact that there are “back door” possibilities for introducing what would otherwise 
be considered character evidence is an argument for careful scrutiny of those uses of the 
evidence.  It is not a principled argument for opening the front door as well. 
 
Conclusion – there is a better way to do this 
 
By perpetuating a ‘categories’ approach, American law has missed the 
opportunity to develop broad guideline principles to govern the admission of all forms 
of propensity evidence.  This has not gone unnoticed in academic circles.  Three 
decades ago, Kuhns observed that:549  
 
. . . . the admissibility of specific acts evidence depends on a careful balancing of 
probative value against the concerns with prejudice, time consumption, and distraction 
of the fact-finder. 
 
                                                            
 
 
548 “Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Commonwealth v Adjutant And Evidence of the Deceased’s Propensity 
for Violence in Self-defence cases in Massachusetts”, (2006) 86 Boston University L. R. 793, at 805.  
The facts of Adjutant are not relevant to this thesis. 
549 “The Propensity to Misunderstand the Character of Specific Acts Evidence”, (1981) 66 Iowa L. Rev. 
777, at 803-4. 
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 With respect, while not novel, this suggestion has great merit.  Evidence which 
is so relevant to the decision which the court has to make demands its own admission, 
whatever label is affixed to it.  If, in the process, it also reveals that the accused is by 
nature a bad person, this should be of no concern, since the jury will not convict them 
from that knowledge alone.  They will, instead, convict them because the facts demand 
that they do so.  Those facts may well reveal the accused’s previous history in a bad 
light, but in the overall context of all the facts in the case, this in itself will carry little 
weight with the jury.   
 
 What will carry weight will be the obvious relevance which the previous acts of 
the accused have to the new facts alleged against them, and any defence raised by them. 
The jury did not convict the Makins after concluding they had ‘fostered’ and killed 
twelve more babies.  They were convicted because the very presence of the additional 
corpses rendered infinitesimal the possibility that the child named on the indictment 
died by accident. 
 
 Leonard,550  thirty years on, is equally dismissive of the treatment of bad act 
evidence under USA law.  He complains that: 
 
 
. . . . none of the categorical rules capture fully the principles and factors that should 
guide the courts in deciding when to admit and when to exclude uncharged misconduct 
evidence. . . . . labels alone can never be a valid substitute for analysis of the reasoning 
behind them and their application to the facts at hand. 
 
 Ironically, those “principles and factors” had already been identified, at the end 
of the Nineteenth Century, by one of America’s most revered legal academics, John 
                                                            
 
 
550 Note 431, at § 8.5.3 and 10.6. 
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Henry Wigmore.  When he was writing for himself for the first time,551 Wigmore was 
able to expand upon his basic observation,552 that “. . . .similar results do not usually 
recur through abnormal causes” in order to generate what Leonard describes as “. . . . a 
major advance in thinking about the subject”.553  
 
Wigmore’s “doctrine of chances” theory concentrates, not on the label which is 
placed on the similar fact evidence, but on its logical relevance to the facts of the case 
in hand.  Once the key role played by relevance is recognised – and labels are thrown 
away – there is no longer anything to fear from the perception that the jury will judge 
an accused on character alone.  Once this possibility is eliminated, there is no longer 
any need to distinguish between “character” and “non-character” reasoning.  Any 
evidence which passes the doctrine of chances test, has, by definition, proved its own 
admissibility through relevance to the facts of the case for some reason other than 
character reasoning. 
 
  
The importance of this doctrine in avoiding the risks of “character reasoning” 
had been fully recognised by leading American academic observers such as 
Imwinkelried,554 who described it as “. . . . a viable, non-character theory of logical 
relevance”.  He offers it as an alternative theory of admissibility which had 
underpinned the English decisions in both Makin and Smith, but had not been 
specifically alluded to in either.555   
                                                            
 
 
551 Wigmore 1, note 522. 
552 In Greenleaf, note 453, at 71-2. 
553 Note 431, § 3.2.4.  
554 Imwinkelried 1993 (note 437), at 79.  His argument that “doctrine of chances” theory should replace 
the contemporary approach of the American courts was further expanded by him in 1990 (note 515), at 
590-3.  
555 In Chapter 3, the point was also made that in Makin, the Judicial Committee ignored the analytical 
approach based on doctrine of chances logic which had been employed by the NSW Court of Appeal. In 
Smith, the Court of Criminal Appeal had simply adopted the “lack of accident” category of inclusion 
suggested in Makin.  They were both heading down the same wrong road as the Americans. 
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 Wigmore’s “doctrine of chances” is considered more fully in the final chapter of 
this thesis.  The only reason which one may conjecture as to why the American courts 
and legislators ignored the rich legacy of Wigmore’s work in this area is that political 
policy proved stronger than logic and legal principle.  They have paid a heavy price for 
that policy. 
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Chapter 6:  
Australian law 
 
Chapter synopsis 
 
 The first judicial utterance on the admissibility of similar fact evidence under 
Australian common law was that of Windeyer J in the NSW Supreme Court’s judgment 
in Makin.  It was based on “doctrine of chances” reasoning.  Had it been followed in 
subsequent decisions of the High Court, then the history of similar fact evidence under 
Australian law would have presented fewer challenges to practitioners and legal 
scholars.  Instead, the law was allowed to develop along lines which led to the sternest 
admissibility test of all the common law jurisdictions, namely that propensity evidence 
is not admissible unless it is so persuasive that a conviction is the only foreseeable 
outcome of admitting it.   
 
This, in turn, led to avoidance policies in various states and territories of 
Australia which left the common law on the topic looking more like a geographical 
lottery than a uniform legal principle.  It also led to a rear-guard action at the federal 
level.  The Uniform Laws of Evidence (“Uniform Laws”) were an attempt by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission (“ALRC”) to generate a set of laws of evidence 
which might apply throughout Australia.  They first came into effect in 1995, in a 
limited number of jurisdictions, and followed the traditional ‘categories’ formula which 
had failed everywhere else, and which in Australia’s case added another layer of 
confusion and uncertainty to the law.  Ten years later, in its review of the Uniform Laws, 
the ALRC saw no reason for fundamental change. 
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Early promise 
 
 The ruling of the NSW Supreme Court in Makin has already been considered in 
the context of its rejected role in the development of English law.556  It will be recalled 
that Windeyer J’s disregarded judgment in NSW had favoured the “doctrine of chances” 
approach suggested by Wigmore,557 under which “. . . .similar results do not usually 
recur through abnormal causes”.  
 
 Windeyer’s approach found favour with some academic writers,558 and at 
least one English judge after Makin.559  Also, despite the fact that in the first two cases 
to come before the High Court immediately after Makin,560 it appeared that Australian 
law was destined to adopt the same ‘categories of admissibility’ approach as the English 
courts, Windeyer’s analysis also proved to be persuasive in the later rulings of the same 
Court in Martin v Osbourne.561 
 
 O had been convicted under a Victorian statute of the offence of 
‘carrying passengers for reward’ without being the holder of a commercial vehicle 
licence.  There was evidence that on the day in question (a Friday) he had been carrying 
                                                            
 
 
556 See note 135. 
557 Note 552. 
558 See Stone, note 59, at 67.  Forbes (“Similar Facts”, The Law Book Company, 1987, at [3.5]) also 
commented, almost a century after the event, that “It is surprising how seldom the Supreme Court 
judgments in Makin are referred to in Australian courts”. 
559 It was the preferred analytical tool of Scrutton J. in both Ball and Ball (note 173) and Smith (note 
180). 
560 See Hardgrave v The King (1906) 4 CLR 232 in which similar fact evidence regarding H’s prior 
dealings with money entrusted to him was admitted in order to rebut a defence of “accident”, and The 
King v Finlayson (1912) 14 CLR 675, in which, in a similar case, the same sort of evidence was 
employed in order to establish a dishonest “system” employed by the accused. 
561 (1936) 55 CLR 367. 
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passengers between Melbourne and Ballarat, and the Prosecution had been allowed to 
lead evidence that he had also been observed carrying passengers on the same route on 
the immediately preceding Wednesday and Thursday.  This evidence was then 
employed in order to lead to the inference that on each of these occasions O had being 
carrying out these activities for reward, in the absence of any direct evidence that the 
Friday passengers had paid for their travel. 
 
It was the unanimous ruling of each of the four judges that this evidence had 
been correctly admitted, and in the judgment of Dixon J,562 may be found the origins of 
what was to become the ‘no hypothesis of fact consistent with innocence’ test.  His 
Honour observed that: 
 
The frequency with which a set of circumstances recurs or the regularity with which a 
course of conduct is pursued may exclude, as unreasonable, any other explanation or 
hypothesis than the truth of the fact to be proved. 
 
When this line of reasoning was applied to the facts of the case, the evidence of 
the carriage of passengers on the same route on the two previous days made it “. . . . 
improbable that the passengers were not carried for reward”.563 
 
This method of analysis does not require the similar fact evidence to fall within 
a recognised category of exception to a general exclusionary rule.  Instead, the rationale 
for its admission is the logical connection between the previous behaviour and the 
                                                            
 
 
562 At 375.  Evatt J, at 393, also took time to explain precisely how the same principle had been employed 
in the NSW judgments in Makin, in the following terms:  “The business of the Makins was of so special a 
character that it could not be continued profitably unless the infants were killed almost at once. . . . . 
Accordingly, it was highly probable that the death of the particular infant was a death in the ordinary and 
inevitable course of conducting such business.” 
563 At 377. See also Evatt J at 382-3.  
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newly-charged criminal act by the accused, making use of our knowledge of human 
behaviour.   
 
This case did not require, as a pre-condition to the admissibility of the 
challenged evidence, that it all but eliminate innocence entirely.  But this is where the 
law was heading, in a series of decisions which led to Pfennig v R.564 
 
The road to Pfennig 
 
 It was over forty years before the first step was taken down this road.  By 
then it had become recognised that ‘relevance’ required to be weighed against ‘potential 
prejudice’.565  Then, in Perry v The Queen,566 came the first inkling of the difficulties to 
follow. The Court was obliged to caution against the uncritical use of the ‘coincidence 
reasoning eliminating any hypothesis consistent with innocence’ rationale which some 
had taken to be the ratio of Martin v Osbourne.  But the same Court, only two years 
later, ignored its own advice.  This took Australian law along a course towards an 
unworkable admissibility test. 
  
In Sutton v R,567 S was charged with a series of rapes of three separate victims, 
whose complaints were joined on the same indictment.  Following his conviction, he 
                                                            
 
 
564 (1995) 182 CLR 461. 
565 In Thompson and Wran v The Queen (1968) 117 CLR 313, at 317, Barwick C.J. and Menzies J. 
observed that: “. . . . a judge should, in a proper case, in the exercise of his discretion, reject such 
evidence if its prejudicial effect is out of all proportion to its probative value.”   In Markby v The Queen 
(1978) 140 CLR 108, at 117, Gibbs A.C.J., with whom the remaining judges concurred, adopted 
Boardman (note 235) into Australian common law by observing that “. . . . the principle allowing the 
admission of the evidence remains subject to the discretionary power to exclude it, even if legally 
admissible, where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value.”   
566 Note 53.  Similar warnings were subsequently handed down in S v The Queen (1989) CLR 266 and B v 
The Queen (1989) CLR 266. 
567 (1984) 152 CLR 528. 
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appealed against this joinder on the ground that the similarity of the facts alleged by 
each victim was not sufficient to justify it.  In dismissing his appeal, and deciding (on 
arguable grounds) that there had been sufficient similarity, Dawson J observed that:568  
 
If in considering the admissibility of similar fact evidence the trial judge concludes that 
there is a rational view of that evidence which is inconsistent with the guilt of the 
accused, then he ought not [to] admit it because in those circumstances the evidence 
cannot be said to have a sufficiently strong probative force. 
 
 While there is, with respect, eminent sense in the suggestion that similar fact 
evidence should not be allowed before a jury if it has insufficient probative force to 
outweigh its almost guaranteed prejudicial effect, that probative force need not be 
sufficient to guarantee a conviction.  If such a test of admissibility is adopted, then not 
only is the trial judge usurping the function of the jury in admitting or rejecting it, but 
the court is being deprived of strongly probative evidence which might lead to the only 
‘just’ verdict if it is admitted.  This point was about to be overlooked in what became 
the seminal Australian High Court authority on the subject. 
 
 In Pfennig v R, 569  P was charged with the murder of a young boy 
(‘Michael’) who had disappeared from a fishing reserve in South Australia in 
circumstances which might have involved abduction and murder, but whose body had 
never been located.  There was evidence to link P with Michael on the day of his 
disappearance, and additional evidence of P’s previous plea of guilty to charges of 
abducting and raping another boy of approximately the same age after the date of 
Michael’s disappearance.  P had attempted to make this boy’s disappearance look like 
an accident, in circumstances very similar to those relating to Michael’s disappearance. 
                                                            
 
 
568 At 564, citing Martin v Osbourne. 
569 Note 564. 
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P had also confessed to his then wife, following his arrest on the instant charge, that he 
had been ‘thinking’ about such an offence for some time. 
 
In their majority judgment rejecting P’s appeal, 570  Mason CJ, Deane and 
Dawson JJ. confirmed that the true test for the admissibility of propensity evidence was 
that : 
 
. . . . there is no reasonable view of it other than as supporting an inference that the 
accused is guilty of the offence charged . . . .. . . . Only if there is no such view can one 
safely conclude that the probative force of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.  
 
In consigning the previous ‘probity versus prejudice’ test to history, Toohey J. 
observed that:571  
 
An approach in terms only of probative force outweighing prejudicial effect leaves too 
many questions unanswered. . . . Evidence that an accused has committed other relevant 
offences must inevitably have a prejudicial effect.  But, in the language of Director of 
Public Prosecutions v P, it may nevertheless be “just” to admit the evidence.  The 
reference to just aptly conveys the notion that it is not only the interests of the accused 
that are involved.  The legitimate interests of the Crown and of the community cannot 
be overlooked. (footnote omitted). 
 
But the strongest criticism, of what had once been hailed as the ‘intellectual 
breakthrough’ of Boardman,572 came from McHugh J, who opined that:573  
                                                            
 
 
570 At 464-5.  They began with the observation that propensity evidence “ . . . may be propensity evidence 
which falls within the category of similar fact evidence , relationship evidence or identity evidence.  
Those categories are not exhaustive and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  The term “similar fact 
evidence” is often used in a general but inaccurate sense.” 
571 At 506-7. 
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. . . . prejudicial effect and probative value are incommeasurables.  They have no 
standard of comparison.574  The probative value of the evidence goes to proof of an 
issue, the prejudicial effect to the fairness of the trial . . . . If there is a real risk that the 
admission of such evidence may prejudice the fair trial of the criminal charge before the 
court, the interests of justice require the trial judge to make a value judgment, not a 
mathematical calculation.  
 
In the passage which followed, 575  his Honour, in substance, delivered a 
judgment which preserved the ‘probity versus prejudice’ test, and defined “prejudice” in 
terms of “insufficient relevance to the matter in hand”.  Thus: 
 
If the risk of an unfair trial is very high, the probative value of evidence disclosing 
criminal propensity may need to be so cogent that it makes the guilt of an accused a 
virtual certainty.  In cases where the risk of an unfair trial is very small, however, . . . . I 
do not think that evidence disclosing . . . . the criminal or discreditable propensity of 
the accused, must always meet this high standard. . . . in each case where [propensity] 
evidence is tendered. . . . it is necessary to identify the nature of the risk, if any, to 
which the admission of the evidence gives rise. 576 [emphasis added]. 
 
McHugh J appears to have been the only member of the Court to have 
anticipated the difficulties which might flow from the imposition, on all future trial 
judges, of what became known as “the Pfennig test” as the sole benchmark for the 
admissibility of propensity evidence.  Instead, he seems to have been arguing for a 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
572 See Hoffman, note 266. 
573 At 528-9. 
574 It may also be observed that if one defines “prejudice” as in some way increasing the chances of 
conviction, then one is in effect attempting to measure the same quantity twice, and the scales will 
always be even. 
575 At 529. 
576 However, and with respect, his Honour was still considering the potential prejudice of propensity 
evidence generally as something which existed independently of its probative value.  In the case of 
‘similar fact evidence properly so called’ (see note 2), the two are linked, in that the greater the 
relevance (probity) of the facts to the issues in the case, the less is the risk of “unfair” prejudice.  
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continuation of the sliding scale ‘probity versus prejudice’ test of Boardman, but with 
an added appreciation that “prejudice” in this context means the sort of “unfairness” 
which can result from the admission of propensity evidence which is insufficiently 
probative of guilt to justify the risk of the jury employing it for “forbidden” purposes. 
 
This, when properly analysed, sounded the warning that the Pfennig formula 
might not be appropriate for all cases. What the majority were laying down as a 
universal test might well be appropriate in a case such as this, when both the 
commission of an offence and the identity of the offender were being proved by the 
known propensity of the accused.  However, as subsequent cases were to illustrate, it 
was to sit uncomfortably in some categories of case in which the relevance of the 
propensity was less startling, and the risk of prejudice less acute.  
 
Had the majority court made it equally clear that Pfennig was a case in which a 
more general rule was being applied at the ‘high end’ of the probity scale, then all might 
have been well.  Unfortunately, it seemed that ‘probity versus prejudice’, as a 
benchmark of general application, had now been replaced by a strict new test which 
required that the trial judge assess, in advance of the admission of such evidence, 
whether, taken along with all the direct evidence in the instant case, the propensity 
evidence had the effect of eliminating any interpretation of the facts consistent with 
innocence. 
 
The headnote to the CLR report of Pfennig summarises what had apparently 
been laid down by the majority in the following terms: 
 
The basis for the admission of propensity or similar fact evidence lies in its possessing a 
particular probative value or cogency such that, if accepted, it bears no reasonable 
explanation other than the inculpation of the accused in the offence charged . . . . 
(emphasis added) 
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It remained to be seen how, or even if, this new test would be applied by the 
intermediate appeal courts of the Australian states and territories. 
 
Questions left unanswered by Pfennig 
 
 As recently as 2011, Heydon J, in Roach v The Queen,577 observed that: 
 
There is much to be said for Pfennig v The Queen, but it has proved to be unpopular 
with legislatures. 
 
This was almost an understatement.  But as it transpired, several of the states 
and territories had limited opportunity to respond to Pfennig anyway, because of the 
enactment, in the same year, of the Uniform Evidence Laws, which were intended in 
due course to apply in all the states and territories of Australia.  These Uniform Laws 
perpetuated the Boardman test, and eschewed the reasoning in Pfennig. 
 
However, adoption of these Uniform Laws by the states and territories was both 
slow and uneven.578  Consequently, most of them had several years at least in which to 
react to Pfennig, and that reaction was far from laudatory.  Various uncertainties 
regarding the workability of the Pfennig test in practice soon emerged, both in the 
scholarly literature and in the judgments of the intermediate courts of appeal, leading to 
                                                            
 
 
577 (2011) 242 CLR 610, at 627.   
578 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applied from its inception to proceedings in federal courts and the courts 
of the ACT.  Identical provisions contained in the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) became effective in that 
state in the same year.  Tasmania followed six years later with the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), and in 2008 
Victoria enacted the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), which commenced on 1 March 2010.  The ACT 
government introduced its own Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), with effect from 1 March 2012, in terms all 
but identical to the Commonwealth Act. The remaining states and territories, at the time of writing, have 
yet to adopt the Uniform Laws. 
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overruling legislation in three major jurisdictions.  The major uncertainties which 
became identified were as follows: 
 
 Does the Pfennig test completely replace the Boardman requirement that 
“probity” be measured against “prejudice”?  
 
 Even some of the judges in Pfennig seemed to be unsure whether or not 
they were laying down a comprehensive new test for the admission of propensity 
evidence in all cases.579  It was hardly to be expected that academic scholars would be 
hailing Pfennig as a new panacea for use in all cases.  Nor did they.580   
 
Among the academic rejections of the Pfennig test as the new way forward was 
the complaint that it imposed too high a standard for the admission of evidence of an 
accused’s relevant past in all cases.581  This criticism was particularly apt in respect of 
cases involving multiple complainants, in which even the possibility of collusion 
between them suggested an alternative “reasonable hypothesis”, and would therefore 
result in the rejection of their testimonies as cross-corroborative of each other.  Those 
state governments which enacted legislation to ensure that such evidence was admitted 
                                                            
 
 
579 Compare, for example, the majority (at 483) with McHugh J at 529-30 and Toohey J at 507. 
580 See, for example, Bargaric and Amarasekara, (note 11), at 76, who opined that “.   it seems that the 
High Court in Pfennig was not attempting to formulate a new standard for the admissibility of similar fact 
evidence.”  In the first edition of the Australian edition of Cross on Evidence to be published following 
Pfennig (5th, 1996), the test was said (at [21075]) to be that “. . . . the evidence may be excluded by the 
trial judge in the exercise of the general discretion to reject admissible evidence the probative value of 
which is insufficient having regard to its prejudicial effect”.  This was clearly an expression of belief in 
the continued application of the broader principle laid down in Boardman.  N.B. however, that a footnote 
in the current edition (note 165 to [21085]) states, in relation to the Pfennig test, that “Australian law 
diverges from English on this point: the test there is that the evidence is inadmissible unless its probative 
value is sufficiently great to make it just to admit the evidence despite its prejudicial effect.  He cites DPP 
v P. The learned editor is now a member of the High Court. 
581 Waight and Williams, Evidence, Commentary and Materials (5th ed, Law Book Co, Sydney, 1998), 
p.428, and Williams and Draganich, ‘Admissibility of Propensity Evidence in Paedophilia Cases’, (2006) 
11 Deakin L. Rev. 1, at 15. 
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without prior enquiry into the possibility of collusion were, in practical effect, ensuring 
that the Pfennig test would not result in rejection of the evidence in such cases.582 
 
The later ruling of the High Court in Roach v The Queen seemed to limit the 
application of the Pfennig formula to a very specific set of circumstances, and for a very 
specific purpose.  The majority in that case observed that:583  
 
The rule in Pfennig operates as an exclusionary rule with respect to similar fact 
evidence tendered for a particular purpose.  Separate and distinct from that rule is the 
common law discretion to exclude relevant evidence in criminal proceedings.  It 
permits a judge to exclude evidence where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative 
value.  It is commonly applied to similar fact evidence. (emphasis added). 
 
In short, that there is a general common law rule governing the admission of 
propensity evidence – and then there is Pfennig, which applies when the probative value 
of the evidence is so high that it eliminates any hypothesis of fact consistent with 
innocence.   
 
The latest High Court utterances on the subject at the time of writing, BBH v The 
Queen 584 are equivocal.   
 
                                                            
 
 
582 As Calloway JA observed, of the Victorian enactment which had this effect [s 398A of the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic)], in R v Best (1998) 102 A Crim R 56, at 70, “It has adopted a flexible criterion of 
admissibility similar to that proposed by McHugh J in Pfennig’s case at pp. 528-530.” 
583 Note 577, at 616.  The appeal dealt primarily with the relationship between Pfennig and s 130 of the 
Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), which contains, in statutory form, the principle first enunciated in Christie, to 
the effect that a trial judge has a discretion to exclude evidence where to admit it would result in an 
“unfair” trial. A further layer of confusion was added by the observation of the majority, at 622-3, that 
once the Pfennig test is applied, “there would be no room for the exercise of any discretion”.  See also 
Heydon J, at 630, that “Whatever s 130 refers to, it does not incorporate the Pfennig  test”. 
584 [2012] HCA 9.  Compare, for example, French CJ at [53] with Gummow and Hayne JJ at [68], 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ, at [157], and Bell J at [197]. 
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Given that, under the stricter view of the Pfennig test, the probative value of the 
propensity evidence which is being admitted all but guarantees a conviction, one needs 
to be very certain indeed that the evidence is “probative” for the right reason.  The mere 
fact that it all but guarantees a conviction is, per se, no justification for admitting it, if 
the use to which is being put (i.e. its alleged relevance to the overall case) is an invalid 
one. While the Court in Roach restricted the Pfennig test to “evidence tendered for a 
particular purpose”, it did not articulate what that purpose was. 
 
It was not long before the lack of guidance on this point in Pfennig raised further 
questions regarding its suitability when applied to propensity evidence being admitted 
for certain “purposes” which had previously been identified, but which were different 
from the purpose in Pfennig itself.585  
 
 Does the Pfennig test apply to “uncharged act” evidence? 
 
The majority Court in Pfennig,586 recognised that what it called “relationship” 
evidence can itself be a form of propensity evidence.  However, the label “relationship” 
is also often attached to evidence that an accused charged with a sexual offence (most 
commonly against a young family member) has behaved inappropriately with their 
victim on other occasions which are not represented in the indictment charges.  The 
short-form name given to such other behaviours is “uncharged acts”.  
 
The admission of such evidence, for whatever notional purpose,587  carries with 
it a risk of prejudice against an accused if employed for the wrong reason.588  Following 
                                                            
 
 
585 Pfennig is perhaps best described as a case in which ‘similar fact evidence properly so called’ was 
being admitted to prove both the commission of a crime, and the identity of the perpetrator.  To this 
extent, it had much in common with Makin. 
586 Note 570.  
587 For example, to provide a “realistic context” for the complainant’s testimony (as in R v Vonarx [1999] 
3 VR 618 at 625, and per Hunt C.J. in R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 515).  In Gipp v The Queen 
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Pfennig, this area of law fell into a state of confusion, due to the failure of the High 
Court to guide the lower courts on how such evidence should be handled following its 
introduction of the ‘no other reasonable hypothesis’ test. 
 
Writing only four years after Pfennig,589 Andrew Palmer drew attention to the 
fact that the failure of the High Court to clarify whether that test applied only to 
uncharged act propensity evidence which the Crown sought to employ directly in proof 
of guilt, or whether it also applied to uncharged act evidence which only revealed such a 
propensity indirectly,590 had already led to a division of opinion in the lower courts.  
This also remained a matter of considerable contention between academic 
commentators. 591  It even divided the High Court on the first occasion that it was 
afforded an opportunity to clarify the matter following Pfennig. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
((1998) 194 CLR 106, per Gaudron J at 113) it was also said to be admissible in order to explain the 
victim’s failure to complain of, or to express surprise at, the accused’s behaviour on the occasion(s) 
specified on the indictment.  In other cases, it has also provided evidence of the “grooming” of the 
intended victim by an accused.   
588 Nor is that risk diminished in any way by applying a euphemistic label to it. As Dawson J had 
observed in S v The Queen (Note 566, at 275), ‘. . . . when such evidence is admitted in a case of this kind 
it is in truth nothing more than evidence of a propensity on the part of the accused of a sufficiently high 
degree of relevance as to justify its admission’ [emphasis added].  See also Holmes JA in R v Roach (note 
618) at [19] that ‘ . . . bland references to “context” or “relationship” evidence . . . . [fail] to acknowledge 
the propensity reasoning underlying the proposed use of the evidence’.  See, in addition, NJB v R [2010] 
NTCCA 5, per Martin CJ at [23]. 
589 “Propensity, Coincidence and Context: the Use and Admissibility of Extraneous Misconduct Evidence 
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases”, (1999) 4 Newcastle Law Review 46, 50-51.  See also Flatman and 
Bargaric, in “Non-similar Fact Propensity Evidence: Admissibility, Dangers and Jury Directions”, (2001) 
75 Australian Law Journal, 191, who observed that “ . . . . . where propensity evidence is not directly 
relevant to a matter in issue, the ‘another rational view’ test is a logically inappropriate standard to govern 
its admissibility.  A more suitable test involves the balancing of the probative value of the evidence 
against its prejudicial effect”. 
590 This would, for example, be the inevitable result of admitting such evidence to provide “context” or 
“background” evidence of the kind described above.  If it is not being admitted in order to prove 
propensity directly, goes the argument, then the “propensity” test ought not to be applied. 
591 Compare, for example, the claim by Smith and Holdenson in “Comparative Evidence: Admission of 
Evidence of Relationship in Sexual Offence Prosecutions”, (1999) 73 Australian Law Journal 432, at 430, 
that the majority in  Pfennig intended the “no reasonable hypothesis” test to apply to “ . . . all evidence 
which reveals the commission of offences other than those with which the accused is charged”, with the 
assertion of Flatman and Bargaric (note 589, at 196) that “ . . . . it would seem that the another rational 
view test is conceptually not suitable in the context of relationship evidence”, because  “. . . it will always 
result in its inadmissibility, since by definition relationship evidence does not carry the special probative 
force which is a feature of similar fact evidence”.  Palmer (note 589, at 64) agreed with the latter view. 
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In Gipp v The Queen,592 seven allegations of sexual abuse by a man of his step-
daughter were supplemented by evidence in chief by her which indicated that the 
specified acts were simply the tip of an iceberg.  The jury were allowed by the trial 
judge to consider this evidence because it demonstrated “. . . the nature of the 
relationship between the complainant and the accused”.593  McHugh and Hayne JJ,594 
had no doubts that the uncharged acts evidence had been admissible: 
 
. . . . to show the relationship which existed between the parties and to explain why the 
complainant so readily complied with the various demands of the appellant. . . . The 
evidence . . . . .  was admitted for the limited purpose of making the circumstances of 
the specific offences more intelligible . . . If the evidence had been tendered to prove 
propensity, it would have required careful direction in accordance with the principles 
emphasised by this Court on numerous occasions in recent years.595 
 
Clearly, they did not regard the challenged evidence as falling under the Pfennig 
test, since it did not involve any “propensity” reasoning; for the same reason, they did 
not appear to be unduly concerned that the trial judge had not warned the jury against 
propensity reasoning.596  This was despite the fact that whatever justification might be 
given for its admission, it indirectly revealed unflattering information regarding the 
accused’s propensity. There was no reference in their judgment to the need for the trial 
judge to exclude the uncharged act evidence in accordance with any principle of 
“fairness” to the accused.  Still less do they seem to have required the probative value of 
that evidence to be assessed against its prejudicial potential. 
 
                                                            
 
 
592 Note 587. 
593 As reported at 111. 
594 At 130-2. 
595 Citing Pfennig.  Note the ongoing confusion between what might be termed ‘mere background’ use of 
such evidence and its description as “relationship” evidence, which in Pfennig had been identified as a 
form of propensity reasoning, the very context in which “careful direction” is required. 
596 While observing (at 133) that “ . . . . it would have been better” had he done so, they added (ibid) that 
“Having regard to the conduct of the case and the rest of his Honour’s summing up, there is no reason to 
suppose that the jury might have used the general behaviour evidence as propensity evidence.” In the 
circumstances, this was an optimistic assumption. 
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Only Kirby J,597 appears to have acknowledged the danger of admitting what 
was in reality “tendency” evidence, without emphasising to the jury the limited purpose 
for which it was being adduced 598,599. 
 
This ongoing failure by the Court to clarify matters was freely conceded by one 
of its own in KRM v The Queen,600 in which McHugh J. observed that: 
 
. . . an important question still to be resolved by this Court is whether the ‘no rational 
view’ test of admissibility applies to all evidence revealing criminal or discreditable 
conduct or only to evidence tendered to prove propensity and to evidence proving 
similar facts. 
 
What was clearly also still missing was any indication of precisely which test of 
admissibility they should apply to so-called “background evidence” – the more 
demanding Pfennig test, or the more flexible “probity versus prejudice” alternative, if 
indeed it was still available as an alternative.  There was also an unresolved tension 
between allowing such evidence before the jury in order to reveal the prior sexual 
relationship between the accused and their victim, while at the same time instructing 
them that they were not allowed to use such evidence as revealing any “propensity” on 
the part of the accused to behave sexually towards them.601 
                                                            
 
 
597 At 156. 
598  Having confirmed (at 156) that “Evidence of this kind is only admissible if its probative value 
outweighs its prejudicial effect”, he ordered a new trial (at 157), inter alia on the ground that “ . . . . 
assuming . . . . that the evidence was . . . admissible as tendency evidence . . . the primary judge gave 
absolutely no warnings about the dangers of the use of such evidence.”  With respect, whether it was 
“admissible” or not, on any ground, the jury were allowed to hear it, without any judicial direction as to 
how they might use it, and this was sufficient ground to overturn the resulting conviction. 
599 Although they were prepared to make the distinction between uncharged acts used for propensity 
purposes and its use as “background evidence”, the remaining judges (Gaudron J at 112, and Callinan at 
168) were not prepared to offer guidance on what test of admissibility should apply to such “background” 
evidence. 
600 (2001) 206 CLR 221 at 231. 
601 A disturbing example of this process is to be found in the directions of the trial judge to the jury in the 
Victorian case of EF (2008) 189 A Crim. R 463, in which the trial judge first advised the jury (as reported 
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The High Court declined another opportunity to give authoritative guidance in 
this area in Tully v The Queen,602 in which the only judge to comment on the confusion 
which had arisen regarding the appropriate test to apply in respect of uncharged acts 
was Kirby J, 603 who contented himself with the conclusion, 604  that “It would be 
preferable for this Court to consider the law on the directions appropriate to evidence of 
uncharged acts in a case that lacks the forensic peculiarity of the present appeal”.   
 
Confusion continued to dominate the judgments of intermediate appeal courts at 
state level, which had looked in vain to the High Court for guidance.  Some states went 
so far as to enact legislation whose effect was to bypass Pfennig altogether.605  Two of 
them, 606  in effect, restored, for all cases in which propensity evidence was to be 
revealed to the jury, and for whatever purpose, the House of Lords formulation of the 
test in DPP v P.607  As was observed in one of the leading cases to interpret the 
Victorian legislation, the test was now the same for all evidence of uncharged acts, 
regardless of the purpose for which it was adduced, and regardless of what the Court in 
Pfennig may have intended.608   
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
at 469) that the evidence of uncharged acts was admissible in order to demonstrate the accused’s “guilty 
passion” for the complainant, but then counselled them against concluding that he was therefore “ . . . the 
kind of person to have committed the crimes charged . . . ”.  This confusing piece of sophistry was not 
even commented on by the Court of Appeal when rejecting the accused’s appeal. It concluded instead that 
this had been “a strong and appropriate warning against the dangers of propensity reasoning”.  For a more 
recent example of such muddled thinking, this time in the context of a multi-count indictment involving 
three separate complainants, see Pretorius [2010] 1 Qd R 67. 
602 (2006) 230 CLR 234. 
603 His Honour was able to cite no less then eleven cases in which this confusion had been manifest. 
604 At 255. 
605 These are considered in a later section of this chapter. 
606 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 398A and Evidence Act 1906 (W.A.), s 31A. 
607 Note 289. 
608 R v Best (note 582) at 70, per Calloway JA.  It was, however, subsequently emphasised by the 
unanimous Court in R v Vonarx (Note 587), at 625, that when uncharged act evidence was admitted in 
order to allow the complainant’s evidence to be “. . . . assessed and evaluated within a realistic contextual 
setting”, then the jury should be warned to avoid any propensity reasoning.  The Queensland Court of 
Appeal, in R v W [1998] 2 Qd. R. 531 (another “uncharged acts” case, almost identical on its facts to 
Gipp), concluded  (at 534 and 537) that Pfennig could not be applied, because its strictness would always 
result in “uncharged act” evidence being excluded. 
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A suitable opportunity for the High Court to speak with one voice on this 
question, and to restore its authority in the states and territories still governed by 
common law rules, presented itself in HML v The Queen.609  To describe the sum total 
of the 171 pages of judgment in this case as a disappointment would be a polite 
euphemism.   
 
The issues on appeal were, in essence, (a) whether such uncharged act evidence 
was admissible at all, and if so, (b) what directions the trial judge should have given to 
the jury regarding the use which they could make of it.  The Court divided evenly on the 
issue of whether or not such evidence was covered by the Pfennig test.610   
 
There was not even any agreement within each school of opinion as to the basis 
for the admissibility of such evidence.611  There was, however, a clear majority in 
favour of the assertion that “relationship” evidence admitted in proof of propensity 
would satisfy the Pfennig test,612 and unanimity on the proposition that such evidence 
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt if it is to be admitted for a “propensity” 
purpose.613   
 
                                                            
 
 
609 (2008) 235 CLR 334.  The case originated in South Australia, which was at the time, and continues to 
be, governed by common law rules in this area.  It was a case of a father accused of sexual offences 
against his natural daughter, this time in Adelaide, in which the Crown had been permitted to adduce 
evidence of other similar (and some different) offences against her both before and after the dates of the 
offences on the indictment. 
610 In support of what might be termed the ‘inclusive’ view that all such evidence should be required to 
pass the Pfennig test even when its effect is merely to reveal the accused’s previous misdeeds were 
Gummow J (at 362), Kirby J (at 364), and Hayne J (at 383).  The alternative, ‘exclusive’ view of Gleeson 
CJ (at 359), Crennan J (at 485) and Kiefel J (at 502) was that the Pfennig test was not applicable to 
uncharged act evidence which was not being used in direct proof of guilt via propensity.    
611 The Full Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, but each of the seven judges gave different reasons 
for so doing. 
612 Per Gleeson CJ at 359, Gummow J at 362, Kirby J at 364, Hayne J at 386 and Heydon J at 431.  This 
conclusion is perhaps unsurprising, given that, as Stuesser (“The Need to Legislate the Law on Similar 
Fact”, The Journal of the Bar Association of Queensland, Issue 35, June 2009, p.1) points out, “ . . . the 
fact that the accused sexually assaulted the complainant on other occasions is only consistent with guilt.  
There is no other innocent explanation”. 
613 This was despite the fact that the task of deciding something beyond reasonable doubt is, traditionally, 
the role of the jury at the end of the trial, and not that of the trial judge at an interlocutory stage.   
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Stuesser,614 describes this process as “circular reasoning at its worst”, and in 
cases in which such a test is applied, the trial judge is being called upon either to arrive 
at an inference of guilt of the accused ahead of the jury, or to withhold from them what 
might be, in the final analysis, a significant element of the Crown’s case, because the 
trial judge does not believe that at the end of the day the overall Crown case is likely to 
lead to a conviction.615 
 
It was left to the long-suffering intermediate state appeal courts to make some 
sort of sense of what had been handed down in HML, in a ‘hunt the ratio decidendi’ 
exercise.  The surprising consequence was a degree of unanimity of opinion regarding 
what the judgments amounted to in aggregation, whether or not it was what the Court as 
a whole had intended to lay down. 
 
First, they concluded that the Pfennig test is applicable when the uncharged act 
evidence is actually being adduced in direct proof of guilt, either through “similar fact” 
logic, or as a circumstantial link in the chain of guilt.616  In such a case, the jury should 
be directed that they may only rely upon the uncharged act evidence if they are satisfied 
of its veracity beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
                                                            
 
 
614 Note 612, at p. 2.  In Stuesser’s words, the trial judge is concluding, in advance of the jury’s verdict, 
that “ . . . the evidence is admissible to prove guilt because the only rational explanation for the evidence 
is guilt”.  The same could be said of any application of the Pfennig test. 
615 For those lawyers educated in the common law tradition, there is also something disturbingly counter-
intuitive in allowing a complainant, as a witness, to enhance the credibility of their allegations by means 
of self-serving additions.  One does not eliminate the possibility that Statement 1 is a lie by allowing in 
Statement 2, from the same witness, regarding which there is no additional guarantee of reliability.  Put 
more crudely, two lies leaning against each other do not make a truth. For this reason, as McHugh J 
observed in Palmer v R (1998) CLR 1, at 21, “. . . . evidence is not admissible if it merely bolsters the 
credibility of a party or witness”. 
616 This would include, for example, the accused’s “guilty passion” for the complainant, as demonstrated 
by their previous actions, leading to the conclusion that they were activated by the same guilty passion on 
the occasion(s) in question. 
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As for uncharged act evidence which is being admitted for some less direct 
purpose,617 the Pfennig test should not be applied. In such cases, they ruled, the DPP v 
P test still applies. 
 
These statements of law are the distillation of a significant number of post-HML 
rulings at intermediate Court of Appeal level.618  The very existence of these rulings is 
both a powerful denunciation of the failure of the High Court to supply leadership and 
guidance in an area of the law in dire need of both, and clear proof that the Pfennig 
formula lacks general utility.  This much was finally admitted by the Court itself in 
Roach v The Queen,619 in which evidence which was clearly prejudicial to R, in that it 
suggested his propensity to commit the type of offence on the indictment, had been 
admitted on the ground that it constituted merely “background” evidence. 
 
 The Court declined to extend to that evidence the safeguard of the HML 
requirement,620 that such evidence be proved “beyond reasonable doubt”.  This was 
because the evidence was not being used as “circumstantial evidence in proof of the 
offence charged”,621 but simply for the limited “background” purpose identified by the 
trial judge.  This, with respect, completely ignores the fact that, whatever the reason for 
its admission, the jury was being exposed to its prejudicial effect.  But the Court had at 
                                                            
 
 
617  These include providing the “contextual background” for the indictment charges, explaining the 
reaction of the complainant to the otherwise seemingly isolated incidents, or answering questions which 
might otherwise remain in the minds of the jury. 
618 The leading case authority in Victoria is R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69, which was followed in R v EF 
(note 601), R v ML [2009] VSCA 106 and Scetrine v R [2010] VSCA 194.   See also Michael Wilson v R 
[2011] VSCA 328. For New South Wales, see DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 and DTS v The Queen 
(2008) 192 A Crim R 204, while in Western Australia the leading authorities are GBT v The State of 
Western Australia (2009) 192 A Crim R 483 and PIM v The State of Western Australia (2009) 196 A 
Crim R 516.  Finally, for Queensland, see R v Rae (2008) 191 A Crim R 279 and R v Roach (2009) 213 A 
Crim R 485, which is considered again below.  
619 Note 577. During R’s trial for AOBH against his former de facto, evidence had been admitted of his 
previous acts of violence against her because the trial judge was of the opinion that without it, the jury 
would be faced with “a seemingly inexplicable or fanciful incident” (at 611).  This put the evidence in 
question into the “background evidence” category, and the Crown disavowed any reliance on the 
evidence for a “propensity” purpose, although it was the belief of the Queensland Court of Appeal (note 
618) that it only had relevance in that context.   
620 Note 613. 
621 At 626.  Heydon J, at 631, was of the belief that the trial judge had given a direction in terms of HML 
anyway. 
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least appeared to be confirming that “background” evidence of prior acts was not 
admissible as “propensity” evidence; ironically, of course, if it were, then the accused 
would receive greater protection.  Clearly, however, such evidence was not required to 
run the gamut of Pfennig. 
 
 But the confusion is still not resolved.  In the latest case in this series, BBH v 
The Queen,622 BBH appealed his conviction of various counts of indecent dealing with, 
and sodomy of, his daughter, C, on the ground of the admission by the trial judge of 
additional evidence from his son (H), to the effect that he had witnessed his father in a 
compromising situation with C, who was naked from the waist down.   
 
This was, in terms of the indictment, an “uncharged” act, and it had been 
admitted on two seemingly contradictory grounds.  These were (a) that it disclosed “the 
true relationship” between the accused and his daughter (which therefore placed it 
within one of the “propensity” categories identified in Pfennig), and (b) that it put the 
indictment charges “in their proper context”, which suggested that the purpose for the 
admission of the evidence was not a “propensity” one.  To further underline this 
dichotomy of admissibility reasoning, the trial judge, while warning the jury against 
using the uncharged act evidence as “tendency” evidence, also instructed them that they 
might use it “to evaluate and decide that the complainant’s evidence is true”. 
 
French CJ was prepared to grant a new trial on the basis that the equivocal 
nature of the incident observed by H was such that it should not have been admitted. 
But the remaining judges chose to investigate yet again the issue of whether or not the 
Pfennig test ought to be applied to evidence of this kind. 
 
                                                            
 
 
622 Note 584. 
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Hayne and Gummow JJ concluded, 623  that because the evidence of H was 
capable of an innocent explanation, it failed the Pfennig test, and should not have been 
admitted.  The inference is therefore that all uncharged act evidence is covered by the 
Pfennig test, even if offered solely by way of background, or “context”. 
 
Heydon J,624 regarded H’s evidence as tending to demonstrate the accused’s 
“motive to commit the crimes charged, namely “sexual passion”.  This required the trial 
judge to apply the Pfennig test to it, and assume it to be true. 
 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ had no doubt that H’s evidence proved either the 
accused’s sexual interest in C, or “an act similar to the offences charged”.  Either 
way,625 “. . . . it was  relevant to show [the accused’s] propensity”, and that since it “. . . . 
might be employed . . . . in propensity reasoning towards guilt . . . . the test in Pfennig is 
therefore attracted”.626  Applying that test: 
 
. . . . it was the coincidence of both [C] and [H] independently giving evidence of 
such events which gave the evidence such probative force.  There could be no 
suggestion of collusion . . . No credible innocent explanation for the conduct 
observed by [H] comes to mind. 627 
 
                                                            
 
 
623 At [77]. 
624 At [105]. 
625 At [152]. 
626 At [153].  Bell J, at [172], also required that the evidence pass the Pfennig test, which for her it did, 
although she seemed unsure whether it constituted evidence of the accused’s “propensity”, or evidence of 
his “guilty passion” (compare [172] with [191].  The point would seem to be largely semantic anyway.  
All three of their Honours declined to categorise the evidence as merely “background” evidence 
employed in order to explain, or render more intelligible, C’s evidence regarding the indictment 
offences. 
627 At [159] & [160]. 
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 At least the Court appears, in this most recent set of rulings, to have been 
prepared to recognise the reality of exposing a jury to information regarding the prior, 
seemingly ominous, actions of an accused in a sexual offence case.  Regardless of how 
such evidence may be categorised, the jury is likely to employ it in “propensity” 
reasoning, and it is therefore essential that they not be allowed to learn of it unless it 
satisfies the strict criterion of Pfennig, namely that it eliminate all reasonable 
hypotheses consistent with the accused’s innocence of the offences on the indictment. 
 
 BBH does not sit comfortably with Roach, and intermediate appeal courts may 
confidently be expected to adopt their own approaches.628    Nor is this the only context 
in which Pfennig has failed to provide guidance. 
 
Is the Pfennig test applicable to res gestae evidence?  
 
The same “context” argument employed to justify the admission of “uncharged 
acts” evidence is often employed by Crown Counsel seeking to ensure that a trial jury 
receives “the full story” behind the indictment charges, even when that full story 
contains chapters which reflect unfavourably on the accused.  The convenient shorthand 
phrase frequently employed by Crown Counsel in this context is “res gestae”.   
 
In many cases, the evidence which they are seeking to adduce could hardly be 
said to fit neatly within that well-understood concept;629 if it did, then it would not be 
necessary to seek its admission, because it would be part of the Crown’s case in chief.630 
                                                            
 
 
628 See, for example, AJE v State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 185, another “uncharged act” 
case, in which the W.A. Court of Appeal, post-BBH, still opted to follow the rulings of its own Court of 
Appeal, along with that of Victoria. 
629 “Res Gestae” translates into English loosely as ‘the very things into which the court is enquiring’. 
630 This is the same as what the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (E+W), s 98  describes as having “to do with 
the facts of the case” (see note 358).  For example, if a man is accused of a serious assault on a fellow 
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But there is also another line of authority, epitomised by O’Leary v The Queen,631 under 
which additional misconduct by an accused leading up to, or perhaps subsequent to, the 
incident on trial, may be admitted as part of the Crown’s case, because this additional 
misconduct, and the event(s) on trial, are regarded as being a “connected series of 
events . . . . which should be considered as one transaction”.632   
 
The argument here, 633  is that the evidence may safely be admitted, and a 
propensity warning will not be required, because there is no serious risk that the jury 
will use the marginal additional evidence for “propensity” purposes.  As long as it is 
possible to make such a clear distinction between such different uses of an accused’s 
previous misbehaviour, then there is no danger of “unfairness”.  However, it is not 
always that clear cut.634 
 
The High Court ruling in KRM v The Queen,635 is authority,636  for the inclusion 
of both relationship evidence in child sex abuse cases and evidence of the type admitted 
in O’Leary within the same category, requiring the same test of admissibility regardless 
of the precise ground for its admission.637  McHugh J observed,638 that whether or not 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
prisoner, it is integral to the facts of the case that he was a serving prisoner at the time, and the defence 
could hardly seek to keep that fact from the jury. As McHugh J ruled in Harriman (note 6), at 633, “If 
evidence which discloses other criminal conduct is characterised as part of the transaction which 
embraces the crime charged, it is not subject to any further condition of admissibility.” 
631 (1946) 73 CLR 566 
632 Per Dixon J, ibid, at 577.  In that case,  the charge on trial was a murder during the course of a drunken 
debauch at a remote bush camp, and evidence was admitted of O’s violent assaults on other victims 
during that same debauch, prior to the killing.  See also R v Lyons (1992) 1 Tas R 193. 
633 See, for example, Flatman and Bargaric, note 589, at 202. 
634 See R v C [2002] QCA 82, in which, notionally as “part of  the res gestae, descriptive of the 
appellant’s manner of dealing with the complainant at the critical time”, the Queensland Court of Appeal 
condoned the admission in evidence of a statement made by C immediately after allegedly raping a 15 
year old girl, that he had done a similar thing in the past.  See also R v Pettigrew [2001] QCA 468, for a 
similar decision, this time in a murder case, and in the context of the accused’s state of mind at the time. 
635 Note 600.  This was yet another case involving “relationship” sexual evidence relating to a man and 
his child victim.  It was followed in R v C (Note 79). 
636 Per McHugh J, at 229. 
637 The analogy seems to have arisen from the remarks of Dixon J in O’Leary (note 631, at 577) to the 
effect that without the evidence of what had transpired earlier, the evidence of those who witnessed the 
eventual murder would have “presented as an unreal and not very intelligible event”, which is of course 
one of the rationales for admitting relationship evidence. 
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the Pfennig test required a higher hurdle to be cleared before such evidence might be 
admitted was an issue “still to be resolved by this Court”.  A decade later, it still has to 
be resolved. 
 
Even some academic commentators seem to have conflated res gestae evidence 
with ‘relationship’ evidence in sexual abuse cases.639  
 
The role of the trial judge under Pfennig 
 
Another issue which arose when the courts set about trying to implement 
Pfennig was whether or not the “no reasonable hypothesis” test was to be applied to the 
Crown case as a whole, or simply to the contested item of evidence.  Although simple 
logic suggests that it is the Crown’s case as a whole which must exclude any hypothesis 
consistent with innocence,640 a good deal of confusion was created by the reference in 
Pfennig to propensity evidence being a form of circumstantial evidence.641     The 
assumption that, as such, it required proof beyond reasonable doubt, appeared to be 
confirmed by the insistence of the later Court in HML,642 that propensity evidence had 
to be proved beyond reasonable doubt before it could be relied upon.  This was certainly 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
638 At 230. 
639 See, for example, Flatman and Bargaric, note 589, at 201 and 205. 
640 For example, in R v Ball and Ball (note 173), the facts that the two accused had previously shared a 
bed, and that the female accused had born a son to her brother, both at a time when incest was not a 
crime, meant nothing in the absence of evidence of ongoing cohabitation at the time specified in the 
indictment when that behaviour had become criminal.  It was the later event which had to be proved 
beyond reasonable doubt, not what had transpired earlier.  See also McHugh and Hayne JJ in Gipp (note 
587) at 133, that “. . . it is the charge, not the surrounding facts, that must be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt”. 
641 In Shepherd (1990) 170 CLR 573, the High Court had held that when an item of circumstantial 
evidence is “an indispensable link” in the chain of proof of guilt, then it must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt.   
642 Note 609. 
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the view of the law taken subsequent to HML in Queensland,643 Victoria,644  South 
Australia,645 New South Wales,646 and Western Australia.647  From this, it was a simple, 
if erroneous, conclusion that the similar fact evidence was required to discharge the 
Crown’s burden of proof all on its own. 
 
Academic scholars argued the point,648 while some judges,649 expressed the view 
that the Pfennig test was a very onerous one to satisfy on the assumption that it was the 
propensity evidence alone which had to eliminate all hypotheses consistent with 
innocence. Similar concerns were expressed by the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v 
W,650 again based on what seems to have been the early assumption that the similar fact 
evidence was required to prove the Crown’s case beyond reasonable doubt all on its 
own.  In R v Wackerow,651 a compromise solution was suggested which was to have 
serious consequences in later cases, namely that the propensity evidence should be such 
that “ . . . there is no reasonable view of it other than as supporting an inference that the 
accused is guilty”.652  The confusion was eventually resolved by the High Court’s ruling 
in Phillips v The Queen that:653  
 
                                                            
 
 
643 R v UC [2008] QCA 194, per Muir JA at [47]; R v ATR [2008] QCA 385 at [76].  This was despite the 
fact that a previous Court of Appeal in that State, in R v O’Keefe [2001] 1 Qd R 564, had opted for the 
view that it was the Crown’s case as a whole which had to eliminate reasonable doubt. 
644 Sadler, note 618, at [59]. 
645 R v S, PC (2008) 102 SASR 199, at [14]. 
646 DJV v R (Note 618). Given the application of the Uniform Laws in this State, this decision is strictly 
obiter. 
647 PIM v State of Western Australia, (Note 618).  This decision was arrived at in the context of the 
application of s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), and may therefore also be regarded as an obiter 
ruling. 
648 Compare, for example, Mahoney, “Similar Fact Evidence and the Standard of Proof”, [1993] Crim. 
L.R. 185, 187, with Hamer, “The Structure and Strength of the Propensity Inference: Singularity, 
Linkage and the Other Evidence”, (2003) 29 Monash University Law Review, 137, at179. See also 
Odgers, “Proof and Probability”, (1989) 5 Aust. Bar Rev. 137, at 144. 
649 See, for example, R v Best (Note 582), per Calloway JA, at 72.  
650 Note 608, at 533-4. This case has already been cited as one example of the confusion which reigned in 
state appeal courts regarding the future admission of uncharged acts evidence in the aftermath of 
Pfennig. 
651 [1998] 1 Qd R 197, at 204, per Pincus JA. 
652 This was lifted, out of context, from Pfennig at 481, although it was then conceded that the inference 
had to supply “strong support” for a conclusion of guilt. 
653 (2006) 225 CLR 303, at 323. 
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Pfennig v The Queen does not require the judge to conclude that the similar fact 
evidence, standing alone, would demonstrate the guilt of the accused.   
 
This did not, however, resolve the related issue of the precise role of the trial 
judge in acting as gatekeeper for the admission of such evidence, which still dogs any 
attempt to apply the Pfennig test, and which is further exacerbated when that test is 
applied to the Crown’s case as a whole.  More than one observer,654 made the point that 
deciding the ultimate issue of an accused’s guilt is the function of a jury, not a trial 
judge, and this much had been conceded in Pfennig.655   
 
Another important factor is the precise timing of the judge’s decision.  A jury 
will only be asked to decide upon the guilt or otherwise of an accused after hearing all 
the evidence available in the case, including that, if any, for the defence.  The trial judge, 
by contrast, is being called upon to make the same decision at a much earlier stage in 
the proceedings,656 based on whatever evidence has been led already, or is available to 
the trial judge from the depositions.   
 
Finally, and most persuasively, the strength of the Crown case without the 
propensity evidence (which is all the trial judge has when called upon to assess the 
latter’s admissibility) is a different matter altogether from the strength of the Crown’s 
                                                            
 
 
654 See, for example, Clough, “Pfennig v The Queen: A Rational View of Propensity Evidence?” (1998) 
20 Adel L.R. 287, at 297 and Hamer, (note 648), at 137.  Academic opinion was in fact divided on the 
appropriateness of such an arrangement. On the one hand was the consideration that if an experienced 
criminal lawyer formed the belief that the evidence in question was sufficiently probative to be admitted 
for the right reason, then there could be no risk of a jury using it for the wrong reason (see, e.g., Palmer, 
note 49, at 168). But against that must be weighed the risk of presuming that a trial judge is less 
susceptible to natural human bias and ‘irrational reasoning’ than the average juror, and that, having 
formed a preliminary view of the accused’s guilt, he or she is capable of keeping that from the jury, even 
subconsciously (for which see Hamer, “Similar Fact Reasoning in Phillips: Artificial, Disjointed and 
Pernicious”, (2007) 30 UNSW Law Journal 609, at 613.  See also Blanck et.al. (note 41). 
655 At 516, per McHugh J. 
656 This may be even before the trial proper begins, if the application to exclude the evidence is made 
pre-trial.  It will certainly have to be made before the defence presents its case. 
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case after that evidence has been added to the factual mix.657 This places the trial judge 
in the (perhaps reluctant) role of a silent prosecutor who has in their possession 
knowledge of the fact that the accused has something in their past which will act as the 
final nail in the coffin of their defence.   
 
If the effect of admitting the propensity evidence will be that there is no prospect 
left of an acquittal, then, goes another argument, why do we need the jury at all?  If the 
Pfennig test is so fool-proof in its guarantee of a ‘safe’ finding of guilt, without recourse 
to “forbidden reasoning”, then the admission of the propensity evidence is the 
equivalent of a finding of guilt, absent a very persuasive defence.658  But that finding is, 
in reality, being forced onto the jury by the trial judge. 
 
The jury must reach their decision on the whole of the evidence in the case; at its 
best, Pfennig obliges a trial judge to make the same decision (guilt or innocence) before 
the defence has even opened its case.  This much has now become accepted by 
intermediate appeal courts; for example, in AJE v The State of Western Australia,659 it 
was held that when the trial judge is assessing whether or not propensity evidence 
possesses “significant probative value”, it must be “taken at its highest from the 
perspective of the prosecution”,660 but that it is then for the jury to decide (a) whether or 
not to accept it, and (b) how much weight to give it. 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
657 Clough, note 654, at 299-300, illustrates this point by reference to the facts of Pfennig itself.   
658 One wonders whether or not the same result would have obtained in Pfennig had P been able to 
supply a credible alibi for the day in question, rather than admitting that he had met M on the day he 
disappeared. 
659 Note 628, at [73], per Mazza JA and Beech J. 
660 This, of course, requires an assumption that it is true. 
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Attempts to avoid Pfennig at state level 
 
Given the difficulties posed by Pfennig, it was hardly surprising that the 
governments of several states begin implementing alternatives.661   
 
Western Australia led the way in 2004 with s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 
(W.A.), which overrode Pfennig, and restored the pre-Pfennig requirement that probity 
outweigh prejudice, as laid down in Boardman and DPP v P.662   While, in other 
jurisdictions, it was not entirely certain how extensive the Pfennig test was meant to be 
in its application, it clearly was not to be applied in any context in Western Australia.  
In Stubley v The State of Western Australia,663 the majority High Court, 664 confirmed 
that s 31A: 
 
. . . . abrogates the common law rule that similar fact evidence is inadmissible unless, 
when considered with the other evidence in the prosecution’s case, there is no 
reasonable view of the similar fact evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the 
accused. 
 
Another fundamental retreat from the strictness of Pfennig occurred in Victoria.  
Section 398A(2) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) restored the “probity versus prejudice” 
                                                            
 
 
661 In Roach (note 577), Heydon J (at 628) observed that “All Australian legislatures have abolished 
Pfennig v The Queen . . . . except Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory”.  In fact, even 
Queensland, in s 132A of its Evidence Act 1977, had sought to bypass the pre-Pfennig ruling of the High 
Court in Hoch (note 303) that testimony from several complainants in a case should be excluded if 
collusion between them could not be eliminated. 
662 As will be seen later in this chapter, it also brought the law in that state closer to that laid down under 
the Uniform Laws of Evidence. 
663 (2011) 242 CLR 374.  This case is further considered below. See, also Wood v The State of Western 
Australia [2005] WASCA 179, Horsman v The State of Western Australia (2008) 187 A Crim R 565, 
and Dair v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 72, in all of which the Court had occasion to 
note the effect of s 31A.   
664 Gummow, Crennan, Keifel and Bell JJ, at [11].  At the same time, of course, their Honours were 
further obscuring the clarity of their ruling in Phillips (note 653) that the “no reasonable hypothesis” test 
was to be applied to the whole of the Crown’s evidence. 
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test first handed down in Boardman, while Subsection (3) also circumvented Hoch, and 
accorded with the House of Lords position in DPP v H.665  In R v Best,666 Calloway JA, 
with whom the remaining judges concurred, observed that “ . . . . s 398A adopts the 
English test of admissibility for all propensity evidence and questions of collusion and 
unconscious influence are left to the jury.” 667  
 
While the High Court might be powerless to prevent the avoidance of its rulings 
in Hoch and Pfennig by means of state legislation 668, it is not so powerless when one of 
its judgments is adjusted to suit the preferences of a state judiciary.  This lesson was 
learned – the hard way – by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Phillips v The Queen.669 
 
In a series of cases beginning with Wackerow, 670  the Queensland Court of 
Appeal had suggested a less strict interpretation of Pfennig which required that the 
propensity evidence which it was sought to admit need only “support an inference that 
the accused is guilty”.671  In R v O’Keefe,672 Thomas JA reformulated this less strict 
interpretation into two tests for Queensland judges to follow when asked to admit 
propensity evidence in future cases.  They were: 
 
(a) Is the propensity evidence of such calibre that there is no reasonable view of it than as 
supporting an inference that the accused is guilty of the offence charged? 
 
                                                            
 
 
665 Note 294. 
666 Note 582, at 64.    Best was still being followed shortly before the Uniform Laws became effective in 
Victoria; see Tognolini v R [2011] VSCA 394, an appeal from a trial held in 2009. 
667 The long-term implications of s 398A were critically examined by Arenson, (note 3), at 275 et.seq. 
668 Each state within the Commonwealth is empowered to legislate in respect of its own criminal justice 
system; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1902 (Cth), s 108. 
669 Note 653. 
670 Note 651. 
671 See, for example, R v Ingram [1996] QCA 294, R v W (Note 53), R v Smith [1997] QCA 350 and R v 
Carne (1997) 94 A. Crim. R. 249. 
672 Note 643. 
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(b) If the propensity evidence is admitted, is the evidence as a whole reasonably capable of 
excluding all innocent hypotheses?  
 
This was a significant departure from the stricter test which had been laid down 
in Pfennig, and it relied on every trial judge who had access to all this incriminating 
evidence against an accused in the trial depositions remaining sufficiently objective to 
consider alternative “reasonable” explanations for the evidence they were being asked 
to admit.   
 
Many of them proved inadequate to that task, and their inadequacies were 
effectively overlooked by a Court of Appeal which, in a subsequent series of cases,673 
seemed to consider that nothing more was required of propensity evidence than that it 
support the Crown’s case in some general way, regardless of whatever specific issue of 
fact the evidence might be said to be relevant to.  This was a far cry indeed from what 
the High Court in Pfennig had intended, and in Phillips, 674  the High Court first 
confirmed,675  that “Since at least 1995, it has generally been thought that that the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence depends on the test stated in Pfennig”, before 
noting that both the trial judge and trial counsel had agreed that the trial judge should 
apply “a reformulation of that test as stated by Thomas JA in . . . O’Keefe”.   
 
                                                            
 
 
673 R v K; Ex Parte A-G (Queensland) (2002) 132 A Crim R 108; R v Coonan [2002] QCA 465; R v 
McGrane [2002] QCA 173. 
674 Note 653.  P appealed his convictions for rape, unlawful carnal knowledge and assault with intent to 
rape, involving five separate complainants on six separate occasions.  The point of law before the High 
Court involved the alleged error of law involved in the repeated refusals by the trial judge to allow 
separation of the trials, decisions which had been condoned by the Queensland Court of Appeal.  The 
Crown had not fully eliminated the possibility of collusion between the complainants. 
675 At 308. 
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The test in O’Keefe had been adopted by the Queensland Court of Appeal 
because it had considered that the Pfennig test was “unworkable” and “had a dubious 
pedigree”.  The unanimous High Court responded to this by asserting that: 676  
 
. . . . it is for this Court alone to determine whether one of its previous decisions is to be 
departed from or overruled . . . .  Pfennig v The Queen . . . . [requires] the judge to 
exclude the evidence if, viewed in the context and way just described, there is a 
reasonable view of the evidence which is consistent with innocence. The tests advanced 
in O’Keefe are expressed differently.  Because they are expressed differently it cannot 
be assumed that in every case they would operate identically to the tests expressed in 
Pfennig . . . .Intermediate and trial courts must continue to apply Pfennig. (emphasis 
added; footnotes omitted). 
  
Intermediate and trial courts seem to have followed this edict in those states and 
territories in which appropriate cases have arisen since Phillips.677  Phillips, with its 
insistence on the continuing authority of the Pfennig test, has attracted academic 
criticism.678  But criticism has not been confined to academics; the Pfennig test has also 
been rejected by some of the common law world’s most senior law-makers. 
                                                            
 
 
676 At 322-4. 
677 For subsequent Queensland cases, see R v MAP [2006] QCA 220, per Keane JA at [43] to [45], R v KP; 
ex parte A-G (Qld) [2006] QCA 301, per Holmes JA at [56], R v Kay [2006] QCA 302 and R v Pretorius 
(Note 601).  The most recent case in that state, at the time of writing, to acknowledge the authority of 
Phillips was R v Brown [2011] QCA 16. Similarly, the courts of South Australia – which had not sought 
to avoid the strictness of the Pfennig test – were soon observed paying due regard to Phillips in their 
application of the law to the facts; see, for example, Sweeney [2008] SASC 300 at [23], Bleby J in R v 
Wallace (2008) 100 SASR 119 at 126,  R v Ellis (2010) 199 A Crim R 249, per Sulan J at 260,  SHN 
[2010] SASCFC 74 and R v Dawson-Ryan (2009) 104 SASR 571. The only remaining jurisdiction within 
Australia which is, in theory at least, subject to the Pfennig test, and its reassertion by the High Court in 
Phillips, is the Northern Territory.  At the time of writing, Phillips appears not to have been cited or 
referred to in any subsequent case within that jurisdiction.  But even in Victoria, following the coming 
into force of its version of the Uniform Laws, the Court of Appeal in Michael Wilson v R (note 618) felt 
constrained to follow Phillips on the inadmissibility, on a multi-count trial for sexual assaults, of evidence 
of non-consent by the alleged victims. 
678 See, for example, Gans, “Similar facts after Phillips”, (2006) 30 Crim LJ  224. Gans claims (at 238) 
that, in Phillips, “Arguably, the [Queensland] Court of Appeal, far from ‘ignoring’ Pfennig, gave the 
majority’s reasons more attention than they probably ever received from their authors.” Gans concludes 
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 Authoritative rejections of the Pfennig test  
 
 Even among those members of the High Court in Pfennig who first 
formulated the test, there had been one expression of guarded reluctance to impose such 
a strict threshold of admissibility in all cases, by McHugh J,679 who had also,680 pointed 
out the impracticality of a so-called test for admissibility which ruled out all but the 
most extreme forms of probity, and then in effect took the decision out of the hands of 
both the trial judge and the jury.   
 
 In Canada, as emerges in Chapter 9, the full Supreme Court, in Handy 681, opted 
for the ‘prejudicial effect versus probative value’ approach, and rejected Pfennig,682 on 
the ground that “ . . . the ‘conclusiveness’ test takes the trial judge’s ‘gatekeeper’ 
function too far into the domain of the trier of fact”.  Pfennig suffered a similar rejection 
by the English House of Lords in DPP v H.683  Lord Mustill, having considered Pfennig, 
concluded that:684  
 
. . . . the function of the trial judge is not to decide as an intellectual process whether 
the evidence satisfies prescribed conditions, but to strike . . . . a balance between the 
probative value of the similar fact evidence and its potentially damaging effect. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
(at 242) that “ . . . . significant problems remain in the application of Pfennig, presumably including 
whatever problems the High Court’s remarks in Phillips were intended to clarify.” 
679 Most notably at 529, where his Honour had continued to argue for a sliding scale of probity against 
prejudice, and had reserved the requirement for the highest level of probity for cases in which “ . . . the 
risk of an unfair trial is very high”.   
680 At 516.  This criticism of the Pfennig test was repeated by his Honour in Melbourne v The Queen 
(1999) 198 CLR 1, at 17.  In KRM v The Queen, (note 600), he questioned whether or not the Pfennig 
test had been intended to apply to all propensity evidence, pointing to ambiguities in terminology 
employed by the majority Court which had left the matter uncertain. 
681 [2002] 2 SCR 908. 
682 At [97]. 
683 Note 294. 
684 At 621. 
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The Pfennig test fared no better when it was considered by the English Law 
Commission in its final Report on “Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings” 
in October 2001.685  It recommended against the adoption of the Pfennig test because:686  
 
We thought the test stricter than necessary, and likely to lead to the exclusion of 
evidence which was probative and of little prejudicial effect. . . . it would require the 
judge to apply the same test to the evidence as the jury would have to apply, if it were 
admitted.  . . . . The test in Pfennig is not necessarily  appropriate for bad character 
evidence of a different kind from that in issue in Pfennig: . . . . we think wrongful 
acquittals would result from setting the test so high, and we do not favour the 
consequences for the judge’s role and the trial process which would follow from it. 
 
The English Law Commission was not the only reforming body to give Pfennig 
the thumbs down, and what must be regarded as the most telling rejection of the High 
Court’s test came from much closer to home.  At almost exactly the same time that the 
Pfennig formula appeared in the law reports, the Australian Law Reform Commission 
recommended a continuing reliance on the “probity versus prejudice” approach.  From 
the perspective of Australian lawyers, this only added to the confusion. 
 
 The final assessment of Pfennig must be that it only suggested a possible (and 
largely unworkable) formula for the admission of propensity evidence at what might be 
termed ‘the high end’ of probative value. It had done so in the context of particularly 
compelling similar fact evidence, but had done nothing to enlighten trial judges faced 
with future requests by the Crown for the admission of either “relationship” or “identity” 
evidence, whatever that term might encompass.  Even in respect of “similar fact” 
                                                            
 
 
685 Cm 5257.  This was considered more fully at note 324. 
686 In Paras. 11.12 and 11.13. 
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evidence, it had failed to identify either those factors which make such evidence 
probative, or those which might lead to unfair prejudice. 
 
 For those states which were about to receive a uniform statutory alternative, 
anything must have seemed preferable to the confusion left in Pfennig’s wake. 
 
A missed opportunity 
 
 In 1987, the Australian Law Reform Commission (“the ALRC”) generated a 
Report,687 most of whose recommendations found their way into the Evidence Act 1995 
(Cth).  This Act applied immediately in all courts of Commonwealth jurisdiction and 
the ACT courts, and ‘mirror’ legislation was thereafter enacted by the Parliaments of 
New South Wales, Tasmania and Victoria.688  These common provisions are known 
collectively as “The Uniform Laws of Evidence” (hereafter “Uniform Laws”). 
 
 What was described, in the Report,689 as “Evidence of Character and Conduct” 
was the subject of only one series of recommendations among many.  These 
recommendations contained what might have been a significant breakthrough in the 
philosophy underlying the admission of “propensity” evidence, had Federal Parliament 
adopted them.  They anticipated by fifteen years an almost identical change in 
philosophy which was to be acknowledged under Canadian common law in R v 
                                                            
 
 
687 ALRC 38 (“Evidence”), 5th June 1987.    
688 For the precise timeline of these enactments, see note 578. At the time of writing, Queensland, South 
Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory are still unaffected by these Uniform Laws. 
Recently, in R v Basa [2012] SASCFC 35, the Supreme Court of South Australia was still applying the 
“affront to common sense” test of Boardman in assessing the cross-admissibility of complaints by 
several sexual offence victims against an accused.  The Courts of Appeal of both NSW (in Ellis, note 677) 
and Tasmania (in L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381) have formally acknowledged that the common law 
rule in Pfennig has been superseded by the provisions of the Uniform Laws. 
689 Note 687, Chapter 36. 
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Handy,690 namely the recognition of those factors which make propensity evidence 
admissible through relevance.691  They were: 
 
• the nature and extent of similarities between that evidence and the fact(s) in 
issue; 
 
• the extent to which the ‘act or state of mind’ of the accused is unusual;  
 
• the number and times of similar acts; and  
 
• the likelihood that the defendant would have repeated them 692.   
 
 Not only did these recommendations reflect the true logical justification for the 
admissibility of propensity evidence – namely its relevance to an issue which the court 
has to decide – but they would have provided trial judges with a comprehensive set of 
benchmarks against which to measure the admissibility of items of evidence urged upon 
them by prosecutors.  Unaccountably, these recommendations did not appear in the final 
form of the legislation.  Instead, s 101 of the Uniform Laws reflected the ‘old’ approach 
of requiring the probative value of the proffered evidence to “substantially” outweigh its 
prejudicial effect. 
` 
                                                            
 
 
690 Note 681. 
691 The ALRC recommended that any legislative provision on the subject should “specify the matters 
that, typically, should be taken into account”. This it did, in Clause 89(3) of its draft Bill, which was 
ignored in Federal Parliament.  
692 This latter requirement reflected the psychological research to which the Commission had referred, 
which concluded that offenders are more likely to repeat offending behaviour the more similar the 
circumstances. 
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 Had the ALRC’s original reasoning been implemented, the resulting legislation 
might also have avoided perpetuating the ‘categories’ approach.  Instead, the Federal 
Government’s legislators committed themselves to a continuation of it. 
 
The Uniform legislation in outline 
 
 The Uniform Laws on the admission of propensity evidence are identically 
worded across the jurisdictions,693 and may be provisionally identified as follows: 
 
 Section 97: The “tendency rule” 
 
 Section 98 The “coincidence rule” 
 
 Section 99 Requirements for notice 
 
 Section 100 Judicial dispensation with notice requirements 
 
Section 101 Further restrictions on the use of tendency and coincidence 
evidence by the prosecution 
 
These provisions differ significantly from the common law, in that: 
                                                            
 
 
693 For ease of reference in the remainder of this chapter, citations are of sections of the Commonwealth 
Act; any relevant points of difference between Acts are noted as appropriate. 
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(a) Whereas the common law treats “propensity” as indivisible, the Uniform 
Laws distinguish between evidence which reveals “tendency” and that which 
discloses “coincidence”.694 
 
(b) The party seeking to adduce either “tendency” or “coincidence” evidence 
must give written notice to the other in advance of the trial, unless this 
requirement is dispensed with by the trial judge. 
 
(c) All “propensity” or “coincidence” evidence must be of “significant” 
probative value in order to be admissible.695  However, before such evidence 
may be adduced by the Crown against an accused, the probative value of that 
evidence must “substantially outweigh” any prejudicial effect it may have.  
This seems to steer a middle course between the bare ‘probity versus 
prejudice’ test of Boardman, and the stricter ‘no reasonable alternative 
hypothesis’ test laid down in Pfennig,696 in the same year that the Uniform 
Laws came into force.   
 
The legislation has created considerable case-law.  Much of this was, arguably, 
unnecessary.  The bulk of it arose from both a failure to properly define each ‘category’, 
and uncertainty over which category might apply in which situation.  There were also 
potentially three different degrees of probative value which had to be attained by any 
challenged item of evidence in a criminal case.  This did nothing to simplify the task of 
trial judges, while the requirement for notice to be given to a criminal accused turned 
out to be illusory. 
 
                                                            
 
 
694  As noted by Ligertwood and Edmond, Australian Evidence, 5th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, 
Australia, 2010), p. 163, “The legislation gives no guidance as to the reason for the distinction”.  Nor is 
any guidance provided in ALRC 38 (note 687). 
695 The sections were drafted so as to apply in both civil and criminal cases. 
696 Note 564. 
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Duelling categories 
 
 The ALRC gave no reason for distinguishing between “coincidence” (s 98) and 
“tendency” (s 97), and the existence of these two notionally distinct categories has 
caused confusion at their factual interface.697  This was not alleviated in any way by s 
95, which provides that evidence which is inadmissible for a particular purpose may not 
be employed for that purpose even if admitted for some other purpose.  As a result, 
evidence which is admissible as “coincidence” should not be used in order to prove 
“tendency”, if it is inadmissible for that purpose.  Not only does this perpetuate and 
encourage a ‘categories’ approach, but s 95 proved to be unworkable in practice, once 
judges began to demonstrate an inability to distinguish between the two notional 
concepts, and began ruling that propensity evidence might be admitted under both  s 97 
and s 98.698   
 
 If trial judges cannot be relied upon to distinguish between “coincidence” and 
“tendency” evidence, then there is little hope that juries can be prevented from 
combining elements of both, and concluding, by circular reasoning, that the accused’s 
tendency may be corroborated by the coincidence of the similarities, while, at the same 
time, the coincidence is all the more remarkable given the accused’s tendency, which 
the victims could not have known about unless they had experienced it.  There is also 
the risk, despite s 95, that the jury will be allowed, under s 98, to hear evidence which 
they then employ for a “tendency” purpose because they have received no warning 
against doing so.  
 
                                                            
 
 
697 The Dictionary to the Uniform Laws proves unhelpful, defining “tendency” evidence as “ . . . . 
evidence of a kind referred to in subsection 97(1)”, and “coincidence evidence” simply as evidence 
which it is sought to adduce under s 98. 
698 See, for example, R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261, State of Tasmania v Y (2007) 178 A Crim R 481, 
R v Ellis (note 677), R v Mason [2003] NSWCCA 331, and SPA v R [2011] VSCA 306.  In fairness to 
them, they are not assisted by Crown counsel; as Rothman J observed, in R v SK [2011] NSWCCA 292, 
at [51], “. . . . often a notice of tendency evidence is drafted in a way which makes it difficult to 
determine whether the evidence is sought to be adduced as tendency evidence or similar fact/coincidence 
evidence”. 
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 Considerations such as these challenge the advisability of sub-dividing similar 
fact evidence into categories.  There is also the attendant risk of ‘category shopping’ by 
Crown Counsel, given the requirement of s 98(2) of the original legislation that there be 
a “striking similarity” of both “events” and “circumstances” before evidence might be 
admitted under the “coincidence” category.  For the first decade of the Uniform Laws’ 
operation, Crown Counsel attempted to avoid this high threshold by seeking leave to 
proceed under both s 97 and s 98, taking advantage of judicial uncertainty regarding 
which section to apply.  Ten years later, following ALRC Report 102,699 s 98(2) was 
abandoned. 
 
 The DPPs of the various jurisdictions also proved themselves incapable of 
identifying which section they were intending to proceed under when issuing the 
“reasonable notice in writing” to the other party which each section required.  Trial 
judges were, under s 100, given the discretionary power to dispense with notice 
requirements entirely, on whatever conditions they deemed fit, even after the 
commencement of the trial.  These broad discretionary powers were used at least once in 
order to allow the Crown to retrieve the situation after serving a notice under the wrong 
section.700   
 
Defining “tendency” 
 
 The word “tendency” was a departure from common law terminology, and 
appears to have emerged when the Commission consulted the Concise Oxford 
                                                            
 
 
699 “Uniform Evidence Law” (13 February 2006).  In 11.24, the ALRC conceded that “. . . to require both 
a striking similarity of events and a striking similarity of circumstances would be to raise the threshold 
too high and would be likely to exclude highly probative evidence”.    
700 R v Teyes (2001) 119 A Crim R 398, an ACT case.  However, in the later ACT case of R v King [2012] 
ACTSC 176, the trial judge declined to allow the Crown to adduce evidence of K’s alleged sexual abuse 
of several victims under either s 97 (to prove his abuse of his position as a sports coach) or s 98 (to prove 
the commission of the offences through the similarity of each allegation) on the ground that it was not 
relevant to any live issue in the case, K having admitted the acts and based his defence on “consent”. 
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Dictionary for the meaning of “propensity”.701  Subsequent case-law has demonstrated 
that “tendency” is apt to encompass all types of behavioural trait possessed by an 
accused other than that giving rise to “coincidence” reasoning.702   
 
 Read literally, s 97(1) only imposes conditions on the admission of tendency 
evidence which is adduced to prove that tendency directly.  The question then arises as 
to whether or not the conditions of s 97 have to be satisfied if the evidence is being 
admitted for some other purpose which indirectly discloses the accused’s “tendency”.  It 
is tempting for the Crown to argue that such evidence is admissible for some purpose 
other than proving “tendency”, and as they had done with Pfennig, they focused their 
attention on (a) “relationship” evidence in all its forms, and (b) evidence which is 
alleged to form part of the res gestae 
 
a) Relationship evidence 
 
Both in Harriman,703 and in Pfennig,704 the High Court had acknowledged that 
in some contexts at common law, “relationship” can constitute a form of propensity 
evidence, but it remained to be seen whether or not “relationship” could constitute 
“tendency” for the purposes of s 97.  The Crown’s campaign to avoid s 97 in this way 
began with “uncharged acts”,705 between an accused and their victim (most commonly a 
child alleging sexual malpractice), and in R v AH, 706  the NSW Supreme Court 
distinguished between the use of uncharged act evidence to prove the sexual desire of 
                                                            
 
 
701 It is therein defined as “inclination or tendency”. 
702 In R v Colby (note 698) it was even held to extend to previous acts by an accused which were not in 
themselves “illegal or reprehensible”, but were sexually “outrageous” (per Mason P at [93]), and 
therefore likely to lead to “moral prejudice” against him.  The potential scope of “tendency” has recently 
been expanded in R v Johnston (2012) 6 ACTLR 297 and R v Edwin [2013] ACTSC 6 by rulings that the 
behaviour cited need not itself  be “similar in nature” to that alleged in the instant trial. 
703 Note 6. 
704 Note 564. 
705 For the meaning attributed to this term, see p. 188. 
706 (1997) 98 A Crim R 71 at 77.     
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the accused for the victim (which had to pass through the “tendency” provisions of s 97), 
and its use simply to place the victim’s evidence in its full “context”, which did not. 
 
AH was followed in subsequent cases, 707  then in R v NKS, 708  the Crown 
succeeded in having admitted, simply as “corroboration” of the evidence of the victim, 
and without recourse to s 97, the evidence of a psychiatrist to whom the accused had 
admitted sexual activity with the victim.  The limits of non-tendency “context” evidence 
were extended even further in Leonard v R,709 and clearly there was a danger of the 
‘context’ argument becoming a regular ploy by Crown Counsel seeking to avoid the 
provisions of s 97.710 
 
Writing at approximately this period,711 Odgers warned that: 
 
It should not be good enough to assert that the evidence is relied on to show the 
“surrounding circumstances” or “background” to the alleged offence, without a clear 
articulation of the precise way in which the evidence is relevant.712      
                                                            
 
 
707 R v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8, R v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475 and R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 
274. 
708 [2004] NSWCCA 144.  Similar rulings were handed down in Rolfe v R (2007) 173 A Crim R 168, R v 
OGD (No. 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 and R v Grattan [2005] NSWCCA 306. 
709 (2006) 164 A Crim R 374.  In this case, an alleged distinction was drawn between previous acts by an 
accused which demonstrated their “motive” to commit the offence on the indictment (held not to be 
“tendency” evidence), and previous acts used to demonstrate their willingness to act on that motive, 
which was regarded as “tendency” evidence which was required to be admitted under s 97.  Quare 
whether this is a distinction without a difference, given the use which a jury is likely to make of such 
evidence. 
710 For further examples of this process, see R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359, R v Dann [2000] 
NSWCCA 185 and R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370.  In R v RJ [2011] NSWDC 158, which involved a 
series of allegations of sexual abuse by the accused of his daughter, the trial judge declined to allow 
“uncharged act” evidence to be admitted under s 97, because the Crown had not served the requisite 
notice on the accused until two weeks before his arraignment, but on the authority of HML (note 609), the 
same evidence was deemed admissible in order to “. . . explain a lack of contemporaneous complaint . . . 
to establish that the occasions [on the indictment] . . . .were not isolated incidents”. 
711 In Uniform Evidence Law, 4th ed (2000), LBC Information Services, Sydney, p. 231.  
712 The same sentiment was expressed in the judgment of McClellan CJ in Qualtieri v The Queen (2006) 
171 A Crim R 463. His Honour handed down a similar ruling in DJV v R (note 618).   
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With respect, there is force in these observations.  The very existence of s 97 is 
predicated on the knowledge, born of experience, that a jury which is informed (for 
whatever reason) that the person on trial has in the past demonstrated a “tendency” to 
behave in the way in which they are now accused of behaving will be more likely to 
convict.  Hence the need for the safeguards built into s 97.  A jury is no less likely to 
convict if it receives the same information for an ostensibly different purpose. Odgers 
was also highlighting the significance of relevance, as opposed to mere categorisation. 
 
 This Crown tactic shows no sign of abating,713 and has in fact been successfully 
extended to violent relationships,714 and relationships between alleged co-accused.715  It 
seems that the Uniform Laws have been no more effective than the common law in 
preventing the perpetuation of artificial distinctions in the area of ‘relationship’ 
evidence.716    
 
 
                                                            
 
 
713 See Galvin v The Queen (2006) 161 A Crim R 449, and KTR v R [2010] NSWCCA 271. In the latter, 
the distinction between “context” and “tendency” evidence was said (at [92]) to be that context evidence 
“allow[s] the complainant's and/or the accused's evidence to be seen in context”, while tendency evidence 
“directly informs a judgment as to whether the offence with which an accused has been charged actually 
occurred.”  There is an equally persuasive argument that “context” evidence ‘indirectly informs’ such a 
judgment, regardless of what directions the judge gives to the jury. 
714 In R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal condoned the admission, 
at C’s trial for murdering his wife, of evidence of the background of “tension and violence” in the 
relationship because (at 575) it was “. . . capable of casting light on whether the appellant killed the 
deceased, and, if he killed the deceased, what his mental state was.”   Section 97 specifically governs 
evidence which shows an accused to “have a particular state of mind”, but not once in the ninety-six 
pages of judgment is there a single reference to s 97.  See also R v El-Hayek [2004] NSWCCA 25 and 
Kaifoto v R [2006] NSWCCA 186. 
715 In Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 354, the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal held (at [39]) that evidence 
disclosing prior drug dealings between two men had been admitted to show merely the nature of their 
relationship, and not to prove a “tendency”.   See also R v Sukkar[2005] NSWCCA 54.   
716 In effect, the jury in such cases is to be told “You may not use this evidence in order to conclude that 
the accused is a person given to this sort of behaviour, but you may use it in order to conclude that they 
have behaved in a similar manner in the past in relation to this particular person.”  When that ‘particular 
person’ is either an alleged victim, or an alleged co-accused, this would seem to be a distinction without a 
difference.  The evidence is being admitted without regard to its relevance, solely on the basis that it 
‘ticks a box’ of admissibility. 
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b) Res gestae 
 
In one of the first cases to come before the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal 
involving res gestae evidence in the context of “tendency”,717 it was able to fall back on 
the general common law principle which had been laid down in R v O’Leary,718 namely 
that the evidence in question should not be excluded if, without it, “. . . . the transaction 
of which the [crime on the indictment] formed an integral part could not be truly 
understood . . . ”.  In dismissing the appeal, and relying on the common law position, 
the unanimous Court held that “We do not consider that the principle in O’Leary has 
been abolished by the Evidence Act.” 719  Put another way, that s 97 could not be used to 
justify the exclusion of such evidence, even if it is prejudicial to an accused. 
 
 Odgers,720 says of this approach that “It is difficult to see how this does not 
involve tendency reasoning”, and it might also be said to have in common with 
Clark,721 that it was really evidence of the accused’s ongoing “state of mind”.   
 
 Adam, O’Leary, and even Martin v Osbourne,722 were cited in the more recent 
decision in Samadi and Djait v R, 723  in which so-called res gestae evidence was 
admitted by the trial judge because it revealed “the state of mind” of the accused, 
                                                            
 
 
717 Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510.  This ruling was followed in R v Lamb and Thurston [2002] 
NSWSC 323 again citing the O’Leary principle.  See also R v Kassoua [1999] NSWCCA 13. Given that 
the incident in this last case occurred a week prior to the event on trial, it is difficult to see how it may be 
so easily be categorised as “evidence of conduct which forms part of a relevant transaction”. 
718 Note 631, per Dixon J at 577. 
719 At 515. 
720 Note 711, p.232, fn 466.  He was referring specifically to the decision in Kassoua, which categorised, 
as part of “the continuity of circumstances which led to a later completed crime”, what appeared to have 
been a ‘dress rehearsal’ for an armed robbery. 
721 Note 714. 
722 Note 561. 
723 [2008] NSWCCA 330.  The two men were charged with raping their victim after spiking her drink, 
and evidence was admitted to show that they had spiked the drinks of a further twelve victims during the 
same six day period in order to steal from them.  For a further case in which “state of mind” evidence 
was passed off as part of the res gestae, see FDP v R (2008) 192 A Crim R 87. 
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without reference to the need for the provisions of s 97 to be invoked.  However, the 
Court also ruled,724 that the similarities between the circumstances of each charge were 
such that the “coincidence rule” of s 98 had rightly been applied.  This only further 
blurs the distinction between “tendency” (which incorporates “state of mind”) and 
“coincidence”.  It also further obscures the boundaries between res gestae evidence 
(which escapes both s 97 and s 98), and an event which is so closely bound up as part 
of “a series of events” that it requires to be considered as “coincidence” evidence.  
Finally, it illustrates yet again the perils of the ‘categories’ approach. 
 
 If nothing else, experience of the operation of s 97 has re-emphasised what had 
been obvious to both Lord Herschell in Makin, and the House of Lords in Boardman.  
This is that the potential misuse of “propensity” evidence cannot be avoided simply by 
allocating it to one of a series of boxes which seek to categorise aspects of human 
behaviour whose boundaries defy precise allocation.  Instead, one must consider the 
factual relevance of the previous events to the new allegations. 
 
 As Ligertwood and Edmond put it:725 
 
. . . . There are fine inferential distinctions to be drawn in considering whether in logic 
evidence is relevant on account of an inference from tendency.  The distinctions require 
clear articulation, first of the issue to be established, and second of the evidence to be 
tendered. 
 
 Crown Counsel faced with s 97 had proved themselves more than a match for 
judicial uncertainty regarding where to draw the line, and apprehension of withholding 
relevant evidence from a jury.   
                                                            
 
 
724 At [96]. 
725 Note 694, at 175 and 177. 
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 In 2004, the Federal Attorney-General commissioned, from the ALRC, a review 
of the operation of the Uniform Laws.  Its Final Report, 726  submitted in 2006, 
recommended,727 that “no change should be made to the definition of tendency evidence 
in s 97”.  As noted above, ‘tendency’ evidence was barely defined under s 97 anyway, 
and experience had demonstrated yet again that a ‘categorisation’ approach will not 
resolve a problem whose origins lie in a failure to distinguish between different reasons 
for ‘relevance’. 
 
Coincidence – or lack of it? 
 
 As indicated above, the ALRC came unwittingly close to their own “intellectual 
breakthrough” when they recognised that one way in which an accused’s past behaviour 
might be relevant is in order to eliminate coincidence.  As the Canadian Supreme Court 
was to demonstrate, a decade later in Handy, it is possible to solve the conundrum of 
‘probity versus prejudice’ entirely on the basis of relevance which defies coincidence.  
However, for the time being the ALRC had been content to regard “coincidence” (when 
in fact, strictly speaking, they meant ‘lack of coincidence’) as simply one category of 
admissible propensity evidence.  
 
 Instinctively, it seems, the ALRC grasped that the closer the ‘fit’ between what 
has gone before, and what is alleged on the indictment, the more ‘probative’ is the 
evidence of what went before.  This may well have been why, in its original form, an 
additional s 98(2) imposed the requirement that in order to qualify under the section, the 
“two or more events” which gave rise to an allegation of “coincidence” must be 
“substantially and relevantly similar” in nature, and occur in “circumstances” which 
                                                            
 
 
726 See note 699. 
727 In para. 11.11.   
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were “substantially similar”.728  This original suggested test was almost immediately 
criticised 729  on the ground that “ . . . . it unnecessarily complicates what should be the 
straightforward application of logical analysis and should be removed from the Act”.   
 
 Once again the legislators appeared not to have appreciated that, by enacting 
what was intended to be an exclusionary rule in terms which allowed prejudicial 
evidence to be admitted only if certain conditions were met, they were encouraging 
prosecutors to ‘split hairs’ in order to justify the admission of prejudicial evidence on 
some other basis. The stricter the admissibility conditions, the greater the temptation to 
give the desired evidence another label and consign it to a different ‘category’.   
 
 A paradigm case for the use of s 98 arose in R v Folbigg,730 a case which had 
strong echoes of Makin.  F was charged with the homicide of her four children on the 
same indictment, and when her application for separation of trials was rejected by the 
trial judge, she appealed that decision.  The Crown had given notice under both s 97 and 
s 98,731 but it was F’s contention that in respect of each of the charges, the evidence 
relating to the others was not admissible under either section.  The Court of Criminal 
Appeal ruled that it was in fact admissible under s 98, for the reason given by Hodgson 
JA regarding:732  
 
                                                            
 
 
728 This itself was a dilution of the ALRC’s original proposal that the circumstances of each of these 
events should also be “substantially and relevantly similar” (see ALRC 38, note 687, Appendix A, s 88 – 
emphasis added).  This was interpreted by Odgers (note 711, p.223) as an attempt to impose a 
requirement of “striking similarity” before coincidence evidence might be employed in support of a 
conviction. 
729 Odgers, ibid.  With respect, a truly strict “application of logical analysis” would disclose that lack of 
coincidence is what makes this type of evidence relevant, and therefore admissible.  The main thrust of 
Odger’s criticism was that such a strict test for what should be allowed in under s 98 would result in a 
greater number of ‘unrelated event’ items of evidence being admitted outside the protective shield of the 
section, and the related requirement of s 101 that the probative value of such evidence substantially 
outweigh its prejudicial effect.    
730 [2003] NSWCCA 17.   
731 This is further confirmation of the confusing potential overlap between the two sections, and of the 
failure of Crown Counsel to appreciate the essential nature of “coincidence” evidence.  
732 At [32], the remaining two judges concurring. 
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. . . . the extreme improbability of four such deaths . . . occurring to children in the 
immediate care of their mother, with asphyxiation being a substantial possibility and no 
other cause of death being anything more than a substantial possibility, without the 
mother having contributed to any of those deaths . . . .  
 
 Folbigg remains the only reported case in which true ‘coincidence’ led to a 
conviction under s 98.  The true meaning of “coincidence”, in this context, was not 
even defined in the legislation.  This has assisted in the circumvention of what was 
originally intended to be a stringent set of admission requirements. 
 
Crown circumvention of s 98 
 
 As with s 97, the wording of s 98 suggested that “coincidence” evidence was 
only to be classified as such when it was intended to be used directly in eliminating 
coincidence and demonstrating guilt.  It was not long before difficulties arose as to 
what precisely constituted “coincidence” evidence which did not go directly to the 
proof of guilt, but had that effect indirectly.   
 
One obvious distinction was between “coincidence” and “circumstantial link”,733 
and the Crown won an early victory in R v Merritt.734  While the persuasive nature of 
circumstantial evidence of this type can hardly be denied, an obvious danger arises 
                                                            
 
 
733 Take, for example, the factual scenario of Glascott v R [2011] VSCA 109, in which G was convicted 
of the murder of R, which the Crown alleged had occurred when R disturbed G in the process of 
attempting to burn down R’s office.  It was held on appeal that there had been no need for the trial judge 
to administer a propensity warning to the jury regarding the (uncharged) attempted arson, because (at 
[21]), “The Crown’s case throughout was that the arsonist and the killer were one”.  
734 [1999] NSWCCA 29.    M was on trial for his alleged part in an armed robbery, during the course of 
which one of the robbers had been shot.  The evidence of alleged gunshot scars on M’s body was held on 
appeal not to be the sort of “coincidence” evidence encompassed by s 98. It might therefore be admitted 
without reference to s 98. Also excluded from the safeguards of s 98, in R v Ngo [2003] NSWCCA 82, at 
[330], was what were described as “ . . . events in the nature of preparatory activity leading to the 
commission of the subject offence”.  N.B. the similarity of approach with that taken in Kassoua (Note 
717). 
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when the “circumstance” in question takes the form of another crime committed by an 
accused.  It is then all too easy to fall into ‘circular reasoning’, and that danger is most 
acute in cases in which a jury is invited to consider the highly distinctive and almost 
identical descriptions of events given by two allegedly independent complainants,735 
and to reason from these that D must have committed both offences because the details 
are so consistent.   
 
 It is the inherent unlikelihood of two or more people at random making the same 
detailed complaint which justifies the conclusion of ‘lack of coincidence’, and the 
consequential admission of the evidence under s 98.  Unless this factor is kept firmly in 
mind when using the evidence of two or more complainants as cross-corroborative, then 
there is a risk of circular reasoning by which the alleged occurrence of incident A is 
made more credible by the alleged occurrence of incident B, and vice-versa.  It is not 
the similarity in events which is the ‘coincidence’, but the fact that two victims 
independently describe such similarities.736  It is therefore imperative that prosecutors 
are not allowed to circumvent the safeguards supplied by s 98 for the admission of such 
evidence by applying a different label to the evidence they seek to have admitted.   
 
 At common law, this type of evidence had never been classified as “coincidence” 
evidence; instead, in cases such as Phillips,737 it had been met head-on, and admitted, as 
“propensity” evidence.  When faced with the same type of evidence under a statutory 
scheme, it was only to be expected that practitioners would think of it as falling into the 
category of “tendency” evidence under s 97, rather than it being classified as a form of 
“coincidence” evidence under s 98.  The distinction is important, particularly since, 
under the Uniform Laws, such evidence need only demonstrate “similarities” in the 
events described before it will be admissible as “coincidence” evidence under s 98, 
                                                            
 
 
735 The risk of collusion in such cases makes the process even more hazardous. 
736 Strictly speaking, such evidence is not “coincidence” evidence at all, unless and until the accused is 
confirmed beyond reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of at least one incident, which may then be 
compared with a second or more such incidents.  The form of “coincidence” being relied upon when two 
or more complainants describe an accused’s behaviour in similar terms goes towards proving the accused 
to be the offender, which, because of its highly prejudicial nature, calls for vigilant judicial supervision.  
737 Note 653. 
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whereas, as the High Court had firmly re-emphasised in Phillips, “striking similarity” 
was required in order to prove “propensity” at common law.738    
 
 Despite this need for clarification, when the ALRC was asked to review the first 
ten years of operation of the Uniform Laws, its only gesture towards clarification was to 
blankly refute the suggestion that there might be some ambiguity over whether or not 
one of the “events” referred to in the section could include the event which was the 
subject of the new charge.  The Commission was clearly of the opinion that it could, 
and a note was added to s 98 putting the matter beyond doubt.  This note appears not to 
have been included in the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), but the applicability of s 98 to 
events alleged at trial was impliedly acknowledged in Wallis v Tasmania,739 in which all 
the “events” being considered (a series of burglaries) were represented on the 
indictment. 
 
The requirement for “significant probative value” 
 
 Before evidence may be admitted under either s 97 or s 98, it must be shown to 
possess “significant probative value”.  Nowhere in the legislation is this phrase defined, 
although the Dictionary defines “probative value” as: 
 
. . . the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the 
probability of a fact in issue”.740 
 
                                                            
 
 
738 This tendency to devalue the potential prejudice of “coincidence” evidence was confirmed judicially 
in WRC ((2002) 130 A Crim R 89), in which Hodgson JA reminded the courts below him (at 102) that 
under the Uniform Laws, “material [which is] not sufficient for tendency evidence, which must depend 
only upon objective fact, rather than upon two or more persons giving similar stories, . . . . may be 
sufficient for coincidence evidence.” 
739 [2007] TASSC 4. 
740 This is consistent with the definition of “relevance” to be found in s 55 of the legislation. 
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 The ALRC, 741  had proposed “to continue the requirement of substantial 
probative value”.  The Commonwealth Parliamentary draftsperson in fact substituted 
“significant” for “substantial”, leaving subsequent courts to conjecture whether the two 
adjectives were synonymous, or whether a new test had been legislated. 
 
 Self-evidently, the probative value of any item of evidence will be its degree of 
relevance to a material fact in issue, and it is obviously difficult to generalise about a 
measure of factual significance which will vary from one case scenario to another.  
However, the courts soon found themselves attempting this task. 
 
 In R v Lockyer,742 Hunt CJ,743 observed that: 
 
. . . . “significant” probative value must mean something more than mere relevance but 
something less than a “substantial” degree of relevance. . . . . One of the primary 
meanings of . . . “significant” is “important”, or “of consequence”.  In my opinion, that 
is the sense in which it is used in s 97. . . . .the significance of the probative value of the 
tendency evidence . . . . must depend upon the nature of the fact in issue to which it is 
                                                            
 
 
741  In its Interim Report 26 (“Evidence”, 21st August 1985), in para. 810.  In para. 806, it had 
recommended the phrase “similarities which ensure the earlier acts or states of mind are capable of 
significantly affecting the probabilities” (emphasis added). Pfennig was yet to come at the time this was 
written. 
742 (1996) 89 A Crim R 457.  This definition was followed in R v Mahmoud Hawi [2011] NSWSC 1663. 
743 At 459.  His Honour was able to adopt his own definition of “significant” a year later in R v Lock 
(1997) 91 A Crim R 334, at 361.  His Honour’s interpretation was also adopted, in its application to both 
s 97 and s 98, by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Martin [2000] NSWCCA 332 (per Ireland 
JA at [67]).  See also R v Fordham (note 710), and R v Ford (2009) 210 A Crim R 451, a NSW case in 
which Campbell JA (at [50]) observed that “significant probative value” involved proof of the 
probability of a fact in issue “to a high degree”. Ford was followed in the more recent ACT cases of R v 
Johnston [2012] ACTSC 89 and R v Fitzpatrick [2012] ACTSC 107.  There was no special reference, in 
Lockyer, to the fact that the propensity evidence in that case was being admitted against a third party in 
the interests of the accused.  It is arguable that a lesser degree of probity is appropriate in such 
circumstances, and this point is raised again below.   
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relevant and the significance (or importance) which that evidence may have in 
establishing that fact.744  
 
 The fact that a trial judge is required to assess the “significance” of evidence to 
be tendered under either section, in advance of that evidence being heard, had already 
been emphasised in two earlier decisions of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal.745   
 
 As had been demonstrated at common law, there are dangers in such a process, 
the obvious one being that the trial judge is in effect being required to act as a ‘pre-jury’, 
and to predict in advance what the real jury is likely to make of the evidence.   Both s 
97(1)(b) and s 98(1)(b) provide that “tendency” and “coincidence” evidence, 
respectively, are not admissible unless “ . . . . the court thinks that the evidence will . . . . 
have significant probative value” (emphasis added).746   
 
 This places the trial judge in the position of a silent prosecutor, only marginally 
less omnipotent than the common law trial judge tasked with implementing the 
procedure foisted upon them by Pfennig.  The Uniform Laws have clearly done nothing 
to avoid this dilemma. 
 
                                                            
 
 
744 The importance of defining the precise issue of fact which is to be targeted by the proposed evidence 
was re-emphasised fairly recently by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in AW v The Queen [2009] 
NSWCCA 1, in which Latham J ruled, at [47] and [48], the remaining judges concurring, that “The 
evidence must have significant probative value, that is, it must be evidence that is meaningful in the 
context of the issues at trial”.  (emphasis added).  This is another case which highlights the danger of 
requiring the trial judge to rule on the admissibility of contested propensity evidence ahead of that 
evidence being heard, and being required to double-guess what the jury will make of it. 
745 R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308 and R v Zhang (2005) 158 A Crim R 504. 
746 By “the court” is meant the trial judge. 
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 A related issue is whether or not, when assessing contested evidence for its 
probative value, the trial judge should also assess it for its veracity.747  There is, at the 
time of writing, no judicial clarification of this issue.748 
 
 Further confusion was generated by the requirement, under s 103, for evidence 
which is being adduced in cross-examination in order to challenge a witness’s 
credibility to possess “substantial probative value”.  The distinction between 
“substantial” and “significant” was raised with the ALRC during their review of the 
working of the Uniform Laws, together with a suggestion that these measures of 
probity should be reversed.   
 
 The unconvincing response of the ALRC,749  was that a higher degree of control 
was required over evidence which was being adduced (often, of course, by a criminal 
accused) in respect of “collateral” issues such as “credibility”,750 “. . . . adding to the 
                                                            
 
 
747 One argument is that this is ultimately a question for the jury (see, for example, DSJ v R; NS v R [2012] 
NSWCCA 9, per Whealy JA at [82]). The other argument is the ‘common-sense’ one that if the evidence 
in question is untrue, then it can have no actual relevance to the matter in issue, the entire logical basis for 
its admission is missing, and the trial judge should exclude it. 
748 The closest which the courts have come at the time of writing is the unanimous decision of the NSW 
Court of Appeal in DSJ v R; NS v R (note 747) that in the evaluation process, the trial judge should at 
least consider alternative interpretations of the challenged evidence consistent with innocence. However, 
in the context of s 137, which requires, of all evidence admitted under either of ss 97 or 98, that its 
probative value be measured against its potential for unfair prejudice, Latham J in R v Sood [2007] 
NSWCCA 214, at [38], the remaining judges concurring, opined that “. . . . the probative value of the 
evidence . . . .is to be assessed by taking the evidence at its highest.” .  Sood was followed in Tasmania v 
Finnegan [2012] TASSC 1 This implies a lack of concern regarding its truth at that stage in the 
proceedings, a conclusion confirmed by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Shamouil (2006) 66 
NSWLR 229 to the effect that the probative value of evidence adduced under either of ss 97 or 98 must 
be assessed on the basis that it will be accepted as true.  This was followed in KMJ v Tasmania [2011] 
TASSCCA 7, but in Tasmania v W [2012] TASSC 47, this was held not to preclude the trial judge from 
assessing the credibility of a sexual assault complainant in relation to alleged concoction or contamination.  
The law in this area is clearly unresolved and inconsistent. 
749 In para.11.50 of ALRC 102 (note 699). 
750 It is submitted, with respect, that any restriction on the right to impugn a witness’s “credibility” is 
misconceived, since, as is pointed out by Odgers (note 711, at 239), “ . . . evidence relating to the 
credibility of the witness will indirectly affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the 
fact in issue”.  For this reason, at common law, it is only the “credit” of a witness (being their reputation 
or character, as opposed to their ‘believability’) which is subjected to the “collateral issues” restraint. 
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time and cost of proceedings”. 751   By contrast, it asserted, “tendency” and 
“coincidence” evidence is “relevant to the facts in issue, and a lower preliminary 
threshold is warranted”.  It did not explain how, or why.752  
 
 After ten years of the legislation in operation, and despite the difficulties identified 
above, the ALRC concluded that:753  
 
. . . . the meanings of ‘significant probative value’ and ‘substantial probative value’ 
have been construed appropriately and are reasonably clear . . . No changes are 
proposed in the use of the expressions. 
 
Additional issues 
 
 The Uniform Laws contain additional shortfalls in effective policy.   
 
 Section 101 
 
 This section provides that in addition to the “significant probative value” which 
propensity evidence must possess before it may be admitted under either of ss 97 or 98, 
                                                            
 
 
751 It did not enhance the intellectual credentials of the Uniform Laws that they appeared to have been 
drafted on economic grounds. 
752 One might also challenge the assertion that the credibility of a witness is not “relevant” to the fact in 
issue to which they are testifying.  Presumably the Commission was referring to “direct”, as opposed to 
“indirect”, relevance.  
753 Report 102 (note 699),  para.11.51. 
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it may not be employed against a criminal accused unless and until that probative value 
“substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have” on that accused.754   
 
 There were obvious problems with this definition.  The first was the extent to 
which “substantial” probity was required to exceed the “significant” probity already 
required under ss 97 and 98.  It was natural for courts seeking to apply the provision to 
look to the common law for answers, particularly since the ALRC,755 claimed to have 
adopted “the orthodox view”.  Only after the full implications of, and doubts relating to, 
Pfennig came to the fore did a different viewpoint prevail. 
 
The case-law immediately after the enactment of the legislation – most 
prominently that in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal - therefore tended to follow the 
common law in its search for probative value which “substantially” outweighed 
prejudicial effect.  The result of so doing was, inevitably, to import into the statutory 
scheme all the problems and conflicts of judicial opinion which were currently besetting 
the common law regime.756 
 
 But there was an alternative view,757 to the effect that the common law should 
not be blindly followed, and it was left to the High Court in Papakosmos v R,758 to rule 
that the Uniform Laws should be interpreted in accordance with their own language, and 
                                                            
 
 
754 Emphasis added. In BP v R [2010] NSWCCA 330, at [109], it was held that “prejudice” in this 
context involved “. . . . some irrational, emotional or illogical response” by the jury.  This definition was 
followed in Tasmania v W (No 2) [2012] TASSC 48.  This additional degree of probity is not, however, 
required when the evidence being adduced by the Crown is in rebuttal of “tendency” or “coincidence” 
evidence adduced by the accused.  In such situations, it will be sufficient for the evidence in question to 
possess only “significant” probative value, per ss 97 and 98. This is at least consistent with Lockyer (note 
742), in which it was held that tendency evidence adduced by the accused need only satisfy this standard. 
755 See note 687. 
756 See, for example R v Lock (note 743), per Hunt CJ at 363, and R v Colby (note 698), in both of which 
the appropriate level of probity was said to be that laid down for common law cases in Pfennig.  See also 
Hodgson JA in R v WRC (note 738), at 101, R v Joiner (2002) 133 A Crim R 90 at 97-8, and R v Folbigg 
(Note 730) at [27] and [28].  
757 See the Full Federal Court ruling in Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at 233 and 234, and the 
judgments of Miles and Madgwick JJ. in W v R (2001) 189 ALR 633, at [53] and [101] respectively. 
758 (1999) 196 CLR 297. 
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not that of the common law.  In R v Ellis,759 a five-member Bench of the NSW Court of 
Criminal Appeal followed this lead, and re-established a simple balancing test which 
would enable all cases under ss 97 and 98 to be determined according to the weight of 
the evidence for and against admission, and not subject to the Pfennig test. However, 
this was only partly successful, due to the complications arising under s 137. 
 
 Section 137 
 
 This section mandates another balancing exercise, for criminal cases only, in the 
following terms: 
 
In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the 
prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant. 
 
 The obvious dilemma facing subsequent courts was how far, if at all, this level 
of probity was required to fall below the level of “substantial” probative value mandated 
under s 101, or the “significant” level of probity prescribed by ss 97 and 98.  Nor is this 
the only problem created by the existence of s 137.  It also introduces a third hurdle for 
propensity evidence which the Crown seeks to have admitted against an accused.  Not 
only must it possess “significant” probative value under ss 97 and 98, and not only must 
that probative value “substantially outweigh” any “prejudicial” effect it might have on 
an accused in terms of s 101, but under s 137 it must also be demonstrated that its 
probative value “outweighs” the risk of “unfair” prejudice to the accused. 
 
                                                            
 
 
759 Note 677. 
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 Several definitional issues arise from all of this, none of which appear to have 
been resolved by subsequent case-law.  The first is whether or not the “unfair” prejudice 
referred to in s 137 is the same as the “prejudicial effect” described in s 101.760  The 
simplest way through this thicket of tests would seem to be to focus on s 101, and 
ensure that any such evidence possesses a probative value which “substantially” 
outweighs any “prejudicial” effect likely to result in an “unfair” trial.761   
 
The only feasible alternative would seem to be to run the evidence in question 
through what Ligertwood and Edmond,762 describe as “ . . . a legislative continuum 
from ‘probative’ to ‘significant probative value’ and then to probative weight 
‘substantially outweighing’ prejudice . . . . “, before finally deciding whether or not the 
admission of such evidence would operate ‘unfairly’.763   This is yet another issue 
arising under the Uniform Laws which currently awaits resolution. 
 
“She’ll be right” 
 
Ten years after the enactment of the Uniform Laws, the ALRC was taxed with 
reviewing their operation, and recommending any changes which it felt were necessary 
following the experience of almost a decade.  In ALRC Report 102, dated February 
2006, it came down firmly in favour of the status quo, and criticised the confusion and 
                                                            
 
 
760 If so, then one or other of these provisions would seem to be superfluous.  If not, then the inescapable 
inference is that the “prejudice” contemplated in s 101 is somehow not “unfair”. 
761 The problem with this approach is two-fold.  First of all, it tends to reduce ss 97/98 and s 137 to the 
status of pious irrelevances.  Secondly, it results in the entire statutory regime under the Uniform Laws 
adding merely one word (“substantial”) to the common law test laid down in Boardman and DPP v P.  At 
least it avoids Pfennig. 
762 Note 694, at p.181. 
763 One may readily imagine an item of evidence whose probative value is “significant”, but which does 
not “substantially” outweigh its prejudicial effect.  It will clear the hurdles of ss 97 and 98, but not s 101, 
and will therefore be inadmissible.  Even if it clears the hurdle of s 101, s 137 still has to be surmounted, 
and at this point the frustrated Crown Counsel is likely to argue along the lines that “If it is substantially 
more probative than prejudicial, how can it then be ‘unfair’ to admit it?”  For an example of a trial judge 
conducting the balancing exercise required by s 137, partly in favour of the Crown, and partly in favour 
of the accused, see R v Marsh [2011] NSWSC 1687. 
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uncertainty of the Pfennig common law alternative.  It also reported,764 that “. . . the 
level of concern of some appears to have been affected by experience . . . .in the period 
when the Hoch/Pfennig principle was treated as applicable under [the Uniform Laws].” 
765   
 
 One would have found this criticism of Pfennig more convincing had the 
Uniform Laws offered a more effective and workable alternative. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is tempting to write off the Pfennig test as an unworkable and extreme formula 
which will only be appropriate in cases of its limited type, and will lead to injustice in 
the majority of attempts to apply it.  While this is true, in those cases in which it is 
appropriate the court is recognising, and giving effect to, a most powerful justification 
for the admission of propensity evidence against an accused faced with new charges – 
namely that to ignore such evidence would be an affront to common sense and a recipe 
for injustice to the victim(s). 
 
Pfennig was simply the last – if an unfortunately excessive – application of an 
alternative analysis of what had occurred in Makin.  Australia had been offered an 
alternative by one of its own courts, but had mishandled it.  In the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal judgment in Makin, and in the High Court’s application of it in Martin 
v Osbourne, may be found an alternative jurisprudence, based on logical relevance 
rather than categorisation.  It was unfortunate, to say the least, that Pfennig was allowed 
                                                            
 
 
764 Para.11.84. 
765 It was arguably no legitimate answer to the criticisms levelled at the statutory regime simply to blame 
the common law alternative. 
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to become a general rule, rather than an exemplar of logical relevance at the ‘high end’ 
of probative value. 
 
It was perhaps inevitable, in view of the terms of reference given to the ALRC, 
that it would proceed from the existing English common law base, that is, without 
knowing what was to happen in Pfennig.  In the process, it incorporated most of 
underlying assumptions of the English common law as at that date, and replicated its 
fundamental errors in statutory form.  In particular, it opted to continue with what 
amounted to a ‘categories’ approach under another name.  
 
There was still no recognition (by the legislators at least) of the importance of 
the factual ‘fit’ between proven propensity and fresh allegation, regardless of category.  
 
 Instead of a statement of broad principle based on the importance of allowing a 
jury to hear evidence which is highly relevant to the decision which they have to make, 
while at the same time ensuring that they do not employ it for an irrelevant purpose, the 
ALRC had followed a formula which was over a century old in common law terms; a 
formula which had failed wherever it had been introduced.   
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Chapter 7:  
Scots law on similar fact evidence 
 
Chapter synopsis 
 
The law of Scotland, in its treatment of similar fact evidence, was allowed to 
develop without direct reference to the Makin principles.  In consequence, it avoided the 
‘categories’ approach which plagued English case-law.  In turn, this obviated any need 
for an “intellectual breakthrough” such as was found necessary in Boardman.  Nor has it 
led to any complex legislation designed to ensure that juries receive ‘the whole truth’ 
regarding an alleged offender.766 
 
What makes Scots law of particular relevance to this thesis is its focus on 
relevance as the basis for the admission of similar fact evidence from an accused 
person’s past in trials in respect of new crimes.  As such, Scots law on similar fact 
evidence provides a valuable “control” study for comparison with the policy-driven 
statutory mire which has threatened to engulf English and American law.  It also serves 
to highlight the missed chances under other regimes. 
 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
766 Since 1999, Scotland has once again enjoyed its own Parliament for the first time since the uniting of 
the English and Scots Parliaments in 1707.  Despite that political joinder, Scots law has always remained 
distinct and separate from its English counterpart, operating within its own jurisdiction, with only a 
selective and piecemeal statutory overlay dictated by Westminster in respect of matters (such as income 
tax and defence) which are essentially federal in nature.  Scots criminal law, and its law of evidence, 
remain unique. 
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Similar fact evidence generally 
 
The current role of similar fact evidence under Scots law is well encapsulated in 
the following extract from the judgment of the High Court of Justiciary,767 in Nelson v 
H.M. Advocate:768 
 
The Crown can lead any evidence relevant to the proof of a crime charged, even 
although it may show or tend to show the commission of another crime not charged, 
unless fair notice requires that the other crime should be charged or otherwise referred 
to expressly in the complaint 769 or indictment.  This will be so if the evidence sought 
to be led tends to show that the accused was of bad character, and that crime is so 
different in time, place or character from the crime charged that the libel 770 does not 
give fair notice to the accused that evidence relating to that other crime may be led; or if 
it is the intention as proof of the crime charged to establish that the accused was in fact 
guilty of that other crime. 
 
As this quotation reveals, the controls imposed on the use of similar fact 
evidence under Scots law owe as much to the need to give “fair notice” to the accused 
of what the Crown intends to allege against them as they do to any perceived inherent 
unfairness or prejudice in the use of such evidence.  The reason for this may be found in 
the history of how Scots criminal law has developed. 
 
The requirement for “fair notice” dates back in Scots law to at least the middle 
years of the Nineteenth Century, and well before Makin.  It was highlighted in two 
                                                            
 
 
767 This is Scotland’s highest court of appeal. 
768 1994 J.C. 94, at 104C. 
769 A “complaint” is the formal document used by the Crown to specify the offence alleged against an 
accused person when the matter is proceeding summarily. 
770 “Libel” is the word used in Scots law to describe the allegation against an accused. 
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leading cases of that era, H.M. Advocate v Pritchard, 771  and H.M. Advocate v 
Monson.772 
 
The infamous Dr. Pritchard was on trial for the alleged murder by poisoning of 
his wife.  Evidence was led by the Crown from one of his domestic servants to the 
effect that she had become pregnant by him, and had miscarried.  There was apparently 
no objection from defence counsel to this line of evidence until the Crown attempted to 
elicit from the same witness the additional evidence that the accused had supplied her 
with the necessary abortifacient.  This objection was upheld, on the ground that there 
had been no reference in the indictment to the allegation that the accused had procured 
the girl’s abortion.  It had clearly not occurred to defence counsel to object to the 
prejudicial nature of the allegation that his client had seduced a servant girl. It was 
explained in the later case of Monson that:773  
 
. . . . . it was held competent to ask a witness whether the prisoner had been having 
relations of improper intimacy with his female servant, that not being a matter which 
could have been made the subject of a criminal charge, and being one which might be 
proved as an incidental fact tending to establish motive, but when it was further 
proposed to ask the question whether the prisoner . . . . had used means to procure 
premature delivery, that was not allowed.  That was a suggestion of crime, and crime 
with which the prisoner might have been charged in the indictment, thus giving him 
notice that he had to meet that charge . . . . The question of the undue familiarity had to 
do with the question that was being tried.  The question of the prisoner having tried to 
get rid of the consequence of that intimacy could have had nothing to do with it except 
to throw suspicion upon him as regards the charge upon which he was brought to the 
bar – suggesting that if he could do the one thing he might do the other – and the court 
disallowed it. (emphasis added) 
 
                                                            
 
 
771 (1865) 5 Irv. 88. 
772 (1893) 21 R.(J.) 5. 
773 Note 772, at pp.7-8, per Lord Justice-Clerk MacDonald. 
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It would seem from this statement that ‘bad character’ evidence was admissible 
on the issue of motive,774 but inadmissible if it was being employed as ‘forbidden 
reasoning’ or ‘reasoning prejudice’ along the lines of ‘A man who is capable of 
procuring an abortion to serve his own ends is capable of poisoning his wife for the 
same reason’.  However, what was seen as equally important was the fact that the 
accused had not been put on notice that this alleged additional crime by him was to be 
raised in evidence. The question which remained unanswered was whether or not the 
abortifacient evidence would have been admissible had the accused been adequately put 
on notice of it by way of its inclusion in the indictment.775 
 
In Monson, M was charged with the murder of an estate owner, and it was 
alleged, as part of the ‘background facts’ to the murder, that he had forged a lease.  No 
notice had been given of any forgery allegation in the indictment, and defence counsel 
objected to any evidence being led regarding it.  In sustaining that objection, Lord 
Justice-Clerk MacDonald referred to Pritchard before adding:776 
 
If it was thought of sufficient importance in this case to prove that this document . . . . 
was a forgery, then that might have been done by making a charge of forgery . . . If the 
charge had been made, the prisoner . . . . would have made all preparation to meet it, 
but . . . . it is impossible . . . at this stage competently to bring forward evidence to meet 
it. 
 
There was again no reference to the possibility that the evidence might also be 
inadmissible because it cast aspersions on the character of the accused which might be 
employed prejudicially by the jury to conclude that he was capable of murder. Instead, 
                                                            
 
 
774 As such, it was of course relevant to the issue of his possible guilt. In a modern court, it might be 
explained away as being part of the “background facts” leading to the alleged offence. 
775 Indictments in Scottish criminal cases are of the “narrative” type, and include a relatively detailed set 
of allegations regarding the accused’s behaviour. 
776 At 7. 
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the main concern of the Court, as in Pritchard, appears to have been that the accused 
had not received fair notice of what was to be alleged against him. 
 
This line of reasoning continued well into the next century.  In Griffen v H.M. 
Advocate,777 for example, Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison observed that: 
 
I should be sorry if the rule laid down . . .  in Monson’s case were in any way weakened.  
But then it may often happen in the course of a trial that facts may emerge that by 
themselves might have formed the subject of a criminal charge, or that may suggest to 
the jury that some other crime may have been committed by the [accused].  The mere 
fact that this may happen is no reason for excluding the evidence, provided always fair 
notice has been given in the indictment so that the [accused] is made fully aware of the 
case he has to meet, and provided also that the evidence is strictly relevant to the 
substantive charge. [emphasis added] 
 
The relevance of the additional criminal behaviour which was being alleged was 
only one factor in the admissibility equation. “Fair notice” to the accused appeared to be 
equally important.  It was not being suggested that the mere prejudiciality of such 
evidence rendered it inadmissible, provided that it was relevant to the case in hand. But 
one may find reported cases from this period which suggest that some eyes at least were 
beginning to look south, and that trial advocates and judges were beginning to take 
notice of the trends developing under English law.778 
                                                            
 
 
777 1939 J.C.1, at 5-6. It was held in this case that a person accused of attempting to defraud a building 
society by purporting to be the owner of certain property had been given adequate notice of the fact that 
part of the Crown case against him would be evidence that he had forged and uttered the title deed to that 
property. This case is further considered at note 790. 
778 The early writers on Scots criminal law had confined themselves to noting specific contexts in which 
prior actions of an accused might be factually relevant to a new matter on trial, in much the same way 
that, as described in Chapter 2, the English courts had begun to do pre-Makin.  Thus, for example, Hume 
(Commentaries, vol.2, 413) acknowledged that in a homicide case, the previous violent behaviour of the 
accused towards the victim might be admissible, while Alison (Principles of the Criminal Law of 
Scotland, 1832, reprinted 1989, vol.1, 416) said that evidence of previous attempted “utterings” by an 
accused might be relevant at his subsequent trial for forgery, “. . . not as substantive articles of charge, 
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For example, in Gallagher v Paton,779 a sales representative was on trial for 
falsely pretending to a shop assistant that her employer was an annual subscriber to an 
advertising directory. Evidence was led of his having made similar false pretences to 
other people on the same day.  In holding that this evidence had been rightly admitted, 
Lord Justice-General McLaren observed,780 in terms highly reminiscent of those handed 
down in English cases,781 that: 
 
. . . . when the question is whether the accused person made false statements . . . for the 
purpose of obtaining money . . . .I do not know of any better way of establishing the 
criminal intention than by proof that he had made similar false statements on the same 
day to other people, and apparently with the same object . . . . A false statement to one 
person may be explained away, but when a system of false statements is proved, the 
probability is very great that the statements were designedly made. 
 
Put in the language of Makin, the possibility of the accused having made a 
genuine mistake in relation to a matter which was “an issue before the jury” fell in the 
face of evidence of the “system” in which he was engaged.  Although there was no 
direct reference to Makin, or its predecessors, it was the sheer relevance of the similar 
fact evidence to what was alleged in the instant case which made it admissible.  There 
was no consideration of any unfair prejudice which the accused might suffer in 
consequence. However, his Lordship did add,782 that such evidence should be restricted 
to events which occurred “about the same time”, because “ . . . if the prosecutor were 
allowed to prove statements made at an earlier period, this would only go to general 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
but in modum probationis of the charges of which the crime was actually completed”.  But none of these 
writers, any more than the courts, sought to “induct” these specific examples into a broader principle, as 
Lord Herschell did in Makin. 
779 (1909) S.C.(J.) 50. His Lordship referred to the earlier case of H.M. Advocate v Ritche and Morren 
(1841) 2 Swin 581, in which the ground of appeal had been the alleged lack of adequate notice to the 
accused. The relevance of the similar fact evidence in the instant case seems to have been impliedly 
conceded. 
780 At 55. 
781 For example, by Lord Coleridge C.J. in Francis (note 94). 
782 Ibid. 
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character, and would not necessarily throw light on the particular act which is under 
consideration”.  This may be seen as an instinctive distinction between the relevance of 
the evidence to the facts of the instant case on the one hand, and more general character 
assassination on the other. 
 
Relevance also won the day over prejudice in H.M. Advocate v Bickerstaff ,783 in 
which the High Court deemed it appropriate to leave two counts conjoined on the same 
indictment. One related to an indecent assault on a 7 year old girl, and the other the 
indecent assault and murder of a 4 year old girl.  Defence counsel argued the prejudicial 
potential of hearing the two charges together. This argument was rejected in the face of 
the perceived “closeness of the relationship – in time, circumstances and character – 
between the charges included in the same indictment”.784 
 
It was to be another twenty years before the authority of Makin was 
acknowledged under Scots law, and even then only obliquely.  In H.M. Advocate v 
Joseph,785 Lord Murray opined that:786  
 
. . . . I am of opinion that it is the law in Scotland, as in England, that it is open to the 
prosecution to prove any facts relevant to the charge, notwithstanding that they may 
show or tend to show the commission of another crime, if they show or tend to show 
that the act charged was done of design and did not arise by accident, or if they tend to 
rebut a defence of innocence which might otherwise be open to the [accused]. 
                                                            
 
 
783 1926 J.C. 65. 
784 At 75, per the Lord Justice-General.  Both offences had occurred in the same town on the same day. 
Note the similarity of his Lordship’s phraseology to that employed in Moorov (note 787) by the same 
judge only four years later. The Moorov Doctrine may be argued to have developed as a specific 
application of a more general principle explained in Bickerstaff. See, e.g. Vandore, “The Moorov 
Doctrine”, (1974) 19 Juridical Review 35, 38. 
785 1929 J.C. 55.  In this case, J was accused of having uttered a forged loan document to a bank in 
Dundee in a fraudulent attempt to raise money on it, and the indictment made specific reference to a 
similar alleged offence involving the same document against the management of an hotel in Brussels.  A 
preliminary objection to the “competence” of this second charge found its way to the High Court of 
Justiciary. 
786 At 56-7.   
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Earlier in the same cited passage, his Lordship referred to the need to show “ . . 
. some connexion or ‘nexus’, which . . . is sufficiently intimate, between the two 
‘incidents’”, and he was of the opinion that there was “ample authority” for the 
admissibility of evidence of other criminal behaviour “ . . . if the connexion between 
the incident sought to be proved and the crime libelled is very close in point of time and 
character, so that they can hardly be dissociated”.  This clearly emphasises the need to 
demonstrate the relevance of the evidence over and above the mere fact that “the 
incident sought to be proved” occurred. 
 
It is the very existence of such a “nexus” which in the following year was to 
justify the decision in Moorov v H.M. Advocate,787 from which a whole line of specific 
similar fact evidence applications was to flow.  However, in respect of what might be 
termed the ‘mainstream’ application of similar fact evidence jurisprudence, it is the 
judgment in Joseph which is regarded, by Scots lawyers,788 as representing the earliest 
direct application of the spirit of Makin to the law of Scotland, even though it contained 
no direct reference to Lord Herschell’s judgment. 
 
Although some subsequent cases continued to emphasise the importance of “fair 
notice” to an accused of additional crimes upon which the Crown intended to rely in 
proof of the instant offence,789 the additional need to demonstrate relevance to the facts 
of that instant case came to occupy a position of at least equal importance.  This was 
                                                            
 
 
787 1930 J.C. 68;1930 S.L.T. 596. 
788 See, e.g, Raitt, Evidence – Principles, Policy and Practice (2008), W.Green and Son, Edinburgh, 
p.232.  Professor Raitt, in “The Evidential Use of “Similar Facts” in Scots Criminal Law”, Edin. L R 
(2003) Vol 7, 174, 182, also expressed the opinion that “In contrast to other Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, the admission of similar fact evidence is relatively uncommon in Scots law”.  See also 
Nelson v H.M. Advocate, note 768, at 101G, and Duff (note 820), at 155.  
789 See, e.g. Cameron v Waugh 1937 J.C. 5, and Boyle, Petitioner 1993 S.L.T. 1058. 
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particularly true in cases in which the contested evidence was being used to demonstrate 
a lack of innocent motive for an otherwise equivocal act.790   
 
The importance of relevance seems, therefore, to have emerged more clearly 
over time, although there rarely seems, under Scots law, to have been any overt 
reference to the prejudice which may ensue if the jury are allowed to employ evidence 
of additional bad behaviour by the accused for the wrong reason.   
 
The closest is perhaps to be found in the High Court ruling in Nelson v H.M. 
Advocate.791 N was charged with supplying drugs, and evidence was led that when 
police raided a public house in which he was believed to be selling the drugs, and 
approached him with a view to searching him, N ran to the toilet and swallowed 
something which was believed to be a drug.  He was convicted after trial, and appealed 
against his conviction on the ground that the evidence of what had occurred in the toilet 
amounted to an allegation of an additional crime (obstructing the police).792  While 
rejecting the submission that N had not received adequate notice that this additional 
crime was to be proved against him,793 the Court observed, 794 that the basis for the 
admissibility of the evidence was “. . . . to be found in the principles of relevancy and of 
fair notice”, and went on to add that:795  
 
The fact that the evidence may show or tend to show that the accused committed a 
crime not charged is not in itself a reason for holding the evidence to be inadmissible, 
                                                            
 
 
790 For example, Griffen v H.M. Advocate, Note 777.  
791 Note 768. 
792 In most jurisdictions, this evidence would surely be admissible either as part of the res gestae of the 
drug supply (see, e.g. O’Leary v R, note 631), or as part of the essential narrative leading up to the 
central facts of the case (See Criminal Justice Act 2003 (E & W) s 101(1)(c), considered in note 366).     
793 See note 768.  The reason for this rejection was said to be that while the Crown had not set out to 
prove his guilt of this second crime, the facts relating to his alleged attempt to conceal the evidence had 
been adequately disclosed to N’s legal team as part of the general narrative relating to the crime on the 
indictment. 
794 At 100. 
795 At 103-4. 
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so long as to do so is relevant to the crime charged in the indictment.  But evidence 
showing or tending to show that the accused committed another crime may be 
prejudicial to him. . . . There is less reason to be concerned on this point if the evidence 
tends merely to show incidentally that the accused may have committed an offence of a 
trivial or technical nature from which no inference could be drawn that he was of bad 
character.  But if it is necessary for the Crown to go to the length of establishing that the 
accused was in fact guilty of another crime, as part of the evidence relating to the crime 
charged, fair notice requires that this should be distinctly libelled in the complaint or 
indictment. (emphasis added). 
 
Clearly, even in those situations in which there may be substantial potential 
prejudice to an accused from the disclosure to a jury of their previous misconduct, the 
Court was primarily concerned with the need to ensure that fair notice had been given to 
that accused of the Crown’s intention to adduce such evidence. 
 
The Scottish High Court continues to down-value the prejudicial nature of 
similar fact evidence even in those cases in which the risk of both “reasoning” and 
“moral” prejudice by the jury is at its highest.796  For example, in H.M. Advocate v 
Beggs (No 3),797 B was convicted of the sexual assault and murder of a male victim. The 
Crown was allowed to lead evidence of his practice of picking up males from “straight” 
public houses, plying them with drink at his home and sexually molesting them.  The 
trial judge allowed the evidence in, after opining that this highly prejudicial evidence 
“ . . . at best . . . might demonstrate only a propensity on the part of the accused to 
engage in homosexual sexual activity”, and as such might be used as part of the 
Crown’s circumstantial case against the accused.  His Lordship was clearly 
downplaying the prejudicial effect of the disclosure to the jury of B’s homosexual 
                                                            
 
 
796 For the meaning of these terms, see notes 336 and 337. 
797 2001 SCCR 891.  This is the most recent case on the subject at the time of writing. 
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preferences, and asserting their relevance, despite the rejection of precisely the same 
assertion by the House of Lords in Boardman,798 a quarter of a century earlier. 
 
The Scottish courts clearly concentrate on the relevance of similar fact evidence 
as an element of a Crown case, insisting merely on the procedural nicety of adequately 
warning the accused of what is to be alleged against them.  The result has been a 
complete absence of any need, under Scots law, to balance probative value against 
prejudicial effect.  
 
Relevance is also the key factor in the most fully developed application of 
similar fact evidence under Scots law, the so-called “Moorov Doctrine”. 
 
The Moorov Doctrine 
 
In order to understand the role played by what has become known as “The 
Moorov Doctrine” in Scottish criminal jurisprudence, one has to be conversant with the 
general procedural rule which requires “corroboration” before any person may be 
convicted of any crime in a Scots court.  The most commonly quoted formulation of this 
rule is to be found in the judgment of Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison in Morton v H.M. 
Advocate,799 that: 
 
. . . . no person can be convicted of a crime . . . unless there is evidence of at least two 
witnesses implicating the person accused with the commission of the crime . . . with 
which he is charged.   
 
                                                            
 
 
798 Note 235. 
799 1938 J.C. 50.   
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While this requirement has never been taken literally, so as to require the 
testimony of two eye-witnesses to the alleged crime,800 it was long asserted by the 
“institutional writers” in Scots law,801 that the necessary corroboration might be found 
in the testimony of a witness recounting another, near identical, piece of behaviour by 
the same identified accused.  This form of “mutual corroboration” is similar fact 
evidence in its purest form. It proceeds, via “coincidence reasoning”,802 to support the 
allegation of offending on the occasion on trial (which might otherwise be held to be 
uncorroborated because of the absence of a second source of evidence, independent of 
the testimony of the victim). 
 
The most obvious scenarios in which this is of value involve sexual offences, 
which by their very nature often have no witness other than the victim, and which in the 
absence of supporting forensic evidence might well never result in a conviction.   This 
was the context in which the High Court laid down the “Moorov Doctrine”. 
 
In Moorov v H.M. Advocate,803 M was charged with a series of sexual assaults 
against female employees over a four year period.  Corroboration of the conventional 
variety existed only in respect of three of these charges.  In respect of a further thirteen 
of them there was only the evidence of the alleged victim.  M was convicted of all of 
these thirteen charges, on the basis that the evidence of each victim corroborated that of 
the other victims whose evidence required corroboration.  In the course of rejecting M’s 
                                                            
 
 
800 Rather, it has required two independent sources of evidence, whatever form they may take.  In 
Patterson v Nixon, 1960 J.C. 42, for example, the corroborating evidence took the form of the behaviour 
of a police tracker dog, while in Nisbet v H.M. Advocate, 1983 S.C.C.R. 13 it took the form of the 
“awkward story” told by N to police who suspected him of receiving stolen property, and who asked him 
to account for his possession of the property in question. 
801 See, e.g. Hume, Crimes, II, 385, Alison, Practice of the Criminal Law in Scotland (1833), II, 552, and 
Dickson, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence in Scotland (Grierson’s edition), paras. 1807-1810. 
802 The “coincidence” in question is the unlikelihood that two or more independent witnesses might 
invent the same factually specific allegation.  The risk of “collusion” which has bedevilled English cases 
of this type seems not to have arisen under this Doctrine, probably because in the majority of the decided 
cases the witnesses did not have any prior relationship with each other. 
803 Note 787.  This was the first ruling on the admissibility of similar fact evidence, of any type, by the 
then newly-established Court of Appeal in Scotland. 
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appeal against conviction, Lord Justice-General Clyde,804 laid down the pre-conditions 
for the admission of this type of evidence in the following terms:  
 
. . . . before the evidence of a single credible witness to separate acts can provide 
material for mutual corroboration, the connection between the separate acts (indicated 
by their external relation in time, character or circumstance) must be such as to exhibit 
them as subordinates in some particular and ascertained unity of intent, project, 
campaign or adventure which lies beyond or behind – but is related to – the separate 
acts. (emphasis added). 
 
Put in terms of English law, they reveal “a course of similar conduct”. In terms 
also recognisable to anyone familiar with the way in which English law had 
subsequently developed, his Lordship underlined the need for a strong degree of 
similarity to exist between the various incidents: 805  
 
. . . . I think the reason why identity of kind should be a sine qua non of the 
establishment of any recognisable connection or relation between the separate acts is to 
be found in the necessity of giving a wide berth to any possible risk of allowing a jury 
to be tempted into the course of “giving a dog a bad name and hanging him”. 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
804 At 599. Lord Sands (at 608) described the logic involved more economically as being that “There 
must be some special circumstances connecting the incidents in order that it may be held that a course of 
conduct is established”.  The Lord Advocate, for the Crown, had cited Makin in support of his successful 
submission, at 597, that “The test of whether evidence in one crime was admissible as evidence in 
another was whether it was relevant”. Lord Alness (note 787, J.C. at 82) agreed that “ . . . . the incidents 
proved disclose a systematic course of libidinous conduct on the part of the appellant – a scheme or 
design or plan on his part to gratify his lewd impulses, at the expense of his unfortunate employees, 
whenever and wherever he thought that a safe opportunity of so doing presented itself”.  However, his 
opinion that the Court was dealing with “a special case unlikely ever to recur” proved to be unduly 
optimistic. 
805 Ibid.  
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Moorov was cited with approval by the House of Lords in DPP v Kilbourne,806 
during the course of which, in reaching an identical decision to the effect that the 
evidence of various alleged victims of an accused’s sexual depredations might be used 
to corroborate that of the others, Lord Hailsham observed:807 
 
That this is so in the law of Scotland seems beyond dispute, and it would be astonishing 
if the law of England were different in this respect, since one would hope that the same 
rules of logic and common sense are common to both. 
 
Although Lord Clyde’s judgment in Moorov emphasised the desirability of 
similarity in “time, character and circumstance”, in practice these elements have proved 
to be interchangeable, in the sense that great strength in one can offset relative weakness 
in the others.  For example, in Coffey v Houston,808 a time gap of slightly over two years 
between two alleged sexual assaults by a male nurse on two 11 year old girls under his 
care in separate hospitals was not fatal to a conviction, given the bizarre nature of his 
behaviour and the identical detail of the assaults testified to by each of the girls.  By 
contrast, in H.M. Advocate v Cox,809 a time gap of three years was said to be too long 
between two alleged assaults against two of C’s step-children within the family home 
when one offence was sodomy and the other was incest. 
 
The precise nature of the alleged behaviour can be important, as the Cox case 
illustrates.  So also can the order in which the corroborating evidence is organised.  For 
                                                            
 
 
806 Note 194.  It was also subsequently approved by Lord Morris in Boardman (note 235) at 440. 
807 At 742. 
808 1992 S.C.C.R. 265.  See also Dodds v H.M. Advocate, 2002 S.L.T. 1058 and Stewart v H.M.Advocate, 
2007 S.C.C.R. 303.  
809 1962 J.C. 27.  However, more recently in K v H.M. Advocate 2012 J.C. 74, the High Court held that a 
time gap of eleven years did not invalidate the cross-admissibility of the evidence of M (sexually abused 
for a period of years ending in 1995) and the evidence of D (sexually abused for a period beginning in 
2008), when the two victims were the accused’s nephews, they were approximately the same age at the 
time of the abuse, the abuse occurred at the same locations, and the accused told D, while abusing him 
for the first time,  “I’ve missed you, M”.  On appeal, this last factor was said to constitute the 
“extraordinary feature” which linked the two testimonies. 
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example, in H.M. Advocate v Brown,810 B was accused, by each of his three step-
daughters, of having committed both indecent assaults and incest against them, during a 
21 month period in which only a matter of months separated the end of a course of 
conduct with one girl and the start of the next.  It was held that in the circumstances the 
time period was short enough to fit within the Moorov Doctrine, and that the evidence 
of incest might be used to corroborate the allegations of indecent assaults (but not the 
other way around), because “The greater here includes the lesser”.811  
 
Although most frequently employed in sexual assault cases, the Moorov 
Doctrine has also proved efficacious in respect of other types of offence.  In McCudden 
v H.M. Advocate,812 for example, it was used in respect of two separate attempts to bribe 
soccer players. In H.M. Advocate v McQuade,813 the charges involved razor attacks.  
Nor are either the technical nature of, or name given to, the charges necessarily crucial, 
if the factual incidents being corroborated are essentially near-identical.  Thus, in Austin 
v Fraser,814 the Doctrine was applied in respect of a breach of the peace and the careless 
driving of a motor vehicle, both of which incidents involved driving a car so as to 
impede the progress of another motorist. 
 
                                                            
 
 
810 1970 S.L.T. 121. 
811 Per Lord Justice-Clerk Grant at 122. See also Hutchison v H.M. Advocate, 1998 S.L.T. 679, in which 
it was held that an assault could corroborate a breach of the peace, but not vice-versa.  It is respectfully 
submitted that if relevance is the key, then the gravity of each offence should not be regarded as 
significant. 
812 1952 J.C. 86. 
813 1951 J.C. 143. See also Harris v Clark 1958 J.C. 3, in which it was applied to three separate offences 
of receiving stolen property (called “reset” under Scots law), in which the evidence identifying the 
accused as the receiver came from the three separate thieves, who all worked in the same wholesale 
warehouse from which the items were stolen.  
814 1998 S.L.T. 106.  See also Hughes (Graham) v H. M. Advocate 2008 J.C. 338, in which it was held 
that the Doctrine could be applied so as to link more traditional acts of sexual abuse with an allegation of 
striking a child on the bare buttocks with a belt, which in the circumstances could be regarded as a 
species of indecent assault. Both victims were pre-pubescent siblings, all the offences had occurred in the 
accused’s bedroom, and they were closely linked in time.  Also Carpenter v Hamilton 1994 S.C.C.R. 
108, in which breach of the peace and indecent exposure were said to possess an “underlying similarity”. 
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The significance of the Moorov Doctrine is that it allows relevance to play its 
natural role in the process of fact-finding,815 without allowing it to be immersed in 
policy-driven concerns regarding the ‘category’ into which it may be placed, or to be 
compared artificially with whatever potential “prejudice” may be said to attend the 
admission of that evidence.  The Doctrine can only apply when new offences are being 
tried for the first time,816 which results in the jury always being able to assess the 
demeanour of each of the witnesses testifying to each alleged similar fact incident 
during the course of the same trial.  In addition, it was held in Lord Advocate’s 
Reference (No.1 of 2001),817 that the Doctrine may not be employed unless the accused 
can be clearly identified as the culprit in each of the incidents relied upon by the Crown. 
 
As Lord Justice-General Hope explained in Reynolds v H.M. Advocate,818 
 
. . . . . cases of this kind, while they must be approached with care, raise questions of 
fact and degree. That is especially so where . . . . the case falls into the open country 
which lies between the two extremes. . . . Where the case lies in the middle ground, the 
important point is that a jury should be properly directed so that they may be aware of 
the test which requires to be applied . . . . When . . . regard is had to the fact that there 
are items in the evidence which may on one view be regarded as similarities and then 
balanced against the dissimilarities, 819  we consider that this case fell within the 
province of the jury rather than the judge. (emphasis added) 
 
 
                                                            
 
 
815 In the words of Lord Wark in Ogg v H.M. Advocate 1938 S.L.T. 513, at 515-6, “The doctrine of 
Moorov . . . . is simply one particular application of the general principle that the evidence to be regarded 
by the jury in each charge must be relevant to that charge”. 
816 Walsh v H.M. Advocate, 1961 J.C. 51. 
817 2002 S.L.T. 466 
818 1995 J.C. 142, at 146. 
819  As emerges in Chapter 9, the measurement of similarities against dissimilarities is the process 
identified by the Canadian Supreme Court in Handy as lying at the heart of the admissibility test for 
similar fact evidence. 
251 
 
The consequences of the dominance of Moorov 
 
The predominant lesson to be learned from the Scottish experience would seem 
to be that relevance may safely be allowed to speak for itself, and the only safeguard 
which needs to be built into the system is the giving of adequate notice to the accused. 
However, it may also be the case that Scots law has paid a price for placing most of its 
similar fact jurisprudential eggs in one basket, namely that:  
 
. . . . the development of any nascent, broad doctrine of similar facts evidence withered 
because the Moorov doctrine came to be seen as the only manifestation of any such 
principle in the law of Scotland and a rather peculiar creature, originating in our 
distinctive rules on corroboration. . . . the role of similar facts evidence became 
categorised as an exception to the need for corroboration, rather than being recognised 
as a doctrine of much more general application and importance.820 
 
This failure to recognise a broader role for similar fact evidence has been 
blamed,821 for the confusion which arose in the wake of the decision of the Appeal 
Court in Howden v H.M. Advocate. 822  H had been convicted of two robberies in 
Edinburgh, in very similar circumstances, and within a two week period.  With respect 
to the first robbery, the identification evidence was strong against H, whereas in the 
second it was weak.  The trial judge had directed the jury that if they were satisfied 
“beyond doubt” that the same person had committed both robberies, then they could 
convict H of the second robbery. He rejected a Crown submission that the matter was 
covered by the Moorov Doctrine on the ground that this required, for its application, 
                                                            
 
 
820 Duff, “Towards a Unified Theory of “Similar Facts Evidence” in Scots Law: Relevance, Fairness and 
the Reinterpretation of Moorov”, 2002 J.R. 143. Duff insisted (at footnote 1) on employing the plural 
form to describe events from an accused’s life which are being used against them.  In support of the 
quoted assertion, the author cites the subsequent authorities of McHardy v H.M. Advocate, 1982 S.C.C.R. 
582, Coffey v Houston (note 808), and Lindsay v H.M. Advocate 1994 S.L.T. 546.  
821 By Duff, note 820, at 162. 
822 1994 S.C.C.R. 19. 
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clear identification of the accused on each occasion which was being relied upon, and 
was limited in its application to issues of corroboration. 
 
The appeal against conviction was based on the argument that despite what he 
had said, the trial judge had in reality been applying the Moorov Doctrine in the absence 
of positive identification of H as the culprit on the second occasion.  The response of the 
Appeal Court was to reject any suggestion that Moorov applied, and to regard the case 
instead as a straightforward one involving circumstantial evidence. The question was 
whether or not the same person had committed both offences.  As Lord Justice-General 
Hope expressed it:823 
 
The strength or otherwise of the identifications of the person who committed the 
offence in the bank was not of any importance in these circumstances, so long as the 
jury were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt by the circumstantial evidence that it was 
the same person who was responsible for both of them, and so long as they were 
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the perpetrator of at least one 
of these offences. 
 
With the benefit of experience of English law in this area, it may be said that this 
was indeed a straightforward case in which H’s proven involvement in Robbery 1 could 
be used as evidence of his identity in Robbery 2 by way of the similar fact inferences.  
His actions demonstrated a modus operandi. But two Scottish academic 
commentators, 824  arrived at significantly different conclusions regarding the 
significance of the decision in Howden. 
 
For Professor Gordon it “. . . . represent[ed] a minor revolution in the law of 
evidence” in extending the range of the Moorov Doctrine to cases in which there is no 
                                                            
 
 
823 At p.124 E & F. 
824 Duff, note 820, at 163, and Gordon, in his commentary on Howden (note 822, at 25). 
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eye-witness identification of the perpetrator on one or more of the occasions relied upon.  
To Duff,825 it was “ . . . simply one application of a more general similar facts principle”. 
 
Duff argued that:826  
 
. . . .the Moorov rule may simply represent one manifestation of a broader doctrine 
which revolves around the use of similar fact evidence, whatever the purpose for which 
it is cited. 
 
This process had, in fact, already begun by the date of Howden.  In Lindsay v 
H.M. Advocate,827  it had been held to be sufficient for the application of the Moorov 
Doctrine that a witness came across the accused immediately after an assault and 
robbery in circumstances which left no room for doubt that the accused were the 
perpetrators, even though the witness had not witnessed the actual incident.  Lord 
Justice-General Hope,828 delivered the opinion of the Court that:  
 
“ . . . what matters as far as the Moorov doctrine is concerned is the underlying unity as 
regards the separate acts established by the evidence of the various witnesses.  We 
cannot find anything in any of the statements of principle which makes it necessary that 
the evidence of identification of the accused in each case must be that of a single eye-
witness to the crime. (emphasis added). 
 
While on the one hand this could be described as a broadening of the previous 
narrow parameters of the Moorov principles, as argued by Professor Gordon, the 
portion of the judgment underlined above could equally have been taken directly from 
                                                            
 
 
825 Note 820, at162 
826 Ibid. 
827 Note 820. 
828 At 549.  
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one of the formative authorities under English law.829  This appears to owe more to the 
acknowledged “nexus of similarity” between the circumstances of each offence, 830 
than to the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators. 
 
Lord Justice-General Clyde in Moorov, 831  had referred to the fact that:  
 
The existence of such an underlying unity, comprehending and governing the separate 
acts, provides the necessary connecting link between them, and becomes a circumstance 
in which corroboration of the evidence of the single witnesses in support of the separate 
acts may be found – whether the existence of such underlying unity is established by 
independent evidence, or by necessary inference from the evidence of the single 
witnesses themselves, regarded as a whole. 
 
In short, the justification for the application of the Moorov principle might be 
found, either in an underlying unity provided by several witnesses all identifying the 
accused in connection with the same criminal action, or in some other unifying 
factor(s) arising from the circumstance of each offence which required only eye-
witness identification of the accused as the perpetrator of at least one offence in the 
series to link him to all of them.  This was what happened in Howden. 
 
The only threat which remains to the clarity of Scots law in its use of similar 
fact evidence is that practitioners and commentators will continue to cling to a narrow 
view of Moorov, and will reject any alternative application of it which does not comply 
strictly with the requirement of “one offence, one identification witness”.832  This threat 
                                                            
 
 
829 For example R v John Bond, note 164, per A.T. Lawrence cited at note 167.                  . 
830 These consisted of a series of robberies at knife-point of insurance agents collecting premiums in 
high-rise flats in the same working class tenement in the east end of Glasgow.   
831 Note 787, at 599. 
832 See, e.g. Ferguson, “Corroboration and Similar Fact Evidence”, Scots Law Times, 1996, 34, 339 at 
340, who claims that “Howden . . . . goes further than Moorov because as Townsley shows, it effectively 
relieves the Crown of leading any evidence of identity in cases where there is an inter-relationship in 
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became more obvious in the scramble for clarity in the judgments in Townsley v 
Lees.833 
 
T was charged with a series of three thefts. In each of them it was alleged that 
she distracted an elderly victim in their garden, employing the same pretext on each 
occasion while an accomplice entered the house and stole from it.  It was held on 
appeal by the High Court that there had been sufficient identification evidence in 
respect of the first two offences to justify the application of the Moorov Doctrine inter 
se 834. The same principle could not be applied to the third theft, in respect of which 
there was no positive identification of T. T’s guilt on the third charge could, however, 
be supported on the basis that this offence was committed in an identical way to the 
two thefts in which T had already been identified. 
 
This was, of course, an identical line of reasoning to that which had been 
employed two years previously in Howden.835 His Lordship made reference to Howden, 
and to the academic criticism which it had received, adding,836 that “ . . . nothing . . . 
has caused us to think that the case was wrongly decided.” 
 
Howden and Townsley v Lees were both classic applications of the logic and 
justice of admitting similar fact evidence on the basis of its sheer relevance to the case 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
time, place and circumstances”.  But it is surely this very inter-relationship which goes to prove identity, 
and given the known unreliability of eye-witness identification, similar fact evidence demonstrating such 
a close similarity between the facts of the case in doubt and the facts of the case in which there is no 
doubt of the identity of the offender, must be considered forensically superior.  See also Quinn v H.M. 
Advocate, 1990 SLT 877, in which the High Court held that the evidence of a girl who identified Q as 
one of a group of three males who raped her in a particular flat could not be corroborated by proof that 
the accused had indecently assaulted another girl in the same flat three hours earlier. 
833 1996 S.L.T. 1182. 
834 The effect of this ruling was of course that there was a “corroborated case” in respect of each of these 
first two thefts. 
835 Note 822. 
836 At 1186. 
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in hand, although it seems to have taken several decades for the Scottish courts to shake 
off the belief that it was only admissible in the type of scenario predicated in Moorov. 
 
By contrast with the attention bestowed on the probative value of similar fact 
evidence under Scots law, there has been little consideration of its potential prejudicial 
effect, beyond the somewhat glib assertion by the High Court in Reynolds,837  that it is 
simply a matter of the jury being given the correct instruction by the trial judge.  Even 
in Moorov there had been an acknowledgement of the fact that a jury advised of an 
accused’s previous misdeeds might “Give a dog a bad name and hang him”,838 and the 
corresponding implied need to ensure that the relevance of the evidence which was 
being admitted justified its admission. 
 
As is often the case, terminology has served to obscure clarity.  Duff,839 asserts 
that: 
 
The problem in Scotland . . . . has been that the courts have sometimes obscured the 
basic issue by labelling as “irrelevant” testimony which they do not wish to go to the 
jury because of the risks of prejudice. 
 
His proposed solution is the adoption of the Boardman equation,840  and he 
suggests some sort of conceptual distinction between “relevance” and “probity”.  He 
then goes on,841 to suggest the following two-stage test: 
 
                                                            
 
 
837 Note 818. 
838 See note 805. 
839 Note 820, at 166. He cites Moorov as one of the cases in which this fallacy was perpetuated. 
840 In Duff’s words, ibid, the appropriate phrasing should be “. . . this similar facts evidence is relevant, 
but, in our view, its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value”.  He appears to be oblivious to the 
fact that this formula failed dismally in England. 
841 Note 820, at 167. 
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(1) Is the similar facts evidence relevant? If so,  
(2) Is it fair to admit it, given its probative weight and likely prejudicial effect? 
 
In reality, there need only be one test, given that the only “probative weight” 
which an item of evidence is likely to possess will derive from its degree of relevance to 
the facts of the instant case.  Taking the facts of Townsley v Lees,842 as an example, 
what was “relevant” in respect of the third charge of theft was the fact that it was 
committed in virtually identical, distinctive circumstances to the first two, in which T 
had been identified as the perpetrator. That same “strong nexus of similarity” gave the 
evidence its “probative weight” in relation to the third charge.  The only remaining 
factor which ought to require consideration was whether that “probative weight” came 
from the similarity between the offences, or simply the fact that T had committed two 
offences of the same general nature previously, and was therefore more likely than a 
person chosen at random to have done it a third time.   
 
Clearly, it was not the mere fact that she had done it twice previously which 
carried the probative weight, but the fact that she had done it in such idiosyncratic 
circumstances. This being the case, then the risk that the jury would convict her simply 
because she had “previous” for that sort of offence was minimal, compared with the 
likelihood that they would conclude guilt from the “strikingly similarity” of the modus 
operandi of all three offences.  Put in these terms, it would seem that the risk of 
“forbidden reasoning” can be almost eliminated if the trial judge directs the jury on 
precisely the purpose for which the evidence is being admitted, and leaves to them the 
decision as to whether or not it achieves that purpose. 
 
                                                            
 
 
842 Note 833. 
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As Duff describes the process:843 
 
. . . . whether courts admit similar facts evidence depends on a complex discretionary 
judgment about the appropriate balance to be struck between the probative weight of 
the evidence and the risk of prejudice in the unique circumstances of each individual 
case. 
 
He does not, however, define “prejudice” in this context, any more than did the 
superior courts in England post-Boardman.  Likewise, his implied belief that the 
“prejudice” involved is something which can be weighed against the “probity” of the 
evidence is doomed to the same fate which befell Boardman.  
 
“Relevance” is clearly a conclusion which can be drawn from the congruence of 
the facts which constitute the similar fact evidence with the facts of the instant case; the 
more specific the similar facts are in relation to those to be found in the fresh 
allegations, the more “probative” they are in suggesting guilt.  “Prejudice”, on the other 
hand, is, in this context, a failure to argue from this congruence, and to argue instead 
from the mere fact that a previous event occurred.  This is what Lord Hailsham meant 
by “forbidden reasoning”, 844  and it is, in essence, a failure to recognise the true 
significance (through relevance) of the evidence. If a jury is properly directed around 
this hazard by the trial judge, and instructed to consider the evidence on the basis of its 
relevance to the facts of the charge(s) to which it is alleged to relate, and on that basis 
alone, then the less risk there is of “prejudice”.  As Vandore puts it:845 
 
  The inference which the Crown are asking them to draw must be spelled out to them. . .  
                                                            
 
 
843 Note 820, at 170.   
844 Note 252. 
845 Note 784, at 194. 
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Conclusion 
 
Scots law underlines that what is clearly needed in any attempt to formulate an 
appropriate test for the admission of similar fact evidence is a thorough understanding 
of the nature and role of relevance.  If the evidence is sufficiently relevant, it is 
admissible, and if it is not, then it must be excluded because of the risk of the jury 
employing it for some reason not arising from its relevance. This is the “prejudice” 
which is to be avoided, and judicial direction to the jury is the obvious mechanism to 
ensure that they only consider such evidence for its proven relevance to a fact in issue in 
the case before them.   
 
While acting as gatekeepers in this regard, Scots judges have proved that it is 
possible to enforce a “notice” regime which leaves an accused in no doubt regarding the 
defence which they have to prepare. There is much which may be learned from their 
approach to the topic, in particular the fact that one can avoid “prejudice” to an accused 
without the need to incorporate it into unworkable and unnecessarily complex formulas, 
or seek to justify the admission of similar fact evidence by reference to categories. 
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Chapter 8:  
New Zealand law 
 
Chapter synopsis 
 
 The superior courts in New Zealand adhered closely to the English authorities, 
most notably Makin, Boardman and DPP v P.  In the main, these proved sufficient until 
the 1990s, when the same uncertainty regarding their practical application which had 
dogged the English courts led to an increasing number of appeals, and the perceived 
need for statutory clarification. 
 
 The New Zealand Law Commission proposed legislation which became the 
Evidence Act 2006 (N.Z.).  Section 43 of that Act provides the first statutory declaration, 
anywhere in the English-based common law jurisdictions, of the factors which make 
propensity evidence “probative”.  On the other side of the equation, it distinguishes 
clearly between “moral” and “reasoning” prejudice. 
 
 However, issues still remain under New Zealand law regarding how a trial judge 
is to employ these various factors in a meaningful direction to a jury. 
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R v Hall: a pre-Makin decision 
 
 In R v Hall, 846  the New Zealand Court of Appeal was granted an early 
opportunity to consider the state of the English authorities to that point, and to formulate 
its own position ahead of what the Judicial Committee was to hand down in Makin.  It 
followed the English precedents closely in ruling that the similar fact evidence would 
only have been admissible to prove (a) that the poisoning of C was not accidental; or (b) 
that the two poisonings were part of a series which formed a single transaction; or (c) 
that they were part of a “common design”.  None of these grounds had been made out, 
and the jury having been told that they could use the evidence for any purpose they saw 
fit, the conviction was quashed.  At this early stage in the development of their law, it 
seems, the New Zealand courts were following their English counterparts.847  They 
maintained the same policy following Makin. 
 
New Zealand law between Makin and Boardman 
 
 Like their common law contemporaries around the globe, the New Zealand 
courts were required to come to grips with the judgment of Lord Herschell in Makin.  
The New Zealand Court of Appeal, like its English counterpart, at first found it hard to 
ignore the precedents which had gone before.  However, it recognised that Makin was 
something out of the ordinary, and was binding on New Zealand courts; ultimately, 
                                                            
 
 
846 (1887) 5 NZLR 93.  H had been convicted of the murder of C by arsenic poisoning, following the 
admission of evidence that H’s wife, W, had subsequently almost died from arsenic poisoning.  H had 
been in attendance on both C and W during their illnesses, and upon H’s arrest on suspicion of attempting 
to murder his wife, he was found to be in possession of both arsenic and a book on poisons.  Arsenic was 
found in both W’s faeces and C’s exhumed corpse. 
847 It would seem that they did so with some judicial hand-washing, observing (at 110) that “[T]he 
common law must often result in what the public may regard as a failure of justice.  That is not really our 
concern”. 
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Makin came to be seen in New Zealand, as it was in England, as validating a 
continuation of the ‘categories’ approach to the admission of propensity evidence.848  
 
 In the last case in this series,849 the Court confirmed the general rule under New 
Zealand law at that time to be that propensity evidence was admissible when it was 
“relevant in any manner whatever to any issue before the jury”, other than merely 
showing the accused to be a person “likely to have committed the crime charged against 
him”.  
 
 From R v Ratu Huihui,850 onwards, the change in admissibility reasoning which 
was slowly occurring in England,851 and which first became apparent in Sims, was 
mirrored in the New Zealand decisions.   Lord Goddard CJ had issued his judgment in R 
v Sims,852 the previous year, observing that the “sensible view” of propensity evidence 
was that its admission was justified by its relevance to the case, regardless of whatever 
issues are raised by the accused.   
 
 By the time of R v Crutchley,853 two years later, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal was able to cite the broader test suggested by the Judicial Committee in Noor 
Mohamed v R,854 acknowledging the need to take account of possible prejudice to the 
                                                            
 
 
848 The relevant cases were R v Rogan [1916] NZLR 265 (a case involving a schoolmaster accused of 
indecent assaults on three male pupils, each of whose evidence was allowed to cross-corroborate the 
others.  There was also some “uncharged acts” evidence admitted), R v Whitta [1921] NZLR 519 (which 
drew heavily on Ball and Ball in admitting propensity evidence to rebut a defence of “innocent intent”), R 
v Smythe [1923] NZLR 519 (a similar decision in respect of two arsons), and R v Cooper [1923] NZLR 
1237, a case eerily close, on its facts, to Makin, in which the Court confirmed that propensity evidence 
might be employed to prove the actus reus. 
849 Cooper, note 848. 
850 [1947] NZLR 581.  See also R v Reddaway [1948] NZLR 1118. 
851 That is, the change from a ‘categories of exception’ basis to a ‘probity versus prejudice’ one. 
852 Note 203, cited at Note 206. 
853 [1950] NZLR 497. 
854 Note 204, at 370.  This dealt with the need to ensure that the propensity evidence being adduced is 
sufficiently relevant to a material issue in the case to justify its admission, despite its prejudicial effect.  
The same question was said to be central to the issue raised on appeal in R v Anderson [1951] NZLR 439, 
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accused. In R v Hare, 855  the Court made frequent reference to the difference in 
approaches, and to some extent the conflict, between the English judgments in Sims and 
Noor Mohamed.  In the end, the Court applied the emerging ‘probity versus prejudice’ 
approach of the latter, and can hardly have been surprised when Boardman was finally 
handed down some twenty years later. 
 
From Boardman to a statutory regime 
 
 From 1975 onwards in New Zealand, the House of Lords ruling in Boardman,856 
became what the leading academic authority in that jurisdiction 857 later described as 
“ . . . the starting point for further examination of the modern law”. This opinion was 
shared – and no doubt partly created – by that nation’s superior courts. Thus, only a 
year after its handing down, Boardman was described in the New Zealand High 
Court,858 as “the most compelling authority”.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
namely the identity of an abortionist.  By this stage, the Court of Appeal was also able to cite some of its 
own previous decisions, for example those in Rogan (note 848), Reddaway (note 850) and Crutchley 
(note 853). 
855 [1952] NZLR 688, another case involving multiple charges of indecent behaviour by an accused, in 
which propensity evidence was led regarding not only “uncharged acts” evidence in respect of the two 
girls named on the indictment, but also a third girl who was not a complainant. The evidence was held to 
be admissible in order to establish the “relationship” which H had built up with each of his victims, which, 
on the authority of Noor Mohamed, was held to be “substantial” enough to justify its admission, despite 
its prejudicial nature. 
856 Note 235. 
857 Cross on Evidence 4th (N.Z.) edition, 1989, Butterworths, Wellington, at p.350. 
858 By Beattie J in R v Geiringer [1976] 2 NZLR 398, at 401.  It was also described as “the leading case” 
by Cooke J, delivering the unanimous judgment in R v McLean [1978] 2 NZLR 358 at 361.  In R v 
Anderson [1978] 2 NZLR 363, it was referred to by the majority court, at 370, as “. . . the leading 
modern authority in this notoriously difficult field”, a description repeated by Richardson J in the later 
case of R v Paunovic [1982] 1 NZLR 593, at 597.  Ten years later, in R v Hsi En Feng [1985] 1 NZLR 
222, at 224, per Cooke J, it was still being described as “. . . the landmark case of R v Boardman”. 
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 There was no attempt to re-formulate what their Lordships had said in 
Boardman.  Instead, the courts appeared to make every effort to apply the essential 
principles which had emerged from it, which were said in R v Te One to be that:859   
 
. . . . there are two separate questions: (i) whether the evidence in question is legally 
admissible, which turns on relevance; (ii) whether in the exercise of the judge’s 
discretion the evidence, although strictly admissible,860 should be excluded because its 
prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. 
 
 At least in the immediate post-Boardman years, there seems to have been no 
difficulty in applying these principles in those cases which came on appeal.861  By 1984, 
it was therefore possible to conclude,862 that “ . . . the New Zealand decisions chart a 
reasonably clear course.  As to the application of those principles, they illustrate the 
inherent difficulties which arise in borderline cases . . . . ” 
 
 The strictness with which the Boardman principles were applied preserved New 
Zealand from some of the errors committed in other jurisdictions.  In Phillips,863 for 
example, the Australian High Court had been obliged to point out that propensity 
evidence cannot be employed in order to prove the state of mind of a victim.  This error 
was avoided by a single New Zealand Supreme Court judge,864 who employed the 
“relevance” principle from Boardman in order to conclude that: 
                                                            
 
 
859 [1976] 2 NZLR 510, per Cooke J at 514. 
860 The more apt word might have been “relevant”. 
861 See, for example, Geiringer, McLean, and Anderson (all note 858). However, in Paunovic (also note 
858), the Court re-emphasised the need to bear in mind that the admission of propensity evidence is 
“exceptional”, and that the jury should be carefully guided on the limited purpose for which it is admitted. 
862 Principles of the Law of Evidence, Garrow and McGechan, (7th Ed, 1984), Butterworths, at p.73  See 
also R v Davis [1980] 1 NZLR 257, at 263 per Cooke J delivering the judgment of the Court, that “ . . . . 
common sense is not to be codified . . . The price of this approach is some uncertainty in borderline cases, 
but some uncertainty is inevitable with questions of relevance or degrees of relevance.” 
863 Note 653. 
864 McMullin J in R v Holloway [1980] 1 NZLR 315, at 320.  This was a case with echoes of the Scots 
case of Moorov v H.M. Advocate (Note 787).  The allegations in the instant case were by women who 
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If identity were in issue, it is unlikely that the admissibility of the evidence of the other 
women could be disputed . . . . The attitude of other women to his advances is not, in 
my view, relevant to the present case. 
 
 Likewise, the New Zealand courts seem to have successfully made the 
distinction between evidence which “has to do with the facts of the case”,865  and 
propensity evidence which is drawn from other incidents in an accused person’s past.  
In R v Katavich,866 K was charged with knowingly being involved in the management of 
a male-only sauna bath-house which was used for indecent homosexual acts.  The 
Crown sought to adduce evidence that the establishment had been used in the past for 
such purposes in order to prove (a) that the premises were used as a ‘place of resort’ for 
such practices,867 and (b) that K knew of these practices.  As to (a), it was held,868 that 
the evidence in question was “directly relevant” to the charge, and that with regard to 
(b), what had happened in the past might be evidence of K’s knowledge of the activities 
being conducted at the time, and was therefore admissible as similar fact evidence,869 
because it was “plainly relevant” to that issue. 
 
 In the years immediately preceding the New Zealand Law Commission’s 1999 
Report on Evidence,870 its courts were able to drawn on an increasing body of their own 
case-law when deciding appeals.  However, the principles which they applied were 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
claimed to have answered advertisements for a live-in housekeeper, and then been raped following the 
subsequent job interview.  H claimed that each act of intercourse was consensual. 
865 Note 486. 
866 [1977] 1 NZLR 436. 
867 This was clearly “to do with the facts” which the Crown had to prove in order to obtain a conviction. 
868 Per Henry J, at 437. His Honour might have added that it was part of the actus reus which the Crown 
had to prove in respect of a crime of a ‘continuing’ nature such as this.  
869 At 440. 
870 Report 55 (“Evidence – Reform of the Law”), August 1999. 
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those which they had inherited from Boardman and its successor, DPP v P,871 and they 
displayed no inclination to develop any new principle of their own. 
 
 The main authority to which they referred was Hsi En Feng,872 in which a clear 
warning had been issued by the Court of Appeal against attempting to reformulate what 
had been handed down in Boardman.  In the main, the courts seem to have had no 
difficulty in balancing probity against prejudice, and appear to have dealt, almost in 
passing, with issues which had caused deeper soul-searching in both England and 
Australia.873 
 
 Another issue which had come to dominate Australian case-law, namely the 
distinction between propensity evidence and “relevant history or res gestae” was 
disposed of by the Court of Appeal in R v Accused with the simple observation,874 that 
“We do not consider that it matters which description is used”.  Their Honours also took 
the opportunity to confirm what had been said in Huijser, that the admission of 
propensity evidence is basically a matter of “common sense”, and that the “labels” 
which were traditionally applied to propensity evidence were “in deference to English 
authority”.875 
 
                                                            
 
 
871 Note 289. 
872 Note 858.  It was referred to, and followed, in R v Huijser [1988] 1 NZLR 577, R v Narain [1988] 
NZLR 580, and R v W [1995] 1 NZLR 548.  R v Huijser was in turn referred to, and followed, in Narain 
and R v Accused [1992] 2 NZLR 187. 
873  In Narain, for example, the High Court dealt expeditiously with the issue of possible collusion 
between complainants by describing it (at 579) as a matter “. . . . that can be properly explored at trial and 
may be more capable of detection (if it exists) if the evidence is heard at the one trial”.   
874 Note 872, at 191.  The evidence of the sister of an alleged victim of A’s sexual offending had been 
admitted as corroboration in respect of charges of which A had eventually been acquitted, and the 
complaint on appeal was the effect which this evidence might have had on the jury in respect of the 
charges on which A had been convicted. 
875 Ibid. They also took the trouble to observe that the recently-enacted Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), 
which mandated a “fair” trial, was not breached when propensity evidence was correctly admitted. 
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 Nevertheless, it was possible to detect in the decisions of the New Zealand 
courts, by the close of the millennium, a growing belief among appeal judges that 
admission standards for propensity evidence were becoming dangerously slack. 
 
 The first warning appears to have been sounded in R v O,876 in which the Court 
of Appeal referred to “ . . . . the less restrictive attitude to admissibility which has 
developed in this country after R v Hsi En Feng.”  The admission rules became more 
stringent following the Court of Appeal judgment in R v M.877   
 
 The Court in that case was obliged to overturn the conviction of M for multiple 
unlawful sexual dealings with his daughter over a 12 year period commencing when 
she was five, following the admission of the evidence of a woman who claimed that she 
had been subjected to sexual abuse by M when she had been staying at his home some 
years previously.  The Crown did not specify any similarities in the mode of offending 
which would have given this evidence probative value, but it had been admitted by the 
trial judge on the basis that it tended to corroborate the allegations made by the 
daughter. Since the opinion of the Court, delivered by Gault J,878 became the mantra for 
the future, it is appropriate to quote it at some length.  It was that: 
 
Nothing in DPP v P or the decisions since it was decided justifies the proposition that 
previous offending of the same general kind, without more, is probative of, and 
admissible to support, allegations of criminal offending. Such evidence has some 
                                                            
 
 
876 [1999] 1 NZLR 347.  O had been convicted of the sodomy of his step-son, following the admission of 
evidence revealing him to be a paedophile.  The convictions were overturned by the Court. See also R v 
Horne (unreported, CA 80/94, 18 July 1994, in which the Court noted that “ . . . the present atmosphere 
towards the admission of similar fact evidence is more relaxed than before the mid-1980s”.  In R v 
Fissenden (unreported, CA 227/94, 18 March 1995 and R v J  (unreported, CA 525/94, 24 April 1995), 
this relaxation was attributed to a desire to “keep in touch with common sense and responsible 
community opinion”.  It will be recalled that a similar ‘law and order’ agenda had preceded statutory 
reform in England. 
877 [1999] 1 NZLR 315.  It was recognised as the new leading case authority in both R v Hodgson [2000] 
NZCA 124 and R v Absolum [2002] NZCA 25. 
878 At 320-2. 
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logical relevance, but has  never been considered sufficiently probative to outweigh its 
illegitimate prejudicial effect. . . .  . there must be some additional significant feature 
which lifts the evidence above showing only bad character or disposition to offend. . . .  
 
  There must be a sufficient factual link between the similar fact evidence and the direct 
  evidence of the crime in question.  That link is necessary to make the similar fact 
  evidence more probative than prejudicial. . . . If the evidence is admitted, its probative 
  force comes from that link. 
 
Deepening confusion 
 
 Despite the confident assertion by the New Zealand Law Commission (‘the 
Commission’) in August 1999,879 that “. . . . the current law is working well”, there 
were, prior to 2006, indications at the highest judicial levels that, if anything, confusion 
was deepening regarding some applications of the time-honoured “probity versus 
prejudice” formula.   
 
 For example, New Zealand courts had encountered the same doubts as their 
Australian counterparts regarding whether or not it was necessary for the propensity 
which was being admitted to be proved beyond reasonable doubt to be that of the 
accused.  In R v Holtz,880 the Court of Appeal held that it was sufficient for juries to be 
directed that they must be “satisfied” of it before relying upon it in order to reason 
towards a conviction.  This still left the question of whether this was to be done on an 
item by item basis,881 or holistically, as part of an overall Crown case of which the 
propensity evidence is simply one item of circumstantial evidence.882 
                                                            
 
 
879 In para. 175 of its Report No. 55 – see Note 870. 
880 [2003] 1 NZLR 667, at [39]. 
881 This was the suggested requirement laid down in R v W (Note 872), at 555, in which it was doubted 
whether a jury considering the similar accounts of an accused’s sexual misconduct from several 
complainants in the same trial should be allowed to consider them as part of “the full picture”.  In R v 
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 These differences of opinion, in the main, post-dated the Commission’s 1999 
Report, but they were symptomatic of the need for either judicial guidance at the 
highest level, or a legislative ‘clean slate’.  In Report 103, 883  the Commission 
considered that conflicting decisions such as these had been overtaken by the House of 
Lords ruling in DPP v H,884 and that the newly-enacted s 43 of the Evidence Act 2006 
constituted a “fresh start”. 
 
 In R v Taunoa,885 Court of Appeal observed, of the test which had been inherited 
from Boardman and DPP v P,886 that “At some point, either this court or the Supreme 
Court, will have to enunciate the test more definitively”.  The Court of Appeal in R v 
Mokaraka observed that:887  
 
The real battleground is not usually relevance but the much more difficult exercise of 
balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
Gee [2001] 3 NZLR 729, this principle was applied so as to prevent the admission of a prior charge of 
which G had been acquitted, on the basis that it would not be “appropriate” to allow a new jury to 
reconsider whether or not G might be said to have committed that offence beyond reasonable doubt.  But 
see R v Degnan [2001] 1 NZLR 280 for a contradictory ruling that same year. 
882 This was the preferred approach of the Court of Appeal in R v Tulisi (2000) 18 CRNZ 418 and R v 
Sanders [2001] 1 NZLR 257.  In R v Peyroux [2004] NZCA, at [32], the Court of Appeal observed that 
“Given the contest between these two lines of cases, this is appropriately a question for a full Court.” 
883 “Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions, Similar Offending, and Bad Character”, 
May 2008. 
884 Note 294.  In R v Degnan (note 881) the Court of Appeal maintained its adherence to English case 
authority by citing R v Z (note 306) for its ruling that previous charges which had resulted in an acquittal 
or “stay of proceedings” could still be used as propensity evidence. 
885 (unreported, CA 494/04, 13 April 2005).  In R v Hobbs (unreported, CA 297/05, 20 October 2005), a 
differently constituted Court declined that opportunity. 
886 Significant variations in the suggested test may be found from the one court – the Court of Appeal – 
in R v M (note 877), R v Mokaraka [2002] 1 NZLR 793 and R v Holtz (note 880). 
887 Note 886, at [48].  It fell on its own sword when its use of the word “propensity” in the context of 
‘relevance’ was criticised by a differently constituted Court in R v Godinet (unreported, CA 403/02, 26 
June 2003), which insisted that “To be admissible, the evidence must establish something more than 
propensity”.  In R v Potter [2007] NZCA 156, the judicial exercise involved in applying the test was said 
to involve “ . . . . a finely nuanced judgement responding to the exigencies of the particular case”. 
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 The Commission,888 described the ‘old’ common law test as being “ . . . at a high 
level of abstraction”.  This reflected the need for something more than ‘mere’ 
propensity before the previous behaviour etc. of an accused could be admitted.  The 
growing use of the word “propensity” to cover all forms of prior behaviour which 
might be relevant enough to outweigh prejudice was also adding fuel to a smouldering 
fire. 
 
 As the Law Commission conceded in 2008,889 once it felt that these problems 
might have been resolved: 
 
There were numerous appeals, with a significant number allowed.  There were also 
complaints, particularly by District Court Judges, of difficulties in directing juries, with 
some mention of tell-tale “glazed expressions” . . . . . At the very least there was room 
for conceptual clarification, simplification, and improvements in application. 
 
The move towards an evidence code 
 
 From 1997 to 2006, New Zealand went through a process which culminated in 
the Evidence Act 2006, which in the words of the Commission,890 was “ . . . intended to 
replace most of the existing common law and statutory provisions on the admissibility 
and use of evidence in court proceedings”.  Only part of this transition from common 
law to statute involved propensity evidence, but the process involved was remarkable, 
by comparison with what happened in England during the same period,891 in meeting 
with little opposition, from either practitioners or academics.  This was no doubt largely 
                                                            
 
 
888 In Report 103, (note 883), para. 2.24. 
889 Ibid, para. 2.34, 2.35.     
890 Report 55 (note 870), para.8.  
891 See, generally, Chapter 4.  
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because there were no radical new proposals, simply an attempt to clarify the common 
law that had been operating for the previous century. 
 
 For most of that period, the prevailing legislation had been the Evidence Act 
1908. 892   It contained only one provision relating to the admission of propensity 
evidence, namely s 23, which, in cases of alleged homicide by poisoning on the part of 
an accused, allowed the leading of evidence to prove the administration, or attempted 
administration, of poison by the accused to any person at any time, on the issue of their 
guilt of the offence alleged on the indictment.  
 
 This unique provision did not survive the passing of the 2006 Act, and neither 
did the only other statutory provision permitting the admission of propensity evidence 
in a specific case.893 
 
 Two major Commission papers preceded the 2006 Act.  They were: 
 
  Law Commission Discussion Paper on Evidence Law, Character and 
  Credibility;894 
 
  Law Commission Report 55.895 
 
                                                            
 
 
892 This was repealed in its entirety as from 1 August 2007, when the 2006 Act came into force.   
893This was s 258 of the Crimes Act 1961, which provided that in trials for receiving stolen property, the 
court might learn of previous occasions upon which the accused had been proved to be in possession of 
stolen property, in proof of their guilty knowledge on the instant occasion.  For examples of this 
provision in operation, see R v Cooke [1990] 2 NZLR and R v McDonald [1976] 2 NZLR 99.  It was 
repealed in 2003. 
894 “PP 27”, February 1997. 
895 “Evidence – Reform of the Law”, August 1999 (note 870). 
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 The final Report in 1999 included, as Volume 2, a “Draft Code with 
Commentary”.  This was largely reproduced in the eventual legislation, and in order to 
avoid duplication, references are to the final statutory provisions, with any deviations 
from the Commission’s original proposals referred to where appropriate. 
 
1997 Discussion Paper 
 
 This had its origins in a double referral by the Minister of Justice to the 
Commission in August 1989.  The first of these was: 
 
To make the law of evidence as clear, simple and accessible as is practicable, and to 
facilitate the fair,  just and speedy judicial resolution of disputes.896 
 
 Preliminary Paper 27 invited responses to proposals for what was called a “Code 
Rule” for the admission of “propensity” evidence in criminal cases.897  As part of the 
background to that invitation, the Commission summarised the contemporary state of 
the law, and highlighted the need for greater guidance for both judges and criminal 
counsel on the application of the ‘probity versus prejudice’ test. 
 
                                                            
 
 
896 The second was, in effect, to devise a “fair” system of criminal trial which was at the same time 
effective and efficient. 
897 “Propensity” was the word eventually selected by the Commission to encompass all the forms in 
which an accused’s previous behaviour (not necessarily criminal in nature) might be presented to a jury 
in a way which might prove unfairly prejudicial.  In passing, the Commission doubted the utility of the 
distinction between “tendency” and “coincidence” evidence employed in the Uniform Laws in Australia; 
see PP27, para. 274.  The Commission also rejected the need for the same ‘notice’ provisions as the 
Uniform Laws, given what it termed (at para. 274, f/n 162) a “high degree of disclosure of the 
prosecution’s case” in New Zealand. 
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 The Commission acknowledged,898 that “ . . . the feature of DPP v P which most 
advanced the law in relation to similar fact evidence” was the “refinement” of the 
probity versus prejudice equation which recognised that each application of the test is “a 
question of degree”.899  It also took from that judgment the conclusion that “ . . . the 
issue in dispute at trial would affect what factors contributed to probative value”. 
 
 It then made the perceptive observations that:900  
 
If the similar fact evidence is relevant merely to the general subject matter of the trial 
and not to the actual issue in dispute, such probative value as it may have can never 
outweigh the prejudicial effect. . . .This approach to admission of similar fact evidence 
requires a clear understanding of what is really in dispute between the parties . . . each 
case presents unique factors, and the imprecise nature of the “test” applied in 
considering admission means that it can be difficult for counsel to assess in advance 
whether the evidence will be admitted. 
 
 This led on to the further observation,901 that “ . . . . the Commission considers 
that guidelines to the admission of similar fact evidence can usefully be developed”.  
The guidelines which it went on to propose were based on two fundamental questions, 
the first of which was “Which behaviour should the rule govern?”  
 
 It went on to identify not just evidence which self-evidently would be likely to 
“generate unfair prejudice towards the defendant”,902 but also,903 “evidence – whatever 
                                                            
 
 
898 In para. 257. 
899 Per Lord Mackay LC in DPP v P, at 460-461 (note 290). 
900 In paras. 257-268.  It also observed (at paras. 259-60) that the difficulties with the Boardman equation 
were still not all resolved, and that the possibility of collusion had been added to the list of problem 
issues following DPP v H (note 294). 
901 At para. 270. 
902 Para. 272. 
903 Para. 274. 
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its source – which might establish the defendant’s propensity to behave in the manner 
of the offence charged”.   
 
 This, it is respectfully submitted, came closer than any previous court or reform 
body to appreciating the full extent of Lord Herschell’s first statement of law in Makin 
– namely that the mere fact that an accused has behaved in any manner on any occasion 
is, of itself, irrelevant.  What makes such behaviour relevant is its factual link with, or 
connection to, a material issue in the instant case.  This fact found due recognition in 
the second question posed by the Commission:904  
 
“Is the test which balances probative value against prejudicial effect an adequate basis 
on which to decide the admissibility of propensity evidence?” 
 
 Clearly, posed in such broad terms, it is not.  The Commission answered its own 
question in paras. 275 and 276, in concluding that what was required was: 
 
. . . .  a clear understanding of those factors which contribute to probative value and of 
what constitutes prejudicial effect, as well as the recognition that those factors are not 
constant but influenced by circumstances . . . In deciding whether to admit similar fact 
evidence, the court would be required to take into account the nature of the issue in 
dispute. (original emphasis). 
 
 The Commission concluded this section of its Report, in para. 277,905 with a list 
of suggested “factors to assist a court in assessing the probative value of the particular 
evidence.”  These were substantially reproduced in the 2006 Act, and will be considered 
                                                            
 
 
904 Para. 275. 
905 It also, in para. 278, sought feedback on whether or not “the issue of collusion” ought to be added to 
the list. 
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in that context below.  However, once again it would seem that the Commission had 
identified the most promising way forward in resolving ‘probity versus prejudice’ issues.  
That is, to clearly identify the issue to which the propensity evidence is said to be 
relevant, and to subject that evidence to a realistic scrutiny in the light of factors 
designed to expose fatuous and implausible justifications for its admission. 
 
 Seen in this perspective, it is not a matter of ‘balancing probity against 
prejudice’.  One first identifies and acknowledges the prejudice, and then asks whether, 
despite that, the probative value of the challenged evidence is such that to exclude it 
would be a miscarriage of justice and/or an affront to common sense.  The factors used 
to assess that probative value are then designed to identify the precise relevance of the 
evidence to a matter in issue at trial. 
 
Law Commission Report 55 and the Evidence Act 2006 (N.Z.) 
 
 In the Preface to its 1999 Report,906 the Commission claimed to have “been 
confirmed” in its view that “codification was the only way to achieve truly 
comprehensive reform” of evidence law.  It therefore set about that task, and the 
provisions of the Draft Code which dealt with propensity evidence, and which largely 
found their way unscathed into the Evidence Act 2006, can have come as no surprise to 
those who had read the 1997 Discussion Paper. 
 
                                                            
 
 
906 Note 870, page xviii.  The Commission also referred to “ . . . a wide response from community 
groups, academics, members of the profession and the judiciary”  to its earlier proposals, which had “ . . . 
greatly influenced the final content of the Evidence Code”.  Those responses were presumably 
favourable, since little changed between PP 27 and the eventual legislation. 
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 What follows is a summary of those provisions of the Act which impact in some 
way on the admission of propensity evidence, together with reference to the proposals 
and Commentary of the Commission which led to them. 
 
 
7 Fundamental principle that relevant evidence admissible 907 
(1) All relevant evidence is admissible in a proceeding 908 except evidence that is –  
 (a) inadmissible under this Act or any other Act; or 
 (b) excluded under this Act or any other Act. 
(2) Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible in a proceeding. 
(3) Evidence is relevant in a proceeding if it has a tendency to prove or disprove 
anything that is of consequence to the determination of the proceeding 
 
 The Commentary, at p 31, observed that “Whether an item of evidence is 
relevant depends on the purpose for which it is offered”.  The “probity factors” to be 
considered in cases involving propensity evidence are itemised in s 43 of the Act; see 
below. 
 
8 General exclusion 
(1) In any proceeding, the Judge must exclude evidence if its probative value  is 
 outweighed by the risk that the evidence will –  
                                                            
 
 
907 On p. 31 of the Commission’s Commentary on the Draft Code (“the Commentary”), section 7 is said 
to have the “important consequence” that once evidence is admissible, it is “ . . . admissible for all the 
purposes for which it is relevant, unless a specific Code provision excludes its use for a particular 
purpose”.  
908 “Proceeding” is defined broadly enough in s 4 of the Act to encompass both civil and criminal cases. 
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 (a) have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding; or 
 (b) needlessly prolong the proceeding. 
(2) In determining whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the 
risk that the evidence will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on a criminal  
proceeding, the Judge must take into account the right of the defendant to offer 
an effective defence. 
 
 The Commentary, 909 asserts that “Probative value will depend on such matters 
as how strongly the evidence points to the inference it is said to support, and how 
important the evidence is to the ultimate issues in the trial”.   
 
 Another difficulty which had arisen under the common law in practice was 
eliminated by clarifying that it is only “unfair” prejudice which will lead to the 
exclusion of a relevant item of evidence. 910   The Commentary, 911  identified 
“unfairness” as an “undue tendency to influence a decision on an improper or illogical 
basis. Commonly an emotional one . . . .”, or the admission of evidence “likely to 
mislead the jury . . . . ”. 
 
 The detailed rules controlling the admission of propensity evidence are found in 
sections 40 to 43 of the Act, which reproduce sections 42-45 of the Draft Code without 
any substantial amendment.  Whereas, under the Draft Code, “propensity” had been 
defined in the “Definitions and Interpretations” section (s 4), in the Act it is found in s 
40, which reads: 
 
                                                            
 
 
909 At p 33.  
910 In the words of the Commentary (at p. 33), “ . . . any evidence from the prosecution is going to be 
prejudicial to the defendant”. 
911 Ibid. 
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40 Propensity rule 912 
(1) In this section and sections 41 to 43, propensity evidence –  
 (a) means evidence that tends to show a person’s propensity to act in a particular 
way or to have a particular state of mind, being evidence of acts, omissions,  
events, or circumstances with which a person is alleged to have been involved;  
but 
 (b) does not include evidence of an act or omission that is –  
  (i) 1 of the elements of the offence for which the person is being tried; or 
  (ii) . . . . . . .  
(2) A party may offer propensity evidence in a civil or criminal proceeding about  
any person. 
(3) However, propensity evidence about –  
 (a) a defendant in a criminal proceeding may be offered only in accordance  
with section 41 or 42 or 43, whichever section is applicable;  
 (b) . . . . . .  
(4) . . . . . . .  
 
 This definition of “propensity” seeks to exclude evidence which is directly 
relevant to a criminal charge in that, to adopt the language of the English legislation, it 
“has to do with the facts of the case”.  By this means, the Act accommodates 
‘continuing offences’ of the type which R v Katavich involved.913  But the reference to 
“elements” leaves unclear whether or not ‘propensity’ aspects of the overall incident on 
trial will be allowed in.  If, for example, an accused, in seeking to overcome the 
                                                            
 
 
912 The section is reproduced only insofar as it concerns the use of propensity evidence by the Crown 
against an accused person. 
913 Note 866. 
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resistance of an intended rape victim, informs her that he found it necessary to kill his 
last rape victim, is this “propensity” evidence, or is it evidence regarding the “element” 
of the subsequent rape charge that the victim’s consent was obtained by ‘force or fear’? 
914 
 
 Despite the attempted broad definition of “propensity” in s 40, certain types of 
prejudicial evidence which were traditionally given ‘labels’ at common law seem not to 
have been included within the definition, and have thereby escaped the need for the 
balancing act required under s 43 between probative value and prejudicial effect.  They 
have, however, been made subject to the “unfairness” test imposed by s 8. 
 
 These categories encompass what at common law was traditionally referred to as 
“relationship” or “background” evidence.915  Immediately prior to the passing of the Act, 
in cases such as MacDonald,916 and Patel, 917 evidence which shed light on the previous 
“relationship” between an accused and their victim was regarded as being separate from 
‘similar fact evidence’, and admissible in order to supply the jury with “the complete 
story”, or to prevent the complainant’s account of events being “incomplete” .918  This 
did not change following the enactment of s 40, although the prejudicial nature of such 
evidence came to be openly acknowledged. 
 
                                                            
 
 
914 A similar issue was confronted by the Court of Appeal in R v McCreath  [2002] NZCA 31, when M 
overcame the resistance of his intended rape victim by telling her that he had “raped lots of chicks 
before”. That evidence was ruled to be admissible on the issue of the accused’s state of mind regarding 
the victim’s consent.  
915 These terms are regarded by the author as inter-changeable insofar as they relate to previous activities 
between accused and victim. 
916 (8 April 2005) CA 166/04. 
917 (12 April 2006) CA 426/05. 
918 See, in particular, the observations of the Court of Appeal in Macdonald, at [14]. 
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 Thus, within months of s 40 becoming law, the Court of Appeal in R v Tanuvasa 
and Anor, 919  ruled that evidence of child neglect by two parents was “relevant as 
background evidence” to specific charges of assaulting the same child, because:920 
 
It would have been artificial to consider the allegations [of specific acts of violence] in 
isolation  from the circumstances which led to the intervention of social workers, the 
supervision regime imposed on the appellants, the events leading to the discovery of the 
rib injury and the delays in obtaining medical treatment, as well as the other instances 
of neglectful treatment. 
 
 The same approach was taken by the Court in R v Toia,921 in the context of 
previous acts of domestic violence being used as background evidence of “the nature of 
the relationship up to [the date of the assault alleged on the indictment]”.  The Court did, 
however, acknowledge the prejudicial effect which such evidence might have, by citing 
with approval the following observations of the Court in MacDonald:922 
 
New Zealand judges do not usually use the similar fact label to refer to background or 
relationship evidence.  But obviously there is not a bright line distinction between such 
evidence and orthodox similar fact evidence. . . . Whether relationship evidence should 
be referred to as similar fact evidence may, in the end, be a matter of semantics.  We 
say this because, whatever the label, there can be no  doubt that such evidence is 
subject to exclusion if its illegitimate prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value. 
 
 In the instant case, defence counsel was forced to argue, unsuccessfully, that the 
challenged evidence should have been excluded, not under s 43, but under the broader 
provisions of s 8, which requires that the prejudicial effect “outweigh” its probative 
                                                            
 
 
919 [2006] NZCA 370. N.B. the factual similarity of this case to that of Mohamed v R, at Note 926. 
920 At [55]. 
921 [2008] NZCA 343, at [7]. 
922 Note 916, at [16], per William Young J. 
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value, and not simply equal it.  Whatever the rights and wrongs of the decision on its 
facts, such ‘background” evidence was clearly not about to be passed through the filter 
process of s 43. 
 
 The same fate befell the appealed evidence in R v Gooch,923 in which G, charged 
with indecently assaulting and raping the family babysitter, was confronted by evidence 
from others which depicted him, by his actions and words, as an alcohol-fuelled, racist, 
sexually obsessed and frustrated individual who, after unsuccessful attempts to seduce 
the wives of his friends, took the opportunity afforded by the presence of the 15 year old 
victim in his house when he came home under the influence of alcohol.  His defence 
had been one of reasonable belief in consent, and he had fared badly in the credibility 
contest. 
 
 The Court of Appeal held that the relevance of the evidence was not as 
propensity evidence, but,924 as demonstrating “a particularly heightened level of sexual 
frustration proximate to the offending”.  In other words, as ‘context’ evidence which 
assisted the jury in choosing between the two versions of events.  The Court added 
that:925  
 
An essential issue is whether the appellant had a reasonably based belief in consent.  
Evidence which may assist the jury to determine his state of mind at that time is 
relevant, and falls to be assessed under the s 8 Evidence Act 2006 balancing test. 
 
                                                            
 
 
923 [2009] NZCA 163.  McDonald  was also influential in a similar decision in Vernon v R [2010] NZCA 
383.  See also R v Tainui [2008] NZCA 119, R v R [2008] NZCA 342, and R v Broadhurst [2008] NZCA 
454. 
924 At [6]. 
925 At [8]. 
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 There is clearly a risk of New Zealand law once more descending into a process 
of ‘hair-splitting’ which would categorise some prior bad behaviour evidence as 
“propensity”, while leaving other, equally prejudicial, evidence, free of constraint. 
 
 With great respect, regardless of the ‘purpose’ for which it is adduced, the effect 
of ‘background’, ‘relationship’ and ‘context’ evidence, whatever label is attached to it, 
is to show the accused in a bad light, and thereby indirectly to ‘bolster’ the likelihood 
that the complainant will be believed.  Section 40 was clearly drafted so as to have 
regard to what the evidence tends to show, not the narrowly-defined technical purpose 
for which it is offered.  To depart from the broad spirit of s 40 is to invite a return to 
categorisation. 
 
 That point seems to have been appreciated in the latest case, at the time of 
writing, to consider the issue.  This was Mohamed v R,926 in which the Court held that 
the definition of “propensity evidence” contained within s 40 did include evidence of 
previous acts by the accused against the victim; as a result, such evidence has to be 
assessed against the provisions of s 43 before it may be admitted.  
 
 Writing in 2008,927 the Commission expressed the opinion, of the rule enacted 
under s 40(2) that “The starting point no longer is exclusion, unless admission is 
justified.  It is admissibility, unless exclusion is justified”.  For good measure, it 
added,928 that “Admissibility has become the rule instead of the exception”.   
                                                            
 
 
926 [2011] NZSC 52, delivered on 19 May, 2011.  A husband and wife were charged with the murder of 
their child, two counts of grievous bodily harm against the same child, and failing to supply the 
necessary medical assistance on the day the child died.  The challenged evidence, which was deemed 
admissible under s 43 to show the “state of mind” of the accused regarding the welfare of their child, 
involved the fact that the same child had been left for three hours in a closed van in a shopping centre 
car-park. 
927 Note 883, para.3.53.  This, it added, “. . . . reverses the traditional policy of the common law . . . A 
polar reorientation is required”. 
928 At 3.75. 
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 This implies that the factors identified in s 43, when applied to the facts of 
individual cases, will be likely to result in the admission of a greater number of items of 
propensity evidence then was the case under the old, more generalised, common law 
rule.  The Commission acknowledged that fact, 929  subject to the proviso that this 
increased level of admission would not include evidence “ . . . of the most seriously 
prejudicial type.  The boundary will develop over time.  No greater precision is possible 
at this juncture”. 
 
 It reinforced this opinion,930 by adding that: 
 
The 2006 Act reverses traditional underlying policies.  Evidence of previous 
convictions is admissible, subject to exclusion by other provisions . . . The operational 
question is not, as previously, what is allowed in?  It has become, what is to be 
excluded? 
 
 The principal section of the Act which relates to the admission of propensity 
evidence by the Crown against an accused is s 43, which differs in one significant 
respect from the original proposal by the Commission, as is explained below.  Section 
43 reads as follows: 
 
43 Propensity evidence offered by prosecution about defendants 
(1) The prosecution may offer propensity evidence about a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding only if the evidence has a probative value in relation to an issue in  
dispute in the proceeding which outweighs the risk that the evidence may have  
                                                            
 
 
929 At 3.78. 
930 At 9.24 and 9.25. 
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an unfairly prejudicial effect on the defendant. 
(2) When assessing the probative value of propensity evidence, the Judge must take  
into account the nature of the issue in dispute. 
(3) When assessing the probative value of propensity evidence, the judge may  
consider, among other matters, the following: 
 (a) the frequency with which the acts, omissions, events or circumstances 931 
  which are the subject of the evidence have occurred: 
           (b)   the connection in time between the acts, omissions, events or  
circumstances  which are the subject of the evidence and the acts,  
omissions, events or circumstances which constitute the offence for  
which the defendant is being tried:    
 
           (c)    the extent of the similarity between the acts, omissions, events or 
 circumstances  which are the subject of the evidence and the acts,  
omissions, events or circumstances which constitute the offence for  
which the defendant is being tried:     
(d)      the number of persons making allegations against the defendant that are  
the same as, or similar to, the subject of the offence for which the 
defendant is being tried: 
 
 (e) whether the allegations described in paragraph (d) may be the result of 
  collusion or suggestibility: 
 (f)      the extent to which the acts, omissions, events or circumstances which are 
the subject of the evidence and the acts, omissions, events or  
circumstances which constitute the offence for which the defendant is 
                                                            
 
 
931 The original Draft Code section submitted by the Commission, s 45(3), did not contain the words 
“events or circumstances”, although its definition of “propensity evidence” did.  Section 43(3) of the Act 
is clearly drafted so as to conform with the expanded definition of “propensity evidence” contained in s 
40(1)(a) of the Act, and is therefore more consistent in its drafting than the Commission’s proposal. 
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                        being tried are unusual:    
(4) When assessing the prejudicial effect of evidence on the defendant, the judge        
must consider, among other matters, 
(a)  whether the evidence is likely to unfairly predispose the fact-finder against 
the defendant; and 
 
(b) whether the fact-finder will tend to give disproportionate weight in reaching  
a verdict to evidence of other acts or omissions. 
 
 The one significant omission from the Commission’s Draft Code referred to 
above was the requirement,932 that before propensity evidence might be admitted against 
a defendant, there should be “sufficient” evidence to allow the “fact-finder” to 
“reasonably” find that the defendant was the person involved.  This would have met 
difficulties of the type encountered in Perry, 933  without requiring beyond proof 
reasonable doubt in cases in which ‘coincidence’ reasoning was being relied upon.  Its 
exclusion from s 43 appears to leave unresolved the issues raised in cases such as 
Holtz,934 Sanders,935 and Peyroux,936 regarding whether the jury must be ‘satisfied” that 
the previous behaviour cited was that of the accused before they may add it to the 
factual ‘mix’ leading to conviction. 
 
 Otherwise, s 43 would appear to have been the most comprehensive attempt thus 
far to encapsulate the spirit of Makin and Boardman into a statutory provision, while at 
the same time having regard to some of the problems which had been encountered in 
attempting to implement the broad generalised common law rule which had resulted 
                                                            
 
 
932 This was contained in s 45(1)(a) of the Draft Code. 
933 Note 53. 
934 Note 880. 
935 Note 882. 
936 Note 882. 
286 
 
from those two landmark decisions.937  Significantly, the New Zealand legislators had 
also acknowledged that concepts such as ‘probity’ and ‘prejudice’ cannot be applied in 
any generalised way, but require to be evaluated with respect to the facts of the case, 
and the ‘issue’ in that case to which they relate. 
 
 Section 43(2) makes it mandatory for the judge to have regard to “the nature of 
the issue in dispute” when assessing the probative value of the contested evidence.  The 
remaining factors in what might be termed ‘the probative evaluation’ – those contained 
in s 43(3) - are not mandatory.  An opportunity was thereby missed of making the entire 
probity investigation a requirement of law which could be easily appealed; as drafted, s 
43(3) is only discretionary, and the exercise of judicial discretion is much harder to 
challenge on appeal.938  However, it would be much easier to argue, for example, that a 
trial judge had erred in law by admitting evidence of a single incident twenty years in 
the past, by reference to s 43(3)(a) and (b). 
 
 Section 43(4) also introduced an element of reality into the process, by requiring 
the trial judge, when assessing the potential ‘prejudice’ of an item of evidence, to take 
into account both ‘moral prejudice’, per subsection (a), and the more direct ‘reasoning 
prejudice’ which is reflected in subsection (b).   
 
 The earliest judicial reaction to s 43 seems to have been a difference of opinion 
as to whether it was meant to be merely declaratory of the common law,939 or involved a 
                                                            
 
 
937 The Commentary, at p 121, said, of the matters listed in what became s 43(3) of the Act, that they ‘ . . 
. follow the case law on admissibility of similar fact evidence’.   
938 For recent examples of judicial consideration of the factors specified under s 43(3) when considering 
the admissibility of similar fact evidence, see Norman v R [2011] NZCA 254 (admission, during N’s trial 
for sexual and physical abuse of his de facto, of evidence of similar behaviour against the same 
complainant); R v Boynton [2012] NZHC 2434 (relevance of previous acts of domestic violence when 
assessing new allegations); and Pickering v R [2012] 3 NZLR 498 (relevance of evidence of prior 
injuries on the body of a child whom P was accused of murdering).  Reference was made, in all three 
cases, to the decision in Mohamed (note 926).  
939 This would have left available, for citation in future appeals, all the prior case-law.  
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‘fresh start’ with a ‘clean slate’.  Among those in favour of a fresh start was Wild J in 
the High Court judgment in R v Goodman,940 who expressed the hope that: 
 
. . . . s 43 will be applied as simply and logically as it is framed, and will not become 
encrusted with case law . . . . I express the fervent hope that there will not be any 
attempt to interpret s 43 in the light of the current case law on propensity evidence . . . I 
say that because the current case law is confusing. 
 
 His Honour’s hopes were ultimately fulfilled.  Despite some high-level 
suggestions to the contrary,941 the majority of the Permanent Court of the Court of 
Appeal in R v Healy,942 firmly ruled that: 
 
The provisions relating to propensity evidence offer the opportunity of a clean slate in 
this area that should be grasped. 
 
 Still ongoing is a major issue which besets all jurisdictions which seek to adduce 
a person’s past life in evidence, namely establishing the very facts which are said to 
provide the probative link between the old and the new.  This was alluded to in a paper 
issued recently by the Commission,943 with the preferred option being to allow the trial 
                                                            
 
 
940 (12 June 2007) HC WANG CRI 2006-034-440. 
941 See, for example, Stevens J in R v R (19 July 2007) HC AK CRI-2006-092-11084, at [92]; Asher J in 
R v Healy (note 942, at [23]) and R v G (6 August 2007) HC AK CRI-2006-004-11979; Heath J in R v T 
(20 August 2007) HC NAP CRI-2006-020-2796.  The Commission, differently constituted in November 
2007 (in Issues Paper 4 – “Disclosure to Court of Defendants’ Previous Convictions, Similar Offending 
and Bad Character”) to what it had been in 1999, also observed (in para.3.60) that “There can be no doubt 
that the Commission proposed nothing less than a restatement and codification of the common law . . . . 
with the three additional protections”. 
942[2007] NZCA 451, at [54].  The Court, in [69], also rejected the suggestion that Phillips (note 653) 
should be followed in New Zealand, preferring the position that evidence of other alleged non-consensual 
sexual activity should be admissible at any trial of the same accused for alleged non-consensual sexual 
activity. 
943 See note 941. 
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judge to compile a statement of “ . . . . the relevant circumstances of prior offending on 
the basis of material on record . . . ” .944 
 
 
A premature review 
 
 New Zealand Law Commission Report No 103,945 arose from a Reference to the 
Commission by the New Zealand Government in 2006 to “ . . . review the law 
concerning the extent to which a jury in a criminal trial is made aware of prior 
convictions of an accused person and allegations of similar offending” .946   
 
 It seems to have been provoked by the public outcry which followed the 
acquittal, of sexual offences charges, of two former police officers whose prior 
offending had not been disclosed to the jury.947  The fact that the Commission almost 
immediately despatched a retired New Zealand High Court Judge (Andrew McGechan 
QC) to England in order to conduct his own enquiries into its experience of the 2003 
Act in operation suggests that, as in that country, ‘law and order’ and ‘get tough on 
criminals’ policies might have been on the agenda.  In the event, Mr. McGechan 
advised against the adoption of similar legislation in New Zealand, on the ground that it 
would not “fit New Zealand conditions” .948 
 
  
                                                            
 
 
944 At 9.32. 
945 “Disclosure to Courts of Defendants’ Previous Convictions, Similar Offending and Bad Character”, 
(May 2008). 
946 In “Forward”, p. iv. 
947 These cases had, however, been dealt with under the common law which prevailed prior to 2006; see 
Law Commission Ministerial Briefing 1 April 2010, para.5. 
948 Ibid. 
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 In May 2008, the Commission reported that:949  
 
Given that there has been some movement in recent years towards a more liberal 
admissibility of propensity evidence . . . . it seems likely that the approach taken under 
the Evidence Act will be in favour of the maintenance of this more liberal approach, 
and even its expansion in some classes of case.  In the light of this, we are not 
persuaded that there is any apparent difficulty with the statutory test that requires a 
weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect. . . . Any statutory test that did not 
involve the exercise of judgment and discretion would result in undue rigidity and 
hence injustice. 
 
 Given that, as at the date of the release of this Report (May 2008), the 2006 Act 
had been in operation for barely a year, it was hardly surprising that the Commission 
proposed,950 that it continue to monitor the “operation and impact of [its] provisions”, 
and report back by the end of February 2010.951  At the time of writing, it has not done 
so. 
 
 However, on 1 April, 2010, it published a Ministerial Briefing,952 in which it 
proclaimed,953 that “The picture, is, we think, very largely a positive one”.  This was 
despite the fact,954  that the Court of Appeal had, subsequent to the coming into force of 
the 2006 Act, shown a tendency to deal with what was essentially propensity evidence, 
not under s 43, but employing the “looser tests in sections 7 and 8 of the Act as the 
route to admissibility.  This is not at all desirable . . . . However, it is not producing 
                                                            
 
 
949 At 10.4. 
950 At 10.6. 
951 This was subsequently extended to March 2010; see note 947, Para. 7. 
952 Note 947. 
953 Ibid, para. 9. 
954 Reported at para. 11. 
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injustice”.955  It also reported, 956 that “ . . . when the provisions were applied, they seem 
to be working smoothly and properly”. 
 
 In the same spirit of self-satisfaction, it added:957 
 
. . . . although the operation of this legislation has not been perfect, we think it remains 
possible that any wrinkles will be ironed out over time.  Our recommendation . . . . 
would be to keep the matter under review and deal with any issues arising in 2012, 
when the remainder of the Act will be reviewed . . . .  
 
 As at the date of writing (March 2013) that review had not been published.  
 
Ongoing issue regarding trial judge directions to the jury 
 
 One substantial issue appears to have escaped clarification in the New Zealand 
reform process, namely the precise nature of the direction(s) which the trial judge 
should give to the jury in a case in which “propensity” evidence has been admitted for 
the Crown. 
 
 There had always been an awareness of the danger of a jury concluding that 
because an accused has behaved in some discreditable way in the past, therefore they 
                                                            
 
 
955 It added, at para. 48, that in the process “The Court has described what is clearly propensity evidence 
as merely “part of the narrative”, or “directly relevant””.  See the cases cited at notes 919 and 921, and 
Optican and Sankoff, “Recognising propensity evidence”, [2009] NZLJ 284. 
956 Ibid, at para. 44. 
957 At paras.15 &16. 
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are more likely to be guilty of the behaviour they are now accused of.  This was re-
affirmed, after the passing of the 2006 Act, in R v Taea.958   
 
 However, it was also acknowledged, even after the passing of the Act, that:959  
 
New Zealand appellate courts have . . . been less prescriptive than their Australian and 
Canadian counterparts as to how trial judges should sum up to juries and, in particular, 
far less enthusiastic about requiring particular forms of direction to be given in respect 
of commonly recurring issues. 
 
 In its Report 103,960 the Law Commission had, however, foreshadowed that 
there might have to be a new approach to judicial directions to juries following the 
coming into force of the Act.  This was because,961 propensity evidence is essentially 
circumstantial in nature, and one of the “strands in the rope” of the overall Crown case.  
In future, it added,962 judicial directions to the jury would be required in order to “ . . . . 
identify the issue or issues to which that propensity evidence is said to relate, and how it 
is said to be relevant.” 
 
 This is clearly a step in the right direction of ensuring that similar fact evidence 
is only left for the consideration of a jury when the evidence really is “similar”, and that 
no other, less relevant, use is made of it.  It has been acted upon by the courts. 
 
                                                            
 
 
958 [2007] NZCA 472 at [47]. 
959 In Mohamed v R (Note 926), at [80], per McGrath and William Young JJ.  See also the Supreme 
Court in Wi v R [2010] NZLR 11, at [40] and [41]. 
960 Note 883. 
961 At 3.90. 
962 At 3.93. 
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 In the pre-Act case of R v Sanders,963 as has already been noted, the Court of 
Appeal,964 had adopted the holistic approach that mere similarity between the accounts 
given by each of the complainants would be sufficient to prove the case as a whole 
beyond reasonable doubt. In Stewart v R,965 the Court,966 took up the challenge thrown 
down by the Commission and prescribed a seven-stage process which a trial judge 
should employ when directing a jury on the use which they might make of propensity 
evidence admitted under the Act,967 which was reduced to a three- stage process by 
McGrath and William Young JJ in the Supreme Court in Mohamed v R.968  This process 
involves the trial judge giving the jury a propensity direction constructed as follows: 
 
(a) Identify the evidence, and explain why it has been led, and the legitimate 
ways in which it may be considered by the jury;969  
 (b) Put the competing contentions of the parties; 
 (c) Caution the jury against reasoning processes which carry the risk of unfair 
 prejudice. 
 
 At the same time, their Honours observed,970 that “ . . . . the requirement for 
such directions is not based on anything which appears in the Evidence Act 2006.  
Rather it is one which appellate courts . . . .have imposed on trial judges”. 
                                                            
 
 
963 Note 882. 
964 At [20]. 
965 [2010] 1 NZLR 197, at [34]. 
966 At [30]. 
967 It was subsequently claimed by the Commission (note 941, at para. 82) that the Court in Stewart had 
adopted the Commission’s “more detailed approach to the directions that should be given” in Report 103 
(note 883). 
968 Note 926, at [95].  Their Honours observed (at [94]) that the attempt in Stewart “to provide something 
of a universal template was overly ambitious”.  This was because (at [84]), “ . . . given our broad and 
literal approach to the definition of propensity evidence, much more evidence is encompassed by it than 
was perhaps thought to be the case when Stewart was decided”.  In particular, they added, some forms of 
propensity evidence which might now be admitted under s 40 might not involve “orthodox similar fact 
reasoning”.  The remaining judges (at footnote [1]), merely commented that “We prefer to leave 
consideration of [the directions suggested in Stewart] to a future case in which it is required”. 
969 During this process, they added, “We see no need for the judge to define “propensity”.” 
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 Finally, they adopted the warning sounded by Lord Phillips in the English Court 
of Appeal in R v Campbell,971 that: 
  
Failure to give a direction that is no more than assistance in applying common sense to 
the evidence should not automatically be treated as a ground of appeal . . . .  
 
 In 2008,972 the Commission had observed that “The directions which should be 
given in relation to section 43 are still in an early stage of formulation”.  That process 
would seem, however, to have begun. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 Rather than attempt to depart from the essential validity of the balancing act 
required between ‘probity’ and ‘prejudice’ in all cases in which it is sought to adduce 
unsavoury evidence from an accused’s past in circumstantial proof of their guilt on a 
new occasion, New Zealand policy makers have sought to face and overcome the 
challenges which it  poses.  They have sought to drill down through the broad concepts 
of “probative value” and “prejudicial effect” and specify the factors which might 
underpin each.  They have also cast aside the use of labels, and acknowledged the 
prejudicial effect of all ‘bad character’ evidence.  
 
 New Zealand has begun to implement a statutory regime which identifies in 
advance those factors which are to be taken into account in the balancing process 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
970 At [82]. 
971 [2007] EWCA Crim 1472, [2007] 1 WLR 2798. 
972 Note 883, at 3.93. 
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between probity and prejudice, and requires that the trial judge give the jury clear 
directions on the use to which they may put any similar fact evidence which may be 
admitted.  This is arguably the most effective way of skirting the quicksands which lurk 
beneath the seemingly solid green grass of the ‘categories’ approach, while also 
avoiding the vagueness of the Boardman formula. 
 
 This much had already been grasped by the Canadian Supreme Court, which has 
taken the process to a more detailed stage at a common law level. Its solution to the 
similar fact dilemma is considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 9: 
The Canadian Solution 
Chapter synopsis 
 Canada has avoided the need for complex legislation such as that found in 
England, and under Australian federal law.  Nor has it chosen extreme positions like 
that adopted by the Australian High Court in Pfennig.  By facing up to their duty to give 
the courts beneath them practical guidance on how to apply the ‘probity versus 
prejudice’ formula, the Supreme Court of Canada has put the law regarding the 
admissibility of ‘similar fact evidence properly so called’ on a rational and workable 
footing. 
 
 Its proud flagship is the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Handy in 2002.  Handy was, however, the culmination of a series of earlier judgments 
by the same Court.  
 
The prelude to Handy 
 
 Canadian courts were no different from their common law counterparts in 
recognising the authority, first of Makin, then of Boardman.973  Following Boardman, 
there was an increasing tendency to formulate the admissibility test in terms of 
                                                            
 
 
973  Note 235. The demise of the ‘categories’ method of analysis in favour of the ‘probity versus 
prejudice’ test was formally acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Sweitzer (1982) 137 
D.L.R. (3d) 702; [1982] 1 S.C.R. 949, in which the unanimous Court observed (at 706) that while the 
‘categories’ approach had been “useful”, it also had “ . . . . a tendency to overlook the true basis 
upon which evidence of similar facts is admissible”, namely that “. . . . its admissibility will depend upon 
the probative effect of the evidence balanced against the prejudice caused to the accused by its admission 
whatever the purpose of its admission.” See also Guay v R (1978), 42 C.C.C. (2d) 536; [1979] 1 S.C.R. 
18, R v Robertson (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 481; [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918 and R v Morin (1988), 444 C.C.C. 
(3d) 193; [1988] 2 S.C.R. 345.   
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relevance. Thus, in Cloutier v R, 974  it was said that the reason for rejecting, as 
inadmissible, evidence of mere propensity was that such evidence has “no real probative 
value”, while in Morris v R,975 it was said that such evidence might only be admissible 
if it possessed “exceptional probative value”. 
 
 As the case-law developed, this “exceptional probative value” was recognised as 
proceeding from the “specific” disposition of an accused, rather than their disposition in 
general.  The more factually aligned the accused’s behaviour in the past was to the 
behaviour alleged in the new indictment, the more probative it was seen to be.  
  
 Thus, in R v D.(L.E),976 a majority Court held,977 that similar fact evidence was 
inadmissible if it possessed no probative value other than revealing “the disposition to  
commit certain types of wrongful acts”.  Then in the following year, in R v C.(M.H.),978 
a unanimous Court ruled,979 that “ Evidence as to disposition, which shows only that the 
accused is the type of person likely to have committed the offence in question, is 
generally inadmissible.”  However, the future direction of Canadian law was indicated 
by the additional assertion that:980  
 
                                                            
 
 
974 (1979), 48 C.C.C. (2d) 1, at 29, per Pratte J at 29.    
975  (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 97. 
976 (1989) 50 C.C.C. (3d) 142.  In this case, D was charged with a relatively innocuous sexual assault on 
his daughter, and the trial judge admitted “uncharged act” evidence from the same complainant regarding 
more serious sexual offences against her in the past, to rebut defence allegations that the victim might 
have a motive for lying.  Such evidence was held to be insufficiently relevant to overcome its prejudicial 
effect. In R v B.(C.R.) (1990) 55 C.C.C. (3d) 1, however, a majority led by McLachlin J. held that 
Canadian law still regarded disposition in itself as sufficient to provide the necessary probity in 
appropriate cases.  
977 At 156-8.  This opinion seems to have based on the belief that the authority of Ball and Ball (note 173) 
had been overtaken by Boardman, and that mere propensity in itself was insufficiently probative to 
override the prejudice which inevitably came with it.  
978 (1991) 63 C.C.C. (3d) 385; [1991] 1 S.C.R. 763; see also R v Litchfield (1993) 86 C.C.C. (3d) 97; 
[1993] 4 S.C.R. 333. 
979 At 392. 
980 Ibid. 
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There will be occasions . . . where the similar fact evidence will go to more than 
disposition, and will be considered to have real probative value. 981 That probative 
value arises from the fact that the acts compared are so unusual and strikingly similar 
that their similarities cannot be attributed to coincidence. 
 
 The key element of this judgment proved to be the reference to an absence of 
coincidence, which was to be picked up and amplified in Handy.  But prior to that final 
breakthrough there was continued confusion, nowhere better illustrated than in the 
unanimous Court ruling in R v B.(F.F.).982  B had been convicted of various serious 
assaults (some of them sexual) on his young niece during a ten year period some forty 
years previously, when she had been one of a group of siblings to whom B had regularly 
acted as a babysitter.  Evidence had been admitted from the victim’s brothers regarding 
the regime of physical abuse and intimidation maintained by B against the entire family 
during the relevant period, following assertions by defence counsel that the niece’s 
allegations had been so fantastic that they had to be inventions. 
 
 The unanimous Court held that the evidence, although strongly indicative of B’s 
abusive disposition, was admissible to explain why the victim had waited so long in 
order to complain, to rebut B’s allegations that physical injuries to the victim had been 
caused by her mother, and to rebut B’s defence of “innocent association” as merely a 
babysitter.  The difficulty with that ruling is that “innocent association” is generally 
regarded, in its modern context, as being nothing more than a denial that the offences 
occurred; in being allowed to prove ‘guilty’ association, the Crown is in reality being 
allowed to trawl the accused’s propensity before the jury.  In the context of this case, 
Crown Counsel was being authorised to say to the jury, in so many words, “This man 
says that he was only the babysitter.  His victim says that he used his connection with 
the family to abuse her.  In resolving this credibility contest, the Crown asks you to take 
                                                            
 
 
981 This was held not to have been the case in the matter on appeal. 
982 (1993) 79 C.C.C. (3d) 112; [1993] 1 S.C.R.. 697. 
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on board what the other children in the family say about this man’s behaviour towards 
all the siblings”. 
 
 After this decision, it was almost impossible to deny that evidence of an 
accused’s actions in the past had relevance to what they were alleged to have done in 
the matter on trial solely because they revealed their tendency to behave in a certain 
way under certain conditions which were closely replicated in the incident before the 
court. 983 
 
 This closeness of circumstance, and the impossibility of putting it all down to 
coincidence, won the day in R v Arp,984 and in the judgments in that case may be found 
the analytical precursors to Handy. A had been convicted of the murders of two women, 
B in 1989 and U in 1993.  There was strong DNA evidence linking A with the second 
murder, but in order to connect A with the murder of B it had been necessary to employ 
similar fact evidence from the murder of U, in order to bolster the otherwise thin 
circumstantial Crown case against him. 
 
 This similar fact evidence had been held by the trial judge to justify the two 
counts being tried on the same indictment, and it consisted of the facts that (a) both 
victims were vulnerable young women alone in the same city in the early hours of the 
morning without transport or money; (b) each had been picked up in a grey pick-up 
truck which was similar to one owned by A; (c) a sexual motive could be attributed to 
each murder; (d) the body of each victim had been left in an isolated area outside the 
city; (e) the clothing of each victim had been discarded nearby, and (e) a sharp-edged 
knife appeared to have featured in each attack. 
                                                            
 
 
983 As Charron J.A. put it, in R v B.(L.) (1997) 116 C.C.C. (3d) 481; 9 C.R. (5th) 38 (Ont. C.A.), at [18], “ 
. . . its relevance usually depends on the proposition that persons tend to act consistently with their 
character”. 
984 (1998) 129 C.C.C. (3d) 321; [1998] 3 S.C.R. 339. 
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 The trial judge described these similarities as “significant and striking”, and in 
his charge to the jury he advised them that they could use the evidence of each killing to 
prove A’s guilt of the other, but only for the limited purpose of identification.  They 
were specifically told not to conclude that A was a person who, through his proven 
character or disposition, was likely to have committed the offences.  He also advised 
them that they were free to conclude, should they so choose, that the circumstances of 
the two killings were so strikingly similar that it was likely that they were committed by 
the same person.  He also directed them that if they were satisfied that A had committed 
the murder of U, and that the B murder was “likely committed by the same person”, 
then they could use this fact to support the additional circumstantial evidence against A 
on that count. 
 
 The unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered by Cory J, who 
began by observing that:985  
 
 . . . where the evidence shows a distinct pattern to the acts in question, the possibility 
 that the  accused would repeatedly be implicated in strikingly similar offences purely as 
 a matter of coincidence is greatly reduced. . . . the evidence necessarily derives its 
 probative value from the degree of similarity between the acts under consideration.  The 
 probative value must, of course, significantly outweigh the prejudice to the accused for 
 the evidence to be admissible. 
 
 It then concluded, so far as concerned the use of such evidence to prove identity, 
that:986  
 
                                                            
 
 
985 At [43] and [44]. 
986 At [48]. 
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. . . . the trial judge should evaluate the degree of similarity of the alleged acts and 
decide whether the objective improbability of coincidence has been established.  Only 
then will the evidence have sufficient probative value to be admitted.  . . Once it is 
determined on a balance of probabilities that the same person committed the alleged 
similar acts, the similar fact evidence may be admitted to prove that the accused 
committed the offence or offences in question.  
 
 At the same time, it held,987 that it was not necessary for the Crown to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that one person committed both offences.  This is because 
similar fact evidence is essentially circumstantial in nature, and is only one element in a 
mix of information available to a jury, which is required to decide guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt on the evidence as a whole.  The correct position was stated,988 to be 
that: 
 
. . . . the jury should determine, on a balance of the probabilities, whether the 
similarities between the acts establishes that the two counts were committed by the 
same person.  If that threshold is met, the jury can then consider all the evidence 
relating to the similar acts in determining whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
accused is guilty. 
 
 Applying those principles to the case in hand, A’s appeal was dismissed.   
 
 Arp was, in some ways, an unusual case, in that ‘coincidence reasoning’ was not 
employed in order to conclude that A must have murdered two women with whom he 
could be factually connected.  Instead, A could fairly convincingly be shown (via the 
DNA evidence) to be connected with one murder, and then the ‘factual similarity’ line 
of reasoning was employed to connect him to the second murder. 
                                                            
 
 
987 At [68]. 
988 At [70]. 
301 
 
 
 The ongoing influence of Arp lay in the Court’s endorsement of the approach 
taken by the trial judge in itemising those factors which made the facts of the second 
murder so similar to the one in respect of which there was strong evidence of A’s 
involvement. It now remained for all the elements of the prior case-law, including Arp, 
to be combined in one final, authoritative, statement which placed the prior 
misbehaviour of an accused into an appropriate conceptual framework based on 
relevance.  This was the legacy of Handy. 
 
The Handy judgment 
  
 In what is recognised 989 as the leading authority on propensity evidence in 
Canada, R v Handy,990 the unanimous Supreme Court of Canada synopsised the relevant 
law in two simple paragraphs:991 
 
Proof of general disposition is a prohibited purpose.  Bad character is not an offence 
known to the law.  Discreditable disposition or character evidence, at large, creates 
nothing but “moral prejudice”, and the Crown is not entitled to ease its burden by 
stigmatizing the accused as a bad person. 
Similar fact evidence is thus presumptively inadmissible.  The onus is on the 
prosecution to satisfy the trial judge on a balance of probabilities that in the context of 
the particular case the probative value of the evidence in relation to a particular issue 
outweighs its potential prejudice and thereby justifies its reception. 
 
                                                            
 
 
989 See, for example, Paciocco and Stuesser, Essentials of Canadian Law: The Law of Evidence (4th ed, 
Toronto, 2005), p. 48.  See also R v Candale 2003 CarswellOnt 8077 (Ont. S.C.J. June 16, 2003) and R v 
Ye (2011) ONSC 2278 at [77]. 
990 2002 SCC 56. 
991 [72] and [55] respectively. 
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 Taken in isolation, that second statement of law could have been drawn directly 
from Boardman. In the final analysis it was, but in Handy the Court dealt more 
effectively with the issues arising from the deceptive simplicity of the ‘probity versus 
prejudice’ formula than the ultimate appeal courts of other jurisdictions had proved 
themselves capable of doing.  It did so by explaining what it meant in practice. 
  
 The two statements cited above were derived from several of the Court’s earlier 
pronouncements,992 but most notably that of the majority Court in R v B.(C.R.).993  In 
that case, it had been acknowledged, first of all, that the Boardman test granted a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge, which would not lightly be overturned on appeal.  
Secondly, and crucially, it had also held that even “disposition” or  “propensity” 
evidence is (exceptionally) admissible when the degree of “distinctiveness or 
uniqueness” between the similar fact evidence and the new charges, and the “connection” 
between such evidence and issues raised at trial, justify its admission for reasons other 
than the mere fact of the accused’s propensity. 
 
 The enduring legacy of Handy is the set of guidelines which the Court 
established for future trial judges to follow when seeking to apply the test it had 
identified in its second statement of law.  It began with the timely reminder,994 that 
“Propensity evidence by any other name is still propensity evidence”, and that,995 even 
though it might be possible to identify the precise purpose for which it was being 
admitted: 
 
                                                            
 
 
992 These included Sweitzer v R, R v Robertson, and R v Morin (all note 973). 
993 Note 976, at 55.  This case had been described as the “governing authority” in the subsequent cases of 
R v C.(M.H.) (note 978) and, more recently, in Arp (note 984). It was regarded by the Court in Handy (at 
[54]) as “ . . . stating the law in Canada”. 
994 At [59]. 
995 At [61]. 
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. . . . it does not (and cannot) change the inherent nature of the propensity evidence, 
which must be recognised for what it is.  By affirming its true character . . . the Court 
keeps front and centre its dangerous potential. 
 
 This “true character” was then defined, not by reference to “the precise purpose 
for which” it is being admitted (which is of course the old ‘categories’ approach), but in 
terms of its relevance to the issue(s) before the court.  Thus: 
 
The policy basis for the exception is that . . . the force of similar circumstances defies 
coincidence or other innocent explanation . . . . Canadian law recognises that as the 
“similar  facts” become more . . . . situation specific . . . the probative value of 
propensity . . . becomes more cogent. . . . Ultimately the policy premise of the general 
exclusionary rule (prejudice exceeds probative value) ceases to be true.996 
 
 Step One in the analysis to be employed by the trial judge was said to be the 
identification of the issue in respect of which the similar fact evidence is said to be 
admissible.  The importance of this had been emphasised in the earlier cases,997 and to 
this the Court now formally added the requirement,998 that “ . . . the trial judge [should] 
instruct the jury that they may use the evidence in relation to that issue and not 
otherwise” (emphasis added). 
 
                                                            
 
 
996 At [47] and [48]. 
997 Notably in R v B.(C.R.), (note 976), at 732; Sweitzer, (note 973), at 953; D.(L.E.) (note 976), at 121; R 
v Litchfield (note 978), at 358; R v B(F.F.) (note 982), at 731; R v Lepage [1995] 1 S.C.R. 654, at [35]; 
and R v Arp , (note 984), at [48]. 
998 Handy, at [70], adding, at [71], that “ . . . the general disposition of the accused” does not qualify as 
such an issue, citing Lord Goddard in R v Sims (note 203), at 700, that “ . . . evidence is not to be 
excluded merely because it tends to show the accused to be of a bad disposition, but only if it shows 
nothing more”. 
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 The Court,999 imposed on the Crown the duty in every case to identify the “live 
issue in the trial to which the evidence of disposition is said to relate”. An associated 
factor in the decision which the trial judge has to make was said,1000 to be “ . . . the 
relative importance of the issue in the particular trial”.   
 
 Having identified the issue, the next stage of the analysis was said,1001 to be an 
assessment of the “principle driver of probative value”, namely the “. . . . connectedness 
(or nexus) that is established between the similar fact evidence and the offences alleged” 
(original emphasis).  This had been identified in Arp,1002 as the factor which established 
“the objective improbability of coincidence”, and in R v Carpenter 1003 it had been 
pointed out that: 
 
 The degree of similarity required will depend upon the issues in the particular case, the 
 purpose for which the evidence is sought to be introduced and the other evidence. 
 
 By way of illustration, a comparison was drawn,1004 between a case in which 
identity is in issue (when something amounting to a “signature” behaviour by the 
accused might be required), and one in which “animus” was the issue, in which case 
                                                            
 
 
999 At [74]. The corollary of this was said to be that if the identified issue is no longer “live”, then the 
evidence should be excluded as being irrelevant.  For example, in R v Proctor (1992), 69 C.C.C. (3d) 436 
(Man. C.A.), the evidence of two young women that P had attacked them in a similar manner, on his trial 
for the murder of a third woman, was held to be irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible, on the issue of 
identity, since P was not denying the act, but was pleading insanity.  See also R v Clermont [1986] 2 
S.C.R. 131; R v Hanna (1990) 57 C.C.C. (3d) 392; R v Bosley (1992) 18 C.R. (4th) 347 (Ont. C.A.), and 
R v B.(L.) (note 983). 
1000 Ibid  The Court was also at pains, at [75], to warn that these “issues” were not be classified as 
“categories of admissibility”, thereby avoiding any risk of the re-emergence of the ‘categories’ regime 
which had followed Makin. 
1001 At [76].  The case at hand was not one which required the use of similar fact evidence to prove 
identity; rather, the contested evidence was being used, in a sexual offence case, to establish the sexual 
proclivities of the accused.  At [78] it was asserted that when comparing an ‘identification’ use of similar 
fact evidence with its use in an ‘actus reus’ context, “ . . . .the issue is different, and the drivers of 
cogency in relation to the desired inferences will therefore not be the same” (original emphasis). 
1002 Note 984, at [48]. 
1003 (1982) 142 D.L.R. (3d) 237 (Ont.C.A.), at 244. 
1004 At [79] and [80]. 
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“ . . . a prior incident of the accused stabbing the victim may be admissible even though 
the victim was ultimately shot – the accused says accidentally”. 
 
 It was also said to be important to identify the “connecting factors” between the 
similar fact evidence and the facts alleged on the indictment, and,1005 “to pay close 
attention to similarities in character, proximity in time and frequency of occurrence”.  
The judgment went on,1006 to list, as some of “the factors connecting the similar facts to 
the circumstances set out in the charge”, (a) proximity in time; (b) similarity in detail; (c) 
number of occurrences of the similar acts; (d) circumstances relating to the similar acts; 
(e) any “distinctive feature(s)” unifying the incidents; (f) any intervening events; and (g) 
“any other factor which would tend to support or rebut the underlying unity of the 
similar acts”. 
 
 On the ‘prejudice’ side of the equation, the Court, 1007  identified the 
“inflammatory nature” of the similar acts, and whether it is possible for the Crown to 
prove the same issue by means of less prejudicial evidence.  It concluded,1008 with the 
observation that “This list is intended to be helpful rather than exhaustive.  Not all 
factors will exist (or be necessary) in every case”. 
 
 By reference to this factor analysis process, the Court,1009 was able to conclude 
that: 
 
                                                            
 
 
1005 At [81], citing Wigmore on Evidence, Chabourn rev.1979), vol.II, pp. 245-6 that “Since it is the 
improbability of a like result being repeated by mere chance that carries probative weight, the essence of 
this probative effect is the similarity of the instance . . . . ”.  The “similarity of the instance” had been 
regarded as a significant factor in Arp (note 984), Cloutier (note 972) and R v B.(C.R.) (note 976). 
1006 At [82]. Most of the factors cited had emerged in earlier case-law. 
1007 At [83]. 
1008 At [84]. 
1009 At [91]. 
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References to “calling cards” or “signatures” or “hallmarks” or “fingerprints” . . . 
describe  propensity at the admissible end of the spectrum.1010 . . . The issue at that 
stage is no longer “pure” propensity or “general disposition” but repeated conduct in a 
particular and highly specific type of situation. 
 
 Having cited Pfennig,1011 as an example of a case in which the similar fact 
evidence was very much “at the admissible end of the spectrum”, the Court declined to 
follow the final Pfennig test because,1012 it represented “ . . . . too great an intrusion by 
the trial judge in the fact finding mandate of the jury”. 
  
 The precise role of the trial judge was also considered in the context of 
allegations by the defence that so-called similar fact evidence is in fact the result of 
collusion.  This had been raised as an appeal point in the instant case, in which H had 
been charged with what amounted to non-consensual ‘rough sex’ (including anal 
intercourse) with A during a casual liaison in a motel room.  H’s defence was that A had 
consented to everything which had occurred, and the principal issue therefore became 
one of credibility.  The Crown had been allowed to adduce the similar fact testimony of 
H’s ex-wife (B), who recounted seven specific occasions during their relationship upon 
which H had behaved in such a way towards her.  From this, the jury would have 
formed an impression of H as a man with a propensity to inflict painful sexual 
experiences on his sex partner, and who, when sexually aroused, refused to take “no” 
for an answer. 
 
 This evidence had been allowed before the jury despite the fact that B admitted 
that prior to the alleged incident between H and A, she had advised A of her allegations 
                                                            
 
 
1010 It had described such minutely detailed similarity, in the preceding paragraph, as “ . . . the observed 
pattern of propensity operating in a closely defined and circumscribed context”. 
1011 Note 564. 
1012 At [93].  It added, at [97], that “ . . . the “conclusiveness” test takes the trial judge’s “gatekeeper” 
function too far into the domain of the trier of fact”. 
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against H, and the fact that she had obtained criminal injuries compensation in respect 
of these simply by making a formal complaint.  The trial judge had refused to exclude 
the evidence of B,1013 on the ground of collusion, and had instead left that as a factor to 
be taken into account by the jury. 
 
 On appeal, the Court took a different approach to the issue of collusion, 
regarding it not simply as a credibility factor for the ultimate decision of the jury, but as 
something which struck at the very heart of the admissibility of the evidence.  In its 
words:1014  
 
. . . . it was part of the trial judge’s “gatekeeper” function to consider this issue because 
collusion, if established to the satisfaction of the trial judge on a balance of 
probabilities,1015 would be destructive of the very basis on which the similar fact 
evidence was sought to be admitted, namely the improbability that two women would 
independently concoct stories with so many (as the Crown contends) similar features. 
 
 It added that the deferral of the issue of collusion to the jury had been an error of 
law by the trial judge which in itself was sufficient to require a new trial. However, and 
presumably because of the importance of the guidance which was being offered to 
subsequent courts, the Court continued with an analysis of the case in light of the 
factors which it had already outlined.1016 
                                                            
 
 
1013 Logically, the evidence which was thereby compromised was that of A, not B.  The principle which 
therefore emerges from this case is that the probative value of similar fact evidence which takes the form 
of allegedly non-coincidental allegations can be weakened by an attack on the ‘coincidence’ element of 
any one of them. 
1014 At [99]. The Court in the earlier cases of B.(C.R.) (note 976), at 733-4, and Arp (note 984), at [47] 
and [48], had already acknowledged that in their “gatekeeper” role, trial judges usurp some of the 
traditional ‘weight assessment’ functions of the jury.  
1015 In [112] it confirmed that the burden lay with the Crown to satisfy the trial judge on a balance of 
probabilities that there had been no such collusion in a case such as this, in which there was “an “air of 
reality” to the allegations”.    
1016 In [101] – [152]. It preceded that with an acknowledgment (at [100]) that the prejudicial effect of B’s 
evidence had been “inflammatory” 
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 Beginning with an acknowledgment that all similar fact evidence is 
presumptively inadmissible, the question became one of whether or not the contested 
evidence was “strong enough to be capable of properly raising in the eyes of the jury the 
double inferences contended for by the Crown” (original emphasis). The first step in 
that process being the identification of “the issue in question”, the Court cautioned 
against allowing “too broad a gateway for the admission of propensity evidence or, as it 
is sometimes put, to allow it to bear too much of the burden of the Crown’s case”.  In 
this regard, there was a risk that by identifying “the issue” as simply that of the 
credibility of the complainant, the jury would be allowed to hear evidence “of nothing 
more than general disposition (“bad personhood”)”, since “Anything that blackens the 
character of an accused may, as a by-product, enhance the credibility of a complainant”. 
 
 The Court also challenged the true relevance of the ex-wife’s alleged lack of 
consent to the various sexual indignities inflicted upon her by H, observing that 
“Because complainant A refused consent in 1992 scarcely establishes that complainant 
B refused consent in 1996” 1017 . In essence, the issue arising from H’s alleged “sexual 
intransigence” was not the broad one of the credibility of the complainant, but, “more 
accurately and precisely framed”, “. . . .. the consent component of the actus reus and in 
relation to that issue  the respondent’s alleged propensity to refuse to take no for an 
answer”. 
 
 With regard to the “proximity in time” between the acts alleged on the 
indictment and those alleged in the similar fact evidence, the Court concluded that the 
ex-wife’s evidence gained “. . . . cogency both from its repetition over many years and 
its most recent manifestation a couple of months before the offence charged”.  
However, the Court also noted several dissimilarities which the trial judge appeared to 
                                                            
 
 
1017 A similar caveat had been imposed by the Australian High Court in Phillips; see note 653. 
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have overlooked,1018 the most important of which being that each of the incidents 
recounted by the ex-wife occurred in the context of a dysfunctional long-term 
relationship, and not a casual liaison in a motel room. 
 
 Continuing to apply the factors it had identified, the Court ruled that there were 
no “distinctive features unifying the incidents”, and no “intervening events to 
undermine their probative value”.  So far as concerned “the strength of the evidence 
that the similar acts actually occurred”, the Court was satisfied that “the issues were 
fully argued” 1019 on the voir-dire, although it sounded the warning that a trial judge 
must be satisfied that the similar fact evidence was capable of belief before allowing 
the jury to consider whether or not to believe it.  
 
 Noting,1020 the “inflammatory nature” of the ex-wife’s evidence, and the fact 
that “The jury would likely be more appalled by the pattern of domestic sexual abuse 
than by the alleged misconduct of an inebriated lout in a motel room on an isolated 
occasion”, the Court observed that “ . . . this evidence has a serious potential for moral 
prejudice” and,1021  “ . . . .significant reasoning prejudice”, which might have been to 
some extent ameliorated by “limiting [its] nature and extent”  more than had been 
done.1022  
 
 On the nature of the final balancing act involved, the Court observed that:1023  
 
                                                            
 
 
1018 These also included the fact that one of the alleged incidents was a non-sexual “choking” assault, and 
that none of them began as consensual activity. 
1019 These “issues” concerned certain inconsistencies in the evidence of the ex-wife. 
1020 At [140]. 
1021 At [147]. 
1022 By agreement, the jury had not been told that H had served a prison term for two sexual assaults on 
other parties. 
1023 At [149] and [150]. 
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As probative value advances, prejudice does not necessarily recede. . . . the two 
weighing pans on the scales of justice may rise and fall together. Nevertheless, 
probative value and prejudice pull in opposite directions on the admissibility issue and 
their conflicting demands must be resolved. 
 
Justice includes society’s interest in getting to the truth of the charges as well as the 
interest of both society and the accused in a fair process. 
 
 In conclusion it ruled that:1024  
 
It can hardly be doubted that the jury, listening to the ex-wife’s evidence, would form a 
very low opinion of the respondent as an individual who behaved abominably towards 
his wife, and be readier on that account to believe the worst of him in his conduct 
towards the complainant.   This is precisely the sort of general disposition reasoning 
(moral prejudice) that the similar fact exclusion rule was designed to prevent. 
 
. . . quite apart from the other frailties of the similar fact evidence previously discussed, 
the trial judge’s refusal to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to 
admissibility was an error of law.  A new trial is required. 
 
 Apart from the step-by-step guidance which Handy offered to future trial judges 
faced with ruling on the admissibility of similar fact evidence, it served to identify, 
more than any other ultimate court of appeal in any other jurisdiction, the central 
importance of critically evaluating the essential relevance of such evidence in the light 
of the purpose for which it is being offered, and ensuring that the jury are not allowed 
to employ it for any other purpose. As such, it constituted a triumph of strict logic over 
confused and distracted reasoning. 
 
                                                            
 
 
1024 At [152] and [153]. 
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An early test of the Handy ruling 
 
 The Court did not have to wait long for another opportunity to demonstrate how 
the tests they had prescribed in Handy might be applied. Shearing v R,1025 had been 
argued on the same day, before the same judges, as Handy, although the judgement in 
Shearing was handed down a month later than Handy.  Shearing was a paradigm case of 
potentially massive moral prejudice arising from similar fact evidence of disputed 
relevance. Although divided 7-2 on another issue raised on appeal, the Court was 
unanimous in applying the Handy tests and dismissing the appeal on the similar fact 
point. 
 
 S was a religious cult leader who was tried on 20 counts of sexual abuse of 
young females during the period from 1965 to 1989.  There were a total of 11 
complainants, 9 of whom (referred to on the appeal as the “Non-G” complainants) had 
been adherents of the cult led by S, and who were alleging that he had abused his 
position of spiritual authority over them to overcome any objection they might have had 
to sexual familiarities, which S had persuaded them was a legitimate path to spiritual 
awakening, and a means of combating negative spiritual forces which were attacking 
them. The remaining 2 victims were sisters (whose surname began with G, and who 
were therefore referred to as the “G complainants”) who had resided in the cult’s group 
residence, where their mother, herself a devotee of the cult, was employed as 
housekeeper.  Their allegations against S involved sexual abuse accompanied by “quack 
spiritualism” which had been facilitated by their virtual imprisonment in the cult 
residence and a regime of physical abuse by their mother, at S’s instigation. All the 
counts were tried on the same indictment, and the evidence of each of the 11 
complainants was admitted as similar fact evidence supporting the allegations of the 
others. 
                                                            
 
 
1025 2002 SCC 58. 
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 The majority Court,1026 had no difficulty identifying: 
  
. . . the exceptional prejudice of the similar fact evidence.  It is bad enough for a 
spiritual  leader to be accused of taking sexual liberties with his disciples. It is a good 
deal worse to have the added element of child abuse.  Similarly in the case of the G 
complainants, child abuse is made worse, if possible, when overlaid with spiritual cant. 
 
 Following,1027 “. . . . .the steps described in Handy”, the majority confirmed that 
although there had been a suggestion of collusion,1028 there had been “. . . . nothing 
sufficiently persuasive to trigger the trial judge’s gatekeeper function”, and he had been 
correct in allowing the issue of collusion to go to the jury with a warning to be mindful 
of that possibility.  They then went on to identify the “issues” to which the similar fact 
evidence might be said to be admissible, which varied as between the two groups of 
complainants. 
  
 S’s defence to the allegations by the two G complainants was a flat denial that 
the incidents alleged had actually occurred, and the Crown argued that the probative 
value of the similar fact evidence from all 11 complainants lay in the inherent 
unlikelihood, absent collusion, that so many complainants might coincidentally concoct 
stories with such specific allegations of the same exploitive techniques employed by S.  
In the case of the “non-G complainants” (i.e. the cult followers), S claimed that they had 
consented to his actions, and the issue for the Crown was therefore whether or not that 
consent had been obtained by spiritual exploitation, which the majority held,1029 “ . . . 
might be thought by the jury to demonstrate sufficient situation-specific propensities for 
                                                            
 
 
1026 At [36]. 
1027 At [37]. 
1028 This was confirmed, at [40] as being “an alternative explanation for the “coincidence” of evidence 
emanating from different witnesses”, which “destroys its probative value, and therefore the basis for its 
admissibility”. 
1029 At [47]. 
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non-spiritual sex to negative the appellant’s claimed innocent “spiritual” purpose”.  In 
rebuttal of both lines of defence, the Crown had been entitled to rely upon what the 
majority ultimately concluded was the situation-specific modus operandi revealed by 
the similar fact evidence, if believed. 
 
 The majority was able to conclude that:1030  
 
While the sexual acts themselves were not particularly distinctive, the underlying unity 
lies in the alleged abuse of a cult leader’s authority.  It is the fantastic sales pitch and 
rationale developed by the appellant that could be considered “particular and 
distinctive”. 
 
 Additionally, the allegations made by both sets of complainants “overlapped and 
were to some extent concurrent. Proximity in time makes the evidence more cogent as it 
reduces the likelihood that the appellant had changed his ways”.1031 Likewise, the fact 
that the incidents were spread over a 25 year time period demonstrated “a degree of 
extended consistency in behaviour”. 
 
 Nor did S’s appeal fare any better when the Court came to consider the 
“circumstances surrounding” the similar fact allegations, which the majority described, 
1032 as being “. . . . united by the allegation of gross abuse of power by a cult leader”.  
So far as concerned the “distinctiveness”  test, they added that:1033  
                                                            
 
 
1030 At [50].  At [52], they added that “Similarity does not lie in the physical acts themselves . . . . The 
similarities really lay in the modus operandi employed by the appellant to create sexual opportunities”. 
This was also said [at 53] to be supported by the sheer number of alleged incidents of “situation specific 
behaviour”. 
1031 At [51]. 
1032 At [54]. 
1033 At [55]. At [57] and [58] they also added in the factors of the age of the majority of the complainants 
and S’s insistence on confidentiality to reach the final conclusion that “A jury might well reasonably 
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The combination of spiritualist imagery (achieving higher states of awareness) and 
horror stories (invasion of young girls by disembodied minds), and the supposed 
prophylactic power of the appellant’s sexual touching to ward off these horrific threats 
is, to say the least, distinctive. 
 
 In concluding that the alleged dissimilarities in the complainants’ accounts of 
events “did not detract significantly from the probative value of the evidence on the 
issue of the modus operandi”, the majority,1034 took the opportunity to warn against: 
 
. . . . an excessively mechanical approach.  The judge’s task is not to add up similarities 
and dissimilarities and then, like an accountant, derive a net balance.  At microscopic 
levels of detail, dissimilarities can always be exaggerated and multiplied.  This may 
result in distortion . . . . At an excessively macroscopic level of generality, on the other 
hand, the drawing of similarities may be too facile. 
The trial judge was not required to sum up the two sides of an artificially constructed 
ledger as contended for by the appellant. 
 
 Before concluding that the appeal on the similar fact issue should be dismissed, 
the majority,1035 repeated what had been said, not only in Handy but in several of the 
cases which had led to it,1036 namely that: 
 
. . . . a good deal of deference is inevitably paid to the view of the trial judge . . . . the 
Court recognises the trial judge’s advantage of being able to assess on the spot the 
dynamics of the  trial and the likely impact of the evidence on the jurors. . . . . absent 
error in principle the decision should rest where it was allocated, to the trial judge. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
conclude that the appellant’s behaviour in these different settings was sufficiently situation specific to 
warrant the drawing of the double inferences” 
1034 At [60] and [61]. 
1035 At [73]. 
1036 For example, R v B.(C.R.)(note 976). 
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Eleven years on 
 
 Handy has stood the test of time, as “. . . a clear direction to identify clearly and 
precisely the probative value of evidence of the accused’s prior bad acts and to weigh 
carefully its prejudicial effects before determining its admissibility”.1037  It has been 
followed over one hundred and fifty times in the decisions of the intermediate appeal 
courts of Canada, and has not been seriously questioned by any subsequent Supreme 
Court of Canada bench.  It has also proved to be extremely flexible in application, and 
capable of allowing a trial judge to admit evidence which, while undoubtedly 
prejudicial in its revelations of an accused’s true character, is nevertheless essential if 
the jury is to be given “the full picture” prior to making its decision on all the relevant 
facts.   One example will suffice. 
 
 In R v Groulx,1038 G was about to stand trial for the second-degree murder of his 
mother, Y, with whom he was residing at the time of her death.  Cause of death was 
either manual strangulation or “shaking syndrome” (either would have been sufficient 
to cause death), and in addition Y’s body bore signs of multiple, but non-fatal, blunt 
force impacts.  The Crown’s case was that G had killed her in a drunken rage, as the 
final act in a long and dysfunctional relationship between them.  In support of this 
theory, it sought, in a pre-trial application, to obtain leave to adduce evidence of prior 
violence by G against Y, his acts of violence against his former de facto C, who had 
lived with the parties at a material time in the past when G had been violent towards Y, 
G’s abuse of alcohol and drugs, G’s acts of violence towards male friends when drunk, 
and G’s loss of his drivers’ licence through drink-driving, which had led to one of the 
prior incidents of violence against Y, when she had been acting as his driver.  The way 
in which these issues were dealt with on the application is a strong vindication of the 
utility of the tests which had been handed down in Handy. 
                                                            
 
 
1037 Stewart, “Rationalizing Similar Facts: A Comment on R v Handy”, (2003) 8 Can. Crim. L. Rev 113. 
1038 2011 ONSC 1316.  See also R v Villeda (2011) 265 C.C.C. (3d) 433, an Alberta Court of Appeal 
case. 
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 After reviewing the principles expounded in Handy, and noting that this was not 
a case in which the propensity evidence was being admitted in order to prove either 
identity or the actus reus of the crime, Pelletier, J. reminded himself,1039 that it was 
important to establish the precise issue(s) in the case to which the challenged evidence 
was said to be relevant , because: 
 
As the analysis moves away from “similar fact evidence” in the traditional sense 
towards  “evidence of other discreditable conduct”, the issue of the admissibility of the 
evidence is resolved by placing greater emphasis on the specific relevance of the 
evidence to an area of dispute in the trial than it is by drawing comparisons between the 
proposed evidence and the circumstances of the offence being tried. 
 
 Using this as his guiding principle, the judge ruled, 1040  that, since “ . . . 
deliberately causing the death of one’s parent is a peculiar and unusual allegation . . . In 
isolation, the events of [the evening of Y’s death] concerning the accused and his 
mother are difficult to understand and interpret”, some of the evidence of G’s prior 
relationship with Y,1041 was admissible because “Without the necessary background 
information, the events giving rise to the charge of second degree murder are, in my 
view, only a portion of the account that must be considered to place those events in 
their proper context”. 
 
 At the same time, his Honour recognised,1042 the potential for such evidence to 
create “ . . . . both moral prejudice, that the accused is a bad man who should be 
punished regardless of the events giving rise to the . . . . charge, and reasoning 
                                                            
 
 
1039 At [17]. 
1040 At [21]. 
1041 This evidence revealed that the deceased was a difficult, withdrawn and slovenly individual who had 
given up on life after the death of her husband, and who was careless in matters of housekeeping, 
personal hygiene and eating habits, imposing considerable stress on those who had to cohabit with her. 
1042 At [22]. 
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prejudice, [such that] that the trial process becomes a series of tangential inquiries into 
events removed in time and location from the central enquiry of the events resulting in 
[Y’s] death”.  Nevertheless 1043, this prejudice was in a sense ameliorated by the fact 
that the previous acts were “considerably less serious in nature” than the murder 
charge, that the adduced evidence could be “organised” so as “ . . . to avoid 
overwhelming the jury . . . .”, and that by limiting the evidence to “a series of specific 
episodes”, the accused would be afforded the opportunity to rebut it, or explain it away.  
Finally, the potential prejudice could be minimised by means of “a clear and limiting 
instruction on the use of such evidence . . . before the evidence is adduced and again in 
the final instruction” .1044 
 
 Employing what might be termed this ‘tailored’ approach to all the available 
propensity evidence, the Crown was granted leave to adduce evidence of: 
 
 (a) An incident in which G lost his temper with the deceased because she had 
left unwashed dishes in the kitchen, and threw them around the kitchen, breaking them 
in the process. In addition, a similar incident in which G’s response to unwashed dishes 
was to threaten to kill Y, choking her and throwing her across the room.  Although such 
evidence was said, 1045  to be “undoubtedly harmful to the issue of the accused’s 
character”, it was nevertheless held to be admissible because it was “ . . . quite 
compelling in terms [of] the relationship that existed between the parties and the 
accused’s perception of his mother . . . [it] is directly related to the conflict between the 
parties and the duration of the accused’s frustration and anger towards his mother”. 
 
                                                            
 
 
1043 At [24]. 
1044 These “instructions” are presumably ones which are to be issued to the trial jury. 
1045 At [25]. 
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 (b) Threatening gestures by G against his mother involving the use of a large 
knife.  This was also held,1046 to be admissible because it “ . . . . is further probative of 
the extent of the animosity between [G and Y] and therefore admissible 
notwithstanding the negative impact upon the perception of [G’s] character . . . . ”. 
 
 (c) G making threatening gestures towards Y with a baseball bat, throwing items 
from the recycling bin at Y, and on several occasions pouring water over her, which 
were admissible because,1047 they were “ . . . . similarly relevant to [G’s] attitude 
towards [Y]”. 
 
 (d) An incident in which G threatened to burn down the home, producing gas 
containers from the garage, and then both chasing and threatening Y with both a grass 
trimmer and a chainsaw.  This was provoked by Y’s refusal to bathe herself, and was 
held,1048 to be admissible because it “ . . . . reveals [G’s] animosity towards [Y] and his 
degree of frustration over her self-neglect . . . . . Evidence that [G] consumed alcohol 
and was intoxicated during all episodes previously mentioned necessarily forms part of 
the description of those events”. 
 
 (e) G’s admission to a friend that he had given Y “a couple of black eyes”, 
which was held,1049 to be admissible because it “ . . . . relates directly to violence by [G] 
directed at [Y] and is probative of his animosity towards [Y].  Its relevance is related to 
the issues of animus, motive and intent”. 
 
                                                            
 
 
1046 Ibid. 
1047 Ibid. 
1048 Ibid. 
1049 Ibid. 
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 But the true value of Handy emerges from the approach which the judge took to 
other items of bad character evidence which the Crown sought to adduce under the thin 
pretext that it supplied a more comprehensive “background” to the events surrounding 
Y’s death.  They were firmly excluded because they were either insufficiently relevant 
to a live issue in the trial, or because, although of marginal relevance, they were 
outweighed by their potential prejudiciality.  They were as follows: 
 
 (a) Evidence of G’s violence and threats to, and sexual abuse of, his de facto C, 
during incidents which also involved threats and violence to Y.  The Crown argued that 
this was relevant in explaining why C did not do more to protect Y from G, and in 
demonstrating G’s “. . . . attitude towards women who displeased him, and how he 
responded to those situations”.  After observing,1050 that “ . . . . this evidence has to be 
approached with caution”, the judge held it to be “ . . . too vague and subjective”.   
Most tellingly, he concluded,1051 that “The relationship between [G] and [Y] and the 
relationship between [G] and [C] was markedly different in terms of its nature, 
duration, dependency and intimacy, rendering evidence of violence towards [C] purely 
a question of propensity for violence with little, if any, added value” .1052  Later in his 
judgment, 1053  his Honour ruled that this aspect of his ruling might have to be 
reconsidered “ . . . . if [C] is significantly challenged in cross-examination on the basis 
of her actions, inactions or decisions relating to her relationship with [G]”. 
 
 (b) Evidence of alleged acts of violence by G against his friend N were similarly 
disposed of, despite Crown assertions that it “ . . . tends to show how [G] responded to 
conflict and how he treated those who contradicted or in some other way displeased 
him”. 1054  His Honour concluded, 1055  that “This line of reasoning has to do with 
                                                            
 
 
1050 At [32]. 
1051 Ibid. 
1052 His Honour also added, at [34] that “The potential for both moral and reasoning prejudice concerning 
misdeeds by [G] against [C] is considerable”. 
1053 At [52]. 
1054 At [39].  
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propensity generally and has little if any further connection to the issues of animus 
towards [Y], motive, intent, state of mind or the relationship between [G] and [Y] 
specifically”. 
 
 (c) Evidence of G’s drinking habits, and his consumption of marihuana, on 
occasions other than those involving those incidents in respect of which propensity 
evidence had already been held to be admissible, was also disposed of strictly within 
the confines of issues which were likely to be live during the trial.  Given that the 
defence had already indicated that intoxication was not to be raised by G as a defence, 
the evidence of his alcohol consumption was held to be inadmissible to rebut that.  As 
regards the Crown assertion that the evidence was necessary in order to “level the 
playing field” regarding allegations which might be made regarding the lifestyle of 
some of the Crown witnesses, his Honour ruled,1056 that should the defence take that 
line, then evidence of G’s drinking habits might become admissible “ . . . . in order to 
avoid what may be an inaccurate depiction of [G] as a pillar of morality among 
questionable characters”.  But unless and until that happened, evidence of G’s 
substance abuse was “ . . . . of little assistance either in relation to narrative, context or 
intent”.1057  
 
 (d) Evidence of the fact that G was banned from driving due to a previous drink-
driving conviction was said by the Crown to be relevant to an incident in which Y had 
been acting as G’s driver, and he had assaulted her during an argument.  His Honour 
observed,1058 that since he had already ruled that incident out because of its “tenuous 
relevance” to the issue of Y’s death, the fact that G required someone else to drive him 
around could be dealt with by reference simply to the fact that he did not have a 
drivers’ licence at that time, without specifying why. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
1055 Ibid.  Once again, his Honour opined that this evidence “ . . . stands at the lower end of the scale and, 
in my view, is greatly outweighed by both moral and reasoning prejudice”. 
1056 At [46]. 
1057 At [47]. 
1058 At [50]. 
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 There are two other aspects of this judgment which are of interest.  The first is a 
reference, 1059  to the possibility of editing the evidence which the Crown is to be 
allowed to adduce, so as to “ . . . .strike a balance between allowing admissible and 
relevant evidence [to be] tendered while not unduly prejudicing the defence . . . . ”.  It 
was in this context that his Honour indicated that evidence relating to G’s alleged 
assaults on, and threats towards, C might become admissible if she was “significantly 
challenged” regarding her alleged failure to intervene between C and Y on those 
occasions when he was abusing Y. 
 
 This raises the prospect of tailoring the evidence which the Crown is allowed to 
adduce to meet the issues arising during trial, and introduces a more flexible approach 
to the management of propensity evidence in light of the dynamics of a criminal trial 
than previous approaches had done, with their “once for all” pre-trial rulings on 
admissibility. 
 
 Secondly, and linked to this, is the reference by his Honour,1060 to “a proposed 
mid-trial limiting instruction” which was attached as an appendix to his ruling.  The 
case report does not include this appendix, but in the final paragraph of his Honour’s 
ruling,1061 is an invitation to both counsel to offer “assistance if the limiting instruction 
is deemed insufficient”. 
 
 From this it would seem that, in Canada at least, counsel are being consulted in 
advance regarding the precise direction which the trial jury are to be given regarding 
the limited use to which they might put the propensity evidence which is being 
                                                            
 
 
1059 At [35]. The authority for this was said to be R v Millar (1989) 49 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. C. A.). 
1060 At [56]. 
1061 [57]. 
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admitted.  This, combined with a strict application of the “precise relevance to a 
genuine live issue” principle, would seem ideally suited to avoid a large number of 
post-trial appeals in which counsel (normally for the defence) challenge the directions 
which were given to the trial jury.  If counsel have given consent to the precise wording 
of those directions in advance of the jury receiving them, then this avenue of appeal is 
effectively closed to them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 There is much in Handy which might profitably be adopted by other 
jurisdictions.  First and foremost is the acknowledgment that the true probity of 
propensity evidence lies in its relevance to a live issue which is of significance in the 
case as a whole.  Secondly there is the recognition that the more precisely identical the 
behaviour of an accused on a previous occasion to the way they are alleged to have 
behaved during the event on trial, the greater the probative value of that evidence, 
despite what might also be its prejudicial effect if employed for some other purpose.  
This is, in turn, further recognition of the fact that the true measure of  the relevance of 
similar fact evidence is on a sliding scale from “general” propensity (of low relevance ) 
to highly specific propensity (of high relevance).   
 
 Flowing from that initial recognition are two other important factors.  The first is 
that if there is some reason other than the specific behaviour of an accused which might 
account for the similarities in the versions given by various witnesses, then the logic of 
‘lack of coincidence’ no longer applies, and that conclusion must be abandoned.  Chief 
among these other reasons in practice is that the seemingly independent witnesses have 
in fact colluded together to give a common account of events.  This requires judicial 
intervention ab initio, rather than leaving the issue of the “weight” to be afforded to the 
witnesses’ evidence as a matter for the jury, who are not best qualified to resist the 
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allure of such an irrelevant distraction.  The relevance of the prior circumstances may, 
it seems from R v Jesse,1062 be established by reference to a prior conviction, even if 
guilt of that crime is denied by the accused at the new trial. 
 
 Secondly, there is a need to define the precise issue to which the challenged 
evidence is said to be relevant.  It is in this regard that Handy represents another 
“intellectual breakthrough”,1063 in the long-running search for a formula by which to 
identify those circumstances in which it is safe to adduce evidence of “bad 
personhood”, as it was expressed in Handy itself.  In Handy came the realisation that 
true probity (with correspondingly less risk of unfair prejudice) is to be found in true 
similarity.   
 
 Put in more practical terms, the more closely “fact specific” the circumstances of 
the previous event are to the event under scrutiny, the less is the chance that the jury 
will employ them for the wrong reason.   
 
 It is, for example, one thing to say “John is accused of rape.  He has raped 
before.  Therefore he raped this time”.  It is another to say “Whoever committed this 
rape left an old-fashioned dance card tucked into the blouse of the victim, with the first 
dance scored out.  This is precisely what John did to a rape victim seven years ago.  
There is a strong probability that John and the new rapist are one and the same person”.  
In R v B. (C.R.),1064 Sopinke J gave the example of the “safe cracker” who is one of 
only three people in the country who can overcome a particular security system – the 
mere fact that he is a safe-cracker is inadmissible, being too “broad” in nature, but the 
                                                            
 
 
1062 [2012] 1 S.C.R. 716, the most recent Supreme Court of Canada’s application of Handy at the time of 
writing. 
1063 Note 266. 
1064 Note 976, at [21]. 
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fact that he belongs in a specialist cohort of only three is admissible because it is more 
“propensity specific”.   
 
 With this approach it is essential that the “issue” which is identified as the one to 
which the propensity evidence is relevant be a “live” one.  If, for example, George 
Joseph Smith,1065 had admitted drowning Bessie Munday in her bath-tub, but claimed 
provocation, of what relevance, other than that of inflaming the jury against him, would 
have been the evidence of the identical deaths of the other two wives?  It was only 
because his defence consisted of a denial of any deliberate “system” on his part that the 
identical circumstances of the deaths of the two other women became relevant.  
Without any such relevance, “prejudice” (of both the “moral” and “reasoning” variety) 
is destined to unbalance the scales, regardless of its actual weight. 
 
 The ultimate utility of Handy lies in its trial-focused approach to the task 
confronting judges presiding over interlocutory applications to admit propensity 
evidence.  No longer are they required to balance two theoretical and largely abstract 
“incommeasurables” ,1066  in a set of hypothetical weighing pans.  Instead, they may 
make use of what is almost a “tick-a-box” checklist composed of factors which are 
designed to eliminate error and maximise the appropriate use of evidence which is 
relevant for the right reasons.  These factors, identified in Handy, are further considered 
and expanded upon in the next following chapter.   
 
 Finally, the Canadian courts have also performed a service to their common law 
contemporaries by demonstrating that it is possible to resolve the admissibility issues 
which beset propensity evidence ahead of the trial itself, and by agreement between 
counsel and the trial judge, in a process which requires the counsel seeking to have the 
                                                            
 
 
1065 Note 180. 
1066 Note 573. 
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evidence admitted to articulate its precise relevance. That same agreement may 
incorporate the exact direction (“limiting instruction”, as it is known in Canada) to be 
given to the jury regarding the use to which they may put that evidence, thus 
eliminating a fertile source of appeals. 
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Chapter 10: 
A statutory formula 
Introduction 
 
 Most attempts at regulating, by statute or by case-law, the circumstances under 
which a jury may safely be allowed to learn of the previous, or additional, bad 
behaviour of a criminal accused have at best led to confusion and uncertainty (as in 
Australia), and at worse have simply failed, as arguably has happened under both 
English and American law.  There has, however, been a considerable measure of 
success from statutory intervention in New Zealand, and an encouraging signpost 
towards the future from the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
 Common to all these experiences has been the role of Wigmore’s “doctrine of 
chances”.  When the admission of ‘similar fact evidence properly so called’ has been 
made to depend upon a detailed and rigorous application of that doctrine, the result has 
been a workable formula.  Failure to acknowledge it has led to confusion, uncertainty, 
and injustice. 
  
 First came Makin, with its recognition that such evidence might properly be 
adduced in certain categories of case.  The primary difficulty with this approach was 
that it ignored the precise reason for which the evidence was being admitted. Next came 
Boardman, and the acknowledgment that what made those categories special was that 
they demonstrated an excess of “probity” over “prejudice”.  However, the failure to 
properly define and particularise either concept led to even greater confusion and 
uncertainty than the Makin approach. 
 
 Nevertheless, both approaches contained the nucleus of the element which 
distinguishes admissible forms of similar fact evidence from inadmissible ones.   This 
element is relevance to a material live issue in the case in hand.  Similar fact evidence 
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will always be “prejudicial” to an accused; the task which has to be addressed is that of 
ensuring that it is not unfairly prejudicial.   
 
 Such unfairness can only arise when the evidence is being employed for some 
purpose unconnected with its relevance.  If it is sufficiently relevant, then its use cannot 
be unfair; it therefore follows that any formula for the admission of similar fact 
evidence must first address the relevance of the evidence in question, and its importance 
in the overall case for the prosecution.  Consideration must also be given to its 
prejudicial effect, which in practical terms means only the risk of it being employed for 
the wrong reason. 
 
 For many years, the common law courts of the world were constitutionally 
obliged to recognise the authority of seminal judgments such as those in Makin and 
Boardman.  At the points in their legal histories when jurisdictions such as those in 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada were free to develop their own approaches, the 
dominant authority was that of Boardman, and the subsequent development of their 
case-law was the product of their own handling of the ‘probity versus prejudice’ 
formula, with later English case-law having only ‘persuasive’ authority. 
 
 Experience has shown that only a fundamental and detailed recognition of the 
role played by logical relevance can provide a workable formula for determining 
whether or not it will be ‘fair’ to allow a court to receive ‘similar fact evidence properly 
so called’.  For jurisdictions other than Canada, with the possible exception of New 
Zealand, there are only two potential mechanisms for ensuring that this occurs.   
 
The first is the emphatic and authoritative imposition, by the highest appeal 
court in each jurisdiction, of a prescribed list of factors which future trial judges are 
mandated to take into account before admitting the evidence.  In short, a replication of 
what happened in Canada in Handy.  However, it is arguably too late for the High Court 
of Australia to replace Pfennig with a totally different approach, while the English 
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courts are bound by the intricate provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.  Also, as 
experience in New Zealand has begun to demonstrate, the introduction of a partial 
statutory amendment to long-established common law precedents results in a tendency 
for judges to approach the ‘new’ law by reference to what has gone before. 
 
 The second possible mechanism is a comprehensive statutory formula to replace 
all that has gone before.  Experience in both England and Australia (with its Uniform 
Laws) has shown that once future trial judges are advised that they are writing on a 
clean slate, they will comply.  The statutory schemes in both those jurisdictions did not 
fail because the judges ignored them; they failed because they employed them, and they 
were wrong. 
 
 It is possible, by reference to the laws of both New Zealand and Canada, to 
construct a statutory regime for the admission of ‘similar fact evidence properly so 
called’ which avoids all the pitfalls which have previously been encountered in this area 
of law, by the rigorous application of the principles of logical relevance. 
 
The inglorious past 
 
 Even Lord Herschell, in Makin v Attorney General for New South Wales,1067 
recognised that what makes evidence of an additional bad action by an accused 
admissible is its relevance to the matter in hand for some reason other than the fact that 
it occurred.  There is no relevance in that, but there is a great deal of potential prejudice.  
It was unfortunate that Lord Herschell went on to express his second, inclusionary, rule 
in terms which suggested that admissible similar fact evidence might be recognised by 
category. 
                                                            
 
 
1067 Note 144. 
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 There was considerable truth in his broad statement that in certain situations (of 
which the facts in Makin itself provided a good example) what an accused has done, 
additionally to what they are now accused of having done, has relevance.  However, the 
flaw in that statement was the failure to acknowledge relevance for what it is, and to 
convey the impression that provided that the contested evidence had a bearing on a pre-
identified “issue” before the court, then it was, by definition, admissible. 
 
 The fallacy in that approach is easily demonstrated.  Assume that a doctor is 
accused of procuring an abortion on Patient A.  Their defence is that the spontaneous 
expulsion of the foetus was the unforeseen side effect of a legitimate gynaecological 
procedure.  The Crown has evidence that on a previous occasion, the doctor wilfully 
procured an abortion on Patient B.  Under the Makin rubric, the testimony of Patient B 
would be admissible to rebut the “issue” of “innocent intent”, and the response of the 
jury would almost certainly be to convict.  This is regardless of (let us also assume) the 
facts that the former abortion was performed for cash in the doctor’s house “after hours”, 
whereas the process involving Patient A was in an operating theatre in a public hospital 
as one of many procedures on the doctor’s normal clinical list.  This latest procedure 
was to remove an ovarian cyst, whereas the previous one was purely and simply 
intended to abort the foetus. 
 
 It was borderline cases such as this which caused later commentators to question 
the utility of admitting similar fact evidence by category.  The manifest “unfairness” of 
allowing the jury to be advised of the previous abortion,1068 arises from the risk that the 
jury will conclude, either that “One abortion is the same as another”, or that “He did it 
once, so why not this time?”, when in fact the circumstances of the two events are 
importantly dissimilar.   If, instead, a trial judge is empowered to consider any such 
                                                            
 
 
1068 It has also been assumed that this previous abortion has only just come to light, otherwise the doctor 
would not still be practising. 
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materially different circumstances, and to conclude that the jury should not be advised 
of the earlier abortion because there is a risk that they will “give a dog a bad name and 
hang him” ,1069 then the risk of unfair prejudice is materially reduced. 
 
 The apparent “intellectual breakthrough”,1070 of Boardman was the recognition 
of the role played by relevance, and the need to consider, at the same time, the risk of 
prejudice.  But they were expressed in terms of items on a weighing scale.  While it is 
true that the risk of unfair prejudice diminishes with increased relevance, it was not 
made clear that the “unfairness” which had to be avoided was the admission of evidence 
which was insufficiently relevant to justify its admission.  If a jury cannot immediately 
see precisely why additional bad behaviour has factual relevance to what the accused is 
alleged to have done this time, then they are likely to employ the ‘broad-brush’ 
approach of “once a thief, always a thief”, despite the fact that the two types of theft are 
factually incomparable (for example, one was a shoplifting while the latest one is an 
armed robbery). 
 
 The subsequent history of the law relating to the admission of similar fact 
evidence was also, in notable jurisdictions such as the UK and America, overtaken by 
considerations of pure policy, rather than clinical reasoning.  Despite - and perhaps 
because of - the inadequacies of the Boardman formula, it was still felt that too many 
guilty accused were escaping conviction because the law unduly restricted the 
revelation of their criminal history.  A new era of ‘categorisation by statutory provision’ 
began, leaving the relevant law as a morass of conflicting and irreconcilable precedents 
which rendered it impossible to predict in advance whether or not a particular item of 
similar fact evidence was likely to be admitted.  In many cases, when it was, it was to 
the unfair detriment of the accused. 
 
                                                            
 
 
1069 Note 805. 
1070 Note 266. 
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 All of this may be avoided if one finally pays appropriate attention to what the 
American jurist Wigmore had been advocating as the true test of admissibility of similar 
fact evidence since the dawn of the Twentieth Century. 
 
Wigmore’s “doctrine of chances” 
 
 This was summarised in Wigmore’s oft-quoted observation that:1071  
 
. . . . . the oftener similar instances occur with similar results, the less likely is the 
abnormal element likely to be the true explanation of them. . . . similar results do not 
usually occur through abnormal causes. 
 
 The “abnormal causes” to which he was referring may be defined further as 
“causes other than those which may be assumed from normal human experience”.  Put 
in positive terms, a “normal” cause is one which flows from our knowledge of human 
behaviour.  In terms of the facts of Makin, it was the “normal” expectation that twelve 
dead infants formally in the care of the Makins had been killed by them, and it would be 
an “abnormal” result had each of them died accidentally.1072  In terms of Smith,1073 it 
would have been an “abnormal” result had each of the women whom he had married 
bigamously all succumbed, in such a short space of time, to precisely the same bizarre, 
and in itself inherently unlikely, fatal accident.  The “normality” of human experience 
suggested that Smith himself had been the agent responsible for each of their deaths.1074 
                                                            
 
 
1071 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 302 (Chadbourn rev. 1979, Little Brown and Co, Boston). 
1072 This, it will be recalled, had been the reasoning employed by Windeyer J when the Makins’ appeal 
came before the NSW Court of Appeal – see note 135. 
1073 Note 180. 
1074 See also Coleridge CJ in Francis (cited in note 94), who observed, in the context of a series of 
alleged false pretences regarding the value of jewelry, that “ . . . every circumstance which shows that 
[the accused] was not under a mistake on any one of these occasions strengthens the presumption that he 
was not on the last”. 
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 Put as broadly as this, Wigmore’s “doctrine” is little more than ‘probability 
theory grounded in human experience’, but as Wigmore himself demonstrated,1075 by 
reference to decided case authority, every circumstance in which similar fact evidence 
might be considered admissible is amenable to his “chances”  analysis. 
 
 The first such circumstance, historically, is the rebuttal of any defence based 
upon innocent intent, innocent association, accident and the like.  When the acts 
committed by an accused, including the last of them (in respect of which they are on 
trial) are equivocal in terms of guilty intent, the sheer number of them may defy 
coincidence or accident.  I might incorrectly enter the wrong amount on a cheque in my 
favour once by accident, but the more times I do so the more unlikely is the possibility 
that any of the incorrect entries was either accidental or innocent. 
 
 This line of reasoning may be applied in any context in which the actus reus of 
each of the events is admitted, but the mens rea is denied.  There is no need for the acts 
themselves to be identical, since the reason for adducing the additional event evidence 
1076 “. . . . is merely to discover the intent accompanying the act in question;1077 and the 
prior doing of similar acts . . . is useful in reducing the possibility that the act in 
question was done with innocent intent”.  
 
 If, for example, several students claim that during “one on one” tutorials with 
their tutor they were indecently assaulted, the precise nature of those alleged assaults 
                                                            
 
 
1075 Ibid. 
1076 Wigmore, ibid.  However, as Wigmore pointed out, the acts must all be “similar”, because “Since it 
is the improbability of a like result being repeated by mere chance that carries probative weight, the 
essence of this probative effect is the likeness of the instance.” 
1077 That is, the act now on trial. 
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need not be identical.1078 The inherent unlikelihood that several students would make 
the same startling accusation may be employed to rebut any suggestion that what 
occurred was purely innocent and academic.  Wigmore himself gave the example of two 
men on a shooting expedition, one of whom notices several shots passing dangerously 
close to him; when the final one hits him, it is difficult not to conclude that they were all 
aimed at him by his shooting companion. 
 
 The second broad use of ‘chances’ reasoning does, however, call for greater 
similarity between each alleged act on the part of the accused.  This involves the 
combining of each of the acts into a  “scheme ”,  “system ” or  “plan ” pursued by the 
accused, of which the act on trial is one instance, but which reveals the underlying 
criminality of the behaviour as a whole.  Makin and Smith were clear examples of this 
process of reasoning.  Only by considering the deaths of the babies in Makin, and the 
‘wives’ in Smith, to be instances of a broader scheme (to benefit financially) devised by 
the accused, could it then be concluded that the only way in which that scheme could be 
successfully implemented  was for each of the victims to die at the hands of the accused.  
From there, it was a simple process of arguing deductively that the death for which the 
accused was on trial was part of that scheme.1079 
 
 The need for greater or lesser similarity between each of these “scheme” events 
will vary according to how the logic is being employed. In Makin, the “abnormal” event 
was so many babies dying whilst under the care of the Makins; in Smith it was the 
bizarre manner of the relevant deaths.  If, in Smith, one of the three wives had died after 
falling down a flight of stairs, while a second had died from arsenic poisoning, could the 
                                                            
 
 
1078 See, for example, Shearing v R (note 1030), in which the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that what 
made a series of sexual assaults by S relevant was not the similarity in their detail, but the commonality 
of the accused’s abuse of his spiritual dominance over his victims. 
1079 In Wigmore’s words (ibid), what is required is “ . . . . such a concurrence of common features that the 
various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual 
manifestations”.  The “common features” in Makin were the deaths themselves; it would not affect the 
reasoning employed if some of the infants died of malnutrition, while others were strangled.  But note 
how it would be different in the case of Smith. 
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Crown have adduced evidence of their deaths in order to persuade the jury that the wife 
who had died in the bath had been murdered by Smith?  All three had died whilst living 
in the same house as him, but there was insufficient similarity in their deaths to incite 
anything other than a vague suspicion of Smith’s involvement. 
 
 The highest degree of similarity is called for when the similar fact evidence is 
being employed in order to prove identity.  In such cases, the jury is being invited to 
conclude that because the crime under investigation was carried out with “hallmark”, 
“signature” or “modus operandi” features which can be associated with the accused, 
therefore they must be the culprit on this occasion.  It is first necessary to associate the 
accused sufficiently with that modus operandi; this may be done either by reference to 
an offence in the past which has been judicially determined to have been committed by 
them (either on a guilty plea, or following a finding of guilt following trial), or by 
means of their being convincingly linked (for example, by means of DNA, as in Arp1080) 
to one offence in the series which bears a strong factual similarity to that (or those) on 
trial. 
 
 A good example of this process was the English case of Straffen.1081  S had been 
confined in a criminal lunatic asylum as the result of his murder of two young girls.  
They had been strangled and left by the roadside where they could easily be found, and 
there had been no apparent motive for their deaths.  S escaped from the asylum, and 
shortly thereafter, a short distance away, another small girl was found murdered in 
identical circumstances.  These identical circumstances, taken together with S’s 
opportunity to have committed this latest offence, were deemed sufficient to identify S 
as the perpetrator. 
 
                                                            
 
 
1080 Note 984. 
1081 Note 226. 
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Other forms of propensity evidence not covered by “doctrine of chances” 
reasoning 
 
 As has been described in previous chapters, there are certain other contexts in 
which the Crown may seek to adduce evidence of additional misdeeds by an accused 
person.  However, it is submitted that they do not fall within the description of ‘similar 
fact evidence properly so called’,1082 since their admissibility cannot be assessed by 
reference to any similarity between those additional misdeeds and the issue before the 
court to which they are relevant.  Other admissibility tests apply to these, and they are 
therefore not included within the statutory provisions which are proposed below, since 
they do not involve the application of “doctrine of chances” reasoning. 
 
 The first of these consists of evidence of misdeeds which are unavoidably 
encompassed within the facts of the charge for which the accused is on trial.  In 
England,1083 these are defined as matters which “have to do with the offence charged”.  
An obvious example is provided by the facts of the New Zealand case of R v 
Katavich,1084 in which the Crown was allowed to adduce evidence of what had taken 
place previously in the bathhouse of which K was the manager, in order to prove the 
offence charged, which was that the premises were used as a “place of resort” for 
homosexual activity.  The admissibility test in all such cases is whether or not proof of 
the offence requires such evidence to be led, and the accused cannot be said to have 
been “ambushed” by the admission of such evidence once they are informed of the 
nature of the charge.  There is a parallel here with the Scottish requirement that before 
propensity evidence may be led, the accused must be given “fair notice” of it.1085 
                                                            
 
 
1082 Note 2. 
1083 Law Commission Final Report, “Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings” (Cm. 5257), 
Summary, para.3 – see note 324. 
1084 [1977] 1 NZLR 436 – see note 866.  Another example might be the offence of escaping lawful 
custody; the “lawful custody” element of the offence cannot be proved without evidence that the accused 
was in lawful custody in the first place, ostensibly for some previous offence. 
1085 See Nelson v H.M. Advocate, note 768. 
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 Closely aligned, chronologically, with evidence which is part of the charge is 
evidence which is part of  “a connected series of events . . . . which should be 
considered as one transaction”.1086  The short title for such evidence is “res gestae”, and 
the justification for its admission is to allow the jury to be given ‘the whole story’ 
behind the offence charged.  An obvious example is the prior theft of the getaway 
vehicle used in a bank robbery.1087  Res gestae evidence possesses its own admission 
rules.1088  The offence(s) thereby disclosed, and the offence(s) on the indictment are 
frequently far from similar, and nothing may be gained by any attempt to apply 
“doctrine of chances” logic to them. 
 
 Giving the jury ‘the whole story’ is also the frequent justification for the 
admission of “uncharged act” evidence in cases in which an accused is charged with the 
sexual abuse of a victim (often a child relative), and that victim is allowed to testify 
regarding other sexual acts committed by the accused on other occasions which are not 
represented in the indictment charges.  Another such justification is to explain away the 
failure of the victim to make a “fresh complaint” at the time, or to prevent the 
indictment event(s) from appearing to be bizarre and isolated events. 
 
 It is tempting to describe such additional events as being “similar fact” in nature, 
since the uncharged acts are frequently factually close to those on the indictment.  
However, they lack one of the essential ingredients of ‘similar fact evidence properly so 
called’, which is lack of coincidence.  In cases in which a group of independent 
complainants make startlingly similar allegations against the same accused, there is 
                                                            
 
 
1086 Per Dixon J in O’Leary v The Queen (note 631), at 577. 
1087 Another example is provided by the facts of Lewis v United States (note 523), in which L was 
charged with a burglary which had been committed with the aid of a specific cutting tool, and evidence 
was admitted of his theft, the same evening, of just such a tool.  It was admitted in order to show “plan”, 
but it might equally as well have been admitted as part of the res gestae.  The two offences were not 
factually similar, and it obscures the true nature of ‘similar fact evidence properly so called’ to ascribe 
the label of “similar fact evidence” to them. 
1088 See, for example, R v Andrews [1987] AC 281. 
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probative value in the unlikelihood that they could all have come up with the same 
description of events, absent collusion or contamination.  But when only one 
complainant insists that the same thing happened on many occasions in the past, there is 
no such corroborative effect.  A complainant who is mistaken or untruthful about the 
true nature of one event is just as capable of being so in respect of all such events. 
 
 It is submitted that “uncharged act” evidence should not be admitted at all, since 
it breaches the “bolster rule” , 1089  which prohibits a witness from enhancing their 
credibility by telling the same “story” more than once.  However, even should it be 
admissible, it does not lend itself to “doctrine of chances” logic, for the reason already 
advanced.  There is no “chance” element in a witness making repeated allegations of the 
same thing, even if they are alleged to have occurred on different occasions. 
 
 When one eliminates these categories of propensity evidence which do not lend 
themselves to “doctrine of chances” logic, there still remain a large number of situations 
in which events from an accused’s life can be said to have a highly probative bearing on 
what they are alleged to have done on the occasion under investigation. They have in 
common the factual similarity of the events themselves, which appears to defy 
explanation on any ground other than that alleged by the Crown.  For this reason, they 
may be regarded as probative, to a greater or lesser degree, according to the extent of 
that similarity. 
 
 These remaining situations consist of what in this thesis has been identified as 
‘similar fact evidence properly so called’.  They are the only situations in which what is 
being admitted should be labelled “similar fact evidence”, and a good deal of confusion 
which currently exists in connection with “propensity” evidence generally can be 
                                                            
 
 
1089 See McHugh J in Palmer v R (note 615), at 21.  This also lies at the root of the ban on the admission 
of prior consistent statements by a witness or party; see Cork v Cork and Cooke [1958] P 93. 
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eliminated if this distinction is maintained.  As indicated above, the remaining 
categories of “propensity” evidence are admitted under different rationales, and 
different admission tests will apply to them which are outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
 In relation to ‘similar fact evidence properly so called’, it is possible to devise a 
procedural structure under which the degree of similarity which justifies its admission is 
judicially considered, and a decision made regarding its admissibility.  The opportunity 
may also be taken to assess the risk of unfair prejudice to which an accused may be 
exposed by its admission, while at the same time agreeing in advance between the 
parties (a) the precise issue to which the evidence is said to be relevant (which will be 
the purpose for which it will be admitted), and (b) the instruction to be given to the trial 
jury regarding the use which they may make of it, and the prohibition against any other 
use. 
 
 Partial precedents for such a procedure may be found in the legislation of New 
Zealand (Chapter 8), and the common law of Canada (Chapter 9).   
 
A proposed statutory formula for the appropriate admission of ‘similar fact 
evidence properly so called’ 
 
 Below is a suggested statutory provision to govern the admissibility of similar 
fact evidence properly so called.  The italicised numbers in brackets relate to the notes 
below the proposed provision itself. 
 
           Similar fact evidence in criminal cases 
 
(1) In this section, “similar fact evidence” means, for the purposes of criminal 
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proceedings, evidence that tends to show that at any time a person acted in a 
particular way, or had a particular state of mind, being evidence of acts, 
omissions, events, or circumstances with which a person is alleged to have 
been involved [1], but does not include evidence of any such act, omission, 
or state of mind that is –  
  (i) an element of the offence for which the person is being tried [2]; or 
                        (ii) evidence which forms part of the res gestae of the offence for which     
the person is being tried [3]; or 
  (iii) sought to be adduced by the person who is being tried. [4] 
 
(2) Similar fact evidence shall not be admissible against an accused person in 
criminal proceedings unless the provisions of subsections (3) to (7) hereof 
have been complied with. 
 
(3) An application for leave to adduce similar fact evidence (“certificate of 
leave to adduce similar fact evidence”) shall be made to the court of trial in 
advance [5] of the trial in respect of which it is sought to adduce the similar 
fact evidence.  In that application, the applicant shall specify the issue in the 
trial to which the similar fact evidence is said to be relevant. [6] 
  
(4) The judge hearing the application for a certificate of leave to adduce similar 
fact evidence shall, before issuing a certificate; 
 
  (a) hear both parties; and 
 
  (b) consider the factors itemised in (5) hereof.  
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 (5) The factors referred to in (4) hereof shall include, but shall not be limited to:  
             [7] 
 
  (a) the nature of the issue to which the similar fact evidence is said to be 
   relevant, including; 
 
   (i) the importance of that issue to the case as a whole; and  
 
   (ii) the extent to which that issue is still in contention in the case. 
 
 (b) the underlying unity between those facts which are said to constitute 
the similar fact evidence and the acts, omissions, events or other 
circumstances relating to the issue in the case to which the similar fact 
evidence is said to be relevant; and 
 
(c) the closeness in similarity of those facts which are said to constitute 
the similar fact evidence to the acts, omissions, events or other 
circumstances relating to the issue in the case to which the similar fact 
evidence is said to be relevant; and 
 
(d) the connection in time between those facts which are said to 
constitute the similar fact evidence and the acts, omissions, events or 
other circumstances relating to the issue in the case to which they are 
said to be relevant; and 
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 (e)  the frequency with which the acts, omissions, events or other  
circumstances which are said to constitute the similar fact evidence are  
said to  have occurred.; and 
 
(f) the extent to which the acts, omissions, events or other circumstances  
which are said to constitute the similar fact evidence and the acts, 
omissions, events or other circumstances relating to the issue in the case 
to which they are said to be relevant are unusual; and 
 
(g) any dissimilarity of features between the acts, omissions, events or 
other circumstances which are said to constitute the similar fact 
evidence and the acts, omissions, events or other circumstances relating 
to the issue in the case to which they are said to be relevant;  
 
(h) the extent to which the acts, omissions, events or other circumstances 
relating to the issue in the case to which the similar fact evidence is said 
to relate may be proved by other evidence; and 
 
(i) when a number of persons will be making allegations said to 
constitute the similar fact evidence which it is sought to have adduced; 
 
   (i) the number of such persons; and 
 
(ii) whether or not such allegations may be the result of collusion 
between the witnesses, or the contamination of any such 
allegation by a source external to the witness making them, or the 
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suggestibility of the witness making them[8]; and 
 
(j) whether or not the admission of the similar fact evidence would be 
likely to unfairly predispose the tribunal of fact [9] against the party 
against whom it is proposed to adduce it, or result in the tribunal of fact 
giving the similar fact evidence disproportionate weight when arriving at 
its verdict; and  
 
  (k) the existence of any factor which might; 
 
(i) account for any apparent similarity or similarities between 
those acts, omissions, events or other circumstances 
which are said to constitute the similar fact evidence and 
the acts, omissions, events or  other circumstances to 
which they are said to be relevant other than  absence of 
coincidence [10]; or 
 
(ii) make it invalid to draw any comparison between those 
acts, omissions, events or other circumstances which are 
said to constitute the similar fact evidence and the acts, 
omissions, events or other circumstances relating to the 
issue in the case to which they are said to be relevant. 
[11] 
 
 (6)  A judge to whom an application is made in accordance with (3) hereof  shall   
not grant a certificate of leave to adduce similar fact evidence unless 
satisfied on a balance of probabilities [12] that it is appropriate to do so. 
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 (7) Prior to granting a certificate of leave to adduce similar fact evidence, the  
judge to whom application therefor was made shall, after appropriate  
consultation with both parties, include within it a statement of the issue in  
the case to which the similar fact evidence is deemed to be relevant  
(“statement of relevance of similar fact evidence”). [13] 
 
 (8) At any subsequent trial to which the certificate of leave to adduce similar fact  
evidence relates, the trial judge shall, at the point in the trial immediately  
after which the similar fact evidence has been adduced, cause to be read to  
the tribunal of fact the statement of relevance of similar fact evidence,  
together with a direction to the tribunal of fact that the similar fact evidence  
is not to be treated as relevant for any other purpose. [14] 
  
 
 [1] This definition of similar fact evidence is taken from s 40 of the 
Evidence Act 2006 (N.Z.).1090  That section was described as applying to “propensity” 
evidence generally, but it obviously, at the same time, incorporates similar fact evidence 
properly so called.  The New Zealand section was also drafted so as to apply in all cases, 
but in the above proposal it has been limited in its application to criminal cases, which 
is the context in which this thesis has been written.  The removal of the sub-clause “for 
the purposes of criminal proceedings” would enable it to be employed in all proceedings, 
with suitable supplementary adjustments in wording to eliminate references to an 
accused person. 
 
                                                            
 
 
1090 Note 912. 
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 [2] This has been included so as not to inhibit the Crown from proving facts 
which are an element of the offence on trial.1091 
 
 [3] As argued above, facts which are admitted under the res gestae exception do 
not require to have their admission justified under any propensity rule. 
 
 [4] It is not uncommon for an accused to rely on propensity evidence in their 
own defence, and this should not be inhibited.  An example might be that of a person 
accused of murder who is pleading self-defence, and who wishes the court to be advised 
of the violent history of the alleged victim.  Since the object of the statutory provision is 
to ensure a fair trial in cases in which the propensity history which is being admitted is 
that of the accused, a broad exclusionary provision relating to all propensity evidence is 
not required, and would unduly impede the effective advancement of a genuine defence.  
Any “tit for tat” consequence to an accused of maligning the character of the victim can 
be dealt with under those provisions dealing with the “shield” protecting an accused 
who elects to testify.  It may also be provided for in a further statutory provision which 
enables such retaliatory evidence to be admitted by the Crown in chief. 
 
 [5] No minimum time period has been specified; an appropriate period in line 
with pre-existing criminal justice legislation might be inserted by legislators when and 
if adopting this provision.1092  The wording is apt to cover even an application on the 
first morning of trial, prior to the swearing in of any jury, but would not, it is submitted, 
cover any voir dire once the trial has commenced.  This is considered appropriate, in 
order that the defence team may have fair notice, ahead of opening addresses, of what is 
to be alleged. 
                                                            
 
 
1091 As per the example given earlier, it allows the Crown, for example, in a trial for escaping lawful 
custody, to prove that the accused was in lawful custody without encountering defence demands that 
such evidence be the subject of an application for a certificate of leave. 
1092 For example, in some jurisdictions it might be required that the matter to be raised in a “pre-trial” 
application, or an interlocutory motion.  
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 [6] It is envisaged that the identification of the “issue” will be required as part of 
any application.  Forcing the prosecutor to be specific at this stage may serve to 
eliminate any vagueness or evasion regarding the true reason why admission is sought 
(e.g. to prejudice the jury against the accused).  It also has the consequence that all those 
involved are required to focus their attention on the true relevance of the evidence 
which it is sought to adduce. 
 
 [7] These factors are an amalgamation of those specified in s 43 of the New 
Zealand Act, 1093  and the Canadian case-law, most notably Handy. 1094  There was 
considerable unity between the significant factors identified in each jurisdiction. 
 
 [8] It is submitted that the possibility of collusion or contamination should not 
be left simply as an issue for the jury, but should militate towards the exclusion of the 
evidence entirely.  This is for the reason given in Handy,1095that the presence of such 
factors is “. . . . destructive of the very basis on which the similar fact evidence was 
sought to be admitted”.  It also accords with the reasoning of the Australian High Court 
in Hoch.1096 
 
 [9] This is a well-understood term, and incorporates not only the traditional jury 
but also a magistrate or trial judge in a “judge only” trial.  It is now established practice 
for a judge conducting a trial alone to “direct” themselves regarding any principles of 
law which govern the case.  This provision is also intended to facilitate consideration of 
the potential “prejudicial effect” aspect of similar fact evidence.  It is submitted that it is 
more appropriate to include it as merely one factor in the overall admissibility matrix 
                                                            
 
 
1093 See page 284. 
1094 Note 990. 
1095 Note 1014. 
1096 Note 303. 
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than to perpetuate the “probity versus prejudice” formula which has caused so much 
difficulty in the past.  It also serves to focus once again on the important consideration 
that what has to be avoided is not “prejudice” per se, but “unfair” prejudice. 
 
 [10] This is drawn from Handy.  It also reinforces the need to be cautious of 
factors such as collusion or contamination. 
 
 [11] This enables due regard to be given to changed circumstances relating to 
the accused, and reflects the school of thought that offending is ‘situational’ in nature.  
An obvious, albeit crude, example might be that of the former rescidivist sex offender 
who has subsequently undergone chemical castration.  Successful drug, alcohol or anger 
management counselling might also qualify. 
 
 [12] The choice of this standard of proof circumvents the difficulty faced by any 
judge being required to pre-assess the reaction of a future jury to the evidence which is 
to be adduced should proof “beyond reasonable doubt” be required for admissibility.  
This became manifest in the wake of the inappropriately high standard of admissibility 
imposed by the Australian High Court in Pfennig. 1097   Under Australian law, the 
“balance of probabilities” test is normally required for proof of the admissibility of 
other types of contested evidence such as a confession.1098 
 
 [13] This provision is intended to leave neither of the parties in any doubt as to 
the sole purpose for which the similar fact evidence is being admitted.  It also 
                                                            
 
 
1097 Note 564. 
1098 See Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559.  In Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573, the 
Australian High Court also held ‘a balance of probabilities’ to be the appropriate standard of proof for 
individual items of circumstantial evidence being considered by a jury as one element of a Crown case 
which they are then required to find proved “beyond reasonable doubt” before they may convict.  Given 
the circumstantial nature of similar fact evidence, it would be inappropriate to impose the same standard 
at the admissibility stage that the jury is required to employ at trial. 
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establishes a continuum from the admissibility assessment stage to the trial stage, when 
the trial judge, and possibly the counsel, may be different. 
 
 [14] This follows on from [13], and prescribes an appropriate judicial direction 
which incorporates a “propensity warning” against “forbidden reasoning”. 
 
 Finally, it will be noted that subsection (4) makes it mandatory for the judge 
ruling on admissibility to consider the factors specified in subsection (5).  This makes it 
a matter of law, rather than the exercise of a judicial discretion, and results in the 
resulting decision being more readily admissible. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 As previous chapters of this thesis have revealed, the conundrum which bedevils 
the admissibility of evidence which is, at one and the same time, highly relevant to an 
issue in a criminal case and potentially prejudicial to the accused, cannot be resolved by 
broad statements which seek to justify its admission by category or by broadly-stated 
formula. 
 
 ‘Similar fact evidence properly so called’ can justify its own admission by 
reference to its relevance, once that relevance is identified by means of a close and 
logical study of the factors which make it relevant.  Any prejudice which flows from 
that relevance is the natural consequence of its relevance for some reason other than the 
mere fact that the event in question occurred.  Such prejudice cannot be “unfair” if it is 
based on the apparent truth which emerges from the application of “the doctrine of 
chances”, rather than the pre-disposing effect of a court being informed that the accused 
has a ‘past’, and nothing more. 
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 A ‘categories’ approach fails to enquire sufficiently into relevance.  A ‘probity 
versus prejudice’ approach overlooks the fact that only unfair prejudice need be 
eliminated, but fails to identify it.  Public policy emanating from a commitment to ‘jail 
more criminals’ has no logical pedigree, and no moral validity. 
 
 A new test based on the identification of those factors which make ‘similar fact 
evidence properly so called’ relevant to a case, while at the same time outlawing its use 
for any purpose other than that for which it is relevant, is of considerably greater 
potential in ensuring justice for all concerned. 
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